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The purpose of this project is to explore the symbolic meaning of “patriot” by
bracketing the way in which it is negotiated during the policymaking process utilized to
authorize, oversight, and reauthorize the Patriot Act. Narrowing the purpose a bit further,
I should specify that what I am looking for is the way in which participants in the
deliberative process describe their own credibility as patriots, the credibility of other
participants in the debate, the credibility of people outside the debate who have a bearing
on the way in which the war on terror is engaged, and the way in which this discussion
about patriotism speaks to the credibility of the deliberative process itself. In other words,
to use Aristotelian terms, I am viewing the debate over patriotism as primarily a matter of
ethos—as distinguished from logos (e.g. legal extrapolation of the law) and pathos (e.g.
appeals to fear, anger, or sadness). This is not to say that appeals to ethos, logos and
pathos can necessarily be separate from each other. In fact, it is nearly impossible to
discuss the presence of ethos without also considering logos and pathos, but from my
vantage point, I hone descriptive efforts toward the way in which all the various appeals




During the very early stages of this project, after deciding that the Patriot Act
would be the focus but not knowing how that focus would take shape, I was talking to a
lawyer friend of mine about the idea and momentarily became a bit discouraged. His
reaction to learning about the initial brainstorming process was, “The Patriot Act? Isn’t
that mostly just symbolic?” Admittedly, I became a bit defensive and responded by
saying, “well no…section 213 does x; section 215 does y…and the Patriot Act allows the
Justice Department to wage the war on terror from a preventative standpoint rather than
the traditional perspective of prosecuting a perpetrator after a crime has been committed.”
My friend replied that he did not know much about it and so we discussed for a little
while longer.
After parting ways, I began to think about how significant the Patriot Act would
be as the topic of a dissertation if my friend was correct and it is “mostly just symbolic.” I
suppose this sort of questioning is probably representative of what many communication
scholars run into at some point in time: the challenge of explaining the importance of the
study of rhetoric to somebody who is not already a serious student of it. The serious
students know that rhetoric ideally “tests ideas…assists advocacy…distributes
power…discovers facts…shapes knowledge” and “builds community” (Herrick, 2005, p.
iii). But, people who do not study communication for a living may have never had the
opportunity or desire to learn about such things because in contemporary popular culture,
“rhetoric” is a derogatory term used by people who want to accuse others of being “all
talk and no action.” For the person who has no interest in reading Aristotle, her exposure
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to the word “rhetoric” most likely comes from hearing a politician accusing an opponent
of espousing “mere rhetoric” (Herrick, 2005). With only that framework in mind, it is
very easy to see how people can overlook the fact that talk is action. Whether one is
speaking the truth about what she intends to do or whether she is lying, the
communicative act is real. Whether a word is a “good” word or a “bad” word, it is
meaning-full.
Over the years of formulating and reformulating the focus of this particular
project, it has become quite clear that there may never be a better chance to examine the
influence that one word can have, than through a study of the word “patriot” in post 9/11
America. Though debates over patriotism have of course happened throughout American
history—especially during times of national crisis, never before has it been etched so
explicitly into the fabric of public policy. Looking back at past (in) famous legislative
responses to national crisis, not one comes to mind, other than the Patriot Act, connoting
anything other than either the action it initiates, or the name of a person associated with
the action. From the Anti-terrorism and Death Penalty Act of 1996, to COINTELPRO
(Counterintelligence Program) operated primarily in the 1960s, to the National Security
Act of 1947, to the Japanese internment camps of 1941, to the Smith Act of 1940, to the
Palmer Raids of 1919, to the Espionage Act of 1917, and all the way back to the Alien
and Sedition Act of 1798, the Patriot Act is the first governmental action intentioned to
protect the homeland, whether enacted legislatively or via executive order, that covertly
draws symbolically from its title to expand the rhetorical function above and beyond the
action it proposes.
Murray Edelman (1964), in his book, The Symbolic Uses of Politics, helps explain
the magnitude of the symbolic power of the title of the Patriot Act by distinguishing
3
between “referential symbols” and “condensation symbols.” The former (referential
symbols) are “economical ways of referring to the objective elements in objects or
situations: the elements identified in the same way by different people” (p. 6). The “Anti-
terrorism and Death Penalty Act of 1996” for instance is a referential symbol because it
simply describes the action it initiates. The Patriot Act by contrast transcends referential
symbolism to become a “condensation symbol” for not only the implementation of the
Patriot Act, but for the Bush Administration’s entire strategy for the “war on terror.”
Edelman (1964) explains that, “condensation symbols evoke the emotions associated
with the situation. They condense into one symbolic event, sign, or act patriotic pride,
anxieties, remembrances of past glories or humiliations, promises of future greatness:
some one of these or all of them” (p. 6). The unique way in which patriotism is crafted as
argument through the titling of the USA PATRIOT Act, leaves very little question that its
title is a condensation symbol as per Edelman’s definition.
Standing for (U)niting and (S)trengthening (A)merica by (P)roviding
(A)ppropriate (T)ools (R)equired to (I)ntercept and (O)bstruct (T)errorism Act of 2001,
the title anachronistically constructs the discursive space surrounding the act such that the
legal adaptations contained therein embody what it means to be a patriot. Barney Frank
(D-MA), a Representative who did in fact vote for the initial authorization of the act in
October of 2001, explains how the title instantly became such a dichotomous influence
during public debate:
Finally, while on the subject of the power of words, I want also to express my
disagreement with the decision to construct an awkward title for this bill so that it
yields the acronym “PATRIOT.” Only my strong commitment to freedom of
expression in general keeps me from filing legislation to ban the use of
acronyms in general in legislative work. But I think that the use of this particular
one is especially unfortunate. The outburst of very vocal patriotism on the part of
virtually all of us that has been part of our national response to the September 11
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mass murders is a source of pride to me and others. It is entirely legitimate for
those of us who are proud of America to reaffirm our patriotism at a time when
enemies of freedom attack us. But invoking the word PATRIOT in the context of
this bill gives the unfortunate impression that those who disagree with it are not
patriots. I voted for the bill, and I am pleased with the work that we did
collectively to provide for enhanced law enforcement powers in a way that I
believe is consistent with American liberty and privacy. But I fully respect those
who disagree with our work, and I wish we had not chosen a title for the bill that
in any way reflects on their good faith in expressing that disagreement. (Provide
Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 433)
This observation from an insider to the debate at the time of its authorization, one who
agreed with the legal merits of the act, yet questioned the ethics behind the symbolism
utilized to generate support for it, provides insight into why the debate over the Patriot
Act has become so divisive. Essentially, the Patriot Act sets up the criteria that those who
support it are patriotic and those who are against it are not.
The purpose of this project is to explore the symbolic meaning of “patriot” by
bracketing the way in which it is negotiated during the policymaking process utilized to
authorize, oversight, and reauthorize the Patriot Act. Narrowing the purpose a bit further,
I should specify that what I am looking for is the way in which participants in the
deliberative process describe their own credibility as patriots, the credibility of other
participants in the debate, the credibility of people outside the debate who have a bearing
on the way in which the war on terror is engaged, and the way in which this discussion
about patriotism speaks to the credibility of the deliberative process itself. In other words,
to use Aristotelian terms, I am viewing the debate over patriotism as primarily a matter of
ethos—as distinguished from logos (e.g. legal extrapolation of the law) and pathos (e.g.
appeals to fear, anger, or sadness). This is not to say that appeals to ethos, logos and
pathos can necessarily be separate from each other. In fact, it is nearly impossible to
discuss the presence of ethos without also considering logos and pathos, but from my
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vantage point, I hone descriptive efforts toward the way in which all the various appeals
converge to frame the meaning of what it means to be credible as a “patriot.”
The Horizons of Patriotism
Merle Curti (1968) in the Roots of American Loyalty provides a working
definition of patriotism, while at the same time leading us to anticipate the ambiguity
inherent to the word: “though it has meant many things and been put to various, even
contradictory uses,” patriotism “may nevertheless be defined as love of country, pride in
it, and readiness to make sacrifices for what is considered its best interest” (p. xiii-xiv).
Qualifying the attempt at denotation, Curti (1968) goes on to articulate that, “What one
man deems the best interests of the country…another declares to be mere class or
sectional, rather than national, interest” (p. xiii-xiv). In other words, people often agree
that loving one’s country is a prerequisite to being a patriot; what is not so easily agreed
upon are the ways in which it is appropriate to demonstrate love for one’s country.
Throughout the course of this project, I will not pretend to be able to resolve that
ambiguity with any degree of certainty. Doing so would be to privilege the way I express
my own love of country over those whose expressions are different. This is the sort of
labeling that led to the divisiveness over the Patriot Act in the first place. But what I can
and will do, as a prerequisite to analysis of the data, is to describe various expressions of
patriotism that help us to form the “horizons” of the phenomenon being intuited. The
horizons of patriotism at this juncture in the project are important because they preview a
sense for the various meanings of patriotism—meanings that are likely to be negotiated
as a part of the debate over the Patriot Act.
Gadamer (1960/2003) explains that the “concept of horizon…is the range of
vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point” (p. 302).
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It is part of the lexicon of the hermeneutic method (interpretation)—a rigorous way of
accessing the world that acknowledges the subjectivity involved with all research. Rather
than providing a sterile instrument to measure the nature of reality such as a survey or
coding schemata, the interpretive method focuses on the researcher as the instrument. In
other words, it has less to say about the way in which data is collected and more to say
about the attitude of the person doing the data collection and analysis. Hermeneutics
helps frame the types of questions asked, helps the researcher to view the world as being
subjective in nature, and helps to provide a philosophical perspective valuing that
subjectivity. In fact, the hermeneutic method views “subjectivity” as being more real, or
empirical, than “objectivity,” thus illustrating the nature of humankind as being
subjective. We are all different—and to pretend as if the world could be “objectively”
reduced to an operationalization within a very small margin of error is to display a false
sense of empiricism.
The role of “horizons” during hermeneutic analysis is to prevent one’s subjective
epistemology from sinking to the depressing depths of the postmodern performative
contradiction—the notion that the only truth is that there is no truth. The horizons of an
object of consciousness frame that object as real—“significant” and “valid,” even though
(or especially because) it is “subjective;” whereas without the horizons of consciousness,
no thing is real—life has no meaning—reality is subject-less. The debate bridging
subjectivity with reality has been going on for centuries and it was Isocrates, around 700
B.C.E., who helped to begin distinguishing between subjectivity of thinking and absolute
relativism/nihilism when he was writing Against the Sophists and Antidosis. Through
these works, Isocrates introduced the philosophia of paidea, which has no literal Greek-
to-English translation, but essentially means the synthesis of education and culture. This
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concept became the cornerstone of the western liberal arts tradition and influenced
Aristotle’s distinction between the scientific syllogism and the rhetorical enthymeme
during the discovery and explication of probability. A philosophy of rhetoric was
expressed by which rational thought and experience coalesce into a reasonable decision
making paradigm, helping one to make informed judgments about the inherent intricacies
and ambiguities of living in a world of difference. In the lexicon of hermeneutics, it is the
“horizon” which recognizes that though there may not be a precise, agreed upon, picture
perfect and “objective” operationalization of an object in consciousness, there are circles
of understanding that create the possibility of effective communication. Through
discourse with each other, we are able to describe the horizons and thus, understand each
other more or less (more discussion of the hermeneutic method comes in Chapter 3). This
study seeks to understand the horizons of post 9/11 patriotism by way of analyzing the
legislative debate over the Patriot Act, but prior to the data analysis, it seems useful to
preview the horizons of patriotism from a theoretical perspective.
Dimensional Accrual Theory
Building upon the work of Jean Gebser (1949/1985 trans), Kramer (1997) posits a
theory of communication helping us to understand the horizons of patriotic
consciousness. The theory is “dimensional accrual/dissociation,” which “suggests that as
dimensional awareness accrues, so too dissociation increases” (p. xiii). The most
significant contribution of the theory is that it illuminates Gebser’s (1949/1985 trans)
structures of consciousness in such a way that his seminal work can be applied more
readily to contemporary everyday communication as a tool for cultural analysis.
Gebser’s work is the result of observations pertaining to patterns of the ways in
which the perception of reality for entire civilizations tends to mutate over time in
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relation to the technological understanding (and mastery) of space and time. For instance,
the discovery of time itself drastically changed consciousness. Being able to measure
time incrementally provides symbolic distance between human awareness and the archaic
origin of consciousness—a drastic transition in the way people think. Critical to Gebser’s
perspective is the notion that healthy mutations of consciousness integrate what has come
before. Otherwise, the pattern of thinking is a “deficient” mode of the new structure of
awareness. Illustrating a deficient mode of time-consciousness is the debate over the
environmental ethic. Many in that debate argue that through efforts to master time and
space technologically, we have lost touch with our origin—the earth itself. Some in that
debate argue a back-to-nature solution, which essentially involves the unlearning of who
we are. Whereas others argue that we cannot unlearn who we are—we must press
forward, not backward—but that we must do so in a way that integrates what has come
before us.
Kramer’s (1997) contribution is that dimension accrual/dissociation theory takes
Gebser’s observations about the mutations of consciousness and describes them in such a
way that the link between those modes of awareness and expression becomes more vivid.
He provides a vocabulary with which to apply Gebser’s work more specifically to
“communication.” In fact, his theory views culture as communication (also see Edward
Hall, 1977). Accordingly, it “can be used to explain any social behavior/communication
including other theoretical artifacts, even the bewildering array of other conflicting
theories of communication (from rhetoric to information theory and deconstruction) that
now populate the modern academy” (p. xiii). Dimensional accrual/dissociation explains
that there are essentially four “types of expressivity” manifest in consciousness, as we
know it: magic/idolic, mythic/symbolic, perspectival/signalic and an integral style, the
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last of which has only begun to be discovered. These four types of expressivity directly
emanate from our origin of consciousness, the archaic structure, and are available to us
by the way in which the origin has mutated into the magic, mythic, and mental structures,
not to mention that in the last few decades, the beginning signs of an integral structure
has begun to enter our awareness (Gebser, 1985 trans).
This theoretical perspective is useful to this study of patriotism given the effort
here to more fully understand patriotism as a cultural phenomenon. From authorization,
to implementation, to reauthorization of the Patriot Act, the discourse concerning the
nature of patriotism changes. Thus to go into analysis with a static, unchanging
operationalization of patriotism would be of little use. Dimensional accrual theory
provides a means to see the horizons of patriotism, while recognizing that those horizons
remain in flux over time from person to person within the debate. Illustrating the way in
which the theory becomes a point of entry to analysis, let us briefly turn to the speech act
of flag burning as an example.
Once a flag is burned and enters our awareness, that action becomes available for
observation and discussion. The language utilized to discuss the act can tell us a great
deal about the sort of awareness the individual using that language has toward the act.
Some may consider flag burning an act of patriotism depending upon the context,
whereas others may instantly label flag burning an act of treason. If an individual
instantly labels flag burning as treasonous, without pause for consideration, she is likely
demonstrating a magic-mythic expression of consciousness. Such an expression denotes
no separation between the flag and America itself. The flag is America, not symbolic of
it; thus when the flag is burning, America—the country is literally burning. There is no
spatial distance between the flag and what it is symbolic of. The expression is two-
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dimensional, reflecting the duality of mythic awareness framing things in terms of light
and dark, heaven and hell, right and wrong, and etc. Recognizing middle ground, the
earmark of rational thought, requires a third dimension of awareness. Rational thinking
pauses and considers the circumstances under which flag burning could be considered a
patriotic action. It is possible that a person burns a flag because she believes it to be
important that other Americans see her committing the ultimate democratic act of dissent
and questioning of government. This rational awareness of flag burning recognizes that
the flag is merely a symbol of the United States, not the country itself. Furthermore,
rational perspective also recognizes that symbols can have different, ambiguously
construed meanings depending upon context. Under some circumstances, the act of flag
burning could very well be seen as the most patriotic action one could take.
This is not to say that rational thought always leads to the conclusion that flag
burning is patriotic. A rational thought process could ultimately conclude that the speech
act is unpatriotic; however, to deny that rational thought process altogether reflects pre-
rational presumptions, thus denying the importance of reasoning and critical thought
entirely. The quest to define and categorize actions as being either good or evil, and
nothing in between, reflects the two-dimensional nature of mythic consciousness,
creating the rhetorical conditions under which someone can be either100% right or 100%
wrong. Whereas to be able to see middle ground or nuance, requires the three-
dimensional perspective of rational thought. From a more rational (i.e. less magical-
mythical) perspective, flag burning could in fact be considered a patriotic speech act. By
pausing and considering the symbolic distance between the flag and country, expression
demonstrates the three-dimensional depth needed for a more rational mode of awareness.
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Of course this is a very hypothetical, simplified, and truncated analysis of flag
burning as expression. It is merely intended to foreground the way in which
communication about patriotism is common to the political landscape in the United
States. Fortunately, there are thorough studies of patriotism also helping to foreground
the horizons of patriotism. One study in particular seems to support the theorizing done in
relation to this hypothetical flag-burning example: Maurizio Viroli’s (1995) book, For
Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism. He helps us to see the
horizons of the debate over patriotism by distinguishing between “religious” and
“political” forms of patriotism.
Religious Patriotism
Prior to Antiquity and even after the dawn of rational thought, love of country
spawned more from a religious, magic-mythic patriotism rather than from a political one.
“The word ‘country’ signified terra patria (land of the fathers)” which was “a sacred soil
inhabited by gods and ancestors and sanctified by worship” (Viroli, 1995, p. 18). The
land encompassing country was magical and the power connecting humans to that space
was religious. According to pre-rational patriotism, “man” must love his country “as he
loves his religion, and obey it as he obeys his gods. He must give himself to it entirely. It
is a demanding love that admits no distinctions, no conditions. He must love his country,
whether it is glorious or little-known, prosperous or unfortunate. He must love it for its
generosity, and also for its severity” (Viroli, 1995, p. 19). Religious patriotism is very
passive in the sense that it demands faith and adherence and thus no independent thinking
by a country’s citizenry, but at the same time, it is quite energetic in that it demands
much fervor behind that faith and adherence.
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In fact, as Viroli (1995) continues to explain, patriotism is often confused as
nationalism due to patriotism’s religious origins. In both academic scholarship and in
“common language,” patriotism and nationalism are erroneously used as synonyms (p. 1).
The confusion between the two ensues according to Viroli despite his observation that the
differences are great: patriotism means “love of country” whereas nationalism means
“loyalty to the nation” (Viroli, 1995, p. 1). Or as Ernest Gellner (1983) defines
nationalism in his book Nations and Nationalism, it is “primarily a political principle,
which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent” (p. 1). Dietz
(1989) (quoted in Viroli, 1995) explains the significance of the confusion between
patriotism and nationalism as it pertains to our understanding of history:
The blurring of patriotism into nationalism, or even the acknowledgement of
nationalism as a ‘species’ of patriotism reveals that we have literally lost touch
with history, with a very real past in which real patriots held to a particular set of
political principles and their associated practices—to a conception of citizenship
that bears scant resemblance to modern nationalism. (p. 191)
According to this analysis, nationalistic tendencies encourage one to support the direction
her country takes, whether right or wrong, without question, much like the religious form
of patriotism; whereas rational-political patriotic tendencies encourage one to love the
country and to do whatever is necessary to protect the best interests of the country, even
if it means disagreeing with the direction it is taking.
Political Patriotism
Though some may not agree with this distinction between patriotism and
nationalism (see Anderson, 1991), there is very little question that different people have
used the word “patriotism” differently at different times in the history of the world.
Furthermore, it is also clear that religious patriotism does not reflect the tenets from
which American democracy was born. We only need to look at a few of the quotations
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provided to us by some of the progenitors of the country to realize that political patriots
will turn a critical eye toward every move leaders make. For example, Thomas Jefferson
has said, “Dissent is the highest form of patriotism.” Benjamin Franklin said, “It is the
responsibility of every citizen to question authority.” George Washington said,
“Government is not reason. Government is not eloquence. It is force. And, like fire, it is a
dangerous servant and a fearful master.” Other American leaders have reiterated the
patriotic sentiment of the “founding fathers.” Teddy Roosevelt, for instance, said, “To
announce that there must be no criticism of the President, or that we are to stand by the
President, right or wrong, is not only unpatriotic and servile, but is morally treasonable to
the American public.” According to the perspective of many of the country’s most
famous leaders—including its founders—being a patriot is not always safe or
conservative; in fact, history tells us that being a patriot can be quite risky as one puts her
reputation, and in some cases, her life at risk while serving the welfare of the country.
The shift in thinking about patriotism is the result of a shift in thinking about
civilization. As rationality begins to be layered onto the magic-mythic-religious patriotic
perspective, its cultural-historical meaning changes. This foundation of American
patriotism was handed down to us through the mythos of Antiquity. Before continuing
with this line of thinking, I must be careful not to glamorize the ancient Greek culture.
There is indeed much scholarly controversy surrounding the inception of Antiquity as a
model of Western culture (see Bernal, 1987) as well as a general consensus that there
were severe limitations as to who could be a “citizen.” Citizenry was decided along
predominately ethnic, gendered, and socioeconomic lines of homogeneity. To be a
participative member of society, one had to, by and large, be a male aristocrat. There
were undoubtedly extreme forms of sexism and racism limiting who could be a citizen
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(Welch, 1996; Glenn, 1997; Atwill, 1998). However, despite the shortcomings of Greek
culture and the controversy surrounding our knowledge of the way it actually was, what
we do claim to know still serves as the mythos behind the rhetorical ideal of civic
engagement—it is the foregrounding of political patriotism in the West.
Rhetorical principles from Athens and the Roman extensions of those principles
“transmitted to modernity a political patriotism based on the identification of patria with
respublica, common liberty, common good” (Viroli, 1995, p. 19). Rationality imparted to
humanity the sense that humans are separate from the land in which they live. According
to political patriotism, country is no longer merely land or space magically bestowed
upon us to be worshipped, but rather, country is comprised of people with agency and the
perspective to think independently. The ability to preserve that agency through politics
became the hallmark of rational patriotism. Glover (1927) reflects upon the relationship
between citizen and city:
In Athens more than in any other place I have read of, or so far have visited, there
is what we may call an equation between city and citizen. The citizen is the city;
L’etat, c’est moi, each one of them can say. He does not break the laws; because
he makes the laws; they are the expression of his own will; they suit him
admirably. They suit him only too well, growls the contemporary critic; they fit
him like a glove (p. 62).
Free speech was the ultimate ideal handed down from the Greeks to the founders of
American democracy. Charles Freeman (1999) explains that, “The key ideological
concept of Athenian democracy, the right of every citizen to participate in government
and to speak his mind freely both in Assembly debates and in private, became an easily
understood and jealously guarded ideal” (p. 224). The idealized system in Athens
encouraged participation by its citizens through limiting the length of public office to one
year, holding 501 member juries for trials, selecting the members of those juries through
lottery, and many other official aspects of the society to get the masses involved with the
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process of policymaking. Every citizen had not only the privilege, but also the obligation,
to participate in the political system of Athens.
Despite the ideal version espoused by Athenian democracy, we know that
democracy in Athens was not perfect (nor is any form of democracy)—it was developing
as the core principles were being constructed. As Stone (1989) points out, perhaps there
is no more apropos story illustrating the lack of perfection in Athenian democracy than
the trial and death of Socrates—a person who did not advocate for democracy, but a
person who is certainly part of the mythos behind the way in which democracy came
about. As the lore goes, Socrates was the prototype of a freethinking philosopher in
Antiquity. However, his freethinking spirit crossed the line according to an Athenian
court and he was sentenced to death for supposedly corrupting the youth and
undermining the religious base of society.
Stone (1989) argues though that Socrates had many opportunities to easily escape
the fate of death. In the Apology (1992 trans./circa. app. 399 B.C.E.) for instance, he had
the opportunity to admit fault for his teachings and avoid such a harsh punishment.
Rather than doing so, he courageously defended his teachings and made a counter-
criticism of the belief system of his accusers. In the Crito (1992 trans./circa. app. 399
B.C.E.), we find another instance when he quite possibly could have escaped the death
penalty. His friend, for whom the dialogue is named, comes to visit Socrates in the jail
cell after learning of the ease with which he could navigate Socrates’ escape through
bribery of public officials. Crito begged Socrates to leave the prison for his own sake, the
sake of his students, and the sake of his children. However, Socrates felt the loftier goal
was to die a martyr for his cause. Indeed he was correct given his status as a founder of
Western thought. Socrates is known as a true patriot because he gave his life willingly for
16
the exercise of free speech. In fact, many think that if he had just made free speech a
more explicit component of his argument, that he could have escaped death while also
defending the morality of his teachings. Multiple people have written alternative
apologies of Socrates—claiming to know what he should have said in his own apology.
Among these people include Plato and Xenophon. Libanius though, is the one who most
adamantly claimed that if Socrates had mentioned free speech as being critical to a
democracy that the jurors would have listened and let him off with a much lighter
sentence (Stone, 1989). Socrates was not interested in a lighter sentence. His legacy was
greater through death than through life—he made the ultimate patriotic sacrifice. As
Dietz (1989) mentioned above, “real patriots…held to a particular set of political
principles … [and] conception of citizenship.”
Importance of this Study
I have to acknowledge that this study began for very personal reasons. When 9/11
happened, I was sad, scared, angry and generally speaking, in a state of shock. I learned a
lot about myself and one of the things that stuck with me was the sense of confusion felt
over the meaning of patriotism—particularly expressions of patriotism in the college
classroom. On the one hand, I felt a sense of duty to lead critical discussions in the
classroom over at least a couple of different topics: a) understanding how people could
hate our country so much that they would give their lives to cause so much terror and b)
critiquing the Bush Administration’s response to 9/11. I also understood that many of the
students in my class would have a difficult time with those types of discussions. Many
seemed to feel obligated to unify behind our President over the war on terror—as did
over 90% of the rest of the American population (Gallup, 2001). This made me a little
skeptical about becoming too critical too soon because I identified with their need for
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healing and furthermore, I had to ask myself what the point would be of leading those
types of discussions if students would be offended and tuned them out? There was much
internal tension over how to balance the complex role of being a patriotic American with
that of a college teacher. While we did end up having some of those types of
conversations that I wanted to have, those conversations never seemed to reach their full
potential and to this day, I wonder if I let my country down in light of that.
More so than at any other time in my life, a realization set in that my own
“autopilot” notion of patriotism lacked depth and confidence. Definite existential angst
existed over how to be a good patriot; thus, I turned to phenomenological inquiry to help
absolve the lack of understanding. Richard Zaner (1970) explains how the
“uncommonness of common sense” (p. 41) is a way to phenomenology:
The disengagement and reflective apprehension of what you have until now been
unaware of effects a crucial shift. Suddenly you are shocked into an awareness of
yourself: ‘And going beyond,’ you ‘come back through those eyes / And find
those eyes your own.’ That is, the jolt of the uncommon, emerging in the midst of
the common, awakens that in you of which until now you were not aware, and by
so doing affects a subtle shift in you and a change in the world itself. You now see
it, for the first time, really. (p. 47)
The awareness of myself that I have been “shocked into” left me with no other option
than to study patriotism, in some shape or form, as my dissertation. It is of particular
importance because patriotism—or any other form of relational glue akin to patriotism
(such as nationalism for instance)—has the power to bond societies together, and perhaps
even entire civilizations, but it also has the power to tear them apart. Thus, a greater
understanding of patriotism in and of itself is reason enough to justify this study.
However, as the project gained more focus, a few other justifications developed for its
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importance. Justifications for this study are related, but in my mind, they each
demonstrate unique reasons to value the research conducted in this study.
A Unique Study of the Patriot Act
The first justification to mention is that surprisingly, the symbolism of the Patriot
Act has been given very little attention in the literature. Studies I have discovered dealing
specifically with the Patriot Act may make some reference to the symbolism of the act,
but then go on to provide their own legal extrapolations about how the act changes the
balance between safety and liberty. Very little attention is given to the way the actual
participants in the debate negotiate the meaning of patriotism. For example, Etzioni
(2004) hints at the type of analysis I conduct here but treats the symbolism as a secondary
matter. He asks a very important question through the title of his book, How Patriotic is
the Patriot Act? His answer to the question begins with acknowledgment that “any
reasonable deliberation about our national security is the recognition that we face two
profound commitments: protecting our homeland and safeguarding our rights” (p. 1).
According to the author, this discussion in the post 9/11 world has become “exceedingly
divisive” (p. 2) given the way in which the language often utilized describes safety and
liberty as being democratic values inherently at competition against each other. An
either/or dichotomy frequently becomes the polarizing framework from which
interlocutors approach the discussion. The author even goes as far too briefly exemplify
the rhetoric he describes from the context of the legislative process in much the same way
as I do here. For instance, on one side of the debate, Etzioni quotes Patrick Leahy as
saying “We don’t protect ourselves by bending or even shredding our Constitution”
(2004, p. 2). Then to demonstrate the rhetoric coming from the other side of the debate,
Etzioni quotes a speech by the former Attorney General John Ashcroft, during testimony
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before the Senate Judiciary Committee on Terrorism on December 6, 2001. Ashcroft is
quoted as saying: “To those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost liberty,
my message is this: your tactics only aid terrorists, for they erode our national unity and
diminish our resolve” (Etzioni, 2004, pp. 2-3). Interestingly though, Etzioni cuts this
quotation off a bit short considering that in the following sentences, Ashcroft continues to
describe the critics of the Patriot Act as being unpatriotic: “They give ammunition to
America’s enemies, and pause to America’s friends. They encourage people of good will
to remain silent in the face of evil” (Ashcroft, 2001, December 6).
This observation about what Etzioni (2004) excluded from is not intended to take
away from the work that he did. It is simply intended to illustrate that while he may speak
to the symbolism of the Patriot Act, his analysis of that symbolism is truncated because
quite simply, that is not his purpose. The purpose of his book is “an examination of each
part of the act on its own merit (or demerit)” (2004, p. 3). The purpose is an important
one, but does not include systematically analyzing the symbolism of the word “patriot.”
Calling attention to the symbolism of the title and the divisiveness surrounding it serves
primarily as a segue into a legal analysis.
Etzioni (2004) is certainly not the only author discovered to hint at the symbolism
of the Patriot Act and provide commentary on the legislative process. Foerstel (2004) for
instance illustrates some of the language used during the authorization of the debate that
was so critical in passing the act through Congress, but then his focus diverts to the legal
effects of the act upon libraries. Authors such as O’Harrow (2005) even goes as far to
personally interview some of the participants in the debate and asks them about what
happened behind the scenes to cause such a rushed authorization process, but once again,
the symbolism of the process is only of secondary importance. Other studies allude to the
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way in which the Patriot Act was rushed through Congress without demonstrating the
language utilized to accomplish that task (e.g. Chang, 2002; Cole & Dempsey, 2002).
Interestingly, James Dempsey—one of the authors cited—was a witness in one of the
hearings analyzed during analysis, but his focus on the symbolism is only secondary to
providing his own legal interpretation.
Thus, the present study makes a unique contribution to our understanding of the
Patriot Act. It examines the legislative process governing it, from start to finish, with an
eye toward discerning the meaning of patriotism. While we certainly learn a few things
about the law itself—that knowledge directly emanates from the people who participated
in the deliberative process. To my knowledge, no other study attempts this task.
Focus on the Legislative Process
Aside from contributing to a general body of knowledge related to the Patriot Act,
this study also contributes to the field of communication by way of adding to the study of
argumentation and the legislative process. Theodore Sheckels (2000) describes the need
in the field for more studies of legislative argument:
Political communication scholars understandably devote much time to studying
the conduct of elections, for they are a fascinating topic. And, in many cases, it is
a fascination with the high-profile campaigns that has led many scholars to choose
to do their work in political communication. However, there are other areas of
political communication that now demand attention. One of these is the debating
that occurs in legislatures— the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of
Representatives or those in the various states. At least part of this particular
communication arena’s demand on scholarly attention is tied to the fact (yes, the
fact) that it has been largely ignored by the communication discipline. (p. xiii)
Especially in the modern era of politics when it is so easy to access transcripts of public
debate, why is it that so few communication scholars have studied the process of
policymaking?
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Part of the reasoning comes from the literature itself (which is reviewed in some
detail in Chapter 2). In fact, the very first article ever found in the communication
literature dealing with Congressional debate (Fitzpatrick, 1941) provides a very cynical
argument claiming that Congressional debate is not worth studying because the
arguments made in that context are simply political tropes. Some of the other earlier
studies that actually did focus on Congressional debate ignored the specific language
utilized by the participants in the debate because it is difficult to sift through the
organizational flow (Cain, 1954; Braden, 1960). These authors point out that because the
debates are not organized like an academic competitive debate, they are difficult to
follow, and this is their justification for not focusing more on the specific language used.
They simply provide a synopsis of their debates of interest rather than actually focusing
on the language used by participants.
The mindset begins to shift with the linguistic turn in rhetorical criticism and
some tremendous progress was made theoretically and methodologically in terms of
studying congressional debate. Some excellent work was done in the field but as Sheckels
(2000) claims, the importance of studying the legislative process is not reflected by the
amount of attention provided. These claims and others will receive much more attention
in Chapter 2.
Citizens Need to Be Informed
It is surprising to this author that legislative argument is not better covered within
communication studies, given how important it is for members of a democratic society to
be informed about what happens within the Halls of Congress. Thousands of years ago,
Aristotle discussed the importance of becoming knowledgeable about legislation:
For the security of the state it is necessary to observe all these things (‘Political
Topics Useful in Deliberative Rhetoric,’ see 1.4.1-11) but not least to be
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knowledgeable about legislation; for the safety of the city is in its laws, so it is
necessary to know how many forms of constitution there are and what is
conducive to each and by what each is naturally prone to be corrupted, both forces
characteristic of that constitution and those that are opposed to it. (1991, p. 54-55,
see 1.4.12)
Policymakers, regardless of the public cynicism associated with the function of their jobs
make the world go round and more scholarly attention should be devoted to
understanding the language they use and the way in which it interacts with our everyday
ways of knowing the world around us. In fact, some of the arguments in the literature
review expound upon Aristotle’s idea, claiming the value of studying congressional
debate is based on the democratic ideal that legislators are both representatives of the
public and educators of the public at the same time (Cain, 1955).
Especially given the way in which information seems to be trivialized in today’s
media driven society, an increased focus on studying the legislative process would seem
beneficial. Herman and Chomsky (2002) for instance describe the declining variety in the
mass media. They point out that between the years 1983 and 2002, the media firms
controlling the country’s source of news declined from approximately 50 major
companies to nine transnational conglomerates. These developments according to the
authors “have seriously weakened the ‘public sphere,’ which refers to the array of places
and forums in which matters important to a democratic community are debated and
information relevant to intelligent citizen participation is provided” (p. xviii). Of course,
Herman and Chomsky are only contributing to the argument advanced by Habermas
(1962/1998) 40 years earlier in his book, The Structural Transformation of the Public
Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. But if we are ever going to
reverse the trend, part of the effort has to include going straight to the source of our laws,
rather than waiting for Fox news to provide us with the sound-bites. Not only would the
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public become more educated in general, but a renewed focus on the legislative process
would encourage policymakers toward actual debate knowing that the entire debate will
become a focus rather than those one or two moments that make the nightly news.
With the Patriot Act in particular though, there seems to be some consensus that
the media has the tendency to distort the facts. At least this claim is acknowledged by
participants in the debate from both sides of the political aisle: the majority side (e.g.
Ashcroft, Dinh, and others throughout the process) as well as the minority side (e.g. Orrin
Kerr, a minority witness; see Antiterrorism Investigations, 2003). Furthermore,
participants in the debate itself are not found to be wholeheartedly defending the way in
which the media presents the Patriot Act. Based upon my interpretation, it seems almost a
consensus throughout the debate that the media has not provided accurate information
related to the Patriot Act.
Contribution to Historical Understanding
Quite related to the previous justifications is the fact that meaningful evaluation of
our country’s leadership is not possible until after the fact. Many examinations of the
Patriot Act from a wide variety of perspectives must be undertaken in order to provide
rigorous interpretation of the debate with the hope that future deliberative processes may
be improved. My primary purpose is not necessarily to provide an evaluation; it is to
interpret the horizons so that subsequent evaluations may be better informed by rigorous
analysis.
Needless to say, the debate over the Patriot Act is a truly significant event in
history. John Conyers (D MA) was aware of its place in history and acknowledges it
while welcoming Attorney General John Ashcroft to an implementation hearing on June
5, 2003:
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It is in that spirit that we come together, Attorney General Ashcroft, hoping that
we can do our job. We are marching into history. This is not only being examined
in great detail right now, but it is going to be examined, as we all know, in far
more detail after it is over. And we want to acquit ourselves as honorably as we
can under these circumstances. (p. 3)
If we are unfortunate enough to ever be in a national crisis of this magnitude again, as we
were after 9/11, perhaps we can learn from the deliberative process surrounding the
Patriot Act. A focus on the symbolic shaping of the nature of patriotism is an important
perspective to consider.
Chapter Preview
With an overview of the project and justifications for it, the study commences.
Part I includes this introduction, the literature review and a chapter offering more detail
about methodology.
In addition to expanding on the themes already alluded to here, there are some
other critical pieces to be reviewed in Chapter 2 that influence the purpose, scope and
method of the present study. The first is by Schuetz (1986) who theoretically
conceptualizes the legislative process as beginning in the realm of the public sphere
moving into the technical sphere of debate on Capitol Hill. The second article standing
out as being highly influential of methodology is Levasseur (2005) who examines the use
of “public opinion” as argument during multiple years worth of legislative debate over
the federal budget. He begins by identifying public opinion as argument and then
thematizes the various ways in which it is used. Additionally, he utilizes descriptive
statistics to show the extent to which public opinion is utilized as argument in proportion
to all pages of text analyzed. This article in particular helps focus the methodology used
here through demonstration of pattern analysis of argument.
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Chapter 3 continues by detailing the methodology of the present study further.
While Levasseur, Schuetz, and others are heavily influential of the methodology, and in
many ways, emulated, the analysis here expands to consider patriotism not only as
argument in one legislative process, but also as an object of “historically effected
consciousness” (Gadamer, 2003). As Chapter 3 explains, the method is hermeneutics,
which in this case, means juxtaposing the meanings behind the various uses of patriotism
in the debate over the Patriot Act with a phenomenological meaning of patriotism. The
overarching purpose is to access the horizons of patriotism as an object of human
understanding in the post 9/11 world. This opportunity must be taken.
During times of peace and prosperity (such as before 9-11-01), patriotism is more or less
latent. At least for me and I suspect many other people, relationship to country is put on
“autopilot”—it is taken for granted. During times of crisis such as 9/11 however, threads
of patriotism become transparent and the opportunity for Verstehen, or understanding, is
more accessible to the observer confronted with the task of “decentering the self with all
of one’s prejudgments” (Kramer, manuscript, p. 6). As Etzioni (1997) suggests,
patriotism is often misunderstood as being something it is really not. So this study is an
exploration of this issue—the use of a condensation symbol, specifically the titling of the
Patriot Act.
Chapter 3 also considers the way in which the data is selected. For pragmatic
reasons, analysis will not attempt to analyze every single debate over the Patriot Act.
Some decisions had to be made about what would be included as part of the analysis and
Chapter 3 discusses the way in which those decisions were made.
Part II of this project begins the data analysis by focusing on the authorization
stage of the Patriot Act. Chapter 4 puts the Patriot Act into the context of the broader war
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on terror by examining the discourse surrounding the war as provided by President Bush
and others. The President articulates his ideal of post 9/11 patriotism, which more than
90% of respondents agreed with (Gallup, 2001)—the espousal of patriotism which
influences the debate over the Patriot Act throughout the process. Bush’s story remained
constant. In Part II, that sense of patriotism condenses the public sphere into a sense of
magical agreement—conformity; whereas later in the project, that same patriotism causes
division. Chapter 5 analyzes the very first debate as part of the data set entitled,
Administration’s Draft Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001, and conducted in front of the Full
Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives. Chapter 6 examines the markup of
the antiterrorism legislation also in the Full Judiciary Committee.
Part III continues analysis of the data by transitioning to what I am referring to as
the implementation stage of oversight. Chapter 7 provides context to part III with an
update on what has happened in the war on terror since the Patriot Act was authorized,
paying special attention to what has happened to public opinion. A lot of time has passed
since the last hearing over the Patriot Act and the magical sense of patriotism begins to
lose its magic. The public is beginning to become critical of the President and the war on
terror and the debate over the Patriot Act proves to be a very significant part of that
transition. Chapter 8 examines a hearing before the Subcommittee on the Constitution—
part of the Judiciary Committee, which occurs on May 20, 2003. It is the first hearing
involving the Judiciary Committee since the act was authorized. Chapter 9 examines the
full committee corollary of that initial hearing on June 5, 2003. Attorney General John
Ashcroft is the only witness at this hearing.
Part IV continues by transitioning into the reauthorization stage of the debate.
Chapter 10 provides some context to this stage by describing again, the changes that
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occur between one stage to the next. Criticism of the Bush Administration, the Patriot
Act, and John Ashcroft in particular has really gained momentum at this point. Ashcroft
attempts to reverse the flow of this momentum by reaching out to the public through an
“educational outreach initiative” concerning the Patriot Act. It does not work. Ashcroft
resigns; Alberto Gonzales takes his place and a new ethos develops around the Patriot
Act. A number of hearings are planned for the reauthorization stage of the Patriot Act—
more than can be accounted for in this analysis; most occur at the subcommittee level. So
part IV analyzes the very beginning of this stage of debate and the very ending of it,
focusing on the full committee hearings. Chapter 11 examines the hearing on April 6,
2005, at which Alberto Gonzales is the only witness. In this debate, we see some signs
that perhaps, the nature of the deliberations over patriotism is changing in the direction of
more collaboration. Chapter 12 examines the second to last hearing in this stage of debate
occurring on June 8, 2005, at which James Comey, the Deputy Attorney General is the
only witness. This hearing was originally scheduled as the last hearing in the process—it
caps off a series of nine hearings that occurred at the subcommittee level. Analysis
reveals that the level of cooperation promised through analysis of the 4/6/05 debate
comes to fruition. But then, as uncovered in Chapter 13, that collaboration experiences a
major meltdown. Minority members of the House push for one final hearing to pursue
topics that they felt did not get enough attention. The hearing occurred but it provides an
auspicious ending to the public deliberations over the Patriot Act.
Part V is the conclusion. Chapter 14 summarizes the way in which the discussion
over the nature of patriotism changes from beginning to end in this deliberative process
as well as the contributions made by this study. Chapter 15 ends the project by discussing





After reading the first three paragraphs of the earliest article found on the study of
congressional debate, written by John Fitzpatrick (1941) in the Quarterly Journal of
Speech, I must admit that I was discouraged at the possibility of finding much guidance
from the literature as to how to begin this project. The thesis of the article is that “there is
little, if any, debating done on the floor of the Senate or of the House” (p. 251). While “it
is true that there is much talking on the floor of both houses,” Fitzpatrick writes, there is
not much debate to speak of (p. 251). Pointing out that many speeches found in the
Congressional Record were not actually spoken, but merely inserted into the record by
the authors for the benefit of those constituents who might actually take interest in
reading them, Fitzpatrick downplays the importance of studying those speeches. From
this central theme of the article, the author makes two primary points about the legislative
process: 1) not a single legislator changes a vote due to speeches heard on the floor of
congress and 2) the party “whips” predetermine which side will prevail, and commit
themselves to ensuring that their prophecy comes true by “threatening political pressure
back home, and by various other forms of politically sanctioned blackmail” (p. 252).
Thus Fitzpatrick determines that floor debate is useless, a very cynical view to be
confronted with while attempting to identify a means with which to study congressional
debate.
Despite the cynicism of this original article, a small number of scholars still
pursued study of debate, although not without their own recognition of a cynical view.
Chester (1945) for instance, who does in fact attribute Senate debate with being able to
impact public opinion in an article concerning selective service legislation leading up to
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World War II, helps explain why many scholars shy away from the study of
congressional debate. Chester claims the general public has grown suspicious of its
purposive ness: “Senate debate, a feature of the American government which our people
once respected greatly, has sunk to a low level in popular esteem. Many present day
observers relegate legislative debate to the political junk pile as time wasting, ineffective,
and inferior” (p. 407). Waldo Braden (1960), in his overview of the “Senate Debate on
the League of Nations,” points out that often times, badly needed deliberative debate over
significant legislation morphs into a sophistic appeal to constituents for greater ethos: “A
senator may make a two-hour speech on a sub-issue, never taking the trouble to relate his
remarks to questions at hand. Even when he is fortunate enough to have interested
listeners on the floor or in the gallery, he may ignore them in his eagerness to get
something into the Record which he can mail to his constituents” (p. 273). Furthermore,
when an issue is hotly contested, policymakers are often accused of utilizing tropes “to
confuse, to delay and to dissipate” argumentation rather than “to clarify or even to
persuade” (p. 273).
Thus study of debate has been discouraged due to the observation that a critic
often “loses himself in argument, questions, cross questions, impromptu speeches,
irrelevant remarks, and parliamentary counterplay. And after an attempt to reduce a
debate covering months to some manageable form for study, the critic finds himself
troubled, confused, and frustrated by the complexity of the verbosity” (Braden, 1960, p.
273). Hence, relatively few scholars have seen much value in closely examining
congressional debate. As late as the year 2000, Theodore Sheckels refers to congressional
debate as a “neglected subject” of academic inquiry mainly due to perceptions that the
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“long-windedness and repetition” (p. 1) have caused many scholars to shy away from its
study.
Why Study Congressional Debate?
With so much cynicism directed toward the study of Congressional debate, it is
hard to believe that anybody has pursued research that takes legislative argument
seriously. Fortunately though, some people have and we owe thanks to two scholars in
particular: Ralph Micken (1951; 1952) and Earl Cain (1954; 1955), who together
articulate the earliest justifications for studying the legislative process, carve out a
methodology for doing so, and provide examples of that methodology in practice. Earl
Cain in particular is responsible for articulating the importance of study, as well as
articulating the specifics of a methodology.
Cain’s (1954) article entitled, “A Method for Rhetorical Analysis of
Congressional Debate,” found in Western Speech, begins with a story that draws attention
to and preempts the cynicism outlined above. He refers to the early portions of Senate
debate over President Roosevelt’s attempt to repeal an arms embargo, and then quotes a
Newsweek (1939) article that describes the level of interest, or lack thereof, in this
particular debate: the debaters “made a desperate effort to entertain the thinning
gallery…Interest had fallen to such an ebb that only twenty-four colleagues were on hand
to hear Thomas and fourteen to listen to Downey. At one point exactly six senators were
in their seats” (p. 29; quoted in Cain, 1954, p. 91). Cain (1954) ends the first paragraph of
this article by acknowledging that, “These disparaging comments on Senate debate are
scarcely encouraging to the critic who would select congressional debate for significant
rhetorical analysis” (p. 91). In the next paragraph though, Cain (1954) responds to the
cynicism and begins making the case for a study of congressional debate:
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There is reason to believe, however, that debates in Congress can be a fruitful
source for rhetorical criticism. Studies which have been made in this area have
shown that congressional speaking does occupy an important part in American
public address; that the objections commonly leveled against this kind of research
are not necessarily insurmountable, and that there is a valid method for significant
rhetorical reporting and analysis of congressional debate. (p. 91)
And so the dual purpose of the 1954 article was to answer the cynicism by providing
reasons why studying congressional debate is important and to outline a method for doing
so. The second goal, pertaining to methodology, is important and will be entertained
shortly. But prior to addressing methodological considerations, the need exists to delve
further into the justification for studying congressional debate at all. Two primary reasons
are given that help explain why studies of congressional debate are useful: 1) debate does
influence policymakers; and 2) debate interacts with the public sphere through both a
reflection of public attitudes and a shaping of those attitudes at the same time.
Influence on Policymakers
Cain’s first point illustrating the significance of studying congressional debate is a
response to the argument that the discourse has no impact on the decision making
process. “Actual studies of congressional debates however, tend to disprove the
preceding objection” (p. 92), he argues. Citation of Ralph Micken’s (1951) study of
strategy in the debate over the League of Nations is Cain’s first piece of evidence.
Micken (1951) summarizes the strategies utilized by both sides in this debate: “the anti-
League leadership practiced social control through the medium of the debate, in an effort
to change a prevailing attitude among the people, while the men favoring the League
attempted to intensify the prevailing attitude or to maintain it” (p. 50). The hope of the
“negative side” (Micken imposes the terms of academic debate upon the context of
congressional debate) “sought to delay a decision until the public could be ‘educated’
away from the idea of a league such as Mr. Wilson proposed” (p. 53). Given the results of
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the decision, as well as the debating methods themselves according to Micken (1951), the
anti-League side won, and this conclusion stands as evidence that debate strategy can and
does influence the outcome of policymaking decisions. We cannot know for sure whether
the participants in the debate were actually swayed ideologically by argumentation, but
the rhetorical tactic of stalling long enough for public opinion to be able to influence the
ultimate decision made proved successful. Ultimately, for the political reason of pleasing
constituents—if for no other, the negative side won the debate.
Next, Cain turns to his own previous study (1950, unpublished dissertation) over
the neutrality debates occurring around the same time as the League of Nations debate,
emphasizing the idea that, “individual speeches were effective in influencing the voting
on the issue” (p. 92). In particular, a speech by William Borah that opened the debate in
1939 empowered the ethos of the isolationists. Newsweek (1939) explains: “Isolationists
were quick to boast that Borah’s oration had won them half a dozen more votes” (p. 29;
quoted in Cain, 1954, p. 92-93). Furthermore, the influenced voters “were followed with
interest by the general public” (p. 93), establishing a link between Cain’s first
counterargument and the second, which will be taken up shortly. But before proceeding, I
want to highlight one additional observation pertaining to the argument being made in
this sub-section and that is by turning back to Fitzpatrick’s (1941) article, the origin of
cynicism in the literature pertaining to the study of congressional debate. Immediately
after discrediting the function of “floor” debate in the House and the Senate by arguing
that members of congress do not change their minds during debate and that party whips
control the voting, Fitzpatrick does recognize that policymakers are influenced during
committee hearings that precede the floor debate. He asks, “Where was the decision
made?” and answers, “In the committee room. And that is where legislation is lost or
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won. It is in the committee rooms before committees that we find the speeches of
persuasion” (p. 252). So to the extent that committee hearings are very much a part of the
legislative process, it is very difficult, especially in retrospect of reading the rest of the
literature that follows, to take Fitzpatrick’s discouragement to heart. Even according to
the biggest cynic of congressional debate found in this literature review, congressional
debate is important from the standpoint that at least committee hearings do show the
potential to influence the decision making of congress people.
However, in light of the purpose of the present study, the influence on policy
makers pales in comparison to the justification for continuing found in the next section.
The way in which congressional debate interacts with the public sphere is perhaps the
most significant rationale for the study of patriotism as argument in the legislative
process.
Interaction with the Public
In a 1955 article, “Is Senate Debate Significant?” Cain continues to provide
justification for study of congressional debate, arguing “Any criticism of Congress which
assumes constructive form should be encouraged,” because “the reckless and destructive
assumptions that Congress has outlived its usefulness as a representative body indicate a
superficial knowledge of the values in Senate discussion and action” (p. 11). Even more
poignantly, Cain quotes Charles Beard (1942), who states “We cannot kill off Congress
without committing suicide as a democratic nation” (p. 529; quoted in Cain, 1955, p. 11).
The reason for Cain’s conviction is found through his reference to James Bryce, a former
British ambassador to America, whose book entitled, The American Commonwealth
(1888) has become a major influence on American political philosophy. Bryce explains
that “public opinion is shaped by a mutual interaction between the public and its leaders”
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and with respect to the function of congress, Bryce suggests that the “debates are at once
a reflection of public attitudes and are also a force shaping public opinion” (Cain, 1955,
p. 11). In other words, congressional debate is more than just leaders deciding policy—it
is ideally a catalyst for consubstantiation with the general public, discussion and critical
thinking.
Due to the inherent complexities of representative democracy, the general purpose
of congressional debate is somewhat circular with respect to the public sphere. On one
hand, congresspersons are elected to represent the voices of their constituency, but on the
other hand, they are also in the role of educating their constituents and helping to form
opinions. And although influence on public opinion is indirect, congressional debate
ideally functions in such a way as to give the public enough time to reflect upon central
premises underlying many sides of debate and then idealistically, to help the public
crystallize opinions. This is in fact the stated purpose of the anti-league senators cited
above in the Micken (1951) study, whose strategy it was to stall the debate on the League
of Nations long enough to “educate” the public fully of the implications to entering such
an international relationship. And while Micken (1951) calls it an argumentative
“strategy,” many theorists of representative democracy, such as James Bryce, would call
it one of the ultimate functions that legislators fulfill. Deliberative debate’s significance
to the public then, according to Micken, is to provide impetus and framework for critical
thought, but more importantly, to provide enough time for the collective American
consciousness to reflect upon that framework, regardless of how simplistic and
unstructured it may or may not be.
Approaching the Study of Congressional Debate
36
So, for the purposes of this study, it is critical to recognize and bracket the rather
ubiquitous relationship existing between representative leadership and the “public.”
Having briefly done so, I assert that studying congressional debate in the context of post
9/11 should be able to tell us more about communication than simply the argumentative
strategies employed by the interlocutors participating in the actual discussion. Especially
when considering the historical context from which this study emerges and the powerful
symbolism invoked through the title of the Patriot Act, analysis of debate over its merits
should tell us something about a more general sense of post 9/11 patriotic consciousness.
Symbolically, the interlocutors in the debate negotiate the ethos of what it means to be a
patriot and simultaneously educate the public of their conclusions.
So with justifications for studying congressional debate articulated as they emerge
in the earliest literature on the subject, despite how few studies that have been inspired by
those justifications, we should turn to the way in which they have been conducted as well
as the results they have produced. While the methodology pursued in this dissertation
does not necessarily replicate any of the applied methodologies discussed in the literature
review precisely, there are overlapping goals and discursive constructs that do emerge, as
well as methodological procedures, which help to narrow the scope of inquiry and frame
a focus on congressional debate that poignantly speaks to the broader purpose of intuiting
post 9/11 patriotic consciousness. One study in particular (Schuetz, 1986) discusses the
overlays and functions of the legislative process that help to further demonstrate a
connection between the actual debate occurring in the halls of congress and the average
level of consciousness/the public sphere. Furthermore, another study in particular, the
most recent study found on the subject (Levasseur, 2005), provides a great deal of
guidance in terms of a specific strategy for analyzing patterns of legislative
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argumentation as manifestations of patriotic ethos, leading to a more complete
interpretation of post 9/11 patriotic consciousness. There are also several other studies
influential to the goals and contributions of the present study that deserve attention prior
to discussing methodology in Chapter 3.
The Early Studies Ignore Language
The earliest attention paid to congressional debate by communication scholars
emerges from the tenets of “neo-Aristotelian criticism” as described by Herbert Wichelns
(1925), a paradigm which limits the critic to three clearly defined tasks: reconstruction of
the context of speechmaking, analysis of speech according to Aristotelian notions of
ethos, pathos and logos, and then an assessment of the immediate effects on the audience
(Foss, 1996). Donald Bryant (1958) discusses the impact neo-Aristotelian criticism, and
Wicheln’s article in particular, has had upon the history of rhetorical criticism, claiming
that it “set the pattern and determined the direction of rhetorical criticism for more than a
quarter of a century and has had a greater and more continuous influence upon the
development of the scholarship of rhetoric and public address than any other single work
published in this century” (p. 5). Although I would not classify the earliest studies of
congressional debate as “Neo-Aristotelian Criticism” precisely, the norms of the
traditional form of rhetorical methodology were certainly influential to the early study of
congressional debate in the communication discipline. While no studies were found
utilizing ethos, logos and pathos specifically as units of analysis, the earliest studies
presume to reconstruct the context of debate and assess the immediate effects of
argument on the immediate audience—congress.
The Impact of Neo-Aristotelian Criticism
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Cain’s (1954) previously mentioned article clearly emerges from the traditional,
neo-classical mode of criticism. The primary questions to be answered by the critic
according to Cain are: 1) “What speeches or speakers were effective in the total pattern of
the debate;” and 2) “Who or what changed the opinions of senators?” (p. 93). According
to Cain, these questions call for a biographical sketch of the major players in the debate
as well as a discovery of major lines of argumentation and supporting evidence, and from
this analysis, an inference can be drawn about the effects of oratory upon the audience,
which Cain does recognize as being very difficult to accomplish. The steps suggested to
attempt the inference of effects include: 1) reading the debates carefully to determine
content and context (time consumed by the whole debate, principal speakers, critical
arguments posited, final voting results, etc.); 2) creating a digest for each speech,
identifying what arguments are given by each speaker; 3) discovering what arguments are
utilized repeatedly throughout the course of the debate; 4) identifying a pattern of
argumentation according to who agrees with what points; and 5) discerning
“contemporary comment and reaction to the debate” by paying careful attention to
newspapers and magazines (p. 94).
According to this traditional form of criticism, individual speeches “must be
considered as a whole, in the framework of the history of the period. This is the value of
studies in public address,” according to Cain (1955, p. 93). But perhaps what is most
telling about the traditional methodology is what is left out of analysis. Cain (1955)
instructs that, “The critic should not attempt to deal in detail with the rhetoric of
individual speeches” (Cain, 1955, p. 93). In other words, the specific language, or the
vehicle through which the message is conveyed, is not a significant emphasis for early
rhetorical analysis of congressional debate. The content is summarized and analyzed but
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the form through which the content is presented goes largely ignored. This norm of early
rhetorical criticism of congressional debate is illustrated by Ralph Micken’s analysis of
the League of Nations Debate. Micken’s (1951) previously mentioned study is an
overview of strategy by both sides of the debate on the League of Nations. The focus of
this research becomes why the anti-league side won and it was because they were able to
stall long enough to “educate” the public about the dangerous precedent of entering such
an international agreement. The effects of the discourse are expounded upon by
considering a generalized overview of argument.
A year later, complementing the 1951 article, Micken (1952) published another
piece that also considers the debate over the League of Nations; except in this article,
argument is not analyzed fully. Rather, background on certain participants in the debate is
provided. Essentially, it gives a biographical sketch of the western senators critical to the
debate: William Borah, Hiram Johnson, Thomas Walsh and Key Pittman. The second
article treats historical context as a separate issue from the actual arguments presented in
the debate. Through consideration of both articles as a whole, Micken puts on display the
strong influence that the neo-Aristotelian method had upon studies of rhetoric: he (1952)
writes about the historical context (separate from actual treatment of the arguments),
overviews the arguments without considering the actual language utilized to present them
(1951), and assesses the effects of those arguments on the receivers (1951).
In 1960, Waldo Braden also analyzes the debate over the League of Nations,
reiterating the conclusions that Micken (1951, 1952) reports by claiming the primary
strategy was to delay a decision on the matter because “they needed time to ‘educate’ the
public and to start ‘backfires’ on wavering senators” (p. 279). And in the process of doing
so, Braden, in one succinct article, demonstrates the impact that neo-Aristotelianism had
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upon the discipline of rhetorical criticism. He begins by discussing “The Occasion” and
classifies the debate into four phases. Then “The Audience” is analyzed and classifies the
senators into four groups based upon their degree of agreement and disagreement with
the idea of America entering the league. Next, Braden presents the “Strategies
Compared,” an overview of the significant lines of argumentation presented by pro-
leaguers and anti-leaguers. And finally, in the summary, Braden addresses the question
of, “why did the Senate reject the League of Nations?” (p. 281) and ends the article with
a discussion of why the anti-league arguments had more impact than the pro-league
arguments. While Braden’s article is quite interesting and informative, a significant
weakness is the inattention to the actual language used by the participants in the debate as
they formed their arguments. Instead, Braden, consistent with the scholars mentioned to
this point, simply summarizes the arguments presented, and while I am sure much justice
is done to an overview of the debates analyzed, I cannot help but think that some
meaning is lost by not displaying the actual language more throughout analysis. In
Braden’s (1960) article for instance, one lengthy quotation is provided which quotes Pat
Harrison, a senator from Mississippi during a Senate speech on July 21, 1919. The rest of
the quoted language includes either catch phrases used, most of which were stated by
President Wilson who would have never participated in the actual discussion on the
Senate floor, or are lengthier quotations of secondhand reports of debate from
newspapers.
Why Ignore Language?
The observation that actual language is ignored in the earliest studies of
congressional debate is not by any means a stretch, or for that matter, even a keen
observation. That was part of the methodology as stated by Cain (1954) (see discussion
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above). The question to consider is why did studies stay away from the actual language of
the debates? The answer to this question lies in the difficulty of sifting through entire
debates to identify critical portions of specific language for analysis because so often,
they do lack structure due to the longwinded-ness of the speakers. The very beginning of
this literature review explains how arduous this task is and how few critics chose to study
congressional debate at all, and here it is understood that this same reluctance is why
none of the few early critics who did choose to study debate found it necessary to take on
the task of analyzing the specific language and how it generates meaning as text. Braden
(1960) reiterates the difficulty:
One of the frustrating problems about studying congressional debating is that the
participants seldom behave like college debaters and seldom follow the
procedures outlined in textbooks on argumentation and debate. There is no simple
affirmative and no simple negative. Instead the debates are often multisided.
Apparently the speakers have never heard of stock issues or standard analysis. (p.
239)
The lack of academic structure in congressional debating makes it challenging to analyze,
and so it seems that one strategy utilized to ease the burden is to impose the competitive
debate structure upon it, which is what studies previously cited have done. By discussing
the debate in terms of “the affirmative strategy” and the “strategy of the negative”
(Chester, 1945, p. 408), or the pro-league side and the anti-league side (Micken, 1951 &
1952), critics have imposed a crystallization of the positions of those who affirm or
negate the proposed legislation in question. Much like a critic charged with the task of
evaluating an academic competitive debate round, the initial scholars of congressional
debate have created a flow chart of sorts so that the affirmative arguments and the
negative arguments emerge in a clear division of ground. While this flow chart may make
congressional debate more manageable as a subject of study, the criticism remains that
without significant display and reference to the actual language used by key participants
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in the debate, much context and hence meaning is lost to the mere reflections of the critic.
Of course scholarship involves the reflections of the critic but if the actual data being
analyzed is not presented so that readers may also make their own reflections, then the
intersubjective validity of writing, reading and critical thinking is largely mitigated.
The Linguistic Turn in Rhetorical Criticism
During the 1950s and 1960s, rhetorical criticism experienced a gradual paradigm
shift whereby the limitations of what was called “neo-Aristotelian” criticism became
apparent to the discipline of Communication Studies; so much so, that it became inferior
and taboo to even approach the study of rhetoric from such a perspective. Brian McGee
(2000) points out that anybody who wishes to be published as a rhetorical critic will not
write from the traditional perspective of criticism. The limitations, some of which have
already been stated, are many. Most notably, they are that 1) the actual language of
discourse goes largely ignored and 2) the effects of rhetoric upon the audience cannot be
ascertained unless one actually asks the audience members individually; so, the study of
effects became relegated to the social scientists, leaving rhetoricians with the primary
goals of studying language to uncover meaning through analysis of text. At the heart of
this shift in paradigm was Kenneth Burke—a revolutionary academic thinker who
“demonstrates mastery of concepts from numerous disciplines, including philosophy,
literature, linguistics, sociology, and economics. His primary perspective, however, could
be considered a rhetorical one. His object of study is the communicative medium itself—
language—and he seeks to discover its nature, its ends, and what it does to us” (Foss,
Foss, and Trapp, 1991, p. 169). Rather than myopically focusing on who agrees with
what in a discursive context from a historical perspective, Burke shifts the focus to the
power of words via symbolic action. From this shift in thinking comes a plethora of
43
rhetorical theories that help lay the foundation of contemporary criticism:
Consubstantiation (identification), the Pentad, and Pollution-Purification-Redemption;
which are but a few of Burke’s theories contributing to what he calls “logology,” or the
“effort to discover how language works” (Foss, Foss, and Trapp, 1991, p. 188).
Other very important critics helping to shape the contemporary landscape of
rhetorical criticism are Walter Fisher, who is most known for his narrative theory of
rhetoric (1987), and Ernest Bormann, who is most known for his contribution of fantasy
theme analysis/symbolic convergence (1972; 1985; and others). These two authors have
of course had major influences on the direction of contemporary rhetorical criticism.
They, like Burke, are not so much interested in the outcome and effects of rhetoric, but
rather the way in which the words that make up the text of a rhetorical artifact work
symbolically through an effort to achieve persuasion. For instance, Fisher’s narrative
theory considers the way in which all language has a storytelling quality to it, and further
that, depending upon the make-up of the intended audience, storytelling is more
persuasive than that what he calls the “rational world paradigm” of persuasion. Bormann
also expounds on the power of language and the way in which symbol using has the
potential to create a sense of familiarity, excitement, and thusly “convergence” amongst a
group of people striving toward accomplishing a goal together—they create their own
fantasy which drives group cohesion and satisfaction.
Fisher and Bormann, from among others, played integral roles in shaping the
contemporary study of rhetoric. The primary importance of mentioning these two
particular authors here is the fact that they both wrote critical pieces contributing to the
literature on congressional debating while at the same time, demonstrating the early stage
of the shift to a more contemporary focus for rhetorical studies: language strategies.
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However, it is absolutely necessary to keep a couple of ideas in mind as we overview the
work of Bormann and Fisher in the context of congressional debating. The first idea to
keep in mind is that for both authors, the work reviewed here represents some of their
earliest scholarly publications, and so, if remnants of neo-Aristotelianism are discovered,
we can certainly understand why that is the case. The linguistic turn is a gradual shift in
emphasis, one that had only begun as Bormann and Fisher were writing the articles
reviewed here. The second point to keep in mind is that the context of congressional
debating is different than many other contexts of rhetoric considering that at the end of
the debate, the audience is surveyed in the form of a vote. Congress people are asked to
vote “aye” or “nay” (they also have the option of abstaining) at the end of the discussion
signaling their agreement or disagreement with the proposition being discussed. So, the
“effects” of the rhetoric are a given before rhetorical analysis even begins; although even
given this formal assessment of the effects, great difficulty lies in determining what
caused a particular congress person to vote a particular way. Thus, the significance of
bringing up these two points—disclaimers of sorts, is that Bormann and Fisher may very
well bring up “effects” in their analyses and may very well portray other qualities of neo-
Aristotelianism as well; however, it is important to recognize that their primary foci shifts
from a historical overview of argumentation found in previously mentioned analyses of
congressional debate to a focus on language strategy.
A Civil War Study / Walter Fisher
Between Bormann and Fisher, it is Fisher (1966) who makes the point of focusing
on language strategy especially clear in his Speech Monographs article entitled, “The
Failure of Compromise in 1860-1861: A Rhetorical View,” in which he analyzes the
congressional debating leading up to the Civil War. He points out that other analyses of
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this debate conducted by historians neglect “a highly significant factor in the failure of
compromise, the rhetorical factor” (p. 366). Past study of the compromise debate points
“to particular men, factions, or events, but ignores the process (original emphasis) of
compromise as a persuasive interaction among these power elements; it considers
compromise from a political as contrasted with a rhetorical point of view” (p. 366). Now,
Fisher is clearly not talking specifically about the studies previously mentioned in this
literature review; he is talking about people who claim to be historians of the Civil War
debate, not scholars of communication. However, the observation is noteworthy and
speaks to accomplishments of the linguistic turn in rhetorical criticism because again, the
previously reviewed studies focus on the historical events of who took sides with whom
and for the most part, ignored the process of rhetoric—the language involved with the
symbolic construction of meaning.
A paragraph later in the article, Fisher becomes much more specific about how he
analyzes the process of compromise when he announces that his study:
…focuses on the interaction of the attitudes and arguments of the rival factions in
respect to the crucial issues in the debate, and it involves the use of the
enthymeme, a concept encompassing the persuasive nature of deductive
arguments and the distinction between rhetoric as the art of practical discourse
and dialectic as the art of theoretical discussion as its critical tools. (p. 366)
By using the enthymeme, Fisher focuses on the logical process of the compromise and
breaks down the proposal into its premises and conclusions. The claim of Crittenden, a
southern democratic senator leading the charge in defense of slavery, was “that slavery be
permitted in the territories” (p. 370); which is broken down further into the major
premise, the minor premise and the conclusion. The major premise is that, “The
Constitution guarantees the right of citizens to take their property into any and all of the
states and territories of the Union” (p. 370). The minor premise is that, “Slaves are
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property” (p. 370). And the conclusion is that “therefore: Slaves may be taken into any
and all of the states and territories of the Union” (p. 370). So, Fisher focuses on the logos
of the compromise as a persuasive appeal. He does not ignore other appeals to ethos and
pathos as important components to the overall failure of compromise, but his focus is on
the logical structuring of the argument presented by the Southern Democrats and the
response of the Northern Republicans, who essentially attacked the minor premise—the
idea that slaves were not property.
Fisher’s article represents a marked difference from the approach of the earliest
studies of congressional debate. Rather than only providing historical context, an
overview of arguments, and inferences as to who agrees with what arguments, Fisher
turns attention to the process of argumentation—and specifically, the appeal to logos and
why the two sides of the debate could not agree to the proposed compromise and hence,
why the two sides went to war against one another. However, while Fisher does direct
attention to the process of rhetoric in the context of congressional debating, and makes
this point especially clear, he, like previously reviewed literature, does not display the
actual language of debate throughout the reporting of analysis.
But before becoming too critical of Fisher for not fully presenting the data in
detail, recognition should be made of the justification Fisher has for merely paraphrasing
the debate. He has a better excuse for doing so than the difficulty of sifting through the
verbosity of the senators, and it was because he did not have a precisely transcribed
record from which to draw data, and so it was virtually impossible for him to accurately
display the data to the readers of his article. Keeping records of congressional debate is
another topic that Earl Cain takes up in his (1962) article entitled, “Obstacles to Early
Congressional Reporting” in the Southern Speech Journal. He explains: “Detailed
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reporting of congressional debate is now casually accepted, but for more than eighty
years of deliberations from 1789 to 1873, Congress was reluctant to establish a system
for accurate publication of its debates” (p. 239).
During this timeframe, the reportage of congressional debate was a contentious
issue. Many congress people felt that having the public eye on them would prohibit them
from discussing all available policy options due to the pressures of public opinion as well
as the matter of threatened national security through disclosure of secrets. Many members
of Congress simply did not want their immediate reactions to the arguments of others to
become permanent fixtures in American history; they felt as if they should be given more
time to reflect upon and prepare statements that would become a matter of public record.
Many members of Congress simply felt as if the public would not be interested in what
goes on during policymaking sessions. Furthermore, since there was no such thing as
Congressional Record at the time, there was no place else to publish the reports than in
the newspapers such as the New York Times, and in light of all the other reasons for not
publishing, this was simply not practical. So until 1873, all that exists in terms of records
of public debate are summaries by the few reporters who were able to make it into the
sessions (Cain, 1962). As much as these reporters should be commended for their
contributions, it still goes without saying that analysis of congressional debating prior to
1873, which would obviously include Fisher’s (1966) analysis of the failure of
compromise leading up to the Civil War, is not nearly as accurate as the analyses post
1873 and beyond as technology allowed transcription to become easier and more precise.
A Civil Rights Study / Ernest Bormann
Bormann’s (1962) article, “The Southern Senators’ Filibuster on Civil Rights:
Speechmaking as Parliamentary Strategem,” also provides an example of rhetorical
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studies shifting more toward a focus on language strategy, as opposed to a neo-
Aristotelian—historical and paraphrased overview of argumentation. Although he does
begin by briefly placing the debate “within the broader political framework” (p. 183), the
focus quickly shifts to “the way the southern senators used speechmaking as a
parliamentary strategem” and how this feature of rhetoric “furnishes an intricate lesson in
parliamentary tactics and legislative politics” (p. 183). Perhaps the most significant point
to make about Bormann’s article for the purpose of this literature review is the way in
which he puts on display the actual language of the debate. Rather than only paraphrasing
arguments, he introduces the arguments made and then identifies an example from the
transcribed text of the debate to demonstrate, thereby giving the reader a chance to judge
for herself. He quotes The Congressional Record at least six different times throughout
the course of a relatively short (11 page) article.
To begin the article though, attention is directed toward historical and political
context. Bormann explains that, “The second session of the eighty-sixth congress
convened in January of 1960 with the election of the coming November furnishing
background of deliberations” (p. 183). Even though then current Vice-President Nixon
felt confident of his selection as the Republican nominee, results of the previous 1958
election cast doubts on his chances of being elected over the Democratic nominee,
despite the fact that “the Democrats had no clear-cut strong candidate for the party’s
nomination: Senator Humphrey was too liberal; Senator Kennedy was a Catholic; Senator
Johnson was from the South; Governor Stevenson had been twice defeated” (p. 184).
Bormann (1962) explains that, “In this atmosphere the great electoral vote of the urban-
industrial states of the North and West became pivotal. The Negro vote in these states
assumed crucial importance. The Congress was in a mood for civil rights legislation” (p.
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184). So, the pre-text of the debate is that the pro-civil rights bloc consisting of
“Republican regulars” led by Senator Dirksen, the “Democratic moderates” led by
Senator Lyndon Johnson, and a “coalition of Republicans and Democrats” who were
“representing the urban-industrial states of the North and West” (p. 184), was supporting
the civil rights legislation proposed by the Eisenhower Administration which spelled out
the right to vote and called for integration of public schools while at the same time,
attempting to gain momentum for the upcoming presidential election. The opposition
bloc, consisting of “eighteen senators from the old Confederacy” who were “veterans of
Congress” and “held important committee chairmanships” (p. 184), on the other hand,
had to defend their ideological ground while trying not to offend a whole race of people.
In addition to the challenge of not offending African Americans during
presentation of arguments by the opposition, the fact that that the pro-civil rights bloc had
an overwhelming majority of senators on its side from the beginning also presented an
obstacle to the goals of the opposition. Thus, the only rhetorical strategy that had any
hope of success was the filibuster; however, even this strategy initially seemed to be only
a far-fetched hope of the opposition given that the majority had enough support for
cloture in the Senate. Bormann (1962) articulates the difficult rhetorical challenge
confronting the opposition bloc: “To stop the Senate from voting required only that the
southerners keep talking; to keep talking without irritating the civil rights majority to the
point where they would vote for cloture was a more delicate task” (p. 186). However, the
opposition got an opening when the proposition made the tactical mistake of introducing
the civil rights legislation as an amendment to the Stella School District bill. This tactic
created an opening for the filibuster to be seen as a rhetorical strategy that had the chance
of success because it irritated enough of the pro-civil rights bloc to the point that they
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would entertain the notion of oppositional strategy. Bormann (1962) cites Senator Wayne
Morse, a vocal supporter of the civil rights legislation, to illustrate the extent to which
this tactical mistake tilted the ground of the debate in favor of the opposition. Morse, a
member of the pro civil rights bloc, advised his colleagues: “I do not believe we ought to
follow a course of action of which it can be said that whatever we pass, we passed it only
after we stooped to indirection, subterfuge, and sharp practices” (The Congressional
Record, vol. 106, p. 2280, quoted in Bormann, 1962, p. 186). But because the leaders of
civil rights bill ignored this advice, an opening was created for the voice of the opposition
to be heard in the form of a filibuster. As long as the opposition bloc could keep making
intelligent arguments, the quorum would not be called, and the minority would be
allowed to keep talking.
This unique context of the southern senators’ rhetoric and how it impacted the
function of the filibuster within the forum of congressional debate is what attracted
Bormann (1962) to the topic. The filibuster of 1960 changed the image of the filibuster
and its role in the policymaking forum. As Bormann points out, “This was not Huey
Long reading from the woman’s underwear section of a mail order catalogue” (p. 187).
The opposition to the civil rights bill was under constant threat of a quorum call, but had
just enough empathy from the majority to be able to say what they needed to say, without
having the luxury of being able to talk simply to waste time. The minority had to make
every argument of every speech count or risk being voted off the podium; as Bormann
suggests though, they were up to the challenge: “The southern senators in systematic
fashion defended their position on civil rights with impressive support”(p. 187) and thus
avoided annoying the majority to the point of cloture. The arguments presented, while not
agreed to necessarily by the majority, made enough logistic sense to keep listening. In
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fact, there was only one senator—Senator Eastland, who opposed the right to vote; the
bulk of the argumentation persuaded the civil rights bloc to take heed.
According to Bormann (1962), logical argumentation presented by the opposition
fell along four lines of reasoning: legal, constitutional, practical and moral. On the legal
front, the argument was made that there was already action available to parties denied the
right to vote. On the constitutional front, the argument was made that the proposed
legislation “called for action clearly beyond the powers delegated by the Constitution of
the federal government” (Bormann, 1962, p. 188). On the practical front, the argument
was made that the proposed legislation was ahead of its time and that enacting it would
cause race riots. And on the moral front was the reverse discrimination argument.
Bormann concludes that these lines of argumentation were commonsensical enough to
enough members of the majority party that the filibuster was allowed to continue. The
logically effective arguments made by the opposition, according to Bormann, dealt with
the inherency of the problem and the workability of the solution; much of his article is
spent examining those arguments because they were most influential to the continuance
of the filibuster, given that sound, logical arguments had to exist in the minds of the
majority party for the filibuster to even be allowed to continue.
Despite the overall positive assessment of the opposition’s argumentative
strategy, Bormann does suggest that there was one weak logical connection in the
southern argument—a question of fact asserting that the warrant for the debate does not
exist to begin with. In other words, the opposition argued that the harm of the status quo
is not significant enough to warrant action. Or specifically, the “contention that the voting
referee proposal was not needed because Negroes were not being denied the vote in the
South” (p. 187) is the one faulty argument given by the opposition according to Bormann.
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However, the reader needs not rely solely on Bormann’s interpretation; rather, he
provides evidence of analysis through display of the actual language being analyzed by
referring specifically to a quotation by Senator Talmadge, who says: “In Georgia, Mr.
President, all qualified citizens –regardless of their race, color, creed or sex—are freely
exercising their right to vote” (The Congressional Record, vol. 106, p. 2639; quoted in
Bormann, 1962, p. 188). Bormann provides the argument and then assesses that “speaker
after speaker came forward” (p. 187-188) to reiterate the same argument.
Although a given to contemporary theorists, direct quotation as presentation of
data was new in the study of congressional debate. Through Bormann’s article, we see a
new trend emerge whereby the reader is able to see the data for herself so she can draw
her own conclusions as to the nature of a given argument and decide for herself as to
whether an argument is either logical or illogical; she is no longer confined by mere
paraphrase, summary and third party translation. Data concerning the pattern of argument
being considered is before the reader and is more invitational of intersubjective validity
testing whereby the reader is a participant in the study of argument as well as a reader of
it. Validity is determined through qualitative awareness of the object of investigation,
including agreement and disagreement over how the object has come to be understood.
Whereas with only mere summary, paraphrase, and other category assignments given to
the data by a researcher, the reader is forced to completely rely on somebody else’s
system of logic as the one accurate, operational definition of what is being studied.
Rejection of Nixon’s Supreme Court Nominees
Throughout the Bormann and Fisher studies, we see the trend beginning to change
from a Neo-Aristotelian approach to studying congressional debate to a more
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contemporary approach whereby language becomes the focus. The change in trend is
represented by authors paying more attention to the details of particular arguments made
in debate along with direct quotation of interlocutors making those arguments; whereas
the original analyses of congressional debate described political context and barely
scratched the depth of argumentation, deferring instead to surface level overview. The
changing trend continues to be seen in the next article, “The Defeats of Judges
Haynsworth and Carswell: Rejection of Supreme Court Nominees,” written by Richard
Vatz and Theodore Windt, Jr. (1974).
Vatz and Windt, Jr. (1974) begin their article by describing the political climate
leading up to the two failed Supreme Court nominations standing as the topic of the
article. The political atmosphere at the time was inundated with concern over how the
upcoming presidential election would affect the makeup of the highest court in the land.
Giving us a sense of the political context, Vatz and Windt, Jr. (1974) quote Richard
Nixon’s acceptance speech of his party’s nomination as their candidate in 1968. Nixon
said, “Let us always respect our courts and those who serve on them. But let us also
recognize that some of our courts in their decisions have gone too far in weakening the
peace forces as against the criminal forces and we must act to restore that balance” (p.
477). Nixon is of course referencing the Warren Court which “had been the eye in the
hurricane of juridicial and social controversy” for “decisions involving desegregation,
Bible reading and prayers in public schools, and the rights of those accused of criminal
acts” (p. 477). In short, the Warren Court “had perplexed and angered many citizens” (p.
477); thus Nixon was determined to shift the court away from its liberal leanings through
appointments of “strict constructionists” (p. 477). In fact, this was a major campaign
promise made by Nixon prior to being elected.
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During Nixon’s inaugural year as President, he received the opportunity to fulfill
his campaign promise by virtue of the fact that two seats on the Supreme Court became
vacant. The appointment process was seemingly a clear path for Nixon considering all the
contextual factors working in his favor: 1) public opinion sided with his criticism of the
Warren Court; 2) only one nominee in the twentieth century was not confirmed by the
Senate because of the longstanding adherence to the idea that the President had the right
to appoint people whose beliefs are consistent with his/hers; and 3) Nixon was in what is
known as the “honeymoon period” (p. 477) of his Presidency—the time in which
Senators usually avoid “head-to-head confrontations” due to acknowledgement of how
difficult it is for a new President to hire a staff and get off to a running start as leader of
the free world. Yet, despite the rhetorical situation being to Nixon’s liking, two of his
nominees failed to be confirmed as appointments and thus took two additional
nominations to fill the vacant spots on the highest court in the land.
Thus, the importance of the Vatz and Windt, Jr. (1974) study is that it analyzes
the effectiveness of argumentation leading to success in a very difficult rhetorical
situation. In much the same way as the Bormann (1962) piece, the significance of
studying congressional debate is learning about argumentative strategy from rhetoric in
the policymaking arena that was successful at overcoming what initially seemed to be
insurmountable barriers. Also like Bormann, authors put on display the actual language
of debate so that readers may draw from their own observations when drawing
conclusions about the accuracy of the categorization of argumentation, as well as the
assessment of its effects.
Conceptualizing the Legislative Process
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During review of studies previously mentioned in this chapter, attention has been
directed by the work of the authors to case studies of congressional debate. Whether the
debate over the League of Nations, the Civil War debate, the Civil Rights debate, or the
debate over Supreme Court nominations, focus has been on particular actors in particular
contexts of debate. It was not until I came across Janice Schuetz’s (1986) article,
“Overlays of Argument in Legislative Process,” published in the Journal of the American
Forensic Association, was work found that focused on classifying particular attributes of
argument unique to the forum of congressional debate. The purpose of the article “is to
isolate several different overlays of legislative argumentation and show how these
overlays work as distinctive species according to their function, form, language and
audience” (Schuetz, 1986, p. 223). The norms of legislative argument and the ways in
which they manifest during the entire complex process of policymaking is the object of
study. Essentially, according to Schuetz (1986), the legislative process is not confined to
the public argument from Capitol Hill like what we all see on C-SPAN. Policymaking
argumentation spans across public and private spheres of discourse. The most successful
arguments are the ones that build thematic consistency from one sphere of discourse to
another, as attributes of argumentation are adapted to fit various audiences. During debate
over the Patriot Act, patriotism itself became the line of argumentation establishing
thematic consistency across spheres of discourse.
Schuetz’s article describes the layers of communication involved with argument
in the legislative process and thus demands in-depth attention. In part one of the article,
attributes of political argumentation are discussed. These attributes include function,
form, language, and audience. In part two, attention is directed toward the public and
private overlays of legislative argument. The public overlay includes constituent based
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communication, public hearings, and floor debate; while the private overlay includes
internal staff conversations, interaction with lobbyists, and closed door House to Senate
conferences. Part three considers the strategic norms of corroboration and congruence
necessary for linking the overlays of argumentation.
Attributes of Political Argumentation
Schuetz (1986) defines political argumentation as “a transactional process in
which persons participate in political decisions by advancing claims, respond to
competing claims, and seek the adherence of others to the claims they present” (p. 223).
As such, argumentation is defined quite broadly and “does not delineate the different
species of argument that emerge in legislative decisions” (p. 224); doing so according to
Schuetz, requires first examining the essential attributes of political argumentation.
Function
According to the classical ideals of deliberative rhetoric espoused by Aristotle,
policymaking determines future actions related to protecting the homeland, war, the
economy, the justice system, etc. However, Schuetz (1986) points out that political
discourse rarely functions ideally—alluding to the fact that politics contains more
gamesmanship than idealists would like to believe. There is more bound up in the
rhetoric of politicians than simply what direction the country should take and why.
“Because much political argument is symbolic and partisan, arguers often justify their
actions as good political decisions when, in fact, they propose policies merely to appease
other politicians or to satisfy their own ambitions” (p. 224). The observation is made that
there are at least two functions of political discourse, the overt function and the covert
function; although it should be noted that, “these dual functions often appear in a single
argument” (p. 224).
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The overt function represents the ideal of political argumentation; it “determines
the public nature of claims, the interests or values used as justifications, and choices of
the primary target audiences” (p. 224). In the case of the debate over the Patriot Act, the
overt function of argumentation by proponents is that we should adopt the act because it
is critical to protecting our homeland from future terrorist attacks. The claim is made and
the warrant is provided, and this encompasses the overt function of political
argumentation. However, also very much at play in the debate over the Patriot Act is the
covert function of political argumentation. Here, Schuetz refers to Murray Edelman
(1964) whose book, The Symbolic Uses of Politics, describes the covert function of
political argumentation as the attempt “to quiet resentments and doubts about particular
political acts, reaffirm belief in the fundamental rationality and democratic character of
the system, and thus fix conforming habits of future behavior” (p. 17). In the case of
debate over the Patriot Act, the covert function of argumentation is fulfilled by the
inference already discussed in previous chapters: those who are for the act are true
patriots and those who are against the act are clearly not. The covert function of
patriotism in this case “serves to dull the critical faculties rather than to arouse them”
(Edelman, 1964, p. 18). Because determining the function of a political argument requires
examining the language utilized in making the argument, language is considered an
important attribute of political argumentation.
Language
To begin the brief section on language, Schuetz (1986) reiterates an observation
made earlier in this literature review that surprisingly, “relatively little emphasis is placed
on the role of language in argumentative discourse” despite the fact that “the role of
language is central to political arguments” (p. 225). As mentioned in the previous section
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on function as an attribute of political argumentation, an argument may fulfill an overt
function and a covert function at the same time, but making this sort of classification
requires that one actually consider the language of the person doing the arguing—
something that again, did not happen in the earliest studies of congressional debate.
Citing Edelman (1977b), Schuetz (1986) tell us that, “language achieves a dual purpose
by revealing meaning relevant to the public interests while simultaneously concealing
meaning pertinent to the partisan interests” (p. 225).
Another reason Schuetz (1986) gives for why language is an important attribute of
congressional debate repeats an observation made earlier in this chapter pertaining to the
relationship between congressional debate and the public sphere. A significant purpose of
making congressional debate an activity open to the public is for education’s sake.
Through attention paid to the legislative process, ideally, the public becomes informed of
how the laws around them are being made and why. Earl Cain and Ralph Micken (cited
earlier) help make this point in the section entitled “Why Study Congressional Debate?”
The forum does not only involve the policymaking participants but also the constituents
represented by those people. Schuetz (1986) explains Doris Graber’s (1976) conclusion
about politics and the public sphere:
The average person understands the world of politics ‘vicariously’ through the
words of politicians and the media. Specifically, the words of political leaders tell
citizens about the past, present, and future policy, supply the public ‘with reasons
and values,’ inform them about attitudes and reasoning of their political leaders,
and outline the public consequences of adherence to or rejection of policies. (p.
225)
In order for any insight to be gained pertaining to the relationship between congressional




The next important attribute to consider according to Schuetz (1986) is
recognition of the fact that political argumentation occurs through various forms.
Form is an essential attribute of argumentation that cannot be overlooked, particularly in
a study such as this one in which a relationship between legislative argument and the
public is being examined. Robert Heath (1979) explains: “Whether by individuals,
society at large, or change in circumstances, the growth of thought through constant
contact with reality and the growth and change of ideology in a culture are inseparable
from form. As individuals and society change, so do the perspectives thereby creating
new equations among ideas” (p. 394). Heath is expounding here on Kenneth Burke’s
notion of form, the same notion that Schuetz references in her article, and points out that
“this conception of form emphasizes the enduring link between form and substance” (p.
394). As Burke (1925) himself says, “form is the creation of an appetite in the mind of
the auditor, and the adequate satisfying of that appetite” (p. 35). So, to consider the way
in which patriotism manifests as argument in the debate over the Patriot Act, attention to
form is necessary.
Burke (1972; 1973) articulates three major forms and one minor form. The major
forms include progressive, repetitive and conventional. The minor forms include
“metaphor, paradox, disclosure, reversal, contraction, expansion, bathos, apostrophe,
series, and chiamus” (Burke, 1976, p. 63). Some understanding of the major forms is
necessary for this project. To begin, progressive form is broken down further into two
types: syllogistic progression and qualitative progression. During syllogistic progression,
the rhetor takes the audience step by step through the sequence of premises, spelling out
the relationships between variables. “To go from A to E through stages B, C, and D is to
obtain such form. We call it syllogistic because, given certain things, certain things must
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follow, the premises forcing the conclusion” (Burke, 1966, p. 54). Qualitative
progressions on the other hand, according to Burke (1931; rpt. 1968), “are qualitative
rather than syllogistic as they lack the pronounced anticipatory nature of the syllogistic
progression. We are prepared less to demand a certain qualitative progression than to
recognize its rightness after the event” (pp. 124-5).
The second major type of form, according to Burke (1931; rpt. 1968), is repetitive
which is “the consistent maintaining of a principle under new guises. It is restatement of
the same thing in different ways” (p. 125). The third major type of form is conventional,
or “categorical expectancy” as Burke (1931; rpt. 1968) puts it. Different contexts of
communication generate different commonly accepted ways of forming the message.
Burke (1931; rpt. 1968) explains that “even before opening a novel,” the reader looks
“forward to an opening passage which will proclaim itself an opening” (p. 126-7). As the
previous quotation suggests though, the extent to which a particular form is effective very
much depends upon the audience exposed to the message, another important attribute of
political argumentation.
Audience
Schuetz (1986) explains how difficult it is to keep track of all the diverse
audiences associated with legislative argument:
Identifying audiences of legislative argument is difficult because arguers, public
interests, and contexts change many times during the process of making
legislative decisions. At times, the audience may be a single constituent or
lobbyist, whereas in other cases, audiences include designated committees,
political colleagues, or the public. For this reason, arguers select evidence and
rationales designed for the target audiences whose assent they seek. (p. 227)
While one form of argument may be compelling in a particular context, it may be
completely ineffective in another. This is what Walter Fisher (1984) tells us when
discussing the narrative paradigm of human communication, claiming that some
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audiences are more swayed by a storytelling form of argument rather than the “rational
world paradigm.” Context generally dictates a particular form emphasized; e.g. prose
interpretation involves a greater proportion of qualitative progression whereas academic
debate generally involves a greater proportion of syllogistic progression. The same is true
for argumentation in the legislative process—when talking to the “public,” the
expectation is that politicians will argue more through storytelling than the line by line
syllogistic reasoning expected when making an argument in front of colleagues in
Congress. Expectations are relative though as critics reviewed earlier suggest that even
on Capitol Hill, senators and representatives are more interested in appealing to the
masses than in engaging in rational-critical debate.
According to Schuetz’s (1986) article there are essentially three target audiences
that arguers in the legislative process attempt to reach. The first audience includes the
elected officials who participate directly in the policymaking process. Lloyd Bitzer
(1981) refers to this group as the “assigned function” audience and believes them to be
well prepared for the task of policymaking because they are knowledgeable about the
problems dealt with through legislation and are familiar with the argumentative forms
utilized in the debating of issues (p. 246). “Such audiences,” according to Schuetz (1986),
“respond to others’ political arguments according to standards embodied in the mutually
agreed rules and procedures where the vote and rule of the majority are the basis for
decisions” (p. 227). The second target audience includes the constituents, the people
whom are being served by the arguers. Bitzer (1981) refers to this group as laypersons
that “set forth their positions out of their own self interest and demand adequate services,
fair taxes, honest public programs, and human institutions” (Schuetz, 1986, p. 227). As
such, this audience typically only considers arguments for policies that favor their
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particular lot in life and only accepts the evidence that supports those positions. The third
target audience is the mass media audience. Citing Furay (1977, p. 4-5), Schuetz explains
this audience has the “grass roots mind,” which “perceives political arguments not
according to the rules or principles of rational decision making but according to the
image of the source, to shared attitudes such as optimism, efficiency, and patriotism that
are embodied in claims, and to their perceived liking for the candidates” (p. 227). Further,
the media prefers stories that involve controversy without a lot of technical
argumentation backed by a lot of evidence.
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“Overlays of Legislative Argumentation”
In this section of Schuetz’s article is found what is perhaps the most influential
analysis helping to conceptualize the framework of the context of communication
standing as the focal point for the current study. The way in which the legislative process
concerning the Patriot Act plays out over the longevity of its existence is quite complex.
The enormity of the process is nearly incomprehensible given the way in which it
overlaps with other major actions taken in the “war on terror,” such as the creation of the
Homeland Security Department and detention centers overseas like Guantanamo Bay and
Abu Ghraib. It is not so easy to compartmentalize the aspects of the “War on Terror.” At
the heart of this complexity lies the fact that this particular war identifies a method of
attack as its enemy as opposed to previous wars fought by the United States in which
actual groups of people were identified as enemies. The war is not the “War against Al
Quaeda;” it is the “War on Terror.” Furthermore, from inside this war is found multiple
subsets of war—“The War in Afghanistan” and “The War in Iraq” standing as two of the
biggest. These wars blur together in the public sphere and ambiguously merge into one
big war. Thus, it is hard to find a case in which the Patriot Act is being discussed without
mention of the other parts of the war, and vice versa. So, conceptualizing and narrowing
what is actually being examined in this project has thusly been a very difficult task.
Also contributing to the difficulty of the task is the fact that “within the field of
politics, several distinct genres of argumentation exist” such as political campaigns and
legislative decisions for which function, form, language, and audience all show up
differently (Schuetz, 1986, p. 228). Obviously, discussion of post 9/11 patriotism and the
Patriot Act seeps into many genres of communication. It was key to the 2004 re-election
of George W. Bush and as many people have said, key to Bush’s entire presidency (Dean,
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2004; Suskind, 2004; to name but a couple of sources here). The pattern in which
patriotism manifests in the post 9/11 public sphere, “is indistinct and blurred, resembling
the picture that an observer might see when several different transparencies are projected
simultaneously on one screen” (Schuetz, 1986, p. 228). Thus, in order for a “clearer
picture” to emerge, observers must “look at one overlay at a time and perceive its
separate and distinct parts” (Schuetz, 1986, p. 228). This justifies the notion of looking
toward one particular overhead of patriotism—the legislative process concerning the
Patriot Act.
Within that particular legislative process even, there are many overlays of
argumentation. “Among the many overlays in a legislative process are both private and
public arguments” (Schuetz, 1986, p. 229). The private arguments occur behind closed
doors in contexts typically not open to public investigation; these arguments occur
between the policymakers and staff members, lobbyists, negotiations in committees, etc.
The public arguments on the other hand, are open to public scrutiny and in fact, are made
easily available to the public in the form of transcription—public speeches, testimony in
Congressional Record, published reports etc. The main source of data for this analysis of
patriotism is public argument; however the private overlay is not left completely alone
thanks to insiders (and former insiders) of government providing their perspectives. Such
sources of information include Paul O’Neill (in Suskind, 2004), former U.S. Treasury
Secretary under Bush, John Dean (2004), Former Counsel to President Richard Nixon,
and various congress people who admit to pressuring and being pressured by the pull of
patriotism in the aftermath of 9/11 (in various exclusive interviews with journalists like
O’Harrow, Jr., 2005). In fact, due to the secrecy of the Bush Administration (Dean,
2004), much of the analysis of the initial legislative engagement with the Patriot Act is
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almost exclusively based on private overlays of argument because such little public
attention was devoted to it. The extent to which the act was rushed through the legislative
process prevented much public discussion (O’Harrow Jr., 2004; Foerstel, 2004; and
others). This observation is explored in more detail later in this project. But for now,
attention has been called to the fact that while most analysis here focuses on public
overlays of argumentation, it does, in second-hand ways, access the reportage of private
overlays—especially in the beginning of the process when the public overlays were, by
design, quite limited. In Chapter 3 on methodology, the overlays of argument to be
analyzed are outlined. For now, we continue with the review of literature.
“Strategic Norms Linking Overlays”
The fact that there are so many overlays of argument affecting the outcome of
almost every piece of legislation that goes through Congress, it is no wonder that so few
people have taken on the task of studying the process. The differences in function, form,
language and audience between overlays of argument and even within one overlay of
argument are enormous. Fortunately though, Schuetz (1986) has provided some guidance
in terms of managing the task at hand. “Since legislative argumentation often continues
on one bill for weeks, months and sometimes even years, it is a major challenge to fit
their arguments with those made by other arguers” (p. 233). Rather than a researcher
feeling obligated to study each and every word spoken by all legislators involved with the
decision making process, it is more prudent to discover if there are norms that link one
overlay to another. For the legislation that is successful at getting passed, strategic norms
can be found. So, in this section, the norms provided by Schuetz are discussed and brief
explanations concerning the way in which these principles conceptualize patriotism as a
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strategic norm linking the overlays of argument in the debate over the Patriot Act are
provided.
Corroboration
Schuetz (1986) explains that the first strategic norm, corroboration, “occurs when
arguments of constituents, witnesses, and legislators presented in one overlay repeat or
reinforce the evidence, rationales, and/or claims of arguments presented in different
overlays” (p. 233). Thus, we get the “talking points” of political discourse. Any
successful campaign, push for legislation, or defense of legislation has to have a
consistent message to be successful, pointing to a fact of modern political life that the
best campaign is the most organized campaign (Francis, 2004). Each debate participant
arguing for a particular position must be sure and corroborate the message of other
arguers who have the same goal in mind. “In this way, arguments develop some degree of
reliability and accuracy and thereby contribute to a common rationale for changing or
refraining from changing laws” (Schuetz, 1986, p. 233). In the debate over the Patriot
Act, patriotism is a significant argument providing corroboration to the side of the
proponents.
Congruence
Schuetz (1986) tells us “congruence is a second norm that attaches the arguments
and arguers of one species to another into the web of a legislative decision” (p. 233).
Helping explain the norm, two aspects associated with it are discussed. For the first
aspect, Zarefsky (1981) is cited and “he recommends that public policy arguments be
evaluated according to their congruence with audiences, that is, the ‘judgments of
audiences’ and ‘history.’ When arguments fit with the ‘underlying assumptions’ and
relate to the ‘historical experiences’ of audiences, they enjoin a strong rationale for the
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claims presented” (Schuetz, 1986, p. 233; see also Zarefsky, 1981, pp. 88-89). In the case
of the Patriot Act, patriotism itself seems to be a significant point of congruence existing
between the various overlays of argument. The historical experience of an audience
overcome with a sense of urgency fits the message well that immediate action must be
taken to defend the country from terrorism and further, any true patriot would make
whatever sacrifices necessary to ensure that it happens.
Studies From the Last Decade
Despite such an interesting and important context of communication to study, at
least according to the level of depth involved with the articles that have been covered
here, it is necessary to note that still not much breadth has been devoted to the subject of
congressional debating. Even after the publication of Schuetz’s article in 1986, not much
attention has been given the topic of Congressional debate.
“Special Issue: Argumentation and the U.S. Senate”
Because study of congressional debate in the 1990s is limited, but not absent, I am
able to appropriate the title of a 1995 issue of Argumentation and Advocacy as the title of
the current section. This special issue “examines the practices of argumentation in the
United States Senate. The three essays are largely concerned with the Senate as a forum
where arguments are made within the cultural practices, norms, and constraints of place”
(Kane, 1995, p. 57). The introduction to the special issue, written by Thomas Kane, sets
up the collection of studies as one that examines the norms of Senate discourse, which
evolve slowly in a unique manner, by focusing on when those norms are violated and the
price that must be paid. For instance, Senator Rick Santorum’s (R-PA) speech against
President Clinton’s budget plan on December 15, 1995 is cited as an example of when
customs were violated. Using terms such as “bald-faced untruths,” “systematic
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disinformation campaigns,” as well as “revisionist history” (S18718-18721), Santorum
proceeded to tear down Clinton and his budget plan. The language used by Santorum
created quite a stir in the Senate because it violated the norm of respect that is to be
afforded all members.
Following the speech, many others stood up to talk from both sides of the aisle—
some agreed with Santorum’s stance against the budget plan, but no one appreciated the
language he used to describe Clinton. Senator Barbara Boxer (D-CA) for instance, who
undoubtedly did disagree with Santorum’s stance, spoke directly after Santorum
reminded him of “the sanctity of this institution” and asked him to review his remarks in
the Congressional Record so that “he will understand the difference between making a
point in a way that is disrespectful and making a point in a way that is respectful”
(S18721). Senator Robert Bennett (R-UT) who agreed with Santorum on the issue,
completely disagreed with his use of language. He said, “I will not use words like ‘lie.’ I
will not use ‘despicable’ and ‘disgraceful.’ I came over here a little bit angry, but I will
not use the word ‘anger’” (S18722). The scolding of Santorum did not end on that either,
for some time to come afterward, various Senators stood up in defense of the Senate
chambers as an institution that should be protected from such ad hominem attacks. So
attention is drawn to the institution of the Senate “where even newer members such as
Boxer and Bennett will argue a sense of the appropriate, believing that the meaning of the
Senate transcends the political issues of the moment” (Kane, 1995, p. 58). Hence, the
entire 1995 special issue of Argumentation and Advocacy is devoted to the study of
forum in the U.S. Senate.
The first article in the special issue is “Carol Moseley-Braun’s Day to Talk About
Race: A Study of Forum in the United States Senate,” by John Butler (1995). This article
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speaks to the rhetorical norms of the Senate by focusing on a day in which the norms
were broken, and perhaps changed, according to the author. Different exchanges in two
different venues for legislative argument are involved in this analysis, but there is one
catalyst for both exchanges—Carol Mosely-Braun (D-IL), a new member of the Senate.
In both instances, the message delivered by Mosely-Braun entailed emotional outrage
over the history of racism. In the first instance, her message was not well understood nor
particularly well received; the second message however, a sequel to the first according to
Butler (1995), was overwhelmingly successful and led to an outpouring of personal
narratives from Senators on both sides of the aisle pertaining to how far America had yet
to go in the struggle to eliminate lines of discrimination in society. Butler (1995) explains
the impact that Moseley-Braun’s “day to talk about race” had upon the Senate forum:
“For certain, those who study the Senate as a place where rhetoric operates will no longer
be able to avoid the significance of interruptions such as Moseley-Braun’s. The ever
increasing multicultural characteristics of our society will force the political forums of
tomorrow to face the sensitivities of diverse backgrounds” (p. 73).
The second article in the 1995 special issue, “Arlen Specter and the Construction
of Adversarial Discourse: Selective Representation in the Clarence Thomas-Anita Hill
Hearings,” also examines the forum of the U.S. Senate through focus on a rhetorical
artifact standing outside of the norm. The hearing in front of the Senate Judiciary
Committee was over whether or not to confirm Clarence Thomas as a nomination to the
Supreme Court. Famously, the crux of the debate over Thomas’s confirmation had to do
with the sexual harassment accusations lodged against him by Professor Anita Hill. The
accusations led to intense questioning of Hill’s credibility as a witness and created a
courtroom like rhetorical context in the halls of Congress. Armstrong (1995), the author
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of the article, points out that the adversarial hearing confused the norms of presumption
typically involved with a policymaking decision with that of a courtroom in which guilt
or innocence is being decided. This confusion put Professor Hill at a unique disadvantage
according to the norms of U.S. Senate proceedings. She was being questioned as if a
witness in a trial in which the attorneys completely control the flow of discussion, and to
make matters worse for Professor Hill, she had no lawyers to make objections about the
flow of discussion or even a judge to intervene on her behalf. Also contributing to this
rhetorical context in which the ground was skewed is the fact that the key interrogator,
Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA), was a prosecutor prior to being elected to the Senate.
Hence, the purpose emerges for Armstrong (1995) who analyzes the way in which
Specter utilized “argument through selective representation” (subject heading: p. 76) as a
strategy to undermine Hill’s credibility. The implications for Specter were negative, as
the public perceived him as having been hostile toward the witness and hence, almost lost
his seat on the Senate during the next election cycle.
The third article in the special issue is entitled, “American Political Mythology
and the Senate Filibuster.” Murphy (1995) examines “the history of the filibuster with a
particular eye toward the ways in which the discourse surrounding the attempts to
eliminate the filibuster exemplify certain fundamental contradictions in the American
political mythology” (p. 90). The mythologies under investigation are Democracy and
The Constitution. The rhetorically mythic nature of these stories, according to Murphy,
are told in such ways that they can be both “contradictory” and/or “collaborative”
depending on whom is telling them and for what purpose (p. 92). To demonstrate the
claim, Murphy (1995) identifies three different scenarios in American history related to
the development of the filibuster, and more generally, the discussion over the
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philosophical tenets of a direct democracy versus a representative democracy. Through
the rhetoric found related to the Federalist papers, the cloture debate of 1917, to the
debate of 1995 over whether to liberalize the cloture rules of the Senate, Murphy
compares and contrasts the ways in which the previously mentioned mythologies are
utilized as rhetorical strategies for both complementary as well as contradictory goals.
The Bakhtinian Paradigm of Legislative Argument
The next piece to be reviewed is a book entitled, When Congress Debates A
Bakhtinian Paradigm, and is written by Theodore Sheckels (2000). The book is important
to this literature review in a number of ways. Perhaps of most significance is the fact that
it was the very first piece discovered by this author and was integral as a bibliographic
reference to make becoming familiar with the seminal work a relatively easy task. In the
book, Sheckels (2000) contributes to understanding of past studies by being extremely
critical of them. He argues:
Critics assume that, once you get to the core of the debate, you will find a clash
that can be accurately rendered in bipolar terms…the problem with the bipolar
paradigm is that it superimposes a structure on the debate. That structure
privileges elements in the debate that readily fit it; however, the structure
marginalizes or ignores elements that do not. (pp. 5- 6)
Sheckels makes this observation and then applies the criticism to many of the studies
already mentioned here, making note that the only study for which the criticism does not
apply is his own previous study, “The Rhetorical Use of Double-Voiced Discourse and
Feminine Style: The U.S. Senate Debate over the Impact of Tailhook ’91,” in a 1997
issue of Southern Communication Journal.
Although I disagree with the way in which the criticism by Sheckels is offered
and especially with the way in which the alternative to the critique is justified, it
nevertheless becomes a meaningful catalyst of thought over the congressional debating
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literature. The structure of the book begins with an outstanding critical review of the
Congressional debating literature, many studies of which have been reviewed here as
well. Next, the author proposes an alternative to the “bipolar paradigm” of studying
congressional debate and presents an overview of the work of Mikhail Bakhtin,
discussing the way in which it is appropriated for congressional debate. Then, each
remaining chapter re-visits individual pieces from the literature, criticizes them
specifically as having artificially polarized debate, and re-works them through the lens of
the Bakhtinian paradigm. Through attention to “double-voiced discourse” and
“carnivelesque energy” (p. 33), two Bakhtinian concepts appropriated by Sheckels,
understanding of the “inter-voices” underlying the debates is claimed and artificial
polarization is avoided.
My reaction to this book is mostly critical. While I must disclaim that a) I’m far
from being a Bakhtin scholar and b) the attempt to become one at this juncture would
only distract from the larger purpose of this project, there would however be a significant
gap in the literature review without giving Sheckels’ approach some consideration. The
reasoning behind this is that one, readers should know why the Bakhtinian paradigm—as
developed through the only book-length treatment of congressional debate—is not
integral to the present study, and two, coming back and re-visiting the paradigm in more
detail is something I would like to do in a later project. But for now, there are some
underlying assumptions about the Bakhtinian paradigm that just do not add up,
particularly in context of studying congressional debate.
The first observation is that debate is a polarizing context for communication, by
function and definition. Policy is formulated, reformulated and then voted upon. It is
passed, rejected, and/or or stalled through various rhetorical tactics. At the end of the day,
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policymakers must vote either aye or nay, or abstain from the vote altogether. Of course
there are an infinite number of reasons as to why any one particular policymaker decides
the way she does and of course, an infinite number of voices affect that decision, but to
claim that somehow the Bakhtinian paradigm escapes the limitation of seeing debate as a
non-polar communicative phenomenon obfuscates the truth of the function of debate. In
the preface of Sheckels (2000) book, he writes:
Rather than giving primacy to an oppositional construct, a scholar (using the
Bakhtinian paradigm) would explore all of the voices that comprise the debate’s
polyphony, including both the many speakers themselves and the voices they
sound by citing, quoting, using the famous words of, telling constituents’ stories,
and inventing the words someone or some group might utter (p. xiv).
None of the authors previously mentioned, based upon my close reading of their work,
seem to oversimplify debate in the way that Sheckels would have us believe. Yes, they do
acknowledge the polarizing nature of debate, but they do not pretend that all who oppose
a particular policy do so for the same reasons and likewise, that all who propose do so for
the same reasons. In fact, most of the articles go to great lengths, within the limitation of
space, to identify the various different reasons why Congress people voted the way they
did.
My second observation about Sheckels’ approach is that the postmodern
tendencies displayed through his presentation of the Bakhtinian paradigm seem to
deconstruct knowledge rather than construct it. While I do agree with one notion
embedded in Sheckels’ argument, the idea that the specific language of the speakers
being studied needs more attention, especially in the earliest studies of congressional
debate, I ultimately find fault with the idea that previous scholars were wrong because
they did not consider the “polyphony” of the debate. The difference is that my critique of
the literature is not that the scholars were “wrong,” in their analysis, and completely
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misunderstood what was going on, but that they would have been more accurate by
showing us the data they were analyzing, i.e., the language of policymakers, and give
readers a greater chance to participate in the analysis. My critique is based on having an
empirical notion of reality whereby when a person says something, it is really she who is
saying it; her language is real data that can be interpreted as having real meaning in the
present. Whereas Sheckels’ critique smacks more of postmodernism whereby the
language a person uses is not really her language, but somebody else’s—a product of
socially constructed reality. The author takes symbolic interaction to the nth degree and
deconstructs knowledge rather than constructing it. The symbolic construction of
meaning according to George H. Mead (1934), views self as a dichotomy between the “I”
and various other “me’s.” The “me’s” comprise the surrounding world from which an
individual’s worldview derives and the “I” mediates those points of reality into a unique,
individual self (Doty, 1999). By hyper-emphasizing the “me’s” in his construction of self,
Sheckels neglects the “I,” and thus strips agency away from the individuals as “their”
language is being examined.
A third point of criticism to make here is one that has been made earlier toward
contemporary rhetorical criticism—and that is in Sheckels’ analysis, there seems to be
the risk of “cookie cutter” criticism involved. Explanation of this criticism seems self-
explanatory when Sheckels (2000), in the preface to his book, explains that, “Using a
Bakhtinian paradigm, a scholar would also look for the use of double-voiced discourse
and the eruption of carnivalesque energy, especially when these serve to subvert the
established order” (p. xiv). Is it possible to find these concepts in every artifact one
examines? I would say that if one looks hard enough for these concepts, they will easily
be found during analysis of the object, and while this does not mean the concepts are not
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useful and interesting lenses from which to explore artifacts, it is to say that Sheckels
does not escape bipolar thinking as he claims. The Bakhtinian paradigm is not a-
conceptual—it does not rise above the polarity of rational thinking. Sheckels’ analysis is
in fact theory driven, rather than data driven, and because he attempts to hide this fact, his
work falls into the performatively contradictory nature of postmodern thinking—the idea
that every theory is wrong except for mine, which is succinctly that the nature of reality is
that there is no reality—a reality that cannot be proven wrong.
Clearly, Sheckels’ book is highly significant to this literature review. It was
amongst the first studies found on the topic of congressional debate; it was the only study
found that devoted book-length treatment to the subject, and thus, it was a tremendous
bibliographic reference. Further, given that much of the book opened itself to critique
from my perspective, it unwittingly became a tremendous catalyst to thinking about how
to approach the study of congressional debate. Interaction with Sheckels’ approach
proved fruitful toward the development of my own paradigm of approaching debate over
the Patriot Act. The criticisms raised are meant as questions to hopefully pursue at a later
time; for, I am quite interested in learning more about the Bakhtinian paradigm. For now
however, the Bakhtinian paradigm has provided another vantage point of studying
congressional debate from which to juxtapose the one developed here—a hermeneutic
phenomenological one—which hopefully provides the discursive space necessary to
move “off the beaten path of antimodernism,” an integration of modern and postmodern
perspectives, rather than a proclamation that one is inherently superior over the other.
Public Policy Argument in the Budget Process
The final piece to review here is critical for this author in his search to integrate
the necessarily amorphous hermeneutic-phenomenological analysis of patriotism with a
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patterned analysis of its use as argument in the Patriot Act. Levasseur (2005) is
methodologically up to something very similar in, “The Role of Public Opinion in Policy
Argument: An Examination of Public Opinion Rhetoric in the Federal Budget Process,”
found in Argumentation and Advocacy. The author begins the article by defining “public
opinion” generally and then continues by analyzing the budget process over a three-year
period. This is perhaps the one study found that seems to provide a model of sorts to help
answer the questions posed in the present study. While Levasseur does not claim to do
hermeneutic analysis, he is essentially alluding to the eidetic nature of public opinion and
its function as part of the democratic process in the first part of his article. Even if he had
been interested in bringing hermeneutics into the study though, he would not have had
the space to carry it through; for it demands an extraordinary amount of description,
questioning, and revision—the likes of which is not possible in a 15-page article.
However, he does do an exceptional job of briefly describing the horizons of public
opinion prior to examining just how it is utilized as argument in the budget process.
After examining 40 Presidential speeches focusing on the budget (comprising 183
pages of text), House and Senate Committee hearings with the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) director as the primary witness (comprising 282 pages of text), and House
and Senate floor debates (comprising 266 pages of text), Levasseur (2005) was able to
identify patterns pertaining to the way in which public opinion is utilized as legislative
argument in the debate over the budget. His findings are that 1) public opinion is actually
not quantitatively used a great deal in the budget process; and 2) when it is used, it is
often used in contradictory ways. One pattern is that politicians sometimes try to claim
that they have identified “what the public wants” (p. 155). Another pattern is that
politicians “shun the popular approach” (p. 157) and assert themselves as independent
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and strong leaders not swayed by the bandwagon. A third pattern identified is called
“justification before public opinion” (p. 158) and occurs when a politician uses public
opinion as a litmus test of sorts when attempting to convince other policymakers to vote a
certain way. A fourth and final pattern identified by Levasseur (2005) is what he calls
“the misled public” (p. 159), suggesting that politicians often play upon a sense of the
“public’s general disinterest in politics” (p. 159) as a rhetorical advantage, giving them
the opportunity to claim that if only the public knew what a particular plan would do their
daily lives, then there is no way they would support it.
Summary
In much the same way as Levasseur (2005) identifies patterns by which public opinion
rhetoric is utilized as argument during the budget process, I identify patterns by which
patriotic ethos is utilized as argument during the legislative process concerning the Patriot
Act. Levasseur’s study, as well as the current approach, both benefit from past studies of
congressional debate in many important ways. One benefit gained through the literature
review is recognition of the fact that utilizing a close textual analysis of debate
transcriptions as methodological lens will not reveal the effects of the language of the
debate. Attempting to learn this demands a survey approach whereby subjects exposed to
the rhetoric self-report the attitude change effected by the independent variable. It is my
contention, though, that the survey approach for this particular study would not be very
fruitful considering the in-flux meaning of patriotism—the independent variable.
Furthermore, the interaction effects associated with the other variables influencing the
decision-making process such as various political allegiances, isolating the effects of one
particular independent variable seems impossible without moving the study into the
laboratory, thereby constructing an artificial, sterile context for communication. At this
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point though, the focus changes because the patriotism being studied is not “post 9/11
patriotism,” it is laboratory produced patriotism and can not accurately mimic the way in
which the meaning of patriotic feeling changes so dramatically during the course of




While “rhetorical criticism,” argument analysis more generally, and the history of
methodologies used to study congressional debate reviewed in Chapter 2 are certainly
influential of the goals of the present study, I refrain from using the term “rhetorical
criticism” per se to describe it. The pursuit of understanding is not limited to the way in
which patriotism, as observed through a “unit of analysis,” influences one rhetorical
situation. Inquiry also puts patriotism on display as an object of “historically effected
consciousness” (Gadamer, 2003). Therefore, the method is a hermeneutic analysis of text
through continuous reference to context. This involves not only identifying the use of
patriotism as argument, but also, for each instance in which it does manifest in such a
way during the debate, asking the question, what form of patriotism is being expressed?
The various meanings of patriotism as they arise through the course of post 9/11
discourse are compared to the horizons established in Chapter 1. The Patriot Act is a
symbolic manifestation of post 9/11 culture and interpreting the way in which it is
discussed within the text of the legislative process becomes a focused way in which to
access its “horizons” (see Chapter 1 for explanation of horizon) as part of the post 9/11
world. Studying congressional debate in particular is especially important when
considering that the legislature is the last chain in the link of communication connecting
the “public” to the bureaucracy of government.
Hermeneutics
The similarities between rhetorical criticism and hermeneutics are more obvious
than the differences given that rhetorical criticism examines language and language is
“the medium of hermeneutic experience” (Gadamer, title of Chapter 1, in part two of
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Truth and Method). But by considering the notion of historicality, rhetorical criticism and
hermeneutics can be more easily juxtaposed. The understanding conveyed through the
ontological awareness at the core of what is perhaps the most imminent overarching goal
of the hermeneutic “method,” is emphasis on the idea that history cannot be reconstructed
as the original. Gadamer (1960/2003) explains: “Reconstructing the original
circumstances, like all restoration, is a futile undertaking in view of the historicity of our
being. What is reconstructed, a life brought back from the lost past, is not the original. In
its continuance in an estranged state it acquires only a derivative, cultural existence” (p.
167). Thus, according to hermeneutics, history is not considered to be “context”
preceding the actual analysis of data; it is very much a part of the data—leading to what
Gadamer calls an “analysis of historically-effected consciousness.” This sort of analysis
sets hermeneutics apart from methods of rhetorical criticism; this analysis looks beyond
the foci of rhetorical criticism and at the same time, it may certainly include them as part
of the investigation.
During the origins of the discipline of hermeneutics, the purpose was literal
interpretation of ancient scripture, whether through translation from language to
language, performance of a text through music or plays, or analytic explanation (Kramer,
manuscript, p. 3). Through contributions of Dilthey, Schleiermacher, Husserl, Heidegger,
Gadamer, and others however, the method has evolved to mean, “interpreting the
meaning of a text through continual reference to its context…and can be applied to any
situation in which one wants to ‘recover’ historical meaning” (Lindlof, 1995. p. 31). The
level of description involved in analyzing “historically effected consciousness” is
distinguished from a history chapter. In many works considered to be rhetorical criticism
is found a chapter on “Historical Context,” which implies that having a sense of
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historicality is a prerequisite to the presentation of data—the text—and subsequent
analysis; context becomes “background information” for the reader. Hermeneutics on the
other hand, views context and text as interdependent. Recognizing this distinction is
necessary for at least two reasons: 1) it encourages participants in this communication,
both author and readers, to consider each other as much a part of the study as the subjects
themselves; and related, 2) it provides deference to the phenomenological deduction that
history does not comprise a stagnant set of facts, dates and ideologies but rather, a living
context in which understanding happens.
The Data Set
In the “war on terror,” the world is the battlefield, which makes analysis of post
9/11 historically effected consciousness a task with no foreseeable ending point. Though
I originally began with eyes wide open, excited to read every transcript of Congressional
debate, it did not take long to realize some minimization would be necessary for
pragmatic reasons.
The decision-making calculus is simple. I began by deciding to analyze the debate
in the House of Representatives and to exclude the Senate debate from the data set. The
reasoning is also simple: the debate is more robust from the beginning of the process
(during authorization) in the House of Representatives1. So quite simply, the House of
Representatives debate was chosen because it offers more data related to the earliest part
of the debate.
1 As chapter 4 will explain in greater detail, the Senate decided overwhelmingly to forego
markup of the bill once it went through a very short-lived Committee hearing. Despite
protests by one Senator—Russ Feingold (D WI), the Senate had very little to do with
shaping the drafting of the bill that would be authorized, at least little influence that could
be detected from a public perspective.
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A second decision-making parameter set was to focus on the debate in the
Judiciary Committee. This again, was a logical limitation to set because this committee is
where 90% of the debate about the Patriot Act occurs. But another reason also exists, and
it is the same reason why most of the debate occurs in the Judiciary Committee: the entire
purpose of that committee is to debate the constitutionality of laws adopted by Congress.
This committee governs the area of greatest dispute relating to the negotiation of
patriotism.
A third parameter was set to make sure that the entire chronology of the
legislative process over the Patriot Act is represented in the data. That is after all, the
focus of analysis—to see how the negotiation of patriotism changes over time. Thus, the
debate is divided into three temporal phases: phase one occurs in the immediate aftermath
of 9/11 when the Patriot Act was first implemented with a sunset clause placed on the
most controversial provisions, and set to expire in December of 2005 unless reauthorized
by Congress. Phase two occurs between the time the act was initially implemented and
when the congressional hearings over reauthorization began in the summer of 2005.
Phase three spans from the time the reauthorization process began to its ending point at
which the final decision over the reauthorized version of the Patriot Act was decided in
March 2006. Each phase of debate provides data for analysis—giving us the opportunity
to see how patriotism functions as argument throughout the duration of the legislative
process.
A fourth parameter was set to make sure each phase of the debate is represented
by more than one hearing. Doing so provides greater context and a measure of reliability
to analysis. A pattern of argumentation that shows up between two separate debates is
quite simply more meaningful than an argument that may show up in only one debate.
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The literature review speaks to the way in which the patterning of argumentation is
critical to analysis, particularly Schuetz’s (1986) discussion of “congruence” and
“corroboration” of arguments. Essentially, the more an argument is repeated throughout
the course of debate, the more it is likely to stand out and influence the “public sphere” of
discourse. This parameter of data selection is where some decisions actually required a
little more thought, at least once getting to the reauthorization stage of analysis. For
authorization and implementation, it was actually very easy—there were only two
debates in each phase that met the previously mentioned parameters.
In the authorization stage, the following debates are the representative data: 1)
Administration’s Draft Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001: Hearing before the Committee on the
Judiciary House of Representatives, that occurred on September 24, 2001; and 2) Provide
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (PATRIOT) Act of
2001: Report of the Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives to accompany
H.R. 2975 together with additional views, which occurred on October 3, 2001—this is the
markup session of the Committee following up the September 24th hearing.
In the implementation stage, the following debates are the representative data: 1)
Anti-terrorism investigations and the fourth amendment after September 11, 2001:
Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary
House of Representatives, that occurred on May 20, 2003; and 2) United States
Department of Justice: Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary House of
Representatives, that occurred on June 5, 2003.
In the reauthorization stage, more thought was required in selecting the
representative data. The reason more thought was required is really a significant
observation to make in and of itself; basically, there were actually enough debates in the
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phase to force a choice as opposed to the previous debates, which required selecting all
the available data in order to meet the previously mentioned selection criteria. After
mentioning the hearings chosen, the selection process will be explained: 1) USA
PATRIOT Act: A Review for the purpose of reauthorization: Hearing before the
Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives, which occurred on April 6, 2005;
and 2) Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act: Hearing before the Committee on the
Judiciary House of Representatives, which occurred on June 8, 2005.
Even though more thought was required in selecting these hearings as the data, it
still was not complicated. All of the provisions set to sunset during the authorization
stage were about to expire in December of 2005; so, they demanded some attention. In all
there were 12 hearings to choose from in the reauthorization stage. The two selected were
chosen for two primary reasons. The first is that one of the debates occurred at the very
beginning and one at the very end of the reauthorization stage, thus covering the entire
chronology of the stage. They essentially provide the introduction and the conclusion to
the reauthorization stage. The second reason is that they were both full Committee
hearings, whereas the nine hearings in between the two chosen were subcommittee
hearings. This in and of itself adds some measure of internal validity to the data selection
process considering that five of the six total debates at this point in data selection are full
committee hearings2.
Another justification for selecting the full committee hearings is the fact that they
draw the Justice Department witnesses who are more toward the top of the organization’s
2 The only subcommittee hearing chosen out of the entire data set was done so simply
because there were no other full committee hearings in the implementation stage to
choose from (aside from the one already in the data pool). Not selecting it would mean
violating the very important parameter of having multiple debates as representative of
each phase.
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hierarchy. Based upon John Ashcroft’s (United States Department of Justice, 2003)
testimony in the implementation stage, the top of the hierarchy provides the symbolic
leadership, whereas people lower in the hierarchy are likely to have more technical
expertise. In the first hearing selected, Alberto Gonzales, the newly confirmed Attorney
General testifies, and in the second hearing selected, the Deputy Attorney General, John
Comey is the Justice Department witness. Thus, by selecting the full committee hearings,
we get to hear from two people who are arguably the symbolic leaders of this stage of
debate.
Before transitioning out of the reauthorization stage, one final note should be
made, and it relates to a third hearing that is partially analyzed as part of the context of
the stage. It was not originally scheduled as part of reauthorization, but as Chapter 13
explains, the minority party was able to add an extra day to the reauthorization debate—it
is a continuance of the June 8, 2005 hearing. The title is: Reauthorization of the USA
PATRIOT Act (continued): Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary House
of Representatives, and occurred on June 10, 2005. It should be noted that all the
witnesses were minority witnesses but none of their testimony makes it into analysis.
Only the way in which the debate begins and ends is analyzed. It is part of analysis only
for the way in which it provides context to the very end of the public deliberative process.
Speaking of context, it is also definitely worth mentioning that a lot of speeches
outside of the deliberative process, delivered by President Bush and John Ashcroft are
analyzed at various points. There really is no method selection process involved with
those other than to say that I read most of their speeches around the times in which the
ones cited are cited. The speeches mentioned in analysis are the ones that provide the best
context for the debates standing as the official data set; in other words, they help to shape
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the meaning of patriotism negotiated in the deliberative process. Schuetz (1986), cited in
the literature review, helps to explain why this context is so important. She argues that
the policymaking process weaves in and out of the Halls of Congress and that the most
effective arguments are the ones that develop congruence and collaboration moving back
and forth. Thus, the very first chapter in each part of this project is devoted to explaining
the context behind the debate.
One last parameter pertaining to the data selection process is again, a very simple
one but one worth mentioning. While reading and analyzing the debates, I skipped
through the parts of the debate “inserted for the record.” The justification is that if the
words were not actually spoken, then no one in the public watching the debate live in
person or on CSPAN would have had the chance to absorb the message. Thus, removing




In Chapter 2 is found a summary of over fifty years worth of congressional debate
studies, beginning with Cain’s (1954) original method of rhetorical criticism and ending
with Levasseur’s (2005) adaptation of a patterned analysis of argument found in Miles
and Huberman (1994). After carefully reading these articles and the many others found
summarized in the previous chapter, I have decided that not a whole lot has changed.
Essentially, the most important component of analysis is to read the debates very
carefully. In Cain’s (1954) case, he summarized entire debates and assessed the effects
that the quintessential arguments had upon the audience. In Levasseur’s (2005) case, he
identified various ways in which “public opinion” is utilized in argument.
In the current project, goals include a) summarizing the quintessential arguments
that contribute to the negotiation of patriotism; and b) displaying the language utilized to
do so in order to provide readers with the opportunity to make their own interpretation.
Analysis involves the following steps:
1) Reading the transcripts of debate (on line PDF format) thoroughly so that general
understanding of content is obtained;
2) Reading the transcripts a second time and coding them: for those familiar with “cutting
cards” as part of the process for writing debate blocks, this essentially amounts to
“tagging” (coding) every argument made in each debate. The tag lines were typed into a
word document in pseudo outline form.
3) The tag lines standing out as ethos related arguments were typed in bold face so that
they stood out against the other arguments. Furthermore, the text of the transcripts for
which those particular taglines were written were cut and pasted over into the word
document.
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4) At this point, after all the debates were analyzed, all of the bold faced tag lines with
demonstration were read again. At this point, categories were formed around the bold
faced tag lines tending to repeat over and over again and/or tag lines that struck me as
being representative of the horizons of patriotism discussed in Chapter 1.
5) Finally, after forming the categories on a tabulation sheet, the exemplars standing out
as being most representative of the categories were chosen for demonstration via the
presentation of data chapters. Hence, those selections serve as the exemplars behind my
interpretation of the debate over the nature of patriotism.
Validity
Recognizing that a hermeneutic, or interpretive, analysis involves “subjectivity”
does not mean that it is less real or empirical than one that only involves “objectivity.” In
fact, it is more “real” than approaching the study of patriotism through any other
methodological perspective because it recognizes the imprecise, unpredictable nature of
human communication. Viroli (1997) explains why historical interpretation is the most
apropos for a study of patriotism:
Instead of aiming at forging scientific definitions of the nature of patriotism, we
should aim at understanding what scholars, agitators, poets, and prophets have
meant when they spoke of love of country. We need historical interpretation
rather than scientific theories, to uncover and understand the meaning of the
themes, metaphors, allusions, exhortations, and invectives that the language of
patriotism has been crafting over the centuries to sustain or repeal, damper,
inflame, or rekindle a rich and colourful universe of passions. (pp. 4-5)
It is absolutely mandatory though, for a hermeneutician to remember that historical
“interpretation” is not merely providing an opinion. As Heidegger writes In Being and
Time: “our first, last, and constant task in interpreting is never to allow our fore-having,
fore-sight, and fore-conception to be presented to us by fancies and popular conceptions,
but rather to make the scientific theme secure by working out these fore-structures in
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terms of the things themselves” (p. 153). The hermeneutician becomes a guide through
the development of understanding an object, paving a way for a reader to develop her
own understanding, one that benefits from, improves upon and undoubtedly criticizes this
one. Such analysis demands a fusion of interpretation, understanding and application
(Gadamer, 1960/2003), which in short, summarizes the philosophical approach being
attempted.
The Bracketing of Biases
Gadamer (1960/2003) provides ample reason to consider hermeneutics as a
rigorous, scholarly, and valid methodology by conceptualizing it as a philosophical
perspective that influences the attitude and preparation of the researcher when identifying
the appropriate research questions to be asked, more so than it influences the mode of
data collection. If a good research question is asked, then the data should speak for itself.
Looking at the history of the hermeneutic-phenomenological tradition, from Hegel, to
Merleau-Ponty, Sartre and the existentialists, to Husserl, Heidegger and Gadamer, there
is not a singular understanding to be had; not one of the seminal authors from the
tradition truly see eye-to-eye with another (Spiegelberg, 1971). And, the fact that they do
not see things in an identical way is illustrative of what is at the core of effective
communication according to Gadamer’s notion of hermeneutics (1960/2003), and that is
a “fusion” of difference. During this fusion of difference, communicators must realize
that there is no such thing as neutrality—we all have a history that we cannot escape, no
matter how hard we may try; however, what we can and must do, is become aware of our
biases, bracket them, and make them a part of inquiry. Throughout the entire, ongoing
task of finding focus for this project, the biggest challenge has in fact been the bracketing
of my own preconceptions and prejudgments.
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Political Bias
First, political bias stood in the way of intuiting—a problem that should have been
anticipated when deciding upon such a politically charged topic. In a nutshell, my initial
phase of dissertation analysis basically amounted to a bunch of Bush-bashing and it took
my adviser, Eric Kramer, pointing out in feedback to a very early draft, that a dissertation
style of description is much different than an opinion editorial, to realize the extent to
which political bias was standing in the way of rigorous interpretation. This realization
serves as a bracket to readers (as well as myself), that opinions and judgments cannot be
unlearned during the course of scholarship, but they can become part of what it is that is
being studied. By picking a topic that is so politically charged from across the entire
spectrum of politics, the task of bracketing becomes all the more challenging, but
rewarding in terms of insight gained, as it is being accomplished. During my initial
attempts at approaching this topic, I found it very difficult to stay away from questions
such as; which notions of patriotism are good? And which notions of patriotism are bad?
While these are important questions, answering them demands a value judgment, the type
of which is not appropriate in the scholarly context of writing a dissertation.
Theoretical Bias
Resolution to political bias was sought, and the resolution itself nearly turned into
another serious, more latent bias—a theoretical/methodological one—by hiding behind
the mythos of “neutrality” created through pre-established and pre-ordained theoretical
and/or methodological paradigms. My instinct was to turn to contemporary rhetorical
criticism—specifically a “narrative criticism” (see Foss, 1996) of the Bush
Administration’s war on terror. According to Walter Fisher’s (1987) narrative paradigm,
a storytelling mode of discourse is more persuasive to a lay audience, i.e. the general
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public, than is the “rational world paradigm” of argumentation. And in the war on terror,
according to Bush’s story, the terrorists are the bad guys, while the U.S. military, FBI,
CIA, allies of these government agencies, first responders to terrorist attacks, and
members of the general public who rushed to save victims of 9/11 are the heroes. But
after getting into this mode of analysis, it became clear that the reporting of the data
could have also gone in the direction of a “pentadic criticism” (Burke, 1966), a “fantasy
theme criticism” (Bormann, 1972), or a variety of other methods of rhetorical criticism as
described by Sonja Foss (1996). Quite honestly, it just felt too easy to categorize the
discourse of patriotism in such a way— I was assembling what has been called a “cookie-
cutter criticism” (McGee, 1999), which implies that by looking for something hard
enough, it will be found. The debate over the Patriot Act is simply too recent and
complex to be categorized in such a way, given that its implications for consciousness
have only begun to be discovered.
Another alternative theoretical approach was sought and it became my hypothesis
that “groupthink” (Janis, 1977) had occurred in the debate over the Patriot Act and
perhaps other post 9/11 decisions in the so-called “war on terrorism,” such as the decision
to go to war against Iraq. The thinking was that I could mask political bias by falling back
on a theory that had been scientifically deduced, making it easy to weed out the political
bias with good social science. I was prepared to review the groupthink literature, utilize a
coding schemata determining whether groupthink occurred or not (see Schroder, Driver,
and Streufert, 1967; Tetlock, 1979), and then move on to another project. While that may
very well have produced useful and interesting knowledge, as well as making the
dissertation process move much more quickly, the simplification of a communication
phenomenon bottled up in the formula of one theory, regardless of how well tested that
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theory may or may not be, seemed incomplete as per my true curiosities and expectations
for learning during the process of writing a dissertation.
Intersubjective Validity
All too often, there is a tendency in communication research to be caught up in
variable-izing communication for the purpose of predicting and controlling what is
standard and normal, so much so that a deeper meaning of the object itself is lost to the
language of significance testing and correction formulas (Kramer, unpublished
manuscript). In stark contrast, the hermeneutic-phenomenological tradition suggests that
scholarship should begin with the object itself; in fact, phenomenology has been referred
to in some circles as the “pre-science” (Spiegelberg, 1971). It “expresses a revolt against
an approach to philosophy that takes its point of departure from crystallized beliefs and
theories handed down by a tradition which only too often perpetuates preconceptions and
prejudgments” (Spiegelberg, 1971, p. 656). This mode of investigation begins with an
intuition of the world, not a hypothesis or hunch about the essence of an object, but direct
experience. Inquiry proceeds from knowledge of a phenomenon specific to one’s own
awareness, and investigation then becomes more systematic through the bracketing of
prejudices and presuppositions of the senses during rigorous interpretation. This type of
inquiry demands persistence and patience during an effort to expound upon historically
effected consciousness of which the researcher is at once a participant and an observer at
the same time. Put differently, the object of investigation is not the only “thing” on
display but ways of knowing that “thing” also become part of the investigation.
While the “scientific method” has a built-in tendency to ignore history and opinions
through its inductive methodological structures in an effort to provide for repeatable
results that are verifiable through further study, the hermeneutic pursuit attempts to
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provide for an exploration of meaning through interpretive analysis in recognition of the
fact that the researcher’s ontological views of the world, as well as epistemological
assumptions, are already a part of an inescapable history of what is being studied. So,
rather than denying that researchers have opinions and a presupposed way of viewing the
world, the hermeneutic-phenomenological tradition brackets unique, individual
perspectives as a part of the inquiry itself. This process provides a measure of
“objectivity” (not neutrality) through acceptance of different worldviews as real and
empirical and through integration of those varying worldviews during analysis.
Intersubjectivity is built into the lexicon of the hermeneutic method, making it perfectly
apropos for the study of patriotism. The validity is evaluated between an internal (or
ideally external) dialogue between author and reader. If the reader is able to feel
confident that she more or less understands my horizons of patriotism based upon the
data available alongside of the interpretation, then my study is valid even though no two
interpretations will be exactly the same.
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Chapter 4:
The War on Terror
Summarizing what Schuetz (1986) points out pertaining to the legislative process,
we understand that deliberative debate is not limited to the discourse occurring solely in
the Rayburn House Office building on Capitol Hill. Threads of discourse, regardless of
where they originate, run through the various overlays of argument and if successful,
those threads achieve a cohesive, unified statement pertaining to the advocacy of a
particular policy. In the case of the Patriot Act, because of the powerful imagery created
through the condensation symbol, the importance of recognizing the various overlays of
argument rings especially true. As Chapter 3 suggests, this makes hermeneutic analysis
so very appropriate for the current study as the text, or the data set, serves as the
organizing principle behind which this study finds a meaningful beginning and ending
point, but also recognizing that the text is irrelevant without continuous reference to
context (Gadamer, 1963/2003). Context in this case involves recognizing that the
Department of Justice’s use of patriotism as argument emanates from higher up the chain
of command than the Attorney General. In fact, it originated with the President of the
United States and began to develop almost immediately after 9/11 in the public sphere;
the patriot as symbol was formulated by President Bush and then etched more concretely
into American consciousness by the legislative process governing the Patriot Act.
President Bush Addresses the Nation
Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, with the country and world confused about what
had been seen live on television, and replayed over and over again, President Bush
boarded Air Force One and hit the skies, maximizing efforts to protect his life in the face
of impending attacks on the country. During a layover at Barksdale Air Force Base in
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Louisiana, President Bush addressed the American people to reassure them of a few
different things: first of all, that the federal government was expending too much of its
available resources to help local authorities deal with the aftermath of the attacks;
secondly, that “the United States will hunt down and punish those responsible for these
cowardly acts;” thirdly, that he has been communicating with Vice President Dick
Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the national security team, his cabinet,
Congress, and other world leaders, to do everything necessary to prevent further attack;
and fourthly that “we have taken the necessary security precautions to continue the
functions of your government” (Bush, 2001, September 11).
The War Begins
One day later, on September 12, immediately following a meeting with the
national security team in the Cabinet Room of the White House, the “war on terror” was
declared. President Bush begins his remarks to the press corps: “I have just completed a
meeting with my national security team, and we have received the latest intelligence
updates. The deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out yesterday against our
country were more than acts of terror. They were acts of war” (Bush, 2001, September
12). Then, the President demands the call for unity of the country: “This will require our
country to unite in steadfast determination and resolve. Freedom and democracy are
under attack” (Bush, 2001, September 12). Bush points out that this is a different kind of
enemy than we have ever faced before because they prey on the innocent, and run for
cover. “We will rally the world,” he says, and “we will win….we will not allow this
enemy to win the war by changing our way of life or restricting our freedoms” (Bush,
2001, September 12). Again, Bush refers to the situation as being a war. Bush ends this
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speech with yet another call for unity and initiates the either/or dichotomy that would
very quickly become so integral to the symbol of patriot. He says “I want to thank the
members of Congress for their unity and support. America is united. The freedom-loving
nations of the world stand by our side. This will be a monumental struggle of good versus
evil. But good will prevail” (Bush, 2001, September 12). By using the “good versus evil”
imagery and suggesting that the good will automatically unify behind his leadership, the
ground work is laid for his (in)famous, “you’re either with us or against us” in the war on
terror proclamation discussed below. As the remarks to the press come to a close, it is
interesting to hear a news reporter attempt to ask if the president is making an official
declaration of war; unfortunately though, the clip ends and we do not get to hear the end
of the question (Bush, 2001, September 12).
A couple of days later, on September 14, 2001, President Bush made his presence
known at Ground Zero, standing on top of a pile of rubble that once was part of the
World Trade Center, to try and raise the spirits of the people working there, as well as the
spirits of the rest of the country. It was there when the display of fervent patriotism
became fully a part of his message behind what would soon be presented as a plan for the
“war on terror.” The following represents the speech in its entirety as transcribed by
Office of Press Secretary and posted to the official White House web site.
CROWD: U.S.A.! U.S.A.!
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you all. I want you all to know…
Q Can't hear you.
THE PRESIDENT: I can't talk any louder. (Laughter.) I want you all to know
that America today—that America today is on bended knee in prayer for the
people whose lives were lost here, for the workers who work here, for the families
who mourn. This nation stands with the good people of New York City, and New
Jersey and Connecticut, as we mourn the loss of thousands of our citizens.
Q I can't hear you.
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THE PRESIDENT: I can hear you. (Applause.) I can hear you. The rest of the
world hears you. (Applause.) And the people who knocked these buildings down
will hear all of us soon. (Applause.)
CROWD: U.S.A.! U.S.A.!
THE PRESIDENT: The nation sends its love and compassion to everybody who
is here. Thank you for your hard work. Thank you for making the nation
proud. And may God bless America. (Applause.)
CROWD: U.S.A.! U.S.A.!
(The President waves small American flag.) (Applause.) (Bush, 2001,
September 14)
The text of the speech itself is of course interesting in and of itself, but what is most
interesting is something that cannot be accurately captured in text—only by watching the
clip of the speech, and that is the way in which Bush was immediately present at the point
of attack, three days following the event, and the way in which he is seemingly acting
spontaneously and naturally with the audience. Not to mention the displays of patriotism,
which are captured in the transcription of the speech, are impossible to overlook. Another
interesting remark not captured in the text of the transcript is a voice in the background
heard over the president—an interruption—screaming “God Bless America” (Bush,
2001, September 14) during the last paragraph of the speech, beginning at the point
where Bush says, “The nation sends its love and compassion…(“God Bless
America”)…to everybody who is here” (Bush, 2001, September 14). Then Bush’s speech
ends with, “And may God bless America” (Bush, 2001, September 14) The nonverbal of
Bush waving the little American flag ends the transcription and the accompanying clip on
the White House web site.
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The All- or- Nothing Dichotomy
On September 20, after building momentum for the war on terror, President Bush
began to provide a specific plan during the Address to a Joint Session of Congress and
the American People. Prior to 9/11, this speech was scheduled as the “State of the
Union” address but the rhetorical function shifted. In deference to the healing process,
President Bush articulated a somewhat altered purpose to his speech. He opened by
saying, “In the normal course of events, Presidents come to this chamber to report on the
state of the Union. Tonight, no such report is needed. It has already been delivered by the
American people” (Bush, 2001, September 20). President Bush specifically refers to
Todd Beamer, who helped bring down the fourth hijacked airplane headed to the White
House, as an example of how strong and brave Americans are—and what patriots do.
Then, the President begins to provide more understanding of what happened to
American consciousness on September 11 as well as what the country’s role is in
combating the enemies. He says, “Tonight we are a country awakened to danger and
called to defend freedom. Our grief has turned to anger, and anger to resolution. Whether
we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done”
(Bush, 2001, September 20). So, in nine long days and sleepless nights, according to
Bush, Americans had had the time to emotionally process the catastrophe and move to
resolution of the problem—the “War on Terror” which “will not end until every terrorist
group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated” (Bush, 2001, September
20). Bush described the response as involving “far more than instant retaliation and
isolated strikes” (Bush, 2001, September 20), warning that “Americans should not expect
one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen. It may include
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dramatic strikes, visible on TV, and covert operations, secret even in success. We will
starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to
place, until there is no refuge or no rest” (Bush, 2001, September 20).
In the same paragraph, Bush made the (in)famous statement that succinctly
characterizes the war on terror, giving all people across the globe an ultimatum: “We will
pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region,
now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.” (Bush,
2001, September 20). It is at this point in Bush’s speech where the lines have been drawn
and resolution to the problem begins. He says to the rest of the world that he has the
solutions; he knows how to fight the war on terror, and he has the power to win the war
whether you agree with him on how to do it or not. Either you support these solutions, or
you may very well become an enemy of the United States. One’s ethos, or credibility as
being loyal to America very much depends upon the extent to which she supports Bush’s
“war on terror.”
Economic Patriotism
President Bush of course addressed the nation many times in the aftermath of
9/11, and every speech delivered contributes to his notion of patriotism. Thus far though,
during every speech analyzed, he has described the patriotism of those immediately
involved in the war on terror: police officers, firefighters, rescuers, military members and
etc. So, what about those who are not directly involved with the war, such as myself; how
can I show patriotism? On September 16 for Mr. Bush begins to answer that question. He
opens the speech by saying, “Today, millions of Americans mourned and prayed, and
tomorrow we go back to work. Today, people from all walks of life gave thanks for the
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heroes; they mourn the dead; they ask for God’s god graces on the families who mourn,
and tomorrow the good people of America go back to their shops, their fields, American
factories, and go back to work” (Bush, 2001, September 16). Here, he makes note of the
patriotic heroes of 9/11, those who died in 9/11, and then infers upon the rest of “the
good people…from all walks of life” (Bush, 2001, September 16) that they can show
loyalty to their nation by going back to work. This notion of patriotism detaches the lay
people from the democratic process of fighting terror and delegates their patriotic roles as
simply trying to go back to life as usual. A couple of paragraphs later, Bush reinforces the
notion of economic duty to nation. He proclaims: “I have faith in our military. And we
have got a job to do-just like the farmers and ranchers and business owners and factory
workers have a job to do. My administration has a job to do, and we’re going to do it. We
will rid the world of the evil-doers. We will call together freedom loving people to fight
terrorism” (Bush, 2001, September 16). In this segment, he suggests that the job of the
people is just like his own and as equally as important—but distinctly separate and
detached—patriotism is shown by participation in the assembly line that it is the U.S.
economy. In other words, loyalty to country is conflated to a sense of economic
patriotism, with each person playing its own unique and separate part but unaware of how
the parts fit together—a theme taken up more thoroughly in Doty (in press).
During remarks to airline employees at O’Hare airport in Chicago, on September
27, 2001, President Bush again illustrates this particular notion of patriotism. First, he
recognizes airline employees as patriots who fight terror by going back to work and
serving consumers:
And we must stand against terror by going back to work. Everybody here who
showed up for work, at this important industry, is making a clear statement that
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terrorism will not stand, that the evildoers will not be able to terrorize America
and our work force and our people. (Applause.)
America understands—America understands that these have been incredibly tense
days for the people who work in the airline industry—difficult times for
stewardesses and captains and baggage handlers and people who are running the
desks. America knows that, and we appreciate –we appreciate your steadfast
willingness to fight terror in your own way. You stand against terror by flying the
airplanes, and by maintaining them. You stand against terror by loading a bag or
serving a passenger. And by doing so, you're expressing a firm national
commitment that's so important, that we will not surrender our freedom to travel;
that we will not surrender our freedoms in America; that while you may think you
have struck our soul, you haven't touched it; that we are too strong a nation to be
carried down by terrorist activity. (Applause.)
And in the next segment of the speech, Bush calls upon consumers to do their part as well
by telling them to “Get on Board”:
When they struck, they wanted to create an atmosphere of fear. And one of the
great goals of this nation's war is to restore public confidence in the airline
industry. It's to tell the traveling public: Get on board. Do your business around
the country. Fly and enjoy America's great destination spots. Get down to Disney
World in Florida. Take your families and enjoy life, the way we want it to be
enjoyed. (Bush, 2001, Sept. 27)
In this speech, we can discern what it is that the administration expected of the public in
response to terror, and that is to simply not be terrorized. While certainly well
intentioned, and arguably effective at unifying, the point is made that the citizenry needs
to play its role as dissociated consumers. Retreating to the protectionist isolation of
accumulating goods became an act of sacrifice and service to and defense of the value
system of America. The response says: “put your faith and your money into the system.
Don’t worry about things, enjoy life, work hard, but leave this terrorism thing up to me.”
This is a hallmark of the consumer mindset, putting faith in the market, an unassuming
pillar of strength and stability.
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Introducing the USA PATRIOT Act
The war on terror is of course being fought on many fronts: the war in
Afghanistan, the war in Iraq, the establishment of the Homeland Security Department, the
creation of the Director of National Intelligence position as a cabinet level official, etc.
But nowhere is the persuasive appeal of patriotism more explicitly portrayed than through
the symbolism of the Patriot Act. As Chapter 1 argues based upon the analysis of Murray
Edelman (1964), the title moves beyond referential description to become a condensation
symbol due to the way in which it embodies not only the action taken by government
through that particular piece of legislation, but also the way in which it defines the
attitude of a country as one that has formed a consensus about future action. The symbol
condenses the emotions of a nation and manipulates those emotions to forge agreement.
Ashcroft’s Call to Action
Less than 24 hours after the 9/11 attack on the country began, at around the same
time that Bush was declaring war on terror, the Department of Justice began its plan for
defense by focusing its energy on easing the restrictions placed on the capacities of the
intelligence community by Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978. Viet
Dinh, the Assistant Attorney General under John Ashcroft, led the charge in formulating
legislation that would streamline the process by which law enforcement agencies, the FBI
and the CIA gather and share intelligence—as well as other updates of law to assist in the
prevention and prosecution of terrorism. Dinh began a meeting with approximately six
policy analysts and lawyers, the small group that would eventually be the architects for
landmark legislation, by describing a conversation he had had with Attorney General
John Ashcroft: “The charge [from Ashcroft] was very, very clear: ‘all that is necessary
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for law enforcement, within the bounds of the Constitution, to discharge the obligation to
fight this war against terror” (O’Harrow, 2005, p. 150).
On September 17, during a press briefing, Attorney General Ashcroft verified
publicly the intense rush placed on adopting counter-terrorism legislation: “we will be
working diligently over the next day or maybe two to finalize this comprehensive
proposal, and we will call upon the Congress of the United States to enact these important
antiterrorism measures this week” (Ashcroft, 2001, September 17). After delivering this
call to action in the public sphere of discourse, Ashcroft specifically asked for two
different drafts of antiterrorism measures to be crafted behind closed doors. Senator
Patrick Leahy (D-VT) was charged with crafting a Senate version of the anti-terrorism
legislation and Dinh, was assigned to craft the DOJ version. From that basis, notes were
to be compared and a final draft was to be compiled and sent through Congress
(O’Harrow, 2005).
Behind Closed Doors Negotiation
Although “Senator Leahy wanted to follow a more deliberative process (through
congress) in considering major changes to America’s civil liberties” (Foerstel, 2004, p.
47), he agreed to communicate directly with the executive branch over the bill’s central
components due to intense public and DOJ pressure. Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ) articulates
an attitude that seems to have dominated the process by which the very initial drafting of
the anti-terrorism measure took place, declaring, “Our constituents are calling this a war
on terrorism. In wars, you don’t fight by a Marquis of Queensberry rules” (see Foerstel,
2004, p. 72). So, by September 19, the two versions of the bill were ready and a meeting
was called which included White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales along with Ashcroft
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and Dinh representing the Justice Department, a senate delegation led by Leahy, Orrin
Hatch (R-UT), and Richard Shelby (R-AL), and a House Delegation led by Richard
Armey (R-TX) and John Conyers (D-MI). Based upon immediate comparison of the
legislative drafts, there were many similarities and differences existing between the two
versions of proposed legislation. Herbert Foerstel, who is currently on the board of the
National Security Archive as well as the Freedom to Read Foundation, provides
comparative analysis of the bills:
Both bills updated pen register and ‘trap and trace’ laws, extending them to e-mail
and the Internet, and they strengthened wiretap laws as well. But Dinh’s bill went
much farther, modifying the FISA law to authorize domestic surveillance
whenever foreign intelligence is ‘a’ purpose of an investigation, rather than ‘the’
purpose. It also permitted the unrestricted sharing of grand jury and
eavesdropping information throughout the government and encouraged Internet
providers to tap e-mail ‘voluntarily.’ It even called for the indefinite detention of
any noncitizen the attorney general has reason to believe might further or
facilitate acts of terrorism. (Foerstel, 2004, p. 48).
Based upon the differences, Leahy reported that, “There were a lot of people in the room,
both Republican and Democrat, who were not about to give the unfettered power the
attorney general wanted” and that “we did not want the terrorists to win by having basic
protections taken away from us” (O’Harrow, 2002, p. 18). “Even Richard Armey, one of
the more conservative members of Congress, expressed concern” (Foerstel, 2004, p. 48).
So, negotiation continued in a public forum of debate.
Summary
It goes without saying that 9/11 left America and parts of the rest of the world in a
state of shock and fear. The country needed healing and it was the difficult job of
President Bush to provide that healing. He had to attempt to make sense of something
that was senseless. This task according to Rowland (1990) is the rhetorical function of
myth. Commonly a myth is often thought of as something that is inherently untrue—a
105
crazy figment of imagination. However, the more truthful a myth is, the more impact it
has upon consciousness. The reason the story of God is so powerful for instance, is
because it is “true.” As Joseph Campbell (1972) notes, myths do not have to be
historically true (this does not mean they cannot be) but they must convey “facts of the
mind.” The audience should be able to relate to the story without a great deal of thought
(pp. 10-11). In Bush’s story of the war on terror, he described in words what had
happened when most of us were speechless. The story identified the villains and the
heroes. It also quickly identified a resolution to the problem. In the minds of many




Given the extremity of the rhetorical situation, Bush’s message related to 9/11 and
the war on terror worked. During the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the country unified
around the Bush Administration and supported it unconditionally. According to the
Gallup Poll, Bush’s approval rating was 90% on September 21-22, 2001. Right around
that same time (on September 19, 2001), Humphrey Taylor, Chairman of the Harris Poll,
provided integrated analysis of the major polls, which includes the Harris, Gallup, ABC
News/Washington Post, New York Times/CBS, and The Los Angeles Times polls.
Taylor reported: “The initial public reaction has been to rally around the President, the
Congress, mayor Giuliani of New York and our national leaders. The President’s
approval ratings are in the stratosphere. For the time being, the overwhelming majority of
Americans are likely to support the initial steps taken by the President and his advisors,
whatever those are (The Harris Poll #46, 9/19/01). The public began the healing process,
and Bush was seen as the healer. Gebser (1949/1985) describes the process of healing as
a powerful act of unity whereby “individuality is obliterated in the magic realm (of the
grotto or cavern)” (p. 163). Healing is magical; it makes individual difference and
expression disappear for the cohesion of the group. The “individual loses his
individuality and is united with everything… differentiation is unknown” (p. 163).
This state of the national consciousness was the backdrop behind which the
legislative process authorizing the Patriot Act began. On September 24th, 2001, the House
Judiciary Committee met with witnesses from the Department of Justice to question them
over the drafting of the legislation that would later become the Patriot Act. Interestingly
though, it was not called the Patriot Act at this juncture; it was simply known as the
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Mobilization Against Terrorism Act of 2001—very much a referential symbol describing
the action it embodied. The title would not change to the USA PATRIOT Act until after
this hearing, but prior to the markup of the bill and the vote in front of the full House of
Representatives. The witnesses present at this hearing are John Ashcroft, Attorney
General of the United States, Mr. Larry Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, Mr.




Chairman Sensenbrenner calls the house to order. As to be expected, he begins by
paying homage to the disaster on 9/11, to those who died and to those who still had faint
hopes of finding loved ones alive underneath the rubble. He points out that he has visited
the sites and talked to many of those people. Then, he quickly gets to the point by
explaining that through discussions with Ashcroft over the bill, he has become convinced
that it needs to be passed expeditiously, claiming our homeland depends upon it:
Today this Committee will hear from the Attorney General of the United States
regarding the need for us to expeditiously pass legislation to give the Department
of Justice and our intelligence community needed prime fighting tools. From my
conversations with the Attorney General and other law enforcement officials, I
believe that there is an unquestionable need for such legislation. In fact, I am
convinced that our homeland security depends upon it. (Administration’s Draft,
2001, p. 1)
“Consequently….” Sensenbrenner says, “I have been working with Ranking Member
Conyers to come to an agreement on a bipartisan bill” (Administration’s Draft, 2001, p.
1). “To that end,” he continues, “majority and minority Committee staff have been
working tirelessly to draft such a bill, and I am hopeful that agreement is near”
(Administration’s Draft, 2001, p. 1). So the urgency of the bill is argued and furthermore,
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the assertion that agreement over the bill by both sides of the aisle is immanent through
the claim of bipartisanship—an important argument establishing a sense of unity and
agreement.
Next, Sensenbrenner claims that we cannot sacrifice the Constitution in adopting
the bill, suggesting that the bill does preserve the freedom of innocent Americans. The
Constitution is utilized as a source of ethos behind the idea that the bill will not in any
way sacrifice liberty. In the very next paragraph of text though, the Constitution is used
differently—to argue for the idea that safety needs to be defended, and further, that the
Constitution calls for the country to unify around the defense of our country and support
of the Patriot Act:
I think it also is important to keep in mind that the Preamble to the Constitution
states that that document was ordained, ‘to establish justice, ensure domestic
tranquility, provide for the common defense and to promote the general welfare
and to secure the blessings of liberty.’ Let me tell you on September 11, our
common defense was penetrated, and America’s tranquility, welfare and liberty
were ruthlessly attacked. I urge the Members of this Committee to stand united
together in recognition of the important purpose we must serve in preventing
future terrorist attacks and prosecuting those who have already attacked us.
(Administration’s Draft, 2001, p. 2)
Sensenbrenner ends his statement by addressing the concern over civil liberties, but does
so by making a direct appeal to those who may be having reservations: “I also urge
Members who have reservations about the Administration’s proposal to listen closely to
the Attorney General and to carefully examine the legislation that is subsequently
introduced. I truly believe you will find it fair and balanced and designed to meet critical
law enforcement needs (Administration’s Draft, 2001, p. 2). In other words, all that
people who have reservations about the bill need to do is listen to Ashcroft and those
doubts would fade away. Then, he again references how real and deadly the terrorist
threat is, claims that “we must do our part to eliminate this threat before another
109
devastating day like September 11, 2001” (Administration’s Draft, 2001, p. 2) and turns
the floor over to Ashcroft.
It is rather interesting though that Ashcroft is the next to speak; generally in a
proceeding like this, the ranking minority member John Conyers would deliver his
opening statement but for some unknown reason, Conyers was late to the proceeding. So,
Sensenbrenner asks consent to submit his statement for the record and continue with
Ashcroft. He also points out that due to another pressing obligation, Ashcroft can only
stay until 3:00. The hearing did not start until 2:02. This point about the hearing may
seem menial but it plays into the debate significantly in the grand scheme of things by
contributing to the perception, which becomes more noticeable in debate during the
implementation stage, that Ashcroft is generally unavailable to oversight.
Ashcroft
Ashcroft begins his testimony by thanking the chairman for the opportunity to
discuss “America’s response to the criminal act of war perpetrated on the United States of
America on September 11” (Administration’s Draft, 2001, pp. 3-4). It is important to the
entire argument of patriotic ethos to establish the idea that the United States is in a war—
a point carried through from Bush’s very early reaction on September 12th—though
recognizing that it is still not clear as to whether an official declaration of war has been
made. Immediately after the mention of war, Ashcroft applies the pressure to pass the
Patriot Act very quickly:
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, the American people do not have
the luxury of unlimited time in erecting the necessary defenses to future terrorist
acts. The danger that darkened the United States of America and the civilized
world on September 11 did not pass with the atrocities committed that day. They
require that we provide law enforcement with the tools necessary to identify,
dismantle, disrupt and punish terrorist organizations before they strike again.
(Administration’s Draft, 2001, p. 4)
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Time is of the essence. We must prepare to defend ourselves because the
atrocities like we saw on 9/11 can happen at any moment. The rhetoric of fear is used to
apply pressure to pass the law very quickly because fortunately, if passed, it can provide
law enforcement with the tools needed to disrupt the terrorist organizations.
Ashcroft continues to utilize the rhetoric of fear by discussing the ethos of the terrorists,
another important line of argumentation that seems to carry throughout much of the
debate. He points out that they are intelligent, highly organized, and well funded:
The highly coordinated attacks of September 11 make it clear that terrorism is
the activity of expertly organized, highly coordinated and well-financed
organizations and networks. These organizations operate across borders to
advance their ideological agendas. They benefit from the shelter and protection of
like-minded regimes. They are undeterred by the threat of criminal sanctions, and
they are willing to sacrifice the lives of their members in order to take the lives of
innocent citizens of free nations. (Administration’s Draft, 2001, p. 4)
At this time, Ashcroft relates the rhetoric of fear to another important argument
that becomes a mantra for the Department of Justice throughout the entire legislative
process, and that is very simply pointing out that this is a new kind of war, a turning point
in American history. Ashcroft describes the change:
This new terrorist threat to Americans on our soil is a turning point in American
history. It’s a new challenge for law enforcement. Our fight against terrorism is
not merely or primarily a criminal justice endeavor. It is defense of our Nation
and its citizens. We cannot wait for terrorists to strike to begin investigations and
to take action. The death tolls are too high, the consequences too great. We must
prevent first. We must prosecute second. (Administration’s Draft, 2001, pp. 4 -5)
The role of the department is changing from serving primarily a prosecutorial
function to serving a crime-prevention function. Terrorism has become the top priority of
the Justice Department according to Ashcroft, but he notes, “As we do in each and every
law enforcement mission we undertake, we are conducting this effort with the total
commitment to protect the rights and privacy of all Americans and the constitutional
protections we hold dear” (Administration’s Draft, 2001, p. 5). An appeal to history is
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utilized to back up his claim, arguing, “In the past when American law enforcement
confronted challenges to our safety and security from espionage, drug trafficking and
organized crime, we’ve met those challenges in ways that preserve our fundamental
freedoms and civil liberties” (Administration’s Draft, 2001, p. 5).
This appeal to history leads into an argument that I think is interesting, and it
seems to come through at several points throughout the legislative process and that is
very simply a statement that says “trust us,” we are Americans and we do not know
prejudice: “This Justice Department will never waiver in its defense of the Constitution
nor relent in our defense of civil rights. The American spirit that rose from the rubble in
New York knows no prejudice and defies division by race, ethnicity or religion”
(Administration’s Draft, 2001, p. 5). The last sentence of that argument leads into a direct
appeal to patriotism, which is not referenced with great frequency throughout the course
of debate, but is definitely present.
Ashcroft goes on to describe the American spirit as one that will unite us and
bring us out of the dark: “The spirit which binds us and the values that define us will light
Americans’ path from this darkness” (Administration’s Draft, 2001, p. 5). The light/dark
metaphor has proven quite powerful over the course of human existence. Its mythic
power derives from such stories as Plato’s allegory of the cave, the Bible’s portrayal of
the prince of darkness being fought off by the beacon of light, and many, many other
stories shaping our consciousness. In this case, the metaphor is being utilized to unify and
forge agreement over the soon-to-be Patriot Act.
In the very next sentence, Ashcroft defines the roles of the executive branch and
the legislative branch, Justice Department members are the torch carriers, ready and
willing to light up the night, while the legislative branch merely needs to set them loose
112
to fulfill their destiny: “At the Department of Justice, we are charged with defending
American’s lives and liberties, and we are asked to wage war against terrorism within our
own borders. Today we seek to enlist your assistance, for we seek new laws against
America’s enemies, foreign and domestic” (Administration’s Draft, 2001, p. 5). As is the
case with opening statements typically, and lines of questioning for that matter, the
pattern typically begins with appeals to ethos, like we have just observed here, as well as
pathos, and then the logos of the argumentation is saved for last.
Ashcroft breaks the proposed legislation down by summarizing the “five broad
objectives” (Administration’s Draft, 2001, p. 5), ones that reemerge again and again as
the debate over the Patriot Act progresses: 1) laws must be updated to reflect changing
technology; 2) “terrorism” must be granted a higher priority within the criminal justice
system considering that organized crime and drug crime are prosecuted more vigorously
than are crimes of terrorism; 3) border security must be enhanced to prevent terrorists
from freely entering the United States; 4) government must be able to seize, in addition to
tracking and freezing, the money trail of terrorist organizations; and 5) the families of the
victims of 9/11 must be granted emergency relief.
Finally, Ashcroft ends his opening statement with a direct appeal to patriotism:
Now it falls to us in the name of freedom and those who cherish it to ensure our
Nation’s capacity to defend ourselves from terrorists. Today I urge the
Congress—I call upon the Congress to act, to strengthen our ability to fight this
evil wherever it exists, and to ensure that the line between the civil and the
savage, so brightly drawn on September 11, is never crossed again.
(Administration’s Draft, 2001, p. 8)
The statement ends by claiming freedom and the nation’s capacity to defend itself
from terrorism depend upon passage of the antiterrorism measure. Furthermore, the light
metaphor is again used, and used in such a way that reinforces President Bush’s either/or
dichotomy in the war on terror, by claiming a distinct line has been drawn between “the
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civil and the savage.” The roles are also defined very clearly once again—the executive
branch has the answers for the war on terror and it is just up to the legislative branch to
give them the green light; Ashcroft urges them to do so in the name of freedom, not to
mention as unquestioning patriots.
Conyers
After Ashcroft finishes, John Conyers, the ranking minority member of the
committee makes his first appearance on the transcript. After being recognized and
engaging in some procedural bickering with Sensenbrenner, bickering which relates to
the fact that Ashcroft can only stay for 58 minutes of the hearing, Conyers begins his
opening statement by thanking the witnesses for being here today and professing that,
“myself and the Chairman of this Committee, Mr. Jim Sensenbrenner, have been working
very closely together…As a matter of fact, different Members on both sides of this
Committee, Democrats and Republicans, have been working over the weekend, as our
staffs have, and as we know you have as well” (Administration’s Draft, 2001, p. 13).
Conyers recognizes the importance of bipartisan cooperation in the matter and this
becomes a highly significant ethos related argument that resonates throughout the debate.
Ashcroft immediately reciprocates the camaraderie: “We are grateful for that, and we are
aware of the time that our staff has spent with yours, and we appreciate the cooperative
relationship” (Administration’s Draft, 2001, p. 13). Conyers then expresses appreciation
for Ashcroft and emphasizes it by making a personal guarantee that, “there is not a
Member on this Committee that is not pressed and committed to urgently produce the
kinds of additional legislation that is needed for this country and particularly for the
Office of the Attorney General to prosecute the tremendously important mission that is
confronting you at this moment” (Administration’s Draft, 2001, p. 13). Continuing with
114
the spirit of cooperation, Conyers references that the patriotic unity and cooperative spirit
enveloping the nation is a positive development…BUT…then eases into the fact that the
purpose of this hearing is to provide review:
We’re coming to grips with the tragic events that have occurred since September
11. The country appears more unified than ever to confront the problem that we’re
presented here in the United States in the year 2001. But today we’re here to
review the Attorney General’s emergency request for new authorities to combat
terrorism… (Administration’s Draft, 2001, p. 13)
The form of this argument is an important one to note as it acknowledges the importance
of unity and cooperation during the legislative process but at the same time, asserts that
unity and cooperation do not necessarily translate into agreement and instant approval.
This illustrates a subtle but significant way in which critics of Ashcroft challenge his
notion of patriotism; more analysis of this argument comes later in this chapter.
The opening statement continues by acknowledging bipartisan cooperation
between Mr. Richard Gephardt, the Minority Leader of the House and the Speaker of the
House, Mr. Hastert. Then, Conyers leads into a very similar argument but spells it out
even more clearly. He begins to chain the point together by initially pointing to a
consensus forming on many of the important provisions of the act:
First of all, there has been a great deal of consensus forming around a number of
the provisions in your proposal that you’ve presented to us recently. As a matter
of fact, I can state that we on this side of the aisle, 16 of us in number, have
agreed to ironically 16 of the provisions within your proposal, 16 of them.
They’re before our drafting Committee, being put into a bill as we speak.
(Administration’s Draft, 2001, p. 13)
“Now, we’re working hard. We’re willing to burn the midnight oil…” says Conyers,
“BUT (emphasis mine) it’s hard for me to understand how if the proposal offered by our
friend, the Chairman from this Committee, Mr. Sensenbrenner—how we will be able to
employ a 10 a.m. markup on a proposal that has never been explained before the
Members” (Administration’s Draft, 2001, p. 13). Conyers makes an attempt to cooperate
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as much as he can, but in order for members in the House to do their jobs, they need
time…much longer than Ashcroft is willing to wait. Immediately, Conyers frames his
argument a bit differently again pointing out that it is a bipartisan argument:
In other words, we’re at close agreement, Mr. Ashcroft, but we’ve got to see the
writing, and we’ve made some small changes, but I think that there are Members
on both sides of this Committee, Democrats and Republicans alike, who are
prepared to move on 16 of these proposals incorporated in the draft of ideas that
you’ve presented us with, and I hope that we’ll be able to do that. It would
expedite everything that we’re doing quite rapidly. But I think that you must also
take into cognizance that there are a number of provisions in your measure that
give us constitutional trouble. (Administration’s Draft, 2001, pp. 13-14).
At the very end of this paragraph of text, criticism begins to pick up steam a little bit—
after slowly and carefully building up to it through acknowledgement of cooperation,
bipartisanship, and even the belief that consensus has been reached on many issues.
He continues this argument by referencing A.C.L.U. witnesses and other
university organization witnesses whom would follow Ashcroft (though after looking and
looking, I can not find where any minority witnesses testified until the implementation
stage of debate). Conyers points to indefinite detention as one issue in particular that
critics are concerned with and prefaces the criticism with an appeal to Ashcroft’s
patriotism—tough on terrorists—and then a BUT…the same pattern of argument alluded
to above: “We’ve got to get these guys, but indefinite detention has not been allowed by
the courts up ’til now. So we know, without too much other discussion, that we may have
some problems here on this issue” (Administration’s Draft, 2001, p. 14).
Then as Conyers concludes his opening statement, he is more frank when talking
about the proposed change to wiretapping laws:
Permitting information for illegal wiretaps performed abroad against United
States citizens to be used in the Federal courts, as the Administration proposals—
proposes, is—well, some have said it’s unconstitutional on its face. Let me be
more polite. We’re deeply troubled. We’re deeply troubled by it. And there are at
least a half dozen other sections that I don’t even know how I’m going to go on
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them until I’ve discussed it with the distinguished Members of this Committee
and witnesses that we will be calling forward. (Administration’s Draft, 2001,
p.14)
In a very straightforward way, he argues that while some of the proposed legislative
change can be agreed to without debate, there are a few provisions that are troubling and
need discussion. In closing, Conyers even alludes to the fact that critics are willing to
expedite the normal process to get the policy passed as soon as possible: “So what I want
to assure you is that at the same time that we want to rearm you with the tools that you
need, and know that at the same time you’re conducting the fight already, you can’t wait
for this legislation, I want to assure you that this Committee is doing everything that it
can possibly do to expedite that happening” (Administration’s Draft, 2001, p. 14)
BUT...it has to be slowed down a little:
Now, know that the United States Senate has already indicated that they may be
weeks away from a resolution. I’m not trying to slow you down, but there’s no
point in us trying to mark up a measure that we agree on tomorrow morning if it
hasn’t come from the printer, and we already know that the U.S. Senate Judiciary
Committee under the esteemed Chairman Leahy has already indicated that they’re
talking about weeks. (Administration’s Draft, 2001, p. 14)
Conyers stresses that he himself is not personally or intentionally trying to slow Ashcroft
down—it is just how responsible policymaking gets done, even when that process is
being expedited; it can not happen overnight. He alludes to the fact that the same has
been said about the process in the Senate as well. Conyers ends his opening statement
with a gesture of friendship and cooperation—an expression that we want to do things
your way within reason: “So this is a discussion between friends of how we get all this
together and move forward in the manner that you’ve described to us. And I thank you
for your kind attention” (Administration’s Draft, 2001, p. 14).
Ashcroft Responds To Conyers: “Trust Us…Deliberation is Bad”
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Immediately after Conyers’ opening statement, Ashcroft is given the chance to
respond. He begins by expressing how cooperative he has been in inviting members from
the majority and the minority to the closed- door meetings:
I do want to recognize the fact that over the course of the last maybe 10 days, I’ve
been working with individuals from the Minority Leader of the House to the
Committee Chairman in the Senate. We’ve had lots of time together. The Ranking
Member and I have spent time together. The Chairman and I have spent time
together. We’ve invited the leadership of Committees of both Houses to confer
with us about this measure, and we—we believe that this is a measure that
should—that is the result of collaborative effort and work, and so there is reason
for us to have substantial agreements. (Administration’s Draft, 2001, p. 14)
He says at the end of this statement that because of this collaboration, there is substantial
ground for agreement. As far as the disagreements are concerned though, Ashcroft
essentially says that America is just going to have to trust that the Department of Justice
is taking the necessary precautions to ensure that the controversial provisions are not
being taken too far: “In regard to the areas where there are disagreements, I must say that
we are confident that we have carefully considered those, that they are merited not only
by the circumstances, but that they pass constitutional muster, and that they will serve
America well” (Administration’s Draft, 2001, p. 14).
Then, Ashcroft’s true feelings on the matter of public deliberation are spelled out
with more detail:
I would just indicate that in regard to the pace of things, I think this is a time for
leadership. I think we would be ill-advised to find a reason that someone else
might be slowing down and indicate that we didn’t understand the urgency that
was appropriate to the ability to protect the American people. It’s our position at
the Justice Department and the position of this Administration that we need to
unleash every possible tool in the fight against terrorism and to do so promptly,
because our awareness indicates that we are vulnerable and this, our vulnerability,
is elevated as long as we don’t have the tools we need to have. (Administration’s
Draft, 2001, p. 15)
Referring to the speed of the process, he makes two very important points. First of all, in
a time such as this, we need leadership to take charge and make the tough decisions by
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themselves. Secondly, slowing down the process with public deliberation is “ill-advised”
and makes us more vulnerable to attack.
Questions Begin
As the opening statements suggest, there is no question among those charged with
leading the country that legislation needs to be passed to update existing law; where the
legislative battle is brewing is over the process to be utilized. How much influence would
the legislative branch have on the process? On one side—the executive branch’s side, a
push is made for deference to leadership, an appeal to trust them during this time of crisis
not to overstep their bounds, and to minimize discussion as much as possible so that the
Department of Justice can go about its business of becoming a crime prevention agency
over and above their traditional role of being a prosecutorial agency. On another side of
the debate, the minority side as represented by John Conyers, deference is given to
leadership during this time of crisis. Some leeway in the process is granted given that
many of the provisions are not controversial by consensus; however, as Conyers points
out, to skip the deliberative process, as Ashcroft would like, would mean that the
legislative branch is not doing its job. That would be dangerous according to the minority
leader because there are a few very troubling provisions in the proposed legislation.
During the transition from opening statements to questions from members,
Chairman Sensenbrenner summarizes the crux of the debate while addressing both
Ashcroft and Conyers directly. While addressing Ashcroft, he seemingly argues in favor
of Conyers by claiming while he does foresee an expedited process over many of the
provisions, and that the process should not be done away with:
Mr. Attorney General, let me say that I am very strongly opposed to breaking this
bill apart into several pieces. There are some easy provisions in your submission,
and there are some difficult provisions. I think when we get the information, we
should make a decision on the difficult provisions and let the Committee
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procedure in the House of Representatives work its will. (Administration’s Draft,
2001, p. 15)
But then he also lets Conyers know that his appeal to keep pace with the Senate (as
proposed by Conyers) will not work because he is independent minded. Very simply he
says, “Let me also state that I have never been guided by how fast or how slow the Senate
wants to work…” and Furthermore, “…sometimes they (the Senate) have much more
difficulty making up their mind than we do” (Administration’s Draft, 2001, p. 15). So,
Sensenbrenner sets the tone that he wants to see the normal process, as expedited as it
may be, run its course; at the same time though, he asserts himself as a strong,
independent leader who will not be influenced by outside pressure.
The first person to ask questions, Mr. Gekas (a majority member), does not
directly address the debate over ethos but instead asks a fairly uncontroversial question
beckoning the Attorney General to clarify the President’s recent executive order
pertaining to the seizure of assets and how that policy gets worked into the current bill.
The question asks if people, who in good faith, contributed to a charity that funneled
money to terrorist organizations could be accused of terrorism. Ashcroft says no…and
questions continue (Administration’s Draft, 2001).
Don’t Take Questions Personally
Barney Frank (D MA) is the second questioner and he immediately chimes in on
the debate over ethos and the state of the democratic process. It is interesting to note that
he calls this “the procedural point” as distinguished from the “substantive points” he
makes a bit later in his line of questioning. He first reassures the Attorney General that
everyone knows he is giving his best effort, and then goes on to say that responding to
9/11 is a tough job that no one wants to do and that no one should do alone:
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General, on one the procedural point, you submitted legislation, I guess, last
week, which represented your best effort. And no one’s good will is in question
here. We’re all trying very hard to do jobs that, frankly, none of us feel fairly
adequate to do. This is a terrible task that none of us ever contemplated having to
do when we got here, and we’re doing our best. And I think it’s a time when the
collective wisdom is very likely to be better by far than what any one of us could
do. I certainly benefited from that. (Administration’s Draft, 2001, p. 16)
Frank explicitly tells Ashcroft that criticism should not be taken personally and that
collective wisdom is going to produce better results than if one person tries to do it all.
He goes on to say that previous collaboration between the majority and the minority has
improved the bill, “while diminishing some of the concerns we would have had, and
we’ve been able to do that by working together between Thursday and today….” Pointing
out that “Another week would make it do even better” (Administration’s Draft, 2001, p.
16). He asks for more time to collaborate, and again reinforces the idea that criticism
should not be taken personally, collaboration is the way to go: “It’s no criticism of your
work product to know that no one can excogitate the perfect bill here, and working
together helped. We’ve already been able to make some improvements and enhance the
area of agreement” (Administration’s Draft, 2001, p. 16). Finally, Frank begs Ashcroft
for more time to collaborate before rushing into markup: “I would ask urgently for
another week to be able to do more of that rather than have us rush to a premature
markup tomorrow” (Administration’s Draft, 2001, pp. 16-17). Then, Frank moves onto “a
couple of substantive questions” (Administration’s Draft, 2001, p. 17) related to
surveillance and asset forfeitures.
He begins the line of questioning by referring the audience to the smear campaign
lodged against Martin Luther King by J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI Ashcroft’s answer to
Frank’s line of questioning was very brief. In 2-3 sentences, Ashcroft recognizes that
status quo safeguards for a wrongful asset seizure should remain in place and
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acknowledges that the leakage of personal information about the subject of investigation
is unlawful. He did not address the first part of the questioning concerning the procedural
issue of needing more time to ask questions. Frank’s time expired and it was the
majority’s turn to ask questions.
All or Nothing
The third questioner is Howard Coble (R NC) and he begins rather
inconspicuously; he does not really address the ethos related debate. Instead, he asks a
couple of substantive questions. One question had to do with why characterizing certain
computer crimes are classified as acts of terrorism under the new law. The second
question asked about a hypothetical scenario concerning whether 9/11 would have
happened if the new tools Ashcroft was asking for were in place at that time. Ashcroft
answers the first question by simply pointing out that, computer crimes can cause serious
damage to the infrastructure and kill people, so they should be taken very seriously.
Following, an important ethos related argument begins to develop. Coble announces that
he knew that and that he just wanted it on record to clarify the matter: “Yeah. I wanted
that on the record, General, because some folks might think that was too far-reached. I
just wanted it on the record” (Administration’s Draft, 2001, p. 18). At this point, the
underlying message of ethos comes forth. Of course it is impossible to know exactly to
whom Coble is referring when he says, “some folks.” My interpretation is that the phrase
is intended to include anybody who questions the DOJ’s proposal for change to computer
surveillance laws—in other words, anybody who questions the proposal in any way just
does not understand the magnitude of the threat by terrorists. This claim plays into the
either/or dichotomy—there is a distinct line existing between good and evil—you either
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support the administration’s attempt to combat terrorism or at best, you just do not
understand it; at worst—you are yourself a terrorist. There is no middle ground.
Admittedly, this interpretation of Coble’s argument does demand some reading
between the lines and probably never would have made the final cut of dissertation
analysis without having the benefit of reading Ashcroft’s immediate reply:
Well, you and I obviously are on the same page. We understand that these kinds
of crimes can threaten the lives and well-being of multitudes of individuals, and
they are far above the garden variety crime of—and I don’t mean to say there’s
something easy about car theft or personal assault, but when you get into
threatening systems and structure and infrastructure, it’s substantial.
(Administration’s Draft, 2001, pp. 18-19)
This seems to confirm the way in which the all-or-nothing dichotomy is built into the
Administration’s rhetorical response to terrorism. Those who agree with the department’s
response understand the threat and value “the lives and well-being of multitudes of
individuals;” whereas those who question proposed changes are not on the same page and
do not understand what is going on. This completely disregards the middle ground that
seems to be taken by many critics (at least the critics in this particular policymaking
arena)—the notion that most, if not all, of the provisions the Department of Justice are
asking for are necessary, as long as there are more checks built into the system of
accountability. The all-or-nothing dichotomy does not allow for such a criticism to be
taken seriously. It says to the interlocutors in this debate and the public paying attention
to the debate: “accept this proposal as-is or don’t accept it all.”
A Challenge to Ashcroft’s Patriotism
Shortly after injecting the all-or-nothing ultimatum into the debate, a reminder is
provided that Ashcroft has to leave as indicated earlier in the debate. Despite the voicing
of concern by Conyers, he did leave as promised, though not before he praised the ethos
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of his assistants who, according to Ashcroft, probably have more technical expertise on
the matters than he does.
The debate continues through the questioning of Thompson and Chertoff. But rather than
continuing to analyze the debate in chronological fashion, it seems more prudent here to
shift gears a bit by beginning to thematize the various ways in which the competing
notions of patriotism are carried through during the remainder of the hearing. We
recognize that Ashcroft, the Justice Department’s leader, put forth his ideal patriotism
and now it is left to his cohorts to defend that ideal. From analysis of Ashcroft’s opening
statement above, and his answers to a few questions, some significant themes emerge.
We learn that the deliberative process needs to move along expeditiously, because the
terrorists are evil and crafty, and because the country needs to unify around this bill out
of what Ashcroft presents as a rather obvious sense of patriotic duty. As Ashcroft begins
to entertain questions, we learn that questions in general are bad because they slow
passage of this bill and thereby make the country more vulnerable to attack. We are also
persuaded that we should defer to the country’s leadership during times of crisis and trust
the Department of Justice. Passage of their proposal is an all-or-nothing issue: it is
complete and perfect. It is the patriotic thing to do.
However, we also recognize that there are critics, on both sides of the aisle, who
wish to alter the notion of patriotism by buying more time for careful debate and
negotiation. The critics have been very careful about how this notion of patriotism is
challenged; they have to be sensitive because of the rhetorical situation, not to mention
panic and fear on the ground. The careful way in which they have broached the topic has
been to 1) acknowledge that they fully support the goals of the proposed legislation—just
not all of the finer details by which the goals are carried out; and 2) praise Ashcroft and
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the job he has done—suggesting that criticism should not be taken personally and that
questions are only meant to be constructive in a spirit of collaboration. But clearly, more
than anything else, critics of the Justice Department want to buy more time so that the act
can receive some thoughtful legislative review. That is the patriotic thing to do. Thus, the
crux of the debate is staged: do patriots defer to leadership in times of crisis by refraining
from asking questions, or do they ask questions?
Negotiating the All-or-Nothing Dichotomy
There is plenty of evidence to suggest that Ashcroft’s message of patriotism was
quite compelling, aside from the facts that a) he more or less got the Patriot Act bill that
he wanted at the end of this stage of debate and b) his message of patriotism ran parallel
to the President of the United States who had a record setting 90% approval rating. Aside
from those contextual matters, further evidence comes through interpretation of the
debate itself. One of the first observations made about the pattern of critics’
argumentation, and this is noted much earlier in the chapter, is the way in which many
critics appear to feel obligated to rhetorically nestle themselves inside of Ashcroft’s
patriotism, before suggesting a subtle adaptation of it.
As discussed earlier and made evident while analyzing Conyers’s opening
statement, a fairly common form for the introduction of criticism is to begin by almost
granting Ashcroft’s notion of patriotism as true, and then slowly moving away from it.
The form is essentially: I am strong on terror and/or I do show support to the
government’s leaders and/or I do support many of the provisions of the act…BUT...I do
wish to express a concern. Many members of the House throughout this phase of debate
display this form when posing questions or making criticisms of any kind. In all, criticism
is introduced this way 16 times during the course of this hearing by 10 different members
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of the committee—seven members of the minority party (Conyers, Frank, Nadler, Scott,
Lofgren, Jackson-Lee, and Waters) and three members of the majority (Goodlatte,
Chabot, and Bachus). Zoe Lofgren (D CA) provides perhaps one of the more illuminating
exemplars of this form of argument. She actually repeats it twice. In the first instance, she
acknowledges some things that could get passed expeditiously before suggesting there is
a problem, and in the second instance, she states that she does not want to get into a
debate:
Now, frankly, looking at this draft, I think there are some things here that all of
us agree about and that we could do very quickly. I think there are some areas that
with some further working we might quickly come to an agreement. And I think
there are some areas that have serious flaws. And without getting into a debate, I
do have a very strong concern, Mr. Dinh—and I didn’t have a chance to talk
about this over the weekend—but the—that the indefinite detention is a real issue,
because there is no time line during which the deportation proceedings must be
undertaken. And so the effect really, I mean, and the Court’s been very clear, and
even recently in terms of those who cannot be deported because of persecution or
failure of the origin country to accept the deportee, that you can’t keep someone
in indefinite detention and be constitutional. So we are going to need to work
through those issues. (Administration’s Draft, 2001, p. 30)
Lofgren’s comment about “avoiding getting into a debate” is certainly puzzling. If a
hearing before the Full Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives is not a time
for debate, when is? She is doing her best to express concerns and seems to feel the
pressure of conformity-as-patriotism. Furthermore, the argument is a sensible and
strategic counterargument. In an indirect way, Lofgren is counteracting the all-or-nothing
dichotomy posed by Ashcroft’s vision of unification. By first saying that she does not
stand in the way and that she in fact agrees with much of the proposal, and then
suggesting that there may be problems with it, she makes criticism seem more “patriotic”
according to the rhetorical situation.
Spencer Bachus (R AL) provides another illuminating example of this
phenomenon within the argumentation from the other side of the aisle; he is a Republican
126
and thus a majority member of the committee. Here, he specifically refers to some of the
main ideas within Ashcroft’s proposal and acknowledges how useful they are:
First of all, the Attorney General said that really the purpose of this legislation is
to, number one, take care of new technology; in other words, update our statutes
because of modern technology. And we all understand where you have mobile
phones, e-mails, computer activities, you need to be able to track those people and
their activities. And I think we all agree that we need to update antiquated
statutes. He also said that this is to confront the uniqueness of the terrorist threats
that we have today. Well, I mean I’m going to accept that, having accepted those
things, we all understand that and I think support it. (Administration’s Draft,
2001, p. 39)
In this case, Bachus makes specific reference to the all-or-nothing dichotomy created
through the rhetoric of unification. He points out that he can agree with many ideas of the
proposal…BUT…have disagreement with some parts. Bachus then proceeds to argue
that one of the provisions in the proposal violates the 4th amendment and engages
Chertoff on the issue.
While noticing this form of argumentation may seem like a menial observation to
make, it is actually very important to note when paying attention to the pressure debaters
were under due to patriotism as argument. Before anybody can question the proposed
policy, it appears prerequisite that they first explicitly justify their credibility as patriots,
or at least as people, who will not stand in the way of the patriots, regardless of the
constitutionality of the proposal. While this form of argument may come across as a
defensive argumentative stance, and it did to this interpreter initially, there is an
embedded offensive strategy to it—and that seems to be to slowly build toward the goal
of espousing a different notion of patriotism. The function is to counter the all-or-nothing
dichotomy built into Ashcroft’s patriotism. When critics explicitly point out that
disagreement with one provision of the act does not translate into complete rejection of
the whole thing, the all-or-nothing vision of unity is countered and arguments against the
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act are more easily acceptable as patriotic. They attempt to preempt an attack on their
own patriotism, while also setting the stage to begin to alter the administration’s notion of
patriotism.
We Need More Debate!!!
Using an exemplar from Mr. Bachus at the end of the previous section provides
for a nice segues into the section describing the extent to which critics attempt to
reformulate the construction of patriotism within the debate. Mr. Bachus, after easing into
some of his frustration over the bill, begins to show some of his true frustrations while
arguing with Chertoff over the 4th amendment issue previously mentioned. During the
interaction, Bachus asserts that the department is in the position of being able to pick
which evidence is disclosed and when. Chertoff is attempting to provide an example of
how the Justice Department protects the 4th amendment and is interrupted by Bachus. The
brief exchange follows:
Mr. CHERTOFF. Well, let me give you a real practical example of
something that happened. There was an investigation involving——
Mr. BACHUS. No. And let me say this. I know you can always
take an example where this is called for, but, you know, the fourth
amendment says we don’t search someone’s house until they’re
given notice. Otherwise—— (Administration’s Draft, 2001, p. 40)
At this point, it should be noted that the argument in which the DOJ manipulates the
disclosure of evidence occurs a great deal more during the implementation phase of
oversight—the 2003 debates. There is no precedent at this point for changes to the tools
at the Justice Department’s disposal. Nonetheless, this little bit of dialogue offers an
example of one way in which critics attempt to alter the flow of the rhetorical
construction of patriotism in this debate. When we get to the implementation phase, we
will see it much more frequently, and arguably, to more effect.
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Other instances exist though during the present debate in which people are
obviously (some more obvious than others) attempting to amend a notion of patriotism
through their own offensive line of argumentation. During 11 instances for examples, five
different minority members (Frank, Nadler, Scott, Jackson-Lee, and Waters) and one
majority member (Barr), begged for more time to debate the issue. Frank for example,
immediately after complimenting Ashcroft on a fine job and letting him know that
criticism is not personal and that better legislation will come through cooperation, argues
a sense of urgency behind the need for more time to cooperate over the markup of the
bill: “I would ask urgently for another week to be able to do more of that rather than have
us rush to a premature markup tomorrow” (Administration’s Draft, 2001, p. 16-17). In
another example, Robert Scott (D VA), a minority member, more directly attacks the
ethos of the Justice Department, when he argues that rushing the process and passing bad
legislation, like what is happening, is letting the terrorists win: “I too want to express my
frustration about the time limitations. The terrorists could not undermine our freedoms,
but as we consider this legislation that might be exactly what we’re doing”
(Administration’s Draft, 2001, p. 26-27). Clearly, this runs directly in opposition to
Ashcroft’s notion of patriotism.
In one or two instances, a direct notion of patriotism is even discovered. Maxine
Waters (D CA) argues, alongside of the we-are-being cooperative preemption, that we
cannot let the current national mood of unity prevent us from having a long,
philosophical debate over what needs to happen to protect safety while balancing liberty:
And I’m hopeful that because of this mood that we’re in, and we have to be in,
that we are not placed in the situation where we are being asked to do things that
normally we would have a long debate on and a tremendous fight, just based on
where we’re coming from philosophically. Civil libertarians are afraid of being
rushed on this kind of legislation. And many of us feel very strongly about the
Constitution. And while we have been very cooperative and we have bent over
129
backwards, we’re going to draw the line. We have to draw the line. And we
cannot be rushed into allowing this tragic moment that we’re in at this time to
cause us to support violation of privacy and the Constitution. (Administration’s
Draft, 2001, p. 38)
Then she argues that there is no reason to ask the questions she has because there is
simply not enough time for them to be answered: “I’m not going to ask you any particular
questions because I don’t think you can answer them at this point. It’s just too much. And
the way we’ve been doing this today does not lend itself to the kind of work that could
get us serious results” (Administration’s Draft, 2001, p. 38). Waters does call the
department’s ethos into question over the way in which they are carrying out the
deliberative process.
Even though Waters, Bachus and others do suggest change in the current course
of the democratic process, and hence patriotism, it should be noted that these arguments
have been prefaced by a nod to Ashcroft’s patriotism. The previously mentioned
deliberators in this section of analysis are also found to have begun their lines of
argumentation with an, “I don’t want to stand in the way…BUT…” argument. The way
in which they attempt to slip this reformulation of patriotism in is strategic; it speaks to
the pressure they were under and the way in which they responded to the pressure—
preempting an attack on their own patriotism, while also trying to get their criticisms
across. Sheila Jackson Lee (D TX) provides an example of the way in which this
reformulation is made. She begins, after thanking Sensenbrenner for recognition, by
pointing out that there is not enough time for questions, and references the debate over
legislation after the Oklahoma City bombing as an example; then the warrant of her
argument is made very casually:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is obvious by the extended questioning of
the Members that this is not enough time, though I do want to thank the
gentlemen, thank General Ashcroft, who I wish could have stayed, and thank the
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deputy Attorney General, Mr. Thompson, as well. My opening remarks will
simply be I ask that you take a message back. I believe some four or five years
ago, when we entered into this process, in 1996 I believe, we had four days of
markup. I would ask that the message be taken back that there are many of us who
want to do the right thing. We want to do it collaboratively. We want to do it in a
bipartisan way that respects the rule of law. (Administration’s Draft, 2001, p. 33)
After asking that the message “be taken back that there are many of us who want to do
the right thing,” she defines what the right thing is: collaboration, bipartisan debate, and
in such a way that “respects the rule of law,” asserting that not having enough time for
questions, her original premise, is the cause for potential constitutional trouble.
There is one notable exception to the way in which critics approach the
reformulation of patriotism, and this exception comes, interestingly enough, from a
majority member of the committee, Bob Barr (R GA). Though it must be noted that while
he was elected to the House as a member of the Republican party, his true political
affiliation is to the Libertarian party—a party which claims to think like a Republican
when it comes to economic issues, but like a Democrat when it comes to issues of civil
liberties. The party members state they are essentially opposed to big government in any
way. Regardless, Barr is listed as a majority member, and was one of the most vocal,
direct critics of the witnesses in this debate.
Barr accuses the Department of Justice of taking advantage of 9/11 to gain powers that
they had been seeking for a long time. He begins by expressing concern over the
provisions of the act that have nothing to do with terrorism and then attacks the ethos of
the DOJ officials (of which only Dinh and Thompson were present at the time of his
questioning):
Does it have anything to do with the fact that the Department has sought many of
these authorities on numerous other occasions, has been unsuccessful in obtaining
them, and now seeks to take advantage of what is obviously an emergency
situation to obtain authorities that it has been unable to obtain previously, even
though the government cannot tell us in the Congress, with any degree of
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certainty or with any specific examples, that had these authorities been available
to the government prior to September 11, they have some confidence that these
events could have been prevented. (Administration’s Draft, 2001, p. 32)
Then, Barr utilizes the credibility of bipartisanship to extend the argument that the
definition of terrorism according to the proposal is not exclusive enough. Following, he
attacks the witnesses’ credibility again by accusing them of speaking in generalities and
not providing enough time for questions:
I really would appreciate something more than just generalities, if you all could.
Why it is necessary, without proper hearings, without due deliberation and input,
to dramatically change provisions of U.S. criminal law and criminal procedure
across the board simply to attack the problem of terrorism, and why would the
Department not agree to simply address those provisions that do relate to
terrorism, which we can all agree on—there are some gaps in the government’s
current arsenal to fight terrorism—but allow us somewhat more deliberative
process to address these other fundamental concerns and across-the-board
changes. (Administration’s Draft, 2001, p. 33)
So, it is interesting to note just how distinct Barr’s participation in the process is from the
general pattern of participation by other members. Rather than acknowledging the
administration’s rhetorical construction of patriotism, and maneuvering around it, he
directly attacks that notion head on, by going after the ethos of those who espouse it, in
an effort to construct his own patriotic ethos. He is the only one of the critics in this
debate who did not enter into his line of argumentation through a, “I really agree with
most of what you have to say…BUT…” approach.
The Justice Department Retorts
In the grand scheme of things, readers need to know that according to the
researcher’s interpretation, this current stage of debate is not overly contentious—at least
compared to what is to come during later stages of the process. Yet, recognizing that
Ashcroft’s patriotism was questioned to some extent, and also recognizing that Ashcroft
left after less than an hour of deliberation, his cohorts from the Justice Department were
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left to extend his arguments while answering questions from the members of the
committee.
“You can trust us”
A significant line of argumentation that emerges from Ashcroft’s testimony above
is a simple declaration that “you can trust us,” and that it is okay—in fact necessary to
defer to our leadership ability. This argument appears seven times throughout the course
of this hearing and is made at some point by all three witnesses provided by the Justice
Department. In this next example, Chertoff is responding to the criticism lodged by Barr,
which is described in more detail above. The criticism is essentially a fourfold argument,
creating a direct attack on ethos: 1) officials are taking advantage of the actual disaster
and the subsequent rhetorical situation to gain power that they have craved for a long
time; 2) the definition of terrorism in the bill is not exclusive enough to distinguish from
other crimes; 3) that officials do not have the time to answer questions directly and thus,
are 4) speaking in generalities rather than directly answering specific points of inquiries.
Chertoff immediately responds to Barr’s criticism: “I’m—I don’t think I’m going to have
the time to address each one of those items. But I do want to try to address some of them
and talk generally. I think the Department was very careful when we put this together not
to engage in the temptation to treat it as a laundry list of all the things we wished we
could have” (Administration’s Draft, 2001, p. 33).
The response is interesting for a number of reasons, the first of which is the fact
that within the answer, he grants Barr’s fourth argument claiming that witnesses are
speaking in generalities. He states that during the first two sentences of his response. But
the second reason why it is interesting is that after acknowledging the very general nature
of his reply, he simply declares that they were “very careful when we put this together
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not to engage in the temptation to treat it as a laundry list of all the things we wished we
could have” (Administration’s Draft, 2001, p. 33), as if that is all we would need to
accept it. Chertoff makes a statement about the state of mind of the authors of the act—
something that cannot be verified one way or the other from the perspective of a logos-
based argument. We simply have to take his word for it that this is true. In all, this
argument was used a total of seven times during the course of this hearing by all three
Justice Department witnesses.
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The Benefit of the Doubt
Continuing with the previous response to Barr’s argumentation, Chertoff goes on
to say, “That’s not to say that {the provisions} don’t have relevance in some instances to
other kinds of crime. But they’re, all of them, related quite specifically to what we need
to do to be more effective fighting terrorism” (Administration’s Draft, 2001, p. 33). So,
he does speak to the logos of the argument and attempts to very generally explain the
relevance standard required for what some call blurring the line between criminal
investigations and terrorism investigations. Then, he claims to specifically “address some
of the issues that you’ve raised, Congressman” (Administration’s Draft, 2001, p. 33). He
says, “You’ve talked about the need to share FISA information, foreign intelligence
surveillance information. Well, by definition, that involves national security information,
either terrorism or espionage, and I think we can all agree that those are critical threats to
the United States. What we’re trying to do is, as Mr. Thompson said, is make sure one
hand knows what the other—” (Administration’s Draft, 2001, p. 33). He gets interrupted
by Barr who asks for further clarification and unfortunately, his time runs out before
getting into any type of discussion that might actually clarify the issue. But, the response
given by Chertoff speaks to the administration’s use of ethos. He addresses Barr’s
question very generally by simply saying that terrorism and espionage are both very
dangerous crimes, and then he says, “I think” everyone in this debate can agree to that.
By saying “I think,” the implication is made that he is not quite positive that Barr can
agree; yet, he gives him the benefit of the doubt.
The benefit of the doubt argument becomes an integral part of the Justice
Department’s construction of patriotic ethos. Although I have only detected it one time in
this particular debate, it does show up later during the markup debate presented in
135
Chapter 6. It is to be sure a very subtle way of claiming that critics are either really, really
confused, or that they support the cause of terrorism. It contributes to the overall
construction of patriotic ethos by finding another way to frame the all-or-nothing-
dichotomy. In the quotation above, Chertoff equates agreeing with the idea that terrorism
is dangerous with agreeing that the administration’s policies are necessary. Chertoff has
delivered a non-sequitar argument, i.e. even if the premises are factually correct, they do
not lead to the conclusions drawn. There is no room for, according to the administration’s
view of patriotism, agreeing with the fact that terrorism is dangerous but at the same
time, thinking that the policy proposal needs more work. To question the potential
infringement of civil liberties is unpatriotic—or at least less patriotic than not
questioning.
All-or-Nothing
As the core of the entire Bush Administration’s call to unity, the all-or-nothing
argument is pervasive during the defense of the Patriot Act. It shows up at least five
different times by one member of the majority party in the House (Coble) and two
different witnesses from the Justice Department: Ashcroft and Thompson (as well as a
related benefit-of-the doubt argument just demonstrated in Chertoff’s discourse). The
exemplars from Coble and Ashcroft have already been alluded to earlier in this chapter.
So now, we’ll turn our attention to Thompson’s discourse, and doing so perhaps most
vividly demonstrates how the dichotomy manifests in the debate—both the current
hearing but also down the road as the deliberative process gets more contentious. In the
current example, Thompson is responding to an argument that was introduced earlier by
Scott, a minority member. As explained previously, Scott did begin the line of
questioning by first arguing that more time is needed for debate, but also acknowledging
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that agreement about many of the provisions would likely be easily reached. After
qualifying the ethos related arguments, Scott makes a logos based criticism suggesting
that there is not enough distinction between terrorism and general crime in the bill and
that because of this, the law blurs the line between terrorists and other criminals.
Thompson’s response ignores the question entirely, opting to generalize about the
importance of enacting the Patriot Act:
Congressman, the ability of the Intelligence Community to share information with
law enforcement authorities and vice versa is critical to our fight against
terrorism. The situation is the left hand has to know what the right hand is doing.
This is a problem with respect to our foreign intelligence investigations. This is a
problem that has really plagued some of our cases that the Department of Justice
has. (Administration’s Draft, 2001, p. 27)
This answer clearly does not address the question Scott asks and jumps to the sweeping
generalization, the all-or-nothing dichotomous assertion, about the ethos of critics in
general. He is implying that questioning the law is a signal that the questioner wants to
maintain the “wall” between intelligence agencies and law enforcement officials.
Critics are Impulsive
While not quantitatively impressive in this stage of debate, the “critics are
impulsive” argument does enter the discourse and is worth noting especially because of
the way in which it becomes quite pervasive as part of the debate during later stages. In
the following, Chertoff and Thompson were both responding to a line of questioning
posed by Bob Goodlatte (R VA) who incidentally began his line of questioning by
saying, “I strongly support this legislation, with some concerns that some elements of it
need some fine-tuning, and I’d like to address some of those” (Administration’s Draft,
2001,p. 25). He is defending his ethos by supporting the legislation up front—making it
very clear that he will not stand in the way of it being passed. He is a good patriot.
But…then he goes on to ask questions of clarification about the pen register and trap and
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trace devices. He points out that with pen registers and the monitoring of phone calls,
only phone numbers appear, whereas with the monitoring of e-mail messages, much more
information would be more readily available in the subject line of an e-mail than in a
telephone number. Goodlatte asks about how the new law would address this gray area.
Thompson begins answering but then turns it over to Chertoff, who answers with a
logical explanation that the protection would occur in the same way in which privacy is
protected during pen register monitoring of phone calls. The subject line is not recorded,
and the content of an e-mail message is ignored unless there is enough suspicion to get a
search warrant. Goodlatte then asks one last question, one pertaining to the difficulty in
distinguishing between terrorism and crime in general. Chertoff responds:
Again, Congressman, I understand the impulse behind that. But let me say that
often when you commence a criminal investigation, it doesn’t come labeled
terrorist or nonterrorist. In fact, this provision, and a number of the provisions
really address inconsistencies in the law where under one type of technology we
are able to do one thing, but emerging technology has created a gap in the law.
There’s no change in the privacy protection substantively. We’re trying to just
even the playing field. (Administration’s Draft, 2001, p. 26)
Chertoff calls the importance of limiting terrorism legislation to specific instances of
terrorism, as distinguished from “crime,” an “impulse.” Impulses do not derive from
rationality but rather from a gut, visceral reaction. His language choice here definitely
conveys a point about the ethos of critics—they do not think rationally. We will see
during later stages of the debate, the accusation of thinking impulsively devolves to the
accusation of thinking hysterically.
After the subtle attack on Goodlatte’s ethos, Chertoff goes on to explain that
distinguishing terrorism from criminal activity is not important:
As to those types of issues, there’s no reason to limit it to terrorist activities. And,
in fact, it will often be the case that terrorist groups engage in other kinds of
criminal activities to finance or support their terrorism. So I think if we’re going
to be comprehensive and make sure we are not merely locking the barn door for
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the last horse, but we’re locking the barn door for the next horse, we have to
address some of these technological gaps right now. (Administration’s Draft,
2001, p. 26)
And on that note, analysis of the 9/24/01 hearing comes to a close, giving us the first
glimpse at the way in which Bush’s message of patriotism has worked its way into the
policymaking arena.
Summary
We have seen the way in which the major lines of argumentation related to ethos
were set up during the opening statements; we have seen the types of
questions/argumentation posed to the majority witnesses in relation to ethos, and we have
considered the responses to those criticisms. Very clearly, even prior to the existence of
the title, “USA PATRIOT Act,” the meaning of patriotism as argument can be discerned.
John Ashcroft began the debate with the argument that any public deliberation about the
act is bad; it is a dangerous waste of time—action must be taken immediately to preserve
safety. When critics argue that there must be more debate, Ashcroft and supporters
respond by framing the Patriot Act as an all-or- nothing, now-or-never issue. They also
frame themselves as trustworthy and capable—ready for this new authority without any
need for public debate. Additionally, the argument is asserted that critics are either
impulsive and misguided at best, or traitors at worst.
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Chapter 6:
Markup and Passage of the Patriot Act
As analysis from this chapter progresses, it appears that for a while the critics in
the House of Representatives may have struck a balance with the Justice Department
concerning the need to debate the Patriot Act. The spirit of cooperation appears high in
the 10/03/01 markup session. The simple fact that they had a markup at all involves far
more deliberation than was occurring in the Senate. There, negotiation was being
conducted almost solely behind closed doors. We are very fortunate to have the
journalistic reporting of people such as O’Harrow (2002) and Foerstel (2004) to help fill
the analytical gaps. Their access to the insiders of the debate, as well as their in-depth
interviewing helps connect the dots of the legislative process.
Talk Won’t Solve Terrorism: The Senate Caved
Late in September, Jim Dempsey, the Executive Director of the Center for
Democracy and Technology, was invited by Beryl Howell, a senior advisor on Leahy’s
staff, to another meeting between the Justice Department and legislative representatives
so that the decision making process could be influenced by an expert who is a third party,
much like the common practice at official legislative hearings3 (Foerstel, 2004). Though
it is important to note that no witnesses invited by minority members were allowed to
testify at any point during the authorization stage of the process. When the DOJ officials
arrived at this meeting, “they were livid” over Dempsey’s presence. According to
Dempsey, “They explicitly said, ‘we don’t think outsiders should be here, and we won’t
talk unless they leave the room’” (O’Harrow, 2002, p. 18). Ultimately Dempsey was
3 Dempsey would become a witness in the legislative proceedings during both the
implementation stage (this testimony is data for this project) and the reauthorization stage
(this testimony did not make the data pool).
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allowed to remain in the room as long as he did not say anything. The Justice Department
officials made their presentation and promptly left without taking questions. A few days
later, another meeting was held between Howell and Timothy Flanigan, White House
Deputy Counsel, to discuss wording in Leahy’s bill, and Leahy was convinced that some
compromise had been reached which provided an increased level of judicial review prior
to the sharing of information between the intelligence community and law enforcement
agencies.
But on October 2, during another closed-door meeting, “Ashcroft quickly made it
clear that he would no longer abide by the agreements negotiated with Flanigan”
(Foerstel, 2004, p. 48). Leahy was angry and told Ashcroft so. He said, “‘John, when I
make an agreement, I make an agreement. I can’t believe you’re going back on your
commitment’” (O’Harrow, 2002, p. 26). Following the meeting, Ashcroft held a press
conference at which he proclaimed “I’ve asked the Congress very clearly for additional
tools to reduce the risk of further incidents. And I believe it is time for us to understand
that tools can reduce the risk of terrorism; talk won’t” (Ashcroft, 2001, October 2).
Obviously, Ashcroft was not interested in deliberating about the legislation—he wanted
immediate action, voicing open resentment toward talk.
At that point, Leahy “was deeply distressed by the collapse of the deal. He felt the
administration was intent on steamrolling over him” (O’Harrow, 2002, p. 26). But Leahy
could not see that there was anything else he could do. After surveying members of
Congress, he realized there was no way the Senate could put up a fight: “He would have
to rely on the House to fight that battle with the administration” (O’Harrow, 2002, p. 27).
When it came time for the Senate to markup the bill, Leahy’s fears proved to be true.
Both he and Daschle realized that the Justice Department was going to get exactly what
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they wanted out of the bill regardless of the fight they put up; thus, they felt it was
necessary for the Democrats to go along. The only member to stand against the process
was Russell Feingold. Despite intense pressure from Daschle, Feingold felt obligated to
resist the administration rather than put up a fight. His concern was that the legislation
did not contain adequate civil liberty safeguards.
Despite his effort, his own party shut down every amendment proposed; leaders
of both Republicans and Democrats desired unanimous consent. On October 11, 2001,
after learning that the bill would probably not even be made available for markup,
Feingold stood up on the Senate floor and made the following remarks, hoping to inspire
debate:
If we lived in a country where the police were allowed to search your home at any
time for any reason; if we lived in a country where the government was entitled to
open your mail, eavesdrop on your phone conversations, or intercept our e-mail
communications…based on mere suspicion that they were up to no good, the
government would probably discover and arrest more terrorists….But that would
not be a country in which we would want to live…Preserving our freedom is the
reason we are now engaged in this new war on terrorism. We will lose that war
without a shot being fired if we sacrifice the liberties of the American people in
the belief that by doing so we will stop the terrorists. (p. S10570)
Feingold then attempted to submit one last amendment. In response, Majority Leader
Tom Daschle (D-SD) replied, “We have a job to do. The clock is ticking. The work needs
to get done…I hope my colleagues will join me tonight in tabling this amendment and
tabling every other amendment that is offered, should he choose to offer them tonight.
Let’s move on and finish this bill” (p. S10575). Ashcroft and those who supported the
rushed process got their way, and no markup whatsoever occurred in the Senate over the
Patriot Act. Ultimately, the Justice Department’s draft legislation passed the Senate
Committee 96-1—Feingold was the only person to vote “nay.”
The House Committee Markup on 10/3/01
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Despite the absence of debate in the Senate, some momentum seemed to be
generated in the House to have deliberation—though everyone recognized the importance
of expediting the process, taking care of the most pressing difficulties, and ensuring more
careful review later on down the line. Following the 9/24//01 hearing, DOJ staff members
went back to work on a draft to put before the Judiciary Committee for mark-up on
10/3/01. As will be seen, the proceeding was amicable, for the most part. Most members
of the House, including the more vocal critics such as Bob Barr from the 9/24/01 hearing,
seem to concur that the process that had transpired was a good one under the
circumstances. Everyone agreed that something needed to be done rather quickly to
update the existing laws; most felt that there was agreement over the proposed ways in
which those changes should be implemented, and now, they felt that they had scored a
legislative victory by extending the deliberative process for a couple of weeks rather than
a couple of days so that some of the more controversial provisions could have adequate
legislative review. The result of that process is that most members felt comfortable with
what had transpired given that the sunset provisions mandating they conduct a more
thorough review at a later time (The original sunset provisions were set to expire after
two years; however, the final product of the bill had them expire after four years instead).
Though there were some amendments proposed and passed—they were non-
controversial ones. Most of the controversial amendments were withdrawn by those
proposing them, under the auspices of cooperation, unity and the promise of coming back
to them at a later time. For the amendments that were proposed and not withdrawn, the
process for rejecting them is short and sweet—and in many cases, the Justice
Department’s notion of patriotism is used to do so. From the vantage point of this project,
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given the unusual level of harmony and agreement during the markup, it seems that
analysis should be brief, so as to parallel the discourse being analyzed.
The Title Changes: PATRIOT as Symbol
Despite the amicability, there are definitely some very interesting parts of the
discourse: the way in which the agreement carries through the course of the markup, the
procedure of the markup itself, and a few cases of disagreement. But perhaps the most
interesting part of the debate is something that does not even get mentioned until after the
markup is over—an afterthought to the debate itself, and it has to do with recognizing the
symbolism of the title. As we recall, the original title of the bill, from the 9/24/01 hearing
was the Mobilization Against Terrorism Act of 2001. The title was referential in the sense
that it described the actions intended within the text of the bill. But entering the markup
session, the title had been switched to the USA PATRIOT Act (see Chapter 1).
The following quote is also provided in full here because it is noteworthy as the
first clue emerging from this legislative process that set this study in motion. The quote
comes from Barney Frank (D MA) who does vote for the authorization of the act but
regrets the way in which it was carefully titled. He begins to express regret by drawing
attention to the “subject of the power of words,” and he says that, “I want also to express
my disagreement with the decision to construct an awkward title for this bill so that it
yields the acronym ‘PATRIOT’” (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 433). He goes on
to say that there has been an outpouring of patriotism on the part of virtually every
member of this legislative body, which is a very appropriate thing to do during a time of
crisis. But “invoking the word PATRIOT in the context of this bill gives the unfortunate
impression that those who disagree with it are not patriots” (Provide Appropriate Tools,
2001, p. 433). He states he voted for the proposal and he is proud of the policy change
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found therein because he does believe there is a proper balance of liberty contained in the
legislation; however, he also feels uncomfortable knowing that to say otherwise would,
by definition, label one as unpatriotic. He concludes by saying, “I wish we had not
chosen a title for the bill that in any way reflects on their good faith in expressing that
disagreement” (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 433).
Opening Statements
Sensenbrenner
Chairman Sensenbrenner opens the session by announcing that it would be “a
little bit different than the procedure that we have utilized in the past… because it is
important that the Committee report this bill out today” (Provide Appropriate Tools,
2001, p. 289). In fact, he goes further in warning the members that, “it is also the Chair’s
intention to keep the Committee in session until we have a final vote on reporting the bill
out” (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 289). In order to accomplish this, many of the
normal procedures generally utilized to stimulate debate and discussion are minimized.
One of the changes includes limiting opening statements to himself and Minority Leader
Conyers; all others who wish to make an opening statement are advised to submit it for
the record.
Sensenbrenner then calls the house to order and begins his statement by
acknowledging the ethos of the terrorists:
On September 11th, not only our Nation but our entire way of life was attacked.
From the moment that the first plane smashed into the North Twin Tower, our
lives were changed forever. The sordid acts of the 19 men and the elaborate
network of organizations that support their cause have opened our eyes to the
clear and present danger that threatens our great country. Now that our blinders
have been removed, the question is how we will act to help prevent future attacks.
(Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 289)
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The terrorists changed our lives forever. They “opened our eyes” to the danger they pose
to the country. But our “blinders” have been removed and now we have to ask ourselves
what we can do to protect our country. That is we have met today says Sensenbrenner,
“with one purpose in mind, to provide law enforcement with important additional tools to
help prevent this sort of catastrophe from ever happening on U.S. soil again” (Provide
Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 289). Then, he proceeds to define what a true patriot is:
A true patriot is one who loves, supports and defends his or her country. In the
days and weeks following this horrific act, it has become clear to the world that
the United States is a nation of patriots who through the selfless act of the New
York firefighters and rescue workers, the heroism of the passengers on Flight 93,
the charitable donations of our citizens’ blood and money and the proud display
of our most enduring symbol of freedom, the American flag. The united efforts of
this country are reflected in the bipartisan efforts of this bill, which I was pleased
to introduce with the Ranking Member, Mr. Conyers, along with the
cosponsorship of 18 bipartisan Members of this Committee. (Provide Appropriate
Tools, 2001, p. 289)
Because a true patriot “loves, supports and defends his or her country,’ he/she will
support this bill because the “united efforts of this country are reflected in the bipartisan
efforts” of passing it. Passing the bill is placed upon a patriotic pedestal right beside the
firefighters who raced into buildings that were doomed, the passengers aboard Flight 93
who prevented a fourth attacking airplane from hitting its target, the charity of the
country’s citizens, and all of this is represented through the symbolism of the American
flag. Not voting for the bill TODAY means violating all of those principles according to
not only the rhetoric of the title of the act but also according to the way in which
Sensenbrenner opens the markup session by referencing that very symbolism.
Continuing, Sensenbrenner reports, “the bill represents the essence of compromise,”
meaning that “the left is not completely happy with this bill, and neither is the right, but
certainly does not represent the Justice Department’s wish list. I think it means we have
got it just about right” (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 289). This legislation is
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important because the rules of the war on terror are “vastly different than the wars this
country has fought in the past” (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 289). We do not
know who the enemy is and because of that, we have to approach the safety of our
country in a much different way than we ever have. This bill, according to Sensenbrenner
helps us to develop “new weapons” for a “new kind of war” (Provide Appropriate Tools,
2001, p. 290). He then reiterates that it “is required that we take action today,” because
we need new weapons; he also reinforces that this legislation is bipartisan.
After a long ethos based introduction, Sensenbrenner gets into the logos of the
message. It is essentially the same talking points Ashcroft gave in the opening statement
of his testimony during the 9/24/01 hearing, and in fact, Sensenbrenner references that
speech. So, I will avoid repetition here by going over those points again. One point that
does stand out though as being a bit different than what Ashcroft describes earlier, or that
anyone else does for that matter is an attempt to turn the civil rights arguments back on
the critics who make them:
Of equal importance, the bill will not do anything to take away the freedoms of
innocent citizens. Of course, we all recognize that the fourth amendment to the
Constitution prevents the government from conducting unreasonable searches and
seizures, and that is why the Patriot Act will not change the United States
Constitution or the rights guaranteed to citizens of this country under the Bill of
Rights. Of course, the first civil right of every American is to be free of domestic
terrorism, and this bill ensures that right by strengthening our Nation’s law
enforcement for the protection of all Americans and to ensure domestic
tranquility. (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 290)
Now we of course know the first amendment to the Constitution as stated in the Bill of
Rights is actually the freedom of religion, press and speech. It is the second amendment
that calls for a well-regulated militia to protect the security of Americans. It seems to me
that Sensenbrenner reverses the order here a bit in his statement, almost (and quite
nonchalantly) recognizing a tradeoff between safety and civil liberties but claiming that
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during a crisis, safety should come first—a much different tone than anything we have
been exposed to up to this point in the debate. The tone change is subtle, and probably,
without a close textual reading of the debate, went unnoticed. Furthermore, the tone is
quite temporary occurring only during this one part of one speech. But, in juxtaposition to
the phenomenological interpretation of patriotism in Chapter 1, this notion whether
intentional or otherwise, is more patriotic from a rational-critical perspective than the one
predominately taken by the Bush Administration in the post 9/11 era—the magic-mythic
mode suggesting that we put all our trust in them because they have it figured out.
Sensenbrenner then closes his opening statement by suggesting that the process
has worked—“we have produced the means to address many of the shortcomings of
current law, and to improve our law enforcement ability to eradicate the terrorism from
our borders while preserving the civil liberties of our citizens” (Provide Appropriate
Tools, 2001, p. 291). He thanks his staff and the minority staff for their hard work and
collaboration. He also thanks the Bush Administration “for making Justice Department
officials available to brief Members of this committee at almost any time and place”
(Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 291). Finally, he once again urges members of the
committee “to support this delicate compromise legislation…I believe there is an
unquestionable need for this bill. In fact, I am convinced our homeland security depends
upon it” (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 291).
Conyers
Mr. Conyers begins his opening statement by acknowledging that, “In my tenure
on the Committee, I have not experienced the degree of cooperation between the majority
and minority that has been displayed over the last two weeks on a bill as complex and as
possibly contentious as this.” Though “there is still work to be done,” according to
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Conyers, “we are off to a good start” (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 291). A
special thanks is then given to Sensenbrenner for preserving a regular order on passing
the legislation explaining “It is well known that many prefer that the Administration
proposal be taken directly to the floor, but I believe that in the national interest order is
preserved, and we reach a better result by taking the additional time required to go
through this Committee” (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 291). This is a tough task
he argues and claims that naturally there will be well intentioned “conflicting interests
and inclinations” during this time of tragedy; deciding the right way to go is a difficult
task. On the one hand, “My friends in law enforcement tell me that they can be trusted
not to abuse the sweeping new powers that they have requested, and I love to believe my
friends in law enforcement,” but on the other hand, history has proven that putting this
level of trust in the government’s leaders is an unwise thing to do “regardless of what
political party might have been in charge” (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 291). He
briefly references infamous events that occurred during the Civil War, World War I,
World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War to illustrate his point. In the same
vein here as in times past, “there have also been anguish(ed), sometimes strident cries, for
a rush to judgment. Let us get this out fast” say some, and we recognize the need for an
expedited process, but “at the same time, the Founding Fathers did not intend the
Congress to be a passive part of government, especially in times of crisis when the Bill of
Rights may be threatened. So as much as I want to help John Ashcroft do his job as
effectively as possible, it would be irresponsible to give him a blank check” (Provide
Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 291).
Conyers points out though that on the other hand, his friends representing civil
liberties groups claim, “there is no need to broaden the wiretap and surveillance laws”
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(Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 291), which he just can not agree with. Conyers
does believe that the laws need to be updated, but notes that part of the updating process
should make sure that we do not “treat immigrants as our enemies” (Provide Appropriate
Tools, 2001, p. 291) because diversity is the cornerstone of America and that certain parts
of the Justice Department’s initial proposal included provisions, such as indefinite
detention, that would indeed threaten the diversity we cherish. Additionally, according to
Conyers, the legislation should also include a new office for the Justice Department that
would oversee all civil liberties abuses and that greater penalties should be imposed upon
those members of law enforcement or intelligence gathering agencies who commit such
abuses.
In closing, Conyers asks, “Is this a perfect bill?” The answer is no, “but it does
represent a marked improvement over the Administration’s initial proposal” (Provide
Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 292) There are things that we still need to work on in the
future, and we will, but we have reached a point where “it is imperative that as we hold
this markup and move on to the floor, we continue to work together in good faith and
seek common ground. Our Nation deserves no less…” (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001,
p. 292). Conyers ends with a direct reference to patriotic unity, one that is compromised
but not passive.
Proposing Amendments: Evidence of Unification
Conyers and Sensenbrenner both indicated they had struck a proper balance
allowing them to move the bill through committee TODAY and onto the floor for a vote
while also providing enough checks on the bill’s enforcement for the time being; another
part of their duty for which they seem to feel proud is that the legislation they have
drafted together mandates that they come back in the near future to continue deliberating
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over, at a minimum, the most controversial provisions of the bill. This was mandated
through the sunset provision of some of the bill’s most controversial provisions. It is
interesting that the sunset was only discussed one time during the 9/24/01 hearings, by
Chris Cannon (R UT), yet the promise of future collaboration on the bill is so much a part
of the patriotic duty as espoused through the bipartisan efforts of the House Judiciary
Committee. I can only surmise that the notion of sunsetting certain provisions was
primarily negotiated behind the scenes. It is interesting to note though that the Senate was
not able to get a sunset into their draft of the bill, and the fact that there was a sunset at all
rests solely on the efforts of the House. It is also interesting to note that the House was
going for a two-year sunset; whereas the sunset that made it into the final draft of the
Patriot Act was a four-year sunset. The sunset though, is indeed an important part of the
patriotic discourse coming from the House Judiciary Committee, it recognizes that an
expedited process is necessary due to the national crisis at hand, but it also guarantees
that whatever may be glossed over and/or missed during the course of the expedited
process will be given proper review at a later time.
Nonetheless, the critical arguments coming from the Chairman of the Judiciary
Committee and the Ranking Member seem to form a cohesive message of patriotic ethos.
The key components of that message are: 1) we should feel proud that we have done our
job as a check on the executive branch—the deliberative process has worked; 2) we
have done so in an unprecedented collaborative sort of way; 3) we must continue to
collaborate and compromise TODAY so that we can get something approved; and 4) we
should take comfort in compromise because our level of unity and commitment will solve
any discrepancies through future deliberation. These four components of the message of
ethos coming from the opening statements set the tone for the rest of the day, making for
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a process that is relatively quick and easy. Most seem to buy into this message and back
away from amendments that do not seem to have a clear-cut majority opinion behind
them; the ones who resist by pushing forward with their more controversial opinions are
basically brushed aside. Then, there are some amendments that are not controversial and
are accepted through expedited process. So, the strategy for analyzing the way in which
amendment proposals in this committee markup are dealt with deliberatively are to
thematize the way in which they fit into the mold of the opening statements.
Non-Controversial Amendments
At the very beginning of the amendment proposal stage of the markup hearing, we
see the theme of unification emerge. Rick Boucher (D VA) was the first to offer an
amendment. He joins with Bob Goodlatte (R VA) and Chris Cannon (R UT) to do so.
The amendment, according to Boucher, “would merely ensure that nothing in the act
imposes a mandate on communications service providers to redesign or modify their
equipment, their facilities, their services, their features of system configuration in order to
comply with the mandates of this act” (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 293).
Boucher argues the Department of Justice never intended for this happen and that the
amendment just clarifies. As he was about to finish making the pitch, he was interrupted
by Sensenbrenner; Boucher yielded by saying, “this is noncontroversial, and I would be
pleased to yield to the gentleman” (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 293)
Sensenbrenner agreed 100% with Boucher about the change being noncontroversial and
he simply wanted to expedite the process by saying: “I thank the gentleman for yielding.
This is a constructive provision to the bill and it says the bill will not impose any
technological obligation on any provider of wire electronic communications service. That
is not the intent of the bill, and I think that this clarifies this” (Provide Appropriate Tools,
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2001, p. 294). Conyers quickly jumps in and says, “I would like the gentleman from
Virginia to know that I think this is a constructive addition to the bill” (Provide
Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 294). Boucher thanks both of them for their support.
Goodlatte, a co-sponsor of the amendment speaks up in support of it and then
Sensenbrenner calls for a quick vote, the ayes have it and the markup proceeds.
The theme of the day is cooperation, agreement and the expedition of the process.
The mode of discourse is designed for speed. Another interesting example of a
noncontroversial amendment comes a bit later in the debate when Mr. Frank proposes an
amendment that has to do with enhanced surveillance, and he clarifies his ethos right off
the bat by saying, “I am a supporter of enhanced surveillance authority properly used…”
BUT… we need to “put in the right due process provisions” (Provide Appropriate Tools,
2001, p. 310). His amendment has to do with what happens if surveillance information is
inappropriately released and suggests that there be something in the law specifying the
type of legal recourse available, i.e. that it is a civil violation open to litigation. He
justifies by turning to past abuses, “the problem comes when the human beings, often
politically motivated by either party who are in charge, will in some cases use this and
will use embarrassing information. Embarrassing information was released about Martin
Luther King” (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 311) for example. He goes on to say
that there is probably is not anybody who has nothing embarrassing about them that they
would not want to be made public. If there is, he says jokingly, then “that person has my
sympathy. That kind of is a dull life to live” (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 311).
Specifically, toward the end of his speech, he specifies a $10,000 statutory minimum if
the complainant can show damages.
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Sensenbrenner immediately accepts the amendment: “We are prepared to accept
this amendment…” he says, “I think the gentleman’s points are very well taken” (Provide
Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 312). Mr. Conyers humorously acknowledges his agreement
as well, while asking a question of clarification: “I thank the gentleman for the yielding
and I would not want to disparage those who may be more virtuous than some of us on
the Committee. But are lawyers compensated for this proposal, Mr. Frank?” (Provide
Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 312). The answer from Frank is “yes,” if the lawsuit is won.
Jerrold Nadler (D NY) also acknowledges acceptance by saying, “I am glad to hear that
this amendment is being accepted…” (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 312) but I just
have one small request for a couple of tiny changes in terminology. Those changes are
agreed to. Zoe Lofgren (D CA) makes a similar appeal…and Frank says, “I apologize. It
was certainly my intention…” (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 312) to make those
items evident in the drafting of the amendment. Let us be sure and clarify. So, the
amendment passes without any controversy and a lot of outward displays of cooperation
and unity.
A similar discussion happens at the beginning of the debate over title II as well.
Henry Hyde (R IL) introduces a money laundering amendment as a cumulative effort of
himself, Mr. Ballenger, and Mr. Lantos, all from the International Relations Committee.
The amendment states that anyone who has ever been involved with money laundering,
and tries to enter the country, is automatically denied access. Frank supports the
amendment and says that this idea has been left out of the process so far and that maybe
the bill does not quite do enough. He suggests that the Administration’s bill addresses the
issue and that maybe we should take a look at what it does as well. Sensenbrenner raises
the question of whether it is in the jurisdiction of this committee, but then a couple of
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other people speak up and say that they have been communicating with INS officials
about it and that there is agreement due to the fact that the bill seeks to limit terrorist
financing. Jackson Lee chimes in and says that she supports the amendment but thinks we
should be cautious about making the standards for inadmissibility too high. Lofgren
praises the bill but points out that the technology is not where it needs to be to truly
enforce it, but she suggests that discussion here may generate support for it.
Sensenbrenner then tries to bring the call for a vote forward but Bachus chimes in with
support of the bill, but suggesting that there needs to be better coordination between law
enforcement and the INS. Scott asks if there is a means for somebody who is on the list in
error if there is an opportunity to be rectify the error. Hyde answers yes, there is. Finally,
Frank speaks up and says he supports the bill but that he would like to see more checks in
the process for people who are denied access to the country.
Sensenbrenner calls for a vote and the amendment is passed easily. There was
some good discussion over the issue. Several people even stepped forward and,
notwithstanding the fact that each speaker first voiced support for the amendment, and
also voiced concerns about how to improve it for the future. No speaker expressed
interest in improving it in the present. The amendment was passed without altering it in
any way, or making any sort of official revision of it. Expediting the process was the
priority—surpassing the need to protect innocent people from the bill’s provisions.
Another example of unifying without controversy comes at the end of debate over
title II when Sensenbrenner and Conyers offer a managers’ amendment, designed to
expedite the process and move things along quickly based upon agreement prior to the
official markup session. It should be noted that a similar sort of manager’s amendment
was attempted at the end of title I debate that did not work so well—with Sensenbrenner
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and Waters attacking each other’s credibility. However, the second manager’s
amendment went much more expeditiously than the first. Conyers begins by saying,
“Ladies and gentlemen of the Committee, I want to thank the Chairman, both our staffs
and you for considering seven additional proposals that will shorten our work for this
evening considerably” (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 380). Then he summarizes
the seven amendments: 1) “a provision worked out between ourselves and the
Department of Justice to craft an amendment to the bill’s extraterritoriality provision to
ensure that it contains safeguards passed by this Committee last year” (Provide
Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 380); 2) an adjustment to the survivor benefits for the family
of public officers lost in the line of duty (from $100,000 to $250,000 per family); 3) the
Keller amendment to study the feasibility of the law enforcement agencies sharing
terrorist information with airlines; 4) Barr’s amendment to limit Justice Department
decision making to high ranking officials; 5) Barr’s amendment to distinguish between
police officers and private security guards; 6) the Canon amendment which would allow
victims of terrorism to collect money from states that sponsor terrorism; and 7) the
Nadler-Jackson amendment that would require the Attorney General to justify indefinite
detention every six months for each person detained.
Conyers ends by saying “I implore your considered support” (Provide
Appropriate Tools, 2001,p. 381). Sensenbrenner adds his encouragement for support and
again reminds the members that the managers’ amendment is an effort to expedite the
process: “Reclaiming my time, let me say that is as a result of a bipartisan effort that has
been worked out by the staffs on both sides. One of the purposes of this is to shorten the
time that we are all here, and I would urge the Members to speedily adopt this
amendment and yield back the balance of my time” (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p.
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380). Their pleas for an expedited process worked and all seven components of the
managers’ amendment were passed virtually unscathed. Though, I should note one minor
disagreement that ended up not affecting the vote, or slowing down the process much.
Robert Scott (D VA) asks Mr. Canon a question about one of the amendments and did
not get a favorable response. So, Scott reports for the record that, “to save time, I would
just announce that if a separate vote were taken, I would oppose this particular
amendment” (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001,p. 381). He did not explain why; nor did
he suggest he would put forward any other type of argument that might slow the process
down—he just wanted that said for the record. Aside from that Jackson-Lee asks a couple
of questions for clarification that are answered quickly and then a vote is called for and
the amendment passes without objection.
Withdrawal of Amendments
Perhaps the largest typology of discourse in this markup debate is one that struck
me as the most odd. The phenomenon of withdrawing amendments, before a vote can
even be taken was highly prevalent. The first example of this is the second amendment
discussed overall, but which never gets officially offered. It is one that attempts to clarify
further the issue brought up in the first amendment overall as introduced by Boucher—
the one that was overwhelmingly accepted in a unified fashion and specified that non
content information was to be excluded from trap and trace device searches of the
internet. Goodlatte, who was also a cosponsor of the previously mentioned amendment
passed without objection, delves deeper into the issue by bringing up the question of how
“content” is defined. While the logos of the question is certainly interesting, what stands
out most about the discussion from the vantage point of this study is the way in which he
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brings the issue up without actually offering the amendment up for a debate and a vote.
He simply wants the report language on record for future reference:
Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk, which, based upon conversations
with you and with Chairman Smith, I do not intend to offer, but I want to reach an
understanding with the Chair as to how he intends to approach this problem. The
amendment deals with the issue of defining what is content when you move pen
register and trap and trace legislation on to the Internet. (Provide Appropriate
Tools, 2001, p. 294)
A bit later in his amendment introduction, after briefly explaining more about why the
definition of content needs to be addressed, he mentions the fact that agreement on the
amendment was not attainable prior to the markup, helping to explain why he is actually
refraining from offering it, but also specifying why he is bringing it up at all:
We have attempted to work on language. We do have language that we have
shown to other Members of the Committee that we have not yet reached
agreement on, but it would be very helpful if there were report language included
within that made clear that this legislation does not include content and gave some
definition of what that content is. (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 295).
Sensenbrenner responds to the non-proposed amendment by pointing out that Goodlatte
is simply trying to clarify the intent of what the Justice Department currently has toward
current legislation. He suggests that we will work on clarifying the language before the
bill goes to the floor for final approval: “The gentleman states what the intent of the
legislation is precisely, and that is that the pen register and trap and trace provisions are
not to get into content of these types of electronic communications but merely where they
have come from and where they go to” (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001,p. 295). Then,
Sensenbrenner confirms the process to be used by which the language will be clarified. It
seems to be the process Goodlatte is going for and will occur away from the public’s
view between the markup hearing today and the time it goes to the floor of the house for
final approval: “We will work on getting appropriate report language in the Committee
report and further work with the gentleman as well as with the Justice Department as this
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legislation moves through the process just to make sure that there is not an expansive
definition of content” (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001,p. 295). Lofgren clarifies that
this is not a controversy by spelling out in more detail the process that is occurring behind
the scenes:
Just briefly. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I am glad that this is going to be
addressed in the report. I think it is worth stating also that in the discussions that
we had at a staff level, and Members as well, with the Justice Department and the
White House, they made it very clear that they agreed with this, and this is not an
argument. It is just a clarification, and I think that is important for the public to
know, and I thank the gentleman for yielding. (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001,
p. 295)
Her comment is especially interesting because of the way in which she addresses the
public specifically and says, “this is not an argument...just clarification.” There is no
breakage of unity…we have it all under control. Lamar Smith (R TX) speaks ups with an
additional voice for cooperation behind the scenes: “I do appreciate your consulting with
me earlier about your amendments and the intent behind those amendments,” but he also
wants to clarify that while he is in agreement with the report language, that the language
does not go against current law: “I just want to make clear that while I think report
language is acceptable, I want to make sure that the report language does not in any way
indicate that we are rolling back current law. I think you agree with that” (Provide
Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 295). Finally, Boucher once again voices support for taking
care of this matter behind the scenes; again cooperation is the theme of this dialogue in
terms of the ethos involved: “I think the gentleman has raised a very important concern,
and I want to thank Chairman Sensenbrenner for agreeing to work with us as we address
this concern between now and the time this measure reaches the floor” (Provide
Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 295).
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Ms. Waters, a minority member, provides us with yet another example of how
members of the House worked together to prevent as much controversy as possible
during this debate. She introduces an amendment about forum shopping, suggesting that
the nationwide search warrant provision of the act allows for a prosecutor to go and seek
out any judge for a search warrant on any alleged criminal act regardless of the
jurisdiction in which the suspicious activity allegedly occurred. There are a few pages of
discussion devoted to clarifying exactly what Ms. Waters is suggesting and comparing
that to the language of the current proposal. At some point the discussion leads toward
the conclusion that Ms. Waters’s concern is addressed in the intent of the bill and that
perhaps, if anything, the bill just needs some clarification. That is the same point that Mr.
Delahunt, also a minority member, makes. The discussion leads to an agreement that Ms.
Waters will withdraw the amendment if the issue can be taken care of through a
manager’s amendment. The following dialogue demonstrates how the agreement
transpires:
Mr. DELAHUNT. I think it is the intention here that the government is seeking to
stay in one place, if you will, where the offense allegedly occurred rather than
doing exactly what you are saying, traveling all over the country because of the
speed with which these terrorist groups now operate. So, in other words, if an
offense was committed in Los Angeles, that the Federal District Court in Los
Angeles would provide the venue for an application for a search warrant.
Ms. WATERS. Right.
Mr. DELAHUNT. That search warrant, once approved, could be executed in New
York or Boston or anywhere. Is that what the gentlelady——
Ms. WATERS. That is absolutely true. That is exactly what we are trying to do.
If you are suggesting that that is what the bill intends to do and if you are
suggesting for the Chair that they will clean it up in the manager’s amendment,
then the job is done. (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 303)
Mr. Frank then brings up a question about how the law changing a federal statute would
affect the state’s authority in the area. Sensenbrenner says that the manager’s amendment
being drafted at that exact moment should address Mr. Frank’s question. In the same
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statement, Sensenbrenner asks Waters to withdraw the amendment, but then re-offer it
again later if her concerns are not addressed. Waters accepts, points out that she is not
trying change anything significant and the debate is expedited. The following dialogue
demonstrates what took place:
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. We are drafting an addition to the manager’s
amendment that I think hits this point. It is presently being Xeroxed off, so I
would like to ask the forbearance of the Committee. Perhaps if the gentlewoman
would withdraw her amendment without prejudice to reoffering it if she doesn’t
like what is in the manager’s amendment.
Ms. WATERS. I have no problems with that, Mr. Chairman. Okay.
Mr. FRANK. Mr. Chairman—I am sorry. I will yield to the gentlewoman.
Ms. WATERS. If what you are suggesting to me is that we both understand what
we are trying to do and that you are not opposed to it—I am certainly not trying to
do anything other than get it in the proper jurisdiction of significant activity—then
I have no problems with withdrawing it and having you work on it and clean it up.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The amendment is withdrawn, at least
temporarily. Are there further amendments? (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p.
303)
Adam Schiff (D CA) and Mr. Scott both continue to ask questions about ambiguities in
the bill and at this point, Sensenbrenner is clearly ready to move forward in the debate.
He replies that, “If the gentleman would yield, I think the change to the manager’s
amendment addresses these concerns” so, “If we can go on to something else and then
come back to this when everybody sees what the language that is being proposed will do,
I think we can expedite the business of the Committee.” Then, without hesitation, he
asks, “Are there further amendments” (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 304)?
Remembering Sensenbrenner’s opening statement, we are reminded that reporting
the bill out today is the number one goal; thus the process must be expedited. Members of
the Committee are encouraged to withdraw their amendments and save them for another
time. In fact, when they do withdraw amendments they are hailed as patriots, at least that
is the way it appears after Howard Berman (D CA) agreed to withdraw an amendment for
a later time and then Conyers, the leader of Berman’s party in this Committee praised
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Berman saying, “I hold my high compliment and praise for you” (Provide Appropriate
Tools, 2001, p. 316). Expediting the process like this demonstrates great faith in the
system and the way in which the system has been applied during these deliberations.
Most members of this committee do seem to be proud of their leadership and what they
have done for their country. Furthermore, they also seem to have faith that the
collaboration will continue into the future. William Delahunt (D MA) explains just prior
to discussing an amendment that he has no intention of putting to the test of a vote:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I intend to withdraw this amendment in recognition of
the effort in terms of the consensus that has been developed between yourself and
the Ranking Member and Members of the Committee to report out a bill that
reflects a thoughtful consensus. Before I describe the amendment, however,
which as I said I won’t press, but I think it is important to raise a concern that I
have and I know that others share. Let me commend you, Mr. Chairman, and the
Ranking Member for having followed regular order. We have had time to
deliberate, to review, to assimilate and analyze, and as a result, we have a vastly
improved product that was presented to us two weeks ago. I think this happens to
be a very good moment in the history of this particular Committee and a good
moment for the Nation, because clearly this is a far superior product than what
was initially presented. (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 321)
Here, Delahunt, before even alluding to the subject matter of his amendment, tells us that
he has no intent of pressing simply because he wants to help the Committee leaders
“report out a bill that reflects a thoughtful consensus” (Provide Appropriate Tools,
2001,p. 321). In the same speech though, he commends the leaders “for having followed
regular order” (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 321)4, and because of that, he feels
comfortable tabling his concern for another time. Then, he goes on to say what a great
moment this is for this Committee and for the nation because the legislators were able to
4 Having studied the legislative process a great deal, what is transpiring does not appear
to be “regular order.” If it is, then it really needs to be reexamined. I would also note that
there is some interesting discussion going on about Delahunt’s amendment. But it was all
a formality, which supposedly would be used as an impetus for later negotiation.
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improve a product for which there was so much pressure to accept the initial draft as
final.
Quick Rejection of Amendments
While there was a tremendous amount of agreement, and some clear signs that the
agreement was negotiated before the markup even started, not everything was conducted
in such a fashion. There was some disagreement, though not a great deal, and the way in
which disagreement is negotiated during this markup is noteworthy. Most of the
disagreement was handled in the same way the agreement was handled—through an
expedited process. In this section, we look at how quickly most of the disagreement was
discarded. It was rejected very quickly. In each of these exemplars, the critic who
proposed the amendment was given one turn to present the gist of it, and then
Sensenbrenner responded, a quick vote was taken and the process moved forward. There
was no dialectic—they were open and shut cases.
One of these examples occurred at the end of debate over title I after the
managers’ amendment was passed. Lofgren proposes that a sunset is added to title II,
much like in title I. She begins by thanking everyone, and acknowledging that everyone
and their staffs have worked hard to make this a successful process in a short period of
time. Then she introduces the amendment in a fashion that analysts of this debate and
those who read those analyses have grown accustomed to seeing, the “I support the
bill…BUT…let us make it better” appeal to patriotism type of arguments:
This bill does make some changes that we are prepared to make. I am a cosponsor
of the bill. And part of the fail-safe, if you will, is that we have put sunset
provisions in title I. Now that doesn’t mean that we are going to let these
provisions go away, but it is going to force the Congress to review how it is
worked and to see if there are problems and to fix the problems if we discover
them. I think all of us feel good about that mechanism to make us really look at
this if something turns out in a way that is unanticipated. We don’t need a sunset
clause in order to do that, but I think it is probably useful to make us do it. And,
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therefore, this amendment would put the same sunset clause on title II as was in
place in title I with the exception of 206, which is the protection of the northern
border provisions that obviously doesn’t need the same kind of review. (Provide
Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 385)
In other words, according to Lofgren, we do not need a sunset, but “it will help us with
the discipline we need to review this section of the act” (Provide Appropriate Tools,
2001, p. 385). Sensenbrenner disagrees. He points out there are drastic differences
between title I and title II. Then he references President Bush as a source of ethos. He
argues that title II should be made permanent, “because as the President has said, we are
in this for the long haul…terrorism is not going away” (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001,
p. 386). He calls for a vote and immediately, discussion ends.
Another example of the open and shut debate occurred over what ended up being
section 802 of the Patriot Act, word for word. The argument was over the definition of
“domestic terrorism”:
The term ‘domestic terrorism’ means activities that- (A) involve acts dangerous to
human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any
State; (B) appear to be intended—(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to
affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or
kidnapping; and (C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States. (USA PATRIOT Act, 2001, 115 STAT 375)
During committee markup, Congressman Scott (D VA) argued that the term was quite
vague and attempted to amend it by striking “appear to be intended” and inserting “are
intended” (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 422). He argued, in patriotic fashion that
this “will tighten up the definition of domestic terrorism in the bill. All of us are intent on
preventing terrorism and providing law enforcement the tools they need to do their work.
(BUT) My concern is that this bill’s present definition of domestic terrorism is too broad
and unclear and would include activities that few of us would define as domestic
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terrorism” (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 422). Continuing, he points out that the
wording adopted into legislation would allow “Someone to be accused of an act of
domestic terrorism based on appearances or effects without the traditional intent
required” (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 422). Furthermore, that the act will:
…kick in the bill’s provisions for a single jurisdiction search warrant, seizing of
assets, sharing of grand jury information. And those who are prosecuted under the
‘appear to be intended or to have the effect’ definition of domestic terrorism is
subject to application of the RICO statute, elimination of statute of limitations,
use of enhanced penalties without proving intent. (Provide Appropriate Tools,
2001, p. 422)
Mr. Scott concludes his argument: “This amendment would make certain that only those
individuals who had the traditional means to do a terrorist act are investigated and
prosecuted as terrorists, not the protestor at an abortion, not the student protestor who is
sitting out in the dean’s office” (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 422).
In response to Congressman Scott’s proposed amendment, Chairman
Sensenbrenner recognizes himself in opposition and begins with a brief appeal to logos,
arguing that “The language in this bill is based upon the current law definition of
international terrorism, which is included in 18 U.S.C. 2331, with a significant exception,
and that is that the violent act is more precisely defined so as to exclude from the
definition of domestic terrorism student protest. That is excluded” (Provide Appropriate
Tools, 2001,p. 422). After this, Sensenbrenner, in a more generic appeal to patriotism,
accuses Congressman Scott of standing in the way of the war on terror, and rather than
encouraging discussion of Mr. Scott’s objection, he brushes it aside and sets up an
implicit formula by which the objection is, by definition, either completely uninformed or
a traitorous action:
What the amendment of the gentleman from Virginia proposes to do is to require
a tougher standard of proof for domestic terrorism than for international terrorism.
So if the people who crashed the plane into the Pentagon and the World Trade
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Center were home grown terrorists rather than those who came from overseas and
lived, the prosecutors would have had a much tougher standard of proof, and I
don’t think that is really what he want because terrorism is terrorism and the
people who die and are maimed, or dead or who have been maimed. (Provide
Appropriate Tools, 2001, pp. 422-423)
Sensenbrenner gives Scott the benefit of the doubt by saying, “I don’t think that is really
what he want(s),” as if Sensenbrenner’s response were somehow the obvious truth
handed down from the heavens and that he was simply a bipartisan, unassuming, and
apolitical messenger. In no way was criticism of the wording of the definition of
domestic terrorism ever considered to be a credible argument that a true patriot would
make. The all-or-nothing argument was imposed. Immediately afterward, Mr.
Sensenbrenner asks that the amendment be rejected and yields his time back to the
chairman (himself) calling for a vote: “The question is on the Scott amendment No. 6.
Those in favor will signify by saying aye. Opposed, no. The noes appear to have it. The
noes have it. The amendment is not agreed to” (p. 422-423).
A Bit of Controversy
Meaningful Debate
This debate, again, is remarkable because of the unprecedented amount of
agreement. Even most of those who do still want to see change to the bill withdraw their
amendments for the sake of unity and expediting the process. The withdrawal of
amendments called for more discussion over the issues than actually proposing
amendments. The previous example of actual controversy had very little to do with
meaningful debate; there were two ships passing in the night with no real clash of ideas,
just a bit of snippiness over what seemed to be some personal animosity. There are two
examples of amendments proposed in such a way that actually sparked some semblance
of meaningful debate. By meaningful debate, I mean there was dialectic—some back and
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forth which involved negotiation and then ultimately, a vote that seemed to be fairly
close.
In the first exemplar, we find unabated opposition to an amendment that actually
led to a meaningful discussion over checking the Attorney General’s authority. The
expedited process was called into question and debate ensued. Mr. Nadler, a minority
member, offers an amendment to prevent the American government from telling foreign
governments that certain individuals are seeking asylum during the process of trying to
figure out if that person is a terrorist or not. The justification, which Nadler expounds
upon during the course of this analysis, is simply that it protects the person who applies
for asylum but is rejected and has to go back to the country from which she came was
protesting against. Some foreign governments have been known to hunt down the family
of asylum seekers and do harm to them. Mr. Gekas, a majority member, strongly opposes
the amendment because he claims it would prevent the Attorney General from doing his
job. Mr. Frank, a minority member, defends the amendment and interestingly even
questions whether Gekas himself has a true problem with the amendment: “I would
implore my friend from Pennsylvania to look at this. I don’t think he has a problem with
this amendment” (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 361). Then he goes on to explain
that the amendment is only designed to prevent people from getting hurt after they are
denied entrance and that the task of determining if someone is a terrorist or not is in no
way affected by the amendment.
Gekas’s true reasoning behind opposition comes out, and it seems that maybe
Frank was onto something when he suggested that Gekas did not have a specific problem
with the amendment. Gekas reports that he is simply “bound a little bit by the thrust of
the Administration’s offer here on the proposed bill that the Attorney General should
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have …” and then his response is interrupted by Frank who argues that “binding yourself
to somebody else’s thrust is not always a good idea” (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001,
p. 362). For the first time in the markup debate, the pressure applied by the Attorney
General to rush through his proposal is questioned. Frank goes on to explain why the
Committee should question the Administration in this process, but prefaces it with the
idea that this does not mean we are not cooperating with them:
The gentleman from Pennsylvania would say—and we are working with the
Administration, but it is not a good idea to say that until the Administration signs
off on something we can’t accept it. My guess is I don’t think they anticipated
this. They were, I think, interested in making sure they got all the information
they needed. I don’t believe that this Administration feels that it is important for
them to be able to tell a host government from which someone is applying for
asylum that that person is applying for asylum. (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001,
p. 362)
Mr. Gekas replies by suggesting that we should trust the Attorney General and give him
the benefit of the doubt to make that type of discretion as needed:
All I am trying to do here is to give the benefit of the doubt to the Attorney
General where this Nadler amendment prevents him from disclosing that the alien
is an applicant for asylum. I am giving the Attorney General the benefit of the
doubt to make that judgment in his discretion. That is what I am upholding here,
and that is why I asked the Members to vote no on this amendment. (Provide
Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 363)
Then Nadler rejoins the debate to respond to Gekas, and the original justification behind
the amendment is expounded upon in more detail through historical example:
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, certain things ought to be
protected. In the 1960s, Simas Kudirka, a Lithuanian seaman, defected from the
Soviet Union in the port of New York or Boston, and because of rather shameful
actions by our government, he was handed back to the Soviet Union. And I think
he died in the gulag, as a result of which a future Secretary of State, Henry
Kissinger, said we would never do that again. What this amendment attempts to
do is very analogous to that situation. (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, pp. 363-
364)
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Nadler then utilizes the historical narrative to tie it to the current situation. He implies
that while we might trust the current Attorney General, “You cannot always trust every
future Attorney General or Deputy Attorney General or consul to make the right
decision” (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 364). Then, he clarifies the amendment
one last time: “What this says is, get whatever information you need to make the
decisions with respect to political asylum, but don’t tell the Soviet Union, don’t tell the
Ayatollahs who from their country is seeking to defect to the United States so they can
arrange the murder or torture of his relatives. That doesn’t make sense” (Provide
Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 363-364). Jackson Lee helps solidify the argument by putting
into a “we want to give the kind of investigatory needs that the Attorney General has.
BUT (emphasis is mine) let me defer you to” legal code suggesting that he already has
that need met through “emergency powers” (p. 364). Ultimately, the amendment is
amended, but then it passes through a vote. From my interpretation this is one of only two
examples of meaningful debate that occurred throughout the entire markup session. This
judgment is based on the observation that argument seemed to change the tide of the
debate. There was no evidence that members of this committee had made up their mind
previously. There was an attempt to get the amendment rejected, but alas, the critics of
the bill had their ideas pushed forward, seemingly on the power of their own
argumentation.
Shutting Down Debate
There is another example that almost fits into the category of meaningful debate,
and perhaps with reinterpretation, it very well could. But, it seems more accurate to this
analyst to place it in the category of an attempt to shut down debate. Yet, at the same
time, we must recognize there was some value to the dialogue, even though the person
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who tried to shut the debate down, Chairman Sensenbrenner, got his way in the end. The
amendment comes from Anthony Weiner (D NY) who proposes that the Justice
Department step up the collection of information on non-immigrant foreign visitors such
as exchange students, but before Weiner can justify his amendment, Mr. Smith
announces that he has a point of order. So, Weiner goes on to justify his amendment
anyway, probably anticipating a debate to occur after he was finished. He claims that the
amendment is needed because the government loses track of student visa holders once
they finish their degrees, or drop out of school, or whatever the circumstances are under
which they leave their university. In fact, according to Weiner, Hani Hanjour, one of the
attackers believed to be on board the flight that hit the Pentagon was in the country on a
student visa. In the middle of Weiner’s presentation, Sensenbrenner interrupts him to
expedite the process: “This amendment is a winner,” says Sensenbrenner, “and I would
urge the Committee to adopt it and would urge the gentleman from Texas to withdraw his
reservation. If he makes a point of order, it will be overruled” (Provide Appropriate
Tools, 2001, p. 389). Now, we must recognize that a point of order is not a substantive
disagreement with a proposal; it is an argument that questions the democratic process
used to make legislation. In this case though, we do not even get to know what Smith’s
objection is, because he withdrew it immediately. Sensenbrenner liked the substance of
the amendment and was intent on expediting the democratic process. Weiner, not wanting
to prolong the discussion any longer than he has to, says, “Well, Weiner can spot a
winner, so he yields back the balance of his time” (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p.
389). He ends his argument right in the middle of what he was talking about before
Sensenbrenner’s interruption.
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Despite Sensenbrenner’s attempt to push this amendment through with
administrative bullying, questions were still raised about the amendment and some
interesting dialogue occurred that actually made this a close vote in the end. Lofgren asks
a fairly non-controversial question about funding; it is answered and then Frank speaks
up. He asks if this policy would be directed toward students coming from a particular
country. Weiner answers the question but then Sensenbrenner clarifies: “That means that
if you have a student from Afghanistan who is anti-Taliban, the Attorney General can
impose a lower fee, but if you have a pro-Taliban student, the Attorney General can sock
it to him” (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 391). Mr. Frank, who actually in a show
of confusion because he thought the amendment had been accepted already, says, “I think
I probably would have voted against this if I hadn’t not been paying attention…but I
would hope that at least we would make a record of what the Chairman had said and that
it would be in the report that there is no automatic imputation of the sins of the
government to the student” (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 391). Sensenbrenner
clarifies that the amendment had not actually been passed yet, and so Frank does have the
chance to oppose after all. He further explains that, “we are talking about students who
are coming from governments that are unattractive governments and requiring the student
to speak out against it, it could be a problem… what this does is it gives discretion to the
Attorney General to visit the sins of the government on the students (Provide Appropriate
Tools, 2001, p. 391). A bit more discussion ensues and then a vote is taken, and this is
interestingly perhaps the most closely contested vote all day. An oral vote is taken and it
is determined by Sensenbrenner that the amendment is rejected, but a roll call vote is
called for, and based upon that, the amendment passes.
A Clash of Egos
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This next example starts off like so many of the other proposed amendments did,
with shows of collaboration and unity. In fact, when I came to this exemplar during the
writing process, I originally began writing about it as being a demonstration of unified
acceptance of a non-controversial amendment—the very first category mentioned in this
section. However, it did not take long to realize that the dialogue was leading to what is,
without doubt, the most contentious part of the markup. The clash over ethos came at the
end of debate over title I when Sensenbrenner and Conyers present the managers’
amendments. These types of amendments are ideal for expediting the process because
they had been agreed to before the markup even began and were suggested to the
Committee leaders by a variety of people: Mr. Hyde—the former chairman of the
committee, Ms. Waters, and Mr. Berman. Mr. Conyers introduces the amendments with a
nod to Sensenbrenner for providing such meaningful bipartisan collaboration, and points
out that that is why the proposed changes were able to gain such widespread acceptance:
“Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With reference to the manager’s amendment, I want to begin
by thanking you for including a number of Members’ suggestions from our side that are
involved in the manager’s amendment, and I think that argues for wide support on the
Committee for it” (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 342).
The amendments have to do with a variety of topics: 1) the terrorist organization
designation process, 2) language to prevent forum shopping (this was motivated by an
example discussed above in which Ms. Waters withdraws one of her amendments
because of the assurance that Sensenbrenner would incorporate it into a manager’s
amendment), 3) the requirement that Internet Service Providers had to be provided
written notification when given roving wiretap orders, and 4) the allocation of research
and development money for biometric identification at points of entry. But the topics of
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the amendments are not nearly as interesting as the way in which they ended up being
debated in terms of clashing perspectives of ethos. The questioning starts off with unity,
much like the way in which Conyers began the managers’ amendments. Mr. Frank
praises the way in which the majority leader and minority leader have worked so well
together, “both substantively and procedurally.” He explains further by saying, “I realize
not everybody is going to be for this bill and there are going to be differences and…there
are some amendments I would like to see, but if you go back to where we were a few
weeks ago when we got the package and some people were expecting it done very
rapidly, I think the procedure and the substance both held up very well” (Provide
Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 342). But then, he pays special tribute to Conyers’s
leadership saying:
…as a Member of the minority, I want to particularly express what I think many
of us on our side feel toward our Ranking Member. This is a very difficult issue.
It is a particularly difficult issue for him in a lot of ways, and his role in this has
really been a model of responsibility, and even those who still have some
disagreements on it I think now are much more on point, I think join me in
expressing their very deep admiration for the leadership he has shown along with
you, Mr. Chairman. (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 343)
At the end of Frank’s complimentary discourse toward Conyers, and Sensenbrenner for
that matter, a few more exchanges of pleasantries occur and I am more convinced than
ever that this is going to be a case of easy acceptance.
A few questions begin to get asked, though they are about minor things that do
not substantially affect the intent of the legislation. For instance, Berman asks a question
about some wording that could inadvertently allow someone to tap a phone without ever
going to court. To that, Sensenbrenner says, “I think the gentleman makes a good point.
We will take a look at it between now and going to the floor” (Provide Appropriate
Tools, 2001, p. 343). Conyers praises Berman for raising the point and says the work that
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he and his staff have done on the issue will help “get some of the rough edges off of it,
and I will join the Chairman in that undertaking” (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p.
344). So, the process is being expedited smoothly… no problems. Then Mr. Scott asks a
question about some of the wording in the bill; Mr. Smith explains and the confusion
seems to go away, but they agreed that they would continue to look at it after the markup
and before it goes to the floor. Still, there are no stumbling blocks toward getting these
manager’s amendments passed.
Then, Mr. Nadler seeks recognition and that is when Sensenbrenner begins to get
irritated. He tries to lay a guilt trip on members for asking questions, asking, “Is the
preference of the Committee to stay here until 2:00 o’clock in the morning or not?” Then
he points out that, “This is a manager’s amendment, which presumably was agreed to,
before recognizing Mr. Nadler who just wants “to clarify the point of this amendment”
(Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 345); the point is clarified and the debate proceeds.
Bob Barr (R GA) asks a question about the grammar of one of the amendments, making
the point that “it is lacking a couple of commas” (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p.
346). Mr. Weiner asks a question of clarification, has it answered very briefly and easily
and then it is Ms. Waters’s turn.
Ms. Waters proposes an amendment to the manager’s amendment that would
exclude memorandums between the Justice Department and the CIA; this would absolve
the department of reporting drug trafficking. She explains why this is necessary by using
the Iran Contra affair as an example and questions the ethos of intelligence agencies for
past discrepancies. Then Sensenbrenner recognizes himself for a response, and this is
when it gets a little heated. He begins very briefly with a logos based response claiming
that this is a matter of oversight, which is “what this committee should be doing,” as
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opposed to something statutory. But then, he begins to attack Waters’s ethos. He accuses
her of not being aware of what is going on in the world, and claims that he does:
I don’t know if the gentlewoman from California heard about the speech that
British Prime Minister Blair gave yesterday to the Labor Party Annual
Conference somewhere in the United Kingdom. I watched part of it on CNN, and
one of the things the Prime Minister Blair said is that 90 percent of the heroin that
is sold on the streets of Great Britain is furnished by Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda
organization, and the Brits who are buying heroin on the street are helping Osama
bin Laden’s terrorist activity. (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 348)
Therefore, her amendment would only hurt the pattern of communication existing
between law enforcement agencies concerning the drug trade’s relationship to terrorism.
According to Sensenbrenner, what “the gentlewoman’s amendment says is that there
can’t be a memorandum of understanding between law enforcement agencies to deal with
this question. And not only is the heroin that the——” (p. 348). Ms. Waters interrupts
him by proclaiming that “that is not true, Mr. Chairman” (p. 348). And just in case his
previous remarks were interpreted as not being an attack on ethos, he reiterates them in a
bit different way that is a bit more accusatory: “I have the floor. This is what the Prime
Minister of Great Britain had to say to his party’s annual conference. And he said—and I
saw it on TV and others could have seen it on TV—that anybody who bought heroin in
Great Britain had a good chance of helping finance what the bin Laden organization was
doing” (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 348).
Sensenbrenner’s response seems to break up the flow of collaboration, unity and
good will. First of all, it seems like he is taking something he saw on CNN as irrefutable
evidence and then overgeneralizing it to make the claim that, “What the gentlewoman’s
amendment does is hamstring the ability of law enforcement to be able to enter into
memorandums of understanding to deal with this issue” (Provide Appropriate Tools,
2001, p. 348). I am not sure how that makes good syllogistic sense and Waters tries to
175
address that below. But, that is beside the point being made here, which is the
identification of the way in which Sensenbrenner goes after Waters’s ethos—suggesting
that she should have been watching CNN, and implying that she is lazy for not doing so.
Ms. Waters asks again, “Will the gentleman yield? Because he is misrepresenting
what my amendment does” (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 349). Sensenbrenner
replies, “No, I will not yield. I could have got the amendment on a point of order on
nongermaneness. I would urge the Members to vote against the amendment and yield
back the balance of my time” (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 349). Waters tries to
get her point across: “Mr. Chairman, that is patently unfair. You have misrepresented
what my amendment does” (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 349). Sensenbrenner
ignores her entirely and recognizes Conyers, who interjects to try and bring this heated
discussion to a conclusion; he does so by reminding Waters, “without going to the
efficacy of the Waters’ amendment,” “that a manager’s amendment is purportedly agreed
to by the Committee. And if we are to open it up to many very excellent proposals that
could be offered, we have just voided the whole reason for having a manager’s
amendment” (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 349). Conyers continues by explaining
the reason he makes that point and that is that “we currently have asked staffs to begin
preparing a second manager’s amendment to expedite the process which we will vent
through to all of the Members that, where there is concurrence, we can move ahead more
quickly” (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 349). Conyers then requests that the
gentlelady withdraw her amendment and reserve her criticism for some other
“appropriate place in our procedure to deal with it” (p. 349). He concludes his remarks by
urging “the Members not to assume that there is some reason to reopen the manager’s
amendment. Because I concede quickly that there are many other modifications that we
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could make, but the whole idea is to get this package through so we can get to other
amendments” (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 349).
Waters draws the line and says that she will withdraw it but not “until it is
clarified, until my amendment is defined and understood.” Continuing, she argues,
“There is no way of misunderstanding what this amendment does. This amendment
simply says that you cannot have law enforcement agencies agreeing that they are not
going to report drug trafficking. Now the Chairman misrepresented what this amendment
does.” After a brief interruption, she declares, “I will not withdraw it as long as the
Chairman is misrepresenting what it is. This is designed to do exactly what the Prime
Minister and others were talking about” (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 349).
Conyers interjects again by thanking “the gentlelady for making clear the terms under
which she would require a withdrawal” and urging “the Chairman to proffer the
necessary statement that would allow us to withdraw this so that we could move forward
(Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, p. 349). The following exchange is how the dispute
ends:
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Gentleman yield? So proffered.
Mr. CONYERS. With pleasure.
Ms. WATERS. I am sorry. I didn’t hear you.
Mr. CONYERS. It was directed to the Chairman.
Ms. WATERS. Did he say something?
Mr. CONYERS. Not yet—he did——
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. I said, so proffered.
Mr. CONYERS.—in interpretation, he apologized profusely for his
misunderstanding and total misinterpretation of this one-sentence
amendment.
Ms. WATERS. I accept the stingy apology.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The amendment is withdrawn.
The question is on the manager’s amendment. Those in favor will signify by
saying aye. Opposed, no. The ayes appear to have it. The ayes have it. The
manager’s amendment is agreed to. (Provide Appropriate Tools, 2001, pp. 349-
350)
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The most contentious part of the markup ends with Sensenbrenner proffering a very
short-lived acknowledgment that he misrepresented Waters’s amendment, Conyers
making light of the discussion, and Waters accepting the apology, although clearly not
completely satisfied with it. Sensenbrenner calls for a vote over the managers
amendments; they pass and debate over title I comes to an end. Once debate over title II
begins, the tone shifts back to one of collaboration and compromise and the focus once
again turns back to expediting the process.
The Justice Department Bypasses the Process
With a couple of notable exceptions, the 10/3/01 markup of the bill
overwhelmingly exemplified unity and agreement. The members of the Judiciary
Committee clearly felt confident in their work. The bill was not perfect in their eyes, but
they did the best job they could, under the circumstances. They slowed the process and
attempted to add some safeguards for civil liberties and more importantly, they ensured
that the act would be reviewed in good time with the addition of sunset provisions.
Qualitatively, we discern this level of unification by simply examining the discourse.
Quantitatively, we triangulate those results very simply by looking at the vote: it was
unanimous. The bill passed through the Judiciary Committee on a 36-0 vote. The
legislative process had worked: a bipartisan approval of legislation was obtained.
It is not until we get to the full House vote that we discover the major controversy
of not only this phase of the debate, but also the one that would plague the legislation
throughout the rest of the process—beyond even the point at which it is finally
reauthorized in 2006. The controversy is the fact that the Justice Department completely
bypassed what little, expedited legislative process existed during the formulation of the
Patriot Act. Taking a quick look at the Full House Vote over the bill, we get the sense
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that the Bush Administration completely ignored the will of the House Judiciary
Committee. Interestingly, both sides of the controversy—those who support and those
who oppose the bill in the full House Report draw attention to the poor process used to
assemble the final draft of the legislation. Sensenbrenner, for instance, a supporter of the
final draft, begins to explain how the process was bypassed by the Justice Department:
Mr. Speaker, I would like to say a little bit about the road this legislation has
traveled on the way to the floor today. The road was relatively short, but certainly
not without its twists and turns. Along the way, the legislation has been the
subject of intense negotiation between House Republicans and Democrats, the
administration, Members from the other body, and our leaders here in the House.
After a 36 to nothing markup in the House Committee on the Judiciary last week
and the introduction of a bipartisan antiterrorism bill in the other body, we were
faced with trying to reconcile two different bipartisan bills, one of which garnered
stronger support by the administration. (Providing for Consideration, 2001, p.
H6759)
He describes the legislative process as short, with a few twists and turns in the House,
because it did attempt to impose its will on the process. However, as Sensenbrenner
notes, the administration supported a version of the bill that was not subjected to any
debate whatsoever—the Senate version of the bill. So basically, the one that was brought
before the House for a final vote reverted to the version that had never received any
legislative review whatsoever. Regardless, Sensenbrenner is still willing to support the
bill for the sake of unity. He explains that, “However,” despite the short process used to
adopt the act, “our goal remains clear, to quickly come to agreement on legislation that
will provide our law enforcement and intelligence officials with new tools necessary to
more effectively battle terrorism and other crimes “ (Providing for Consideration, 2001,
H6759).
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Ms. Waters though, has a slightly different opinion about the course of action
needed. She opposes the bill and the entire means by which the Administration has gone
about pushing it through Congress:
Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to this bill. This is a Senate bill that was
voted out at 3 a.m. this morning. This bill is quite different than the bill passed by
the House Committee on the Judiciary. Under the rules of the House, the
Committee on the Judiciary's bill should have been heard on this floor and the
differences between this bill and the House bill should have been worked out in a
conference committee. (Providing for Consideration, 2001, p. H6762)
She points out that House members have had no time whatsoever to review the bill before
them. It is nothing like the one passed through the House Judiciary Committee, which
according to Waters, is a violation of the rules of the House. They are currently voting on
a bill that would be taken to conference with the Senate bill for compromise—but it is in
no way a reflection of what they talked about. Waters explains how the Attorney General
has completely bypassed the bipartisan cooperation of the House Judiciary Committee:
Mr. Speaker, we had a bipartisan bill, and John Ashcroft destroyed it. The
Attorney General has fired the first partisan shot since September 11. Mr.
Speaker, both Democrats and Republicans worked hard to come up with a
bipartisan bill. Attorney General John Ashcroft undermined the work of the
Republican committee chairman, the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr.
SENSENBRENNER), and the Democratic ranking member, the gentleman from
Michigan. (Providing for Consideration, 2001, p. H6762)
Waters goes on to say that she even overlooked many worries that she had about the bill
passed through the House Judiciary Committee for the sake of unity and compromise.
She also acknowledges that many Republicans compromised as well: ”Mr. Speaker, I
serve on the Committee on the Judiciary. I consented to some policies I did not
particularly care for. For the good of the House I compromised. Some of the Republicans
on that committee compromised also. We had a bipartisan bill” (Providing for
Consideration, 2001, p. H6762-H6763).
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Waters closes her argument by claiming, “the bill before us today is a faulty and
irresponsible piece of legislation that undermines our civil liberties and disregards the
Constitution of the United States of America” and that “this bill takes advantage of the
trust that we have placed in this administration…this Attorney General is using this
unfortunate situation to extract extraordinary powers to be used beyond dealing with
terrorism, laws that he will place into the regular criminal justice system” (Providing for
Consideration, 2001, p. H6763). Finally, Waters wraps it up by quoting a famous
American patriot, Patrick Henry, who said “’Give me liberty or give me death.’ I say the
same today. Vote ‘no’ on this bill” (Providing for Consideration, 2001, p. H6763).
Remarks throughout the House vote mirrored the ones provided by Sensenbrenner
and Waters. Many thought the process was not very good, but most felt that did not
outweigh the need to pass a bill very quickly. Given the final vote, it is clear that most
just wanted to pass the act and move on. The final vote was recorded as 337-79 in favor
of the House draft of the act. The process was ignored and afterward, Conyers issued a
statement to the press. In it, he boldly attacks the ethos of Attorney General John
Ashcroft:
Because he didn’t get everything he wanted, the Attorney General pulled the old
bait and switch. In the dark of night in backrooms of the Capitol, a new bill was
written by the Administration and placed on the House floor. Not one Member of
Congress had read it when it came up for a vote. We have read it now and it
would do grave damage to our Constitution. (Conyers, 2001, October 15)
This sentiment would fester for a year and a half, until the next time the House Judiciary
Committee would have the opportunity to question Ashcroft about the implementation of
the bill during a public hearing.
Summary of the Authorization Stage of Debate
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Analysis of ethos related arguments during the debate over authorization of the
Patriot Act reveals various and distinct notions of patriotism. On one hand, we find
members of the Bush administration claiming that asking questions is bad, that we should
trust the government and defer to their leadership, that the Patriot Act is an all-or-nothing
issue (as is Bush’s entire war on terror), that criticism is impulsive, and that bypassing the
will of the House of Representatives is appropriate under the circumstances. On the other
hand, we find critics from both sides of the political aisle arguing that while an expedited
process is necessary, more debate above and beyond what the administration wants is
needed; i.e. the process needs to slow down if only just a little bit. Throughout much of
the authorization debate, there seems to be a great deal of compromise and negotiation
between the differing notions of patriotism, at least until the very end. Critics go to great
lengths to comfort the architects of the act, pointing out that there is overwhelming
agreement over many of the key provisions. There is no apparent effort made to stall the
bipartisan legislation by quibbling over details—that, according to a contingent of
interlocutors, can and should be done at a later time. Yet despite the unity, a few
limitations are needed through deliberation for critics to be satisfied with that decision-
making paradigm. At the end of the authorization phase though, we find that the Bush
Administration would simply not allow for most of those limitations. They pushed their
Senate backed version of the legislation forward in a manner that, at least according to
many members of the House, was rather manipulative. The Bush Administration’s
message of unity and agreement was critical to accomplishing their legislative goals and
it was quite effective given how easily their version of the antiterrorism legislation was
passed through Congress. There were simply not enough people willing to stand up to the




Before moving on to analysis of the next round of debate over the Patriot Act,
attention to context is needed given how much time passes between the end of the
authorization stage and the beginning of the oversight stage in the House Judiciary
Committee. Authorization ended on October 26, 2001 when President Bush signed the
Patriot Act into law and then it is not discussed again in the public forum of the House
Judiciary Committee until May 20, 2003. Needless to say, a great deal happened to
patriotism phenomenologically speaking during that time. Its ethos from an
argumentative perspective shifted from framing criticism of the President as intolerable
to one that is tolerable. As this chapter progresses, public opinion is utilized as evidence
for this claim, and it is an important claim because public opinion is in fact at the core of
determining how much power the Commander in Chief has while leading the country. As
the literature review indicates, the will of the people and legislative debate do go hand in
hand—if only in an indirect fashion. The ideal relationship between legislator and the
general public is to carry out the will of the people while at the same time, educating the
people as to what is going on in the world. If the will of the people is behind the President
90%, there is not a whole lot the legislature can realistically do to slow the President
down. But at a lower approval rating, theoretically, the legislature has more discursive
space to be critical of Bush’s ethos—and change the tone and tide.
In the beginning of the war on terror, the cohesive post 9/11 message of unity was
wildly successful; the administration managed to capture the hearts and minds of nearly
all Americans. According to Gebser (1949/1985) it was a magical healing process. As
time passed though, that level of support began to taper off, largely due to the
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catastrophic failure of the war in Iraq. This point is significant to this study given that the
implementation stage of the debate over the Patriot Act during a substantial decline in the
President’s approval rating—right after the “end of hostilities” statement made by Bush
on May 1, 2003. The hearings examined in this chapter happened on May 20 and June 8
of the same year; it is no surprise that the discourse reveals quite a politically polarizing
debate over the nature of patriotism, especially considering the way in which the
authorization debate in the House ended. However, before analyzing the debates proper,
context is needed to help explain how the tone of 90% unity shifted to one influenced
more by a tone of rational-critical debate.
Loyalty to the Government Always
In Chapter 4, we learn from President Bush who the patriots are in the post 9/11
world: the emergency personnel who put their lives at risk during the catastrophe, the
members of the public who sacrificed their own safety to help others in need, the heroes
of Flight 93 who brought the 4th attacking airplane down before reaching its target, the
rescue workers looking to save victims after the attacks were over, members of the
government who led the fight against terrorism, members of Congress who supported
those leaders, and the men and women of the armed forces who were ready and able to
carry out the war against terrorists. Also in Chapter 4, we learned about Bush’s
prescription for the rest of us who were wondering how we could be patriots. According
to him, we could “go back to work.” “Get on board.” We could show our patriotism
economically. We could do anything that did not involve asking questions, or criticizing
the Administration’s decisions.
We heard this message loud and clear. We did “get on board” to play our part.
Bush’s agenda went virtually unquestioned for many months following the attacks. To
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illustrate the political powers entrusted to the President after 9/11, we turn to some
political polls. Prior to 9/11, on September 10, Bush had an approval rating of around
55% and it was declining (President Bush’s Approval Ratings, 2005) according to a
Washington Post-ABC News poll. But on September 11, that number instantly jumped to
above 85%, and then on October 7, the day the war in Afghanistan began, approval rating
jumped to over 90%. These numbers are reinforced by a previously cited September 21
Gallup poll (see Chapter 1), which shows the approval rating at 90% following Bush’s
“State of the Union Address” on September 19.
Bush’s popularity rating was made possible by the rhetorical situation he was in,
but it was still up to his Administration to take advantage of that situation, which it did to
great effect. The rhetorical situation generated kairos, the opportune moment, to become
assertive and tell us that under his leadership, we will make it through the crisis. He used
words to describe what had happened when most of us were speechless. He provided
order when there was no order, and people listened to him. He used words to provide a
mythic understanding of the war on terror; this in turn, produced a magical adherence to
that understanding. Much of the mythical power of Bush’s rhetoric derived from the way
in which patriotism was built into the overarching post 9/11 message of safety and
security. Bush’s mythmaking manipulated the rhetorical situation to foster the sense that
criticism was intolerable from the perspective of a truly patriotic American.
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Pressure on Dissenters
Very few people dared question the Bush Administration in the war on terror.
There are undoubtedly a plethora of reasons. Perhaps many people were in such a state of
shock that questioning was just not possible. Perhaps many people felt like they needed
time for peace and quiet to heal from the wounds of 9/11. Perhaps many people felt the
fear of isolation that would occur if they did stand up and question the Bush
Administration. According to Irving Janis’s (1972) theory of “groupthink,” this
possibility is very likely. Although Janis’s theory was developed in relation to a small
group problem-solving context, the idea seems to be very applicable at the societal level,
given the presence of the pressure on dissenters. Examples of the pressure applied by the
Bush Administration, occurring even outside of the legislative process abound.
The first example here involves looking at the Administration’s response
to a comment made by Bill Maher, popular host of the talk show Politically
Incorrect, made during a show shortly after the war in Afghanistan began. Maher
stated, “We have been the cowards, lobbing cruise missiles from two thousand
miles away…Staying in the airplane when it hits the building—say what you want
about that, it’s not cowardly” (Chang, 2002, p. 94). Soon after, there were
multiple responses from the Administration admonishing Maher for his remarks,
including Ari Fleischer, the White House Press Secretary who vehemently
scolded the talk show host, claiming that Americans “‘need to watch what they
say,’ and that ‘this is not a time for remarks like that’” (as quoted in Chang, 2002,
p. 94). While there is no expectation that Fleischer would agree with Maher’s
opinion, or that he should publicly refrain from objecting to it, the means by
which he holistically attacked Maher’s character and status as a patriotic
American was a bit extreme.
Another example involves a country music star, Natalie Maines of the
Dixie Chicks. An AP article from cbsnews.com on March 14, 2003 reports that,
“The Dixie Chicks are drawing criticism from country music fans for remarks
singer Natalie Maines made about President George W. Bush during a recent
performance in London. Maines told the audience earlier this week ‘Just so you
know, we're ashamed the president of the United States is from Texas.’” These
remarks triggered an outcry from the public as “Angry phone calls flooded
Nashville radio station WKDF-FM on Thursday, some demanding a boycott of
the Texas trio's music” (Dixie Chicks slammed for Bush gibe, 2003). In response
to the outcry, the band attempted to clarify in a statement expressing that while
traveling and performing overseas for an extended period of time, “the anti-
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American sentiment that has unfolded here is astounding. While we support our
troops, there is nothing more frightening than the notion of going to war with Iraq
and the prospect of all the innocent lives that will be lost” (Dixie Chicks slammed
for Bush gibe, 2003). Clarifying further, Maines, in a separate statement on her
own, said, “I feel the president is ignoring the opinion of many in the U.S. and
alienating the rest of the world. My comments were made in frustration, and one
of the privileges of being an American is you are free to voice your own point of
view” (Dixie Chicks slammed for Bush gibe, 2003). Apparently though, a lot of
people did not agree with her given that concerts were cancelled by many venues
and that many radio stations refused to play the Dixie Chick’s music. Active,
overt effort was applied toward silencing the voice of Natalie Maines and ruining
her career.
Another example involves Tim Robbins (2003, April 15), a celebrity
actor, who along with his spouse Susan Sarandon, a famous actress, describes the
personal ramifications of questioning President Bush’s war in Afghanistan.
During a speech to the National Press Club on April 15, 2003, he describes what
they have actually gone through because they voiced dissent:
Susan and I have been listed as traitors, as supporters of Saddam, and various
other epithets by the Aussie gossip rags masquerading as newspapers, and by their
fair and balanced electronic media cousins, 19th Century Fox. (Laughter.)
Apologies to Gore Vidal. (Applause.) Two weeks ago, the United Way canceled
Susan's appearance at a conference on women's leadership. And both of us last
week were told that both we and the First Amendment were not welcome at the
Baseball Hall of Fame. (para. 5)
Robbins (2003, April 15) goes on to mention example after example of
discriminatory actions taken against him and his family, including a history
teacher who told an 11-year old nephew that “Susan Sarandon is endangering the
troops by her opposition to the war” and “another teacher in a different school”
who asks a niece “if we are coming to the school play,” followed by saying
“they're not welcome here” (para. 3).
Another notable exemplar includes examining the comment of Rod Paige, the
Secretary of Education under George W. Bush, who accused the teacher’s union of being
a terrorist organization during a private White House meeting with the nation’s governors
on February 23, 2004, because its members criticized Bush’s “No Child Left Behind
Act.” Alex Wohl, an American Federation of Teachers spokesperson, points out that,
“Secretary Paige’s statement is indicative of the way this administration and this
secretary paint with a broad brush and attack anybody that disagrees with them…There
has to be room for disagreement, but this administration tends to simply attack the
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messenger instead of discussing the message” (Dillon & Jeanschemo, 2004).
Representative Betty McCollum (D MN) describes Paige’s remarks as “neo-
McCarthyism at its worst” (Dillon & Jeanschemo, 2004).
Immediately after the meeting during which the comments were made in an AP
interview, Paige apologized and explained that what he said was “a bad joke; it was an
inappropriate choice of words” (Toppo, 2004, p. A04). However, the sincerity of his
apology became questionable later that day, in an official press release, when he says that
the comment “was an inappropriate choice of words to describe the obstructionist scare
tactics the NEA’s Washington lobbyists have employed against No Child Left Behind’s
historic education reforms.” Describing intense disagreement as an “obstructionist scare
tactic” is simply a bit more politically correct (albeit not much more) strategy of
questioning the motivation of those who disagree with status quo policymaking.
Furthermore, given Paige’s history of treating dissenters as evildoers, his apology seems
even more difficult to interpret as sincere. “In early January, in discussing the Brown v.
Board of Education desegregation case, Dr. Paige compared critics of the new education
law to ‘those who fought Brown,’ suggesting the critics were racists…And on Jan. 28, he
compared those who oppose educational choice, the movement that includes everything
from vouchers to charter schools, to ‘the French at the United Nations, promising to veto
any resolution on Iraq, regardless of what it says’” (Dillon & Jeanschemo, 2004).
The Return of Rational Critical Debate
The freeze on rational-critical debate in the public sphere did not last forever,
though it may have seemed like it to some. As we can observe from any major poll,
President Bush’s approval rating went through a slow but steady decline from over 90%
just after 9/11 to about 60% in January of 2003, indicating that the public was slowly
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accepting the idea of criticizing the Bush Administration. There are a number of events
that woke the public sphere from its malaise. Richard Clarke (2004), former head of
counterterrorism in the Bush Administration, largely attributes the 9/11 Commission’s
report published in December of 2002 (Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community, 2002),
as well as the family members of the victims for applying the pressure needed to establish
the commission. Other events also contributed greatly to the thawing of the freeze on
criticism: the Abu Ghraib prison scandal which fully broke to the public in April of 2004,
Michael Moore’s film, Fahrenheit 9/11, released in 2004, the Presidential campaign
culminating in November of 2004, and other events to be sure that mark significant shifts
back to a climate of patriotic criticism of our Commander in Chief. Yet, no doubt about
it, the biggest catalyst to the decline of the President’s approval rating, the one around
which all others revolve, is the mismanagement of the war in Iraq.
The War in Iraq
The war in Iraq began March 20, 2003. In the month leading up to the beginning
of the war, it is interesting to notice a dramatic rise in Bush’s approval rating from 60%
on February 25, 2003 to roughly 70% on the starting date of the war; then afterward it
continued to climb to more than 75%. It did level off to around 70% before Bush’s “end
of hostilities” announcement on May 1, 2003. However, at the end of June, 2003, the
approval rating plummeted from just under 70% to just under 60%--a full 10 percentage
points in less than two weeks (President Bush’s Approval Ratings, 2005). This
plummeting resulted from recognition by the public that while Bush had claimed
“mission accomplished,” violence in Iraq was only getting worse; thus, more Americans
began to question his judgment and strategy for the war on terror. Interestingly, just prior
to the big decline of approval in June of 2003, the next round of debate over the Patriot
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Act occurred. This time, unity displayed through the public discourse was not the modus
operandi. Debate was very heated. Critics were angry over the way in which the Bush
Administration pushed their antiterrorism bill through Congress.
Patriot Act Criticisms
Several events specifically related to the Patriot Act point to the growing concern
over Bush’s war on terror during the lead up to oversight in the House Judiciary
Committee. Perhaps the most telling evidence is the legislative effort to amend the Patriot
Act. Several efforts were made, both before and after the House Judiciary Oversight of
2003, attempting to significantly alter the impact of the Patriot Act. Prior to the oversight
hearings, Representative Bernie Sanders (I-VT), who introduced the Freedom to Read
Protection Act on March 6th of 2003, made a significant effort. In an interview with
Herbert Foerstel (2004) on May 29th, 2003, Joel Barkin, Sanders’s press secretary, makes
an interesting point about the increased level of support for changing the Patriot Act since
its adoption in October of 2001. He reports that, “Right now, our bill has 105 co-
sponsors. As you probably know, 66 House members originally voted against the USA
Patriot Act, so our co-sponsors are already twice the number that voted against the Patriot
Act. That, in and of itself, is an interesting point” (p. 161). That certainly is interesting
and speaks to the growing concern in the public over the Patriot Act leading up to the
House Judiciary Oversight Hearings. The Senate version of the same legislation was
introduced by Barbra Boxer (D-CA) on May 23, 2003, three days after the House
Judiciary Committee Oversight hearings began.
So clearly, there was some critical momentum building up to the debates serving
as the data set for this chapter of analysis. But it should also be noted that critical
momentum continued to build at a faster pace after the two House Judiciary Oversight
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Hearings that will be analyzed shortly. On July 30, 2003, for instance, Russell Feingold,
the one Senator who voted against the original authorization of the Patriot Act,
introduced the Library Personal Records Privacy Act, which was intended to modify (not
repeal) parts of section 215. A day later, Senators Lisa Markowski (R-AK) and Ron
Wyden (D-OR) sponsored the bipartisan Protecting the Rights of Individuals Act, which
also attempted to modify section 215. By August 13, 2003, “more than 140 cities and
counties, in addition to state legislatures in Alaska, Hawaii, and Vermont, have passed
resolutions against the Patriot Act, some of them imposing restrictions on compliance.”
Interestingly, “Supporters of these resolutions cover the entire political spectrum”
(Forestel, 2004, p. 169). Then, in September of 2003, perhaps the boldest attempt to
legislate change to the Patriot Act occurred in the House. Representatives Dennis
Kucinich (D-OH) and Representative Ron Paul (R-TX) proposed the Benjamin Franklin
True Patriot Act, which would have repealed sections 213, 214, 215, 216, 218, 411, 412,
505, 507, 508, and 802 of the Patriot Act. Furthermore, it would have repealed section
214 and 871 of the Homeland Security Act (Foerstel, 2004). Then in October of 2003,
perhaps the most recognized attempt at legislation was introduced. Interestingly,
architects of this proposal also used a condensation symbol to generate support. It is
called the SAFE Act, standing for the Security and Freedom Ensured Act. Larry Craig
(R-ID) and Richard Durbin (D-IL) proposed it to modestly amend some of the Patriot Act
provisions such as the “lone wolf” provision, the “sneak and peek” provision, as well as
the definition of domestic terrorism.
Summary
May 2003 was an important turning point for the health of the public sphere; for
the first time since 9/11, the general public began to question Bush’s strategy for the war
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on terror. Not only did the war in Iraq come under fire, so did the Patriot Act as well as
the Homeland Security Act. Even though there was not enough criticism or sway of
public opinion to effect significant policy changes in any arena of the war—nor would
there be for a long time to come, a significant shift concerning the permissibility of
criticism is detectable. Persuasion theorists stress that any rational attitude change takes
time. During May 2003, it seems that criticism of the Bush Administration became more
prominent and acceptable according to analysis of public opinion. Debate in the 5/20/03
hearing before the Subcommittee on the Constitution and the 6/5/03 Full Committee
Hearing demonstrates this changing nature of discourse. It is the lens from which the




The hearing before the Subcommittee on the Constitution on 5/20/03
is the first oversight hearing in the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives.
Other forms of oversight had occurred: classified hearings, written questions and
responses, and even one public hearing in the Financial Services Committee. But this is
the first public oversight hearing of the act that deals with the balance between safety and
liberty. In particular, the hearing deals with the 4th amendment of the Constitution.
According to Steve Chabot (R-OH), chair of the Subcommittee on the Constitution, in his
opening statement, “the hearing will consider where and when the federal government
can go to search the addressing information of electronic communications, library
records, and public settings in order to prevent terrorist attacks” (Antiterrorism
Investigations, 2003, p. 1).
Jerrold Nadler (D-NY) is the ranking minority member on the committee. There
is one majority witness, Viet Dinh, the Assistant Attorney General at the Office of Legal
Policy in the Justice Department. The other three witnesses are from the minority side—
the very first time in the entire process that the House Judiciary Committee has had the
opportunity to hear from minority witnesses. They are: James Dempsey, the Executive
Director of the Center for Democracy and Technology; Orin Kerr, Associate Law
Professor at George Washington University Law School; and Paul Rosenzweig, a Senior





From the very beginning of this debate, I get the sense that the presumption of
ethos has shifted such that proponents of the way in which the act originally passed, now
have to defend their ethos of caring about civil liberties whereas during authorization, the
critics were the ones having to be defensive of their ethos—they had to prove that they
were strong on terror. Chabot introduces the topic of the hearing by stating that he and
fellow members have been careful to protect the balance of civil liberties while fighting
terrorism:
During the debate over the PATRIOT Act in the House, many of us in congress,
including myself, raised concerns about infringing on the civil liberties of the
American people and, therefore, supported protective measures, such as the
sunset. As we move forward in the process of providing the strong measures that
are necessary to combat terrorism, we must also keep in mind the importance of
protecting civil liberties Americans hold dear. (Antiterrorism Investigations,
2003, p. 1)
Chabot seems to be proud of the legislative process utilized to adopt the act and wants to
keep moving forward with the same level of diligence when it comes to protecting safety,
while at the same time, also protecting civil liberties.
After introducing the majority’s ethos in the debate, Chabot previews the major
issues to be addressed: 1) the protection of content privacy when monitoring email
addresses; 2) standards for accessing business records—specifically library records, and
3) FBI monitoring of public gatherings. Then, he ends his opening statement with another
defense of the oversight process:
When Congress was debating the USA PATRIOT Act, which would give law
enforcement new tools to combat terrorism, we promised to conduct vigilant
oversight over the implementation of these laws. This hearing today is a
continuation of this important oversight, and we look forward to hearing from our
witnesses here this afternoon. (Antiterrorism Investigations, 2003, p. 3)
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He says that oversight has been working and that this hearing is merely an extension of
that oversight process.
Nadler
As promised, critics of the process utilized to authorize the act waste no time in
attacking the ethos of proponents. Nadler begins his opening statement by saying,
“Today, we review the USA PATRIOT Act, legislation that was rushed into law in a
manner that was, to say the least, not conducive to careful and thoughtful consideration”
(p. 3). He alludes to the “unusual” level of cooperation this Committee adhered to in
drafting bipartisan legislation: “While the Members of our Committee worked
cooperatively to forge legislation that won unanimous and bipartisan support—something
rather unusual on this Committee…carefully considering the balancing between privacy
considerations and national security” (Antiterrorism Investigations, 2003, p. 3).
Unfortunately, though, according to Nadler, the legislation that was ultimately signed into
law bore little resemblance to the one we reported” (p. 3). He continues to argue, “That
legislation was drafted in secret over a weekend by representatives of the Department of
Justice and the House leadership, was brought to the floor with no one having an
opportunity to see it in advance” (Antiterrorism Investigations, 2003, p. 3). Then, Nadler
gets fired up and refers to the process as a “shameful procedure,” pointing out that
government leaders used fear and patriotism to avoid delay:
Members had to vote on a multi-hundred page bill, with no one having had a
chance to even read the bill, except for staffs. The bill was available an hour in
advance. People had to vote based on summaries. This was shameful procedure to
deal with legislation of such vital import and impact on our very liberties. When
people said that we would have an opportunity to vet the legislation, to send it out
to law schools and civil liberty unions and other groups that are interested for
their comments, we were told that the ideas in this legislation had been around for
a long time. True. Lots of ideas have been around for a long time. It doesn’t make
them good ideas. It also wasn’t clear which ideas had gotten into the bill, the
extent to which those ideas have gotten into the bill, the form those ideas had
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gotten into the bill. We were voting on the basic summaries. And we were told we
didn’t have time to consider the legislation properly because, if it were delayed by
several days, lives could be lost. (Antiterrorism Investigations, 2003, p. 3)
Nadler continues to state the grievance by referring to the beginnings of the legislative
process as hysteria and claiming that now we need to go back and do the job with a more
critical eye: “With this kind of hysteria, the bill was passed almost sight unseen by the
House, unfortunately. Now we are under—we are going to do the kind of oversight that
we really should have done before voting on the bill” (Antiterrorism Investigations, 2003,
p. 3). Continuing with that thought, he argues that criticism is bipartisan and worthy of
consideration:
And it’s about time we are. There were and have been bipartisan concerns
that powers extended under the rubric of fighting terrorism, in fact allow
Federal agencies to reach well beyond the war on terrorism to target the
privacy and fundamental liberties of average law-abiding Americans. Our
witnesses today provide extensive evidence that the concerns of those who
oppose this law as well as those who voted for it despite their misgivings
have been borne out. (Antiterrorism Investigations, 2003, pp. 3-4)
The witnesses he mentions, the first minority witnesses to go before the committee, lend
support to his point—criticism is not hysteria. There are real reasons to be concerned.
Moving on, Nadler makes an argument that becomes a new point of contention—
one that could only come up by virtue of having implemented the act and seeing it in
progress. Since passage, according to Nadler, the Administration has been overly
secretive—making it very difficult for the Committee to do its oversight job:
Of even greater concern is the extent to which this Administration’s penchant for
excessive secrecy has thwarted the Members of this Committee in the discharge
of our constitutional duty to provide oversight of those activities within our
jurisdiction and to monitor the strengths and weaknesses of the law and its
implementation. I would hope that the Administration would be more responsive
to congressional requests for specific rather than general information. ‘‘We can’t
tell you’’ or, in effect, “it’s none of your business” are not adequate or acceptable
answers to a congressional Committee seeking to exercise its legitimate oversight
functions. (Antiterrorism Investigations, 2003, p. 4)
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This argument is a noteworthy one; it shows up a lot during this round of debate and
marks a significant shift in discourse from the authorization stage to the oversight stage
of debate. It is one that is made over and over again as the hearing continues.
In the next argument from Nadler, we find a familiar form for making a claim in the
debate. It is the, “I want to be tough on terror…but…” argument. Here though, Nadler
seems to use it a bit more offensively as opposed to the authorization stage when it was
used in a rather defensive manner. He says:
Mr. Chairman, no one needs to instruct me about the dangers of terrorism or the
need to fight it effectively. My District has been the target of repeated terrorist
attacks, not only the September 11 attack on the World Trade Center, but on
several occasions prior to that terrible day. Even now, there isn’t a single New
Yorker who’s not acutely aware that when—not if—future acts of terror are
attempted against this country, it will likely be our homes, our workplaces, our
families, our neighbors, and our friends who will be at the top of the terrorist lists.
No community has a greater stake in a successful war on terrorism than mine.
And yet, the—my constituents are consistently among the most outspoken
defenders of individual rights in this war on terrorism. They do this not because
they’re indifferent to their own safety, but because they understand that the choice
between liberty and safety is too often a false one. (Antiterrorism Investigations,
2003, p. 4)
Also interesting in this quotation is the example as demonstration utilized. Nadler uses
the example of public opinion from his own district—the target of a 9/11 terrorist attack
to illustrate his point. He explains that his constituents are certainly aware of the effects
of terrorism; yet it is they, the ones hit hardest by the attacks who are most vociferous
about ensuring the protection of individual rights—they understand that fighting the war
on terror is not an all-or-nothing issue.
Nadler begins to wrap up his opening statement by referring again to the notion
that the Patriot Act was originally legislated in hysteria and now is the time to go back
and take “a sober look”: “So Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the testimony of our panel.
Liberty and security must not be partisan issues. They represent the fundamental
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underpinnings of the American way of life. We legislated in hysteria in October of 2001.
We have done this before in times of crisis. It is now time for a sober second look”
(Antiterrorism Investigations, 2003, p. 4).
In closing, Nadler thanks Chabot for holding the hearing and expresses hope that “we
will be able to work together to provide consistent and effective oversight of this pressing
and timely issue” and that “we can pass into law any necessary amendments that we find
to be necessary as a result of these hearings.” Particularly, Nadler points out that he is
“interested in how the Administration can justify the kind of intrusive oversight, shall we
say, of what people read in libraries that is included in this act” (Antiterrorism
Investigations, 2003, pp. 4-5).
Following Nadler, Chabot asks if anyone else wishes to make an opening
statement before getting to the witnesses. Mr. Watt (D-NC), a minority member, speaks
up very briefly to emphasize the importance of having more hearings:
I really can’t think of a subject that cries out for a hearing more than the issue
that’s before us today. And I hope that this will be the first hearing and prelude to
a full Committee hearing on this issue. And I hope, beyond that, that the Members
of this House will use the information that is being submitted at this hearing and
subsequent hearings to inform themselves better about how to strike an
appropriate balance in these difficult times, and make sure that the constitutional
imperatives are safeguarded. I thank the Chairman for convening the hearing. I
hope he will encourage the full Committee chair, as we have been doing, to have
a follow-up hearing about the same issue. Thank you. Yield back. (Antiterrorism
Investigations, 2003, p. 5)
There is obviously a sense of urgency behind his message. Afterward, Chabot moves on
to introduce the witnesses.
Dinh
Viet Dinh, one of the chief architects of the Patriot Act, is the only majority
witness at the hearing on this day. He begins his opening statement very generically by
thanking the committee but then, he quickly launches into the reasoning behind why he is
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so eager to be there: “Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank you and the Ranking
Member for having this meeting and for having me here. There has been much confusion,
misinformation, and indeed sometimes disinformation about the events after September
11 or activities thereon, and I appreciate the opportunity to clear up some of the
confusion” (Antiterrorism Investigations, 2003, p. 6). According to Dinh, in the very
opening words of his testimony, criticism is based upon faulty information, whether
accidental or otherwise, and that he is here to clear it up for us. The proclamation is very
Platonic in nature. Dinh positions himself as the all-knowing philosopher-king who has
access to the perfect form; thus all he needs is the opportunity to speak to the masses so
that clarification can be achieved.
Then, Dinh attempts to establish his own ethos as being cooperative and open about the
way in which the act has been implemented:
I fully share Mr. Nadler’s call for more public accountability and congressional
information. That is why the department has been cooperating with this
Committee and the full Committee on the questions on—with respect to
oversight. In that respect, I call the Members’ attention to the 60-page submission
that we submitted last week containing information regarding our activities, about
which I hope to have an opportunity to elucidate during this hearing.
(Antiterrorism Investigations, 2003, p. 6)
Obviously, Dinh is responding to the attack on the Department’s ethos—the one claiming
that they have been overly secretive about operations. He welcomes oversight and claims
that the Justice Department has been submitting information all along—information that
details the specifics of Patriot Act enforcement.
In the next sequence of arguments, Dinh claims the Patriot Act is the answer to
our problems. He sets this up by first, reverting back to an argument that we have become
familiar with from the authorization stage of debate—the rhetoric of fear. He draws from
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a quotation by a terrorist who failed to assassinate British Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher during an attack in 1984:
Mr. Chairman, when the IRA failed in an attempt to assassinate British Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher in 1984, a spokesman said, ‘Today we were unlucky.
But remember, we only have to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always.’
That simple statement underscored the momentous task facing the Government
after 9/11 (Antiterrorism Investigations, 2003, p. 6).
This quotation reminds us that we will forever need to be afraid of terrorists.
Dinh continues with this line of thinking by introducing resolution to the problem: the
Patriot Act. Accordingly, it has prevented more attacks on U.S. soil since 9/11. As the
quotation refers to, events such as the train bombing in Morocco as well as a terrorist
attack in Saudi Arabia had just occurred, but none had happened in the U.S. because of
the Patriot Act:
Even as events in Saudi Arabia and Morocco this past week remind us that the
terrorist threat is real and constant, we do take some comfort that terrorists have
not successfully attacked the American homeland since September 11. In our
judgment, the successful effort in preventing another catastrophic attack on the
American homeland in the past 20 months would have been much more difficult,
if not outright impossible, without the tools that Congress has authorized, in
particular, the tools in the USA PATRIOT Act. These authorities have
substantially enhanced our ability to investigate, prosecute, and most important, to
prevent terrorist attacks. (Antiterrorism Investigations, 2003, p. 6)
The line of argumentation ends with another argument that is not new to the discourse
and that is the declaration to trust us…we have been doing all of this without bending the
Constitution in any way. We are perfect:
In doing so, we are constantly mindful of the legal and constitutional limits to
governmental authority. We have safeguarded the constitutional rights and civil
liberties of law-abiding Americans, just as we have protected them from the
threat of terror. We have achieved these twin objectives by implementing
common-sense reforms and utilizing the tools that Congress has provided.
(Antiterrorism Investigations, 2003, p. 6)
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Following a long ethos-based introduction, Dinh transitions into a series of logos based
arguments.
He argues that first, section 218 has removed the artificial “wall” existing
between law enforcement agencies and intelligence gathering agencies—the one
supposedly created by FISA in an effort to prevent intelligence gathering agencies from
spying on people who are U.S. citizens. Dinh claims that getting rid of this wall through
the Patriot Act has led to the capture of Al Arian, a Palestinian jihadist. Secondly, Dinh
argues that section 216 of the Patriot Act updated laws to take into account emerging
forms of technology; this according to Dinh, allowed information to be gathered about
Danny Pearl’s killers. Danny Pearl is an American journalist who was kidnapped and
executed by jihadists. In the middle of the logos based appeal, Dinh inserts another “you
can trust us” argument, claiming that, “Again, Congress armed law enforcement with this
powerful weapon without sacrificing the constitutional rights and civil liberties of law-
abiding citizens” (Antiterrorism Investigations, 2003, p. 7). Then, the third logos based
argument is made. Dinh claims that the Patriot Act has decentralized Attorney General
authorities by empowering field agents to use more common sense in the field rather than
being overly restricted by a set of uniform rules that prevent creativity and independent
thinking.
Dinh ends his statement by pointing out that the terrorists are the greatest threats
to Americans; i.e., he uses the rhetoric of fear once again:
Mr. Chairman, the greatest present threat to the American people comes from the
terrorists who seek to destroy our way of life. The men and women of law
enforcement, instead, seek to protect that way of life and secure our liberty. The
Department will continue to do everything in our power, with your help, to
incapacitate the terrorists and to liberate the activities of law-abiding Americans.
I thank you very much. (Antiterrorism Investigations, 2003, pp. 7-8)
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It is interesting the way Dinh tells this narrative. He defines himself and his colleagues at
the Justice Department as the heroes in the narrative who “will continue to do everything
in our power” to win the war on terror. In the middle of telling the story, he says that we
need “your help” to continue the fight. In other words, Congress is in the role of assisting
the Bush Administration, giving them the tools they need, without getting in the way.
Patriotism demonstrated by Congress in Dinh’s narrative, means for members to become
a passive stamp of approval for whatever the Bush Administration needs. This is the
theme that has been developing throughout Dinh’s entire opening statement. Looking
back we find Dinh saying that, “Congress armed” us with these tools…that we are
winning the war on terror “utilizing the tools that Congress has provided…,,” that
another attack would have occurred “without the tools that Congress has authorized.”
These quotations come directly from Dinh’s opening statement and all formulate a
narrative in which the Justice Department officials are the action heroes, in contrast to the
Congress members who play the supporting cast. They are passive, docile actors who
know and appreciate their roles as bystanders.
Minority Witnesses
To begin analysis of the minority witnesses’ opening statements, let me just say
how shocked I was by how restrained their testimony seemed. These witnesses, Kerr and
Dempsey in particular, are cited to a great extent throughout much of the Patriot Act
literature. The literature I read in which they are cited, provides a rather scathing,
political attack on the Patriot Act and its architects. Most notably, Foerstel’s (2004) book
is titled, Refuge of a Scoundrel: The Patriot Act in Libraries. On the cover of the book is
a picture of John Ashcroft delivering some sort of a public address; i.e. Ashcroft is the
scoundrel according to the book. Another project from which I gained a great deal of
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background from is Nancy Chang’s (2002), Silencing Political Dissent: How Post-
September 11 Anti-Terrorism Measures Threaten Our Civil Liberties. On the cover of
that book, we find an ominous black and white picture of individuals from the waste
down who appear to be dressed in law enforcement uniforms. One of the individuals
looks to have riot gear on. They are lined up shoulder-to-shoulder as if they are blocking
an entrance to some place. Clearly, these books were packaged to sell copies and are
politically driven, and this is not to say that there is not truth in them or that they are not
backed by good evidence and analysis, but it is to say that criticism may have been
exaggerated a bit for the purpose of selling books, detracting a bit from their value as
scholarly criticism. Nonetheless, because Kerr and Dempsey are cited to such a great
extent throughout these books, and others to be sure who portray a similar sort of ethos, I
was expecting them to extend that sort of ethos during their congressional testimony.
However, they caught me off guard by being more restrained in their commentary, and at
times, even complimentary of the Justice Department. There was not a great deal of ethos
related arguments in the testimony—most of it was logos-based. But even when
argumentation did cross over into the area of speaker credibility, criticism was quite
restrained. In fact, some of their testimony was actually rather complimentary of the
Patriot Act.
The complimentary portions of their testimonies in relation to the Patriot Act,
must be prefaced by noting their criticism of laws existing prior to 9/11. Both witnesses
refer to pre-Patriot Act laws as esoteric; they were not particularly useful for the fight
against terrorism, nor were they all that useful for protecting against civil liberties abuses.
This is why, according to Kerr in particular, that it has become such a difficult task for
Congress to find a balance between too much power and not enough. While neither Kerr
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nor Dempsey are satisfied with the Patriot Act as-is, they do acknowledge that in many
ways, it is an improvement over the status quo.
For instance, Kerr articulates that section 216, a clarification of a 1986 pen
register law, is a very positive change in the direction of civil rights protection. He said
that before section 216 existed, there were no standards and that systems such as
Carnivore went unchecked. Accordingly, the law is on its way to striking the right
balance—but does need some more work. Dempsey offers another example by discussing
the most controversial provision of the act—section 215, also known as the Library
Provision. He makes the point that libraries have never been “law free” zones
(Antiterrorism Investigations, 2003, p. 14) and dispels an argument made by some critics
that the library should be a safe haven where people can go and do whatever they wish
from any computer terminal in the library.
After dispelling a “conspiracy theory” type argument common to Patriot Act
discourse, Kerr does suggest that there needs to be more limitations of searches to
specific individuals based upon specific knowledge of illegal activity, rather than a
blanket search of records which 215 seems to permit. This is a pattern of argument that
permeates much of the minority witness testimony—they find that much of the Patriot
Act makes some commonsense changes to antiterrorism policy. However, they are not
convinced there are enough checks and balances in place. In the next exemplar, Kerr
again acknowledges that many criticisms of the Patriot Act are myth, and blames the
press for not reporting on the laws accurately:
Yet another challenge in this area is that the press has often had a hard time
explaining what these very complicated laws do, so oftentimes the newspapers
will say the law’s doing one thing, when in reality the stories have gotten it
slightly off, still posing very difficult challenges for the Congress to find that
balance in a way that reflects what the laws are actually doing, often requiring a
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great deal of scrutiny of very difficult statutory texts that can go on for many
pages. (Antiterrorism Investigations, 2003, p. 22)
Here, Kerr agrees with a point made by Dinh earlier and one that would remain a part of
the Justice Department’s defense of the Patriot Act, and that is that much of the
controversy is due to public confusion—not the substance of it. Again though, as he does
above, Kerr argues that despite confusion, more checks and balances are needed. It is not,
as Dinh would have us believe, simply a matter of explaining more thoroughly, as Dinh
would have us believe above.
While discussing the minority witnesses’ opening statements, we cannot forget about
Paul Rosenzweig who has some important points to make as well. The first point he
makes is very much an ethos related argument. He justifies the necessity of listening to
criticism and points to the fact that there are people on both sides of the political aisle
begging the Justice Department to do so. He begins his point with an attempt at humor.
Referencing earlier in the hearing when Nadler quotes Rosenzwieg for his own argument
during his opening statement, Rosenzwieg makes a joke about the irony of him and
Nadler agreeing on anything:
Mr. ROSENZWEIG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you very much for
the opportunity to be here. It’s pleasing to hear one’s words quoted back at one,
although I confess, Mr. Nadler, that if I go back and tell them that you’ve quoted
me, they’re going to wonder what’s up back at the Heritage Foundation as well.
But——
At this point, Nadler interrupts Rosenzwieg briefly to acknowledge the point and return
the friendly banter: “You never know what conspiracies are afoot on this
Committee” (Antiterrorism Investigations, 2003, p. 27).Then Rosenzweig uses the
humorous moment to make an important argument. He says:
But what I think that that demonstrates, actually, is that this is an issue where
those who are traditionally skeptical of Big Government because of its ability to
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invade people’s social privacy, and those who are—who come from my tradition
of skepticism about Big Government as an engine for economic and—change,
tend to find a little bit more common ground. (Antiterrorism Investigations, 2003,
p. 27)
The argument is that because people across the political spectrum are calling for more
checks and balances on the Patriot Act, the demand is there for the Justice Department to
take criticisms more seriously. The criticisms are bipartisan, and that according to
Rosenzwieg, should lend them greater credibility.
Immediately after this appeal to bipartisanship, Rosenzweig makes it a point to
recognize that there does not necessarily need to be wholesale change in the Patriot Act—
perhaps only some minor tweaking. He argues that the Patriot Act is not anywhere close
to being the greatest constitutional challenge occurring since 9/11 and claims that the
blanket stoppage of cars while looking for the D.C. sniper is. Continuing to identify with
the Justice Department’s argumentative ground, he goes further to argue that the Patriot
Act should expand its powers even further than it already does in its regulation of the
Internet, pointing out that there is no regulation of it at the present time.
At the end of his statement, Rosenzweig summarizes his stance on the balance
between safety and liberty in the post 9/11 world:
For my part, I think ultimately the question that this Committee has to face in
addressing the guidelines and, frankly, in addressing all of these concerns, is
whether or not we should maintain a high set of standards knowing that in doing
so we may miss some investigative opportunities, important investigative
opportunities that might protect the American public; or lower those standards,
accepting that there may be some abuse, and hope and expect that congressional
oversight, of the form that my colleagues on the panel have already talked about,
will protect those. As a strong backer of congressional oversight and a believer in
it, I hope that the latter is sufficient. (Antiterrorism Investigations, 2003, p. 28)
He essentially says that we should err on the side of safety, which is very surprising to me
given his leadership of the Heritage Foundation—a governmental watchdog organization.
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I fully expected him to favor liberty more—even if it lessened the value of safety. But he
did not—he stressed safety and even acknowledges that at times, this balance may blur
the line for civil liberties protection. But because this is justified due to the threat of
terrorism, he stresses the need for greater Congressional oversight to provide balance.
The issue of oversight is, in the minds of critics, where the debate lies. The issue is not
whether the government should have more power or not in the 9/11 world, it is a matter
of how we are going to keep that power in check—if we are going to keep it in check.
The issue of oversight leads into the final point to make about the minority
witnesses’ testimonies and that is the way in which they pick up on the issue of how
forthcoming the Justice Department has been with matters relating to oversight. This is an
issue where again, I was expecting more direct attacks on the ethos of the Justice
Department—much like during Nadler’s opening statement, but they never came. In fact,
only one of the minority witnesses mentioned that topic—James Dempsey, and even he
steps around the issue a bit—implying some doubt about the intentions of the Justice
Department, but a far cry from the very vocal criticism by Nadler described earlier.
Dempsey brings the issue up very casually by making it clear that the process of
oversight is just beginning:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon, Mr. Nadler, Members of the
Subcommittee. Thank you for giving us the opportunity to testify today at this
very important hearing. We commend Members of this Subcommittee and
Chairman Sensenbrenner and Mr. Conyers for the oversight that you have been
pursuing into the application of the PATRIOT Act. This hearing is clearly just one
step in that process. (Antiterrorism Investigations, 2003, pp. 13-14)
So he acknowledges the oversight currently being done, but lets everyone know that this
is only one small part of the needed process—he expects more in the future.
Dempsey then makes another slight criticism of the Justice Department’s role in
the oversight process, by implying that information provided has not been very timely: “I
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think that the answers to the questions that were submitted by the Justice Department—
we just received them today, 69 pages—are another step” (Antiterrorism Investigations,
2003, p. 14). He acknowledges that the Justice Department is providing answers, but
perhaps too slowly—i.e., “we just received them today.”
In the next sentence, he extends beyond questioning the timeliness of the answers
to also question the clarity: “I’ll say that in quickly looking at some of those, I have to
say that some of them were not entirely clear answers and they raise additional questions,
which, naturally, this Subcommittee and the full Committee will have to follow up on”
(Antiterrorism Investigations, 2003, p. 14). Even as he questions the clarity of Justice
Department answers, Dempsey is careful to not cross the line of accusing the Justice
Department of being intentionally manipulative about the way it is conducting business.
He says it is a natural process for there to be confusion and the for confusion to bring
more questions. The key is that he expects the process to improve with more questions.
Questioning Witnesses: The Debate Over Secrecy
Given the way in which the topic of secrecy was discussed in opening statements,
it should come as no surprise that it becomes the most critical point once the questioning
of witnesses begins. Together, Dinh and Chabot answer the charge of secrecy by arguing
that the deliberative process is working well because they have been cooperative in
sharing information and because they have been willing to criticize their own work. This
sort of argument occurs a total of seven times throughout the debate, but is only made by
Chabot and Dinh. No other participant in the debate makes the claim that the deliberative
process has been effective. Whereas the counterclaim, that the process has not been
effective due to the Justice Department being unwilling to share information, bypassing
the process, and answering questions in a vague way, was made a total of 14 times by
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four different participants, all from the minority side: Nadler, Dempsey, Schiff, and Scott.
As questions begin, the debate begins to find even more focus around the themes
previously alluded to in the opening statements.
That’s Classified Information
Following the opening statements, Chabot begins questioning by asking how long
the government is required to maintain records for Carnivore and then how courts and/or
the legislative body would review those records? Dinh answers that section 216 requires
the department to retain information and give it to the courts within 30 days for a review.
The first question and answer was a straightforward, logos based dialectic about the way
in which the law works. However, during the answer to the second question asked by
Chabot to Dinh, a new ethos based argument unique to the oversight round of debate
emerges. Chabot asks how many times library records have been accessed under the
Patriot Act, and whether the request for those records was made specific to one person, or
if it was accessed based upon a blanket sweep of information? Dinh responds that
specifics to that question cannot be provided because it is classified information due to it
being in the context of a national security investigation:
Mr. Chairman, section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act requires the Department of
Justice to submit semi-annual reports to this Committee and also to the House
Intelligence Committee and the Senate counterparts on the number of times and
the manner in which that section was used in total. We have made those reports.
Unfortunately, they—because they occur in the context of a national-security
investigation, that information is classified. (Antiterrorism Investigations, 2003,
38)
Dinh does reveal though, that an informal survey discovered that about 50 library
contacts were made, but that the official use of FISA cannot be released. Afterward,
Chabot moves on to another question, but, perhaps the most contentious of the answers
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given during the course of this round of debate is out on the table, and it is used
repeatedly by the Justice Department. Critics also question it repeatedly.
In fact, Nadler is the next questioner and he picks up where Chabot left off. The
question he ultimately asks is, how does the number of times libraries are visited impact
national security? But, it is also interesting to observe the way he leads up to the question.
He makes the point that critics are not asking for specific information that would tip
anybody off to anything. Critics just want to know how often a law is being used:
Attorney General Dinh, I was interested to hear you say a few minutes ago that
the number of times that libraries have been visited was classified information.
The Department claims the mere fact as to whether the Department has used
various authority granted in the PATRIOT Act is classified. The question is not
when, where, how, or against whom. Is it your position that you can’t even tell the
Committee whether you have actually used the particular authority granted in the
act? You can’t tell us—I mean, the libraries know whether they’ve been visited.
How does it help the national security—why should it be classified how many
libraries have been visited or even which—well, which—how many libraries have
been visited? How do you suggest we evaluate the authority we have given you if
you can’t even tell us whether you’ve used that authority, how often you’ve used
it? (Antiterrorism Investigations, 2003, p. 40)
Dinh tries to answer the question, but seems to simply repeat himself. The answer is very
simply that is in a “national-security context.” Nadler probes deeper and the answer
changes to it is “pursuant to Executive Order 12333”—Dinh defers to a higher authority
rather than answer the question of why. Nadler continues to press Dinh for an answer to
why that information is classified. The most specific answer Dinh can give though is that:
The reason is fairly straightforward. The amount of activity as well as specific
number of authorities used give an insight as to patterns of intelligence and
terrorist activities that is known to the United States. If you will recall that FISA
controls not only terrorists, but also spies. And so our ability to know what spy
networks are there, what terrorist networks are there, the number of those
networks—— (Antiterrorism Investigations, 2003, p. 40)
After continued discussion, Nadler still does not understand why the information
needs to be classified (nor do I). So, he asks Dempsey to comment.
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That’s Sophistry
Interestingly, Dempsey claims that the information being discussed is actually not
classified. In fact, he says it is published and available for public consumption. He argues
though that the information could and should be more specific; it is reported upon in such
a vague way, that it makes oversight very difficult—like comparing “apples and
oranges.” The claim is essentially that the Department picks and chooses how to count
their information, and how to release their information, so that any information that is
released makes them seem conservative in their usage of the Patriot Act. The only answer
is for the government to be more open with their information:
The number of FISAs is actually published and known, and we watch how it goes
up and down from year to year. I think that the information that is published could
be more detailed than that. Right now, there’s a broad statement of the number of
FISA applications that were granted. I think in the case of the—going even down
as specific as the number of times that section 215 has been used in a library—I
happen to think that number’s relatively small—I don’t think that tells anybody
anything. Because in fact, even in the case of terrorism investigations, the
Government can be going in with subpoenas, criminal subpoenas. And so you—
already you’ve got almost an apples-and-oranges question in terms of anybody
trying to predict where the Government is or to try to evade Government
surveillance. I think overall some of these numbers can be made publicly
available. I think it would greatly help the subcommittee. (Antiterrorism
Investigations, 2003, pp. 40-41)
The type of response Dempsey provides here, in answer to Dinh’s deferment to secrecy,
hints at the way in which this sort of argumentation extends throughout the entire debate.
However not all forms of this argument are as reserved as Dempsey. As was noted above
when analyzing Dempsey’s opening statement, he is very reserved in the way in which he
addresses the ethos of the Justice Department. His comments are very cerebral. If he
experienced any anger whatsoever toward the majority witness, it was tempered by the
way in which he put forth his argumentation.
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Not all participants in the debate are so reserved about responding to
governmental secrecy—especially Nadler, the ranking minority member on this
subcommittee. While positing a similar sort of rebuttal to Dinh’s ethos, Nadler’s tone
gets quite antagonistic. The example occurs at the very end of the debate; the normal
process has ended—all members of the committee had been given the chance to ask
questions, and then Nadler asks for additional time—Chabot gives it to him. Nadler
wants to talk about the Hamdi and Padilla cases. In doing so, he ends up accusing the
Bush Administration of a tyrannical abuse of power:
I’m getting confused here. You were discussing the Administration’s position in
the Hamdi and Padilla cases. And the fact is—the fact is that the Administration
took the position, and if you look at your brief you’ll see it, that when the
President or the Department of Defense has designated an American citizen or
anyone else an enemy combatant, the courts have no jurisdiction, no jurisdiction,
to question that designation. The courts have not agreed with that, but that’s the
Administration’s position. And that’s a claim of power, a claim that habeas corpus
doesn’t exist, that nothing exists, that the President in that decision is all-
powerful, that nobody, until that brief, had made in an English-speaking
jurisdiction—before Magna Carta. And I would point out that this country
rebelled against Great Britain for tyrannical assertions far less grievous than that.
My question, however, is on a different—and that’s the record, if you look at the
brief of the Justice Department. There’s no question. In saying that habeas corpus
exists, it only exists because the court didn’t agree with the Administration.
(Antiterrorism Investigations, 2003, p. 52)
Nadler is claiming that the executive branch is attempting to become “all powerful” by
advocating the Patriot Act. Furthermore, through historical analogy, Nadler suggests that
critics may very well be justified in revolting violently against the government. He points
out that the American Revolution occurred over reasons that are “far less grievous” than
the change in habeas corpus resulting from the Patriot Act. The ethos of “patriot” is
established as not only a critic—but also as one who is willing to violently revolt against
the government when it is necessary.
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Then Nadler poses the question that he spent a great deal of effort leading up to,
and that deals with the way in which the Patriot Act applies FISA standards to crimes in
the United States, asking how that does not violate the 4th amendment by a de facto
suspension of habeas corpus. As Dinh begins to answer the question though, a great deal
of animosity and flaring temper becomes transparent given the interruptions seen in the
dialogue:
Mr. DINH. You ask a very good question. I would like to discuss that in
detail—
Mr. NADLER. And—excuse me, let me just say—and how can we do that
constitutionally and say the crimes can be—criminal investigations, even if
there’s some foreign intelligence thing, can be governed by a less-than-Fourth-
Amendment standard? Whatever you decide the Fourth Amendment means, how
can you say it’s governed by less than the Fourth Amendment?
Mr. DINH. I completely understand. With respect, Mr. Congressman, I am
advised that in the Hamdi case, we did not move to dismiss the habeas petition,
but simply argued that the designation was conclusive, consistent with Ex Parte
Qurin. In Padilla, we did make a——
Mr. NADLER. And—excuse me—and if—go ahead.
Mr. DINH. In Padilla, we did make a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction because we thought that Mr. Padilla, who was being held in South
Carolina, venue was in South Carolina.
Mr. NADLER. Well, forget the venue. But even your first thing, if you say the
court lacks jurisdiction, then there can be no habeas.
Mr. DINH. No, sir, we did not move to dismiss on lack of jurisdiction. We argued
that under the law, Ex Parte Qurin in particular, the designation as enemy
combatant is conclusive upon the——
Mr. NADLER. Excuse me, the designation is conclusive; therefore there is
no habeas corpus or anything else. The designation——
Mr. DINH. No, here’s——
Mr. NADLER. Wait a minute. The designation is con—if you say the designation
is conclusive, and once that designation is conclusive, then there is no right to
habeas corpus, correct? (Antiterrorism Investigations, 2003, p. 53)
Finally then, at the end of this bit of dialogue, we come to the end point of the analysis in
this section and that is where Nadler accuses Dinh of “sophistry”:
Mr. DINH. We are in agreement in all but characterization. Habeas petition exists,
he can present all his arguments legal and factual. It just so happens that under
the law, his habeas argument is not worth very much. The habeas petition would
be dismissed not for want of jurisdiction, but for want of substance.
Mr. NADLER. I find that, frankly—what’s the word I’m looking
213
for?—sophistry. (Antiterrorism Investigations, 2003, p. 53)
There is a fine line between an ad hominem fallacy and a legitimate argument in this
case. If the accusation is true, then perhaps it is not a fallacy, but either way, Nadler’s
version of the rebuttal comes across as less restrained than Dempsey’s; his temper is
clearly flaring—for better or worse.
Evidence of a Contradictory Ethos?
Before the reader decides if the previously mentioned example demonstrates
“sophistry” or not, awareness of more context surrounding the topic of discussion should
be revealed. Honestly, given the context, it is any wonder that the Hamdi and Padilla
cases were discussed at all, much less in as much detail as Nadler and Dinh were
discussing them? Note that we are out of chronological order at this stage of analysis, but
earlier in the debate, Dinh stated those specific cases were off limits as topics of
discussion due to the fact that they are still under review. This response comes about
when Mr. Scott, a minority member, asks Dinh if the Secretary of Defense designates a
person as “a guilty foreign terrorist” (Antiterrorism Investigations, 2003, p. 43) does that
mean they should not have access to judicial review? Dinh’s answer is, “Mr.
Congressman, as you know, those cases, both in the 4th Circuit with Yaser Hamdi and
the 2nd Circuit with Jose Padilla, are currently under litigation, so I’m somewhat limited
in my ability to answer” (Antiterrorism Investigations, 2003, p. 43). So again, the veil of
secrecy is utilized to keep information out of the hands of critics. Though this time, the
justification is a bit different than in earlier examples. Here, the justification is that a
court case is still under review as opposed to the national security justification.
Regardless of the justification though, there is some evidence that perhaps Dinh’s
response is a result of his own picking and choosing, not of some clear-cut legal barrier
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that he simply could not overcome. The first observation supporting this assertion is that
Scott’s question in no way asks Dinh to comment on the Hamdi or Padilla cases. The
question is a generic one asking Dinh to provide his interpretation of the law. Dinh
himself introduces the court cases as a reason not answer Scott’s question. A second
observation is that a few pages later in the debate, after other topics of questioning are
discussed, the Hamdi and Padilla cases come up again, only this time, it is Mr. Feeney, a
majority member, who brings them up (specifically mentioning the cases in his question)
in a question of clarification—meaning that he is simply giving Dinh the opportunity to
argue that individuals involved in the case were not stripped of any constitutional
rights—the very issue for which the courts are deciding in the present. Dinh is more than
happy to discuss the cases in this context:
Mr. FEENEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Dinh, in the first place, the two
individuals that you were just being—the cases that you were being asked about a
little bit earlier with the—with respect to the Department of Defense designation,
were those U.S. citizens that were so designated?
Mr. DINH. Both, sir. Mr. Hamdi was a U.S. citizen who was captured on the
battlefield in Afghanistan. Mr. Jose Padilla is a U.S. citizen who was captured in
the Chicago O’Hare Airport, and our evidence indicates—and this was made in an
affidavit submitted in court—indicates that he came to the airport with the
intention of detonating a dirty bomb in the vicinity.
Mr. FEENEY. I appreciate that. I’m also interested in whether or not there’s
anything in the PATRIOT Act or any other aspect of Federal law that would
permit any of the Executive Branch offices to designate an individual U.S. citizen
in such a way that that individual would lose any of their otherwise protected
freedoms under the Constitution or the Bill of Rights.
Mr. DINH. No, sir, nothing in the laws or specifically in the United States—or in
the USA PATRIOT Act. As our pleadings make clear, the President was acting
under his authority, his executive authority as commander in chief.
Mr. FEENEY. And there are exceptions under article I, section in terms of
suspending habeas corpus, is that right? I think invasion of the public safety and
domestic rebellion, or——
Mr. DINH. Yes, sir, you are absolutely correct. And those are the provisions that
President Lincoln relied upon in order to suspend habeas corpus and declare
martial law during the Civil War. And this is in answer to Mr. Scott’s earlier
question, that the President obviously has not made such a determination nor does
he have intent, present intent to do so.
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Mr. FEENEY. Well, even if we are under a current rebellion or invasion of the
public safety, other than habeas corpus, I’m not aware of any other rights that any
U.S. citizen may be forced to forfeit as a consequence of such a designation.
Mr. DINH. Nor am I, sir, just the great writ of habeas corpus is the specific
suspension clause. (Antiterrorism Investigations, 2003, pp. 49-50)
So, had Feeney not given Dinh the opportunity to clarify the constitutional rights issue, or
if Dinh had truly felt that the cases were off limits as a topic of discussion, it is likely that
the exchange between Nadler and Dinh at the end of the debate—the one analyzed a few
pages ago, would have not occurred. Remember that the exchange between Feeney and
Dinh occurs after the exchange between Scott and Dinh—the one in which Dinh refused
to comment about the cases. Furthermore, the Feeney-Dinh exchange occurs at the very
end of the normal proceedings for the debate, which is why Nadler had to ask Chabot for
additional time in order to get his line of questioning in at all.
After Nadler asks for additional time to ask questions, and gets it, a couple of
other people make the same request—Scott being one of them. At this point, with the
Hamdi and Padilla floodgate opened, Scott gets his opportunity to question Dinh over the
matter after all. Rather than accusing Dinh specifically of sophistry, he tries to provide
his own evidence of it by reading Dinh’s own language back to the Committee—
suggesting that he had contradicted himself from an earlier proceeding:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just wanted to make a quick statement before I asked
a question, and that is to quote language out of—quote some language for Mr.
Dinh. ‘It is well settled that the military has the authority to capture and detain
individuals who it has determined are enemy combatants. Such combatants,
moreover, have no right of access to counsel to challenge their detention. The
courts have an extremely narrow role in challenging the military judgment to
detain an individual as an enemy combatant. A court’s inquiry should come to an
end once the military has shown that it has determined that the detainee is an
enemy combatant. The court may not second guess the military’s enemy
combatant determination. At the very most, given the separation of constitutional
powers in this unique area, a court should only require the military to point to
some evidence supporting its determination. Either way, no evidentiary hearing is
required to dispose of a habeas petition in this military context.’ (Antiterrorism
Investigations, 2003, p. 56-57)
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Dinh’s whole argument is that the writ of habeas corpus still exists for enemy
combatants—meaning that they still have access to the courts once their status is
determined as such. Scott reads his own language back to him, which seems to suggest
otherwise. Dinh responds by claiming that he never contradicted himself and refers Scott
to the sentence in his own previous statement that comes before the part of the quote
Scott reads:
Thank you very much, Congressman. I fully agree with what you’ve read, and
there again, we agree. On what the Government argued, I would like to read the
portion that immediately precedes that. It says very clearly that ‘the writ of habeas
corpus remains available to individuals, such as Hamdi, who are detained as
enemy combatants to challenge the legality of their detention.’ As I have
answered Mr. Nadler’s question, our position is that the writ of habeas corpus
remains open. But as you have read in our portion of the brief, we believe that the
law governing such habeas corpus in the case of enemy combatants is highly
limited and the Judiciary gives substantial deference to the Executive.
(Antiterrorism Investigations, 2003, p. 57)
In chronological order, this is essentially how the debate comes to an end. However,
according to the present order of analysis, the exemplar merely wraps up the case of the
critics. Their primary argument is that the Justice Department is too secretive—to the
point of not being able to provide for effective oversight.
It seems to me that the way in which the Hamdi and Padilla cases are introduced
as topics in this debate suggests evidence of contradiction on Dinh’s part—
notwithstanding the claim of substantive contradiction over the writ of habeas corpus—
just procedural evidence that Dinh seems to pick and choose issues that can be discussed
based upon the extent to which they will potentially further his own agenda along. In the
very first instance of the Hamdi and Padilla court cases being brought up, Dinh suggested
that they were off limits as topics of discussion. However, in the second case, when the
questioner brought up the court cases during an effort to provide Dinh the opportunity to
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clarify his own agenda and Dinh did not object. He was happy to discuss details of the
case. It is difficult then, to view this evidence as anything other than Dinh portraying
some sense of a contradictory ethos regarding the use of secrecy during public discourse.
Regardless of whether readers decide there is contradiction or not, the fact that the
“that’s classified” rebuttal is made repeatedly throughout the debate is significant in and
of itself. Dinh uses it a total of six different times in response to various questions.
The Debate over the Sunset
Statistically speaking, the sunset provision of the Patriot Act is not debated a great
deal in the implementation stage of debate. But it is given some attention, and because it
plays such an important role throughout the process as a whole, it deserves analysis.
William Jenkins (R TN) brings up the issue of the sunset. He claims that the
sunset provisions should relieve the fear that critics have and make us feel more
comfortable about the situation:
Another thing that nobody has mentioned here is the permanency of these
provisions. Nobody has mentioned that with respect to, not all, but some of
…these, there is a definite life to these provisions. It’s, under the statute, what,
four years for most? And does that not—is—does not, that not lessen the threat
that some people fear? (Antiterrorism Investigations, 2003, p. 42).
Jenkins then gives the witnesses a chance to respond.
Dempsey is the first to do so and begins by acknowledging the premise of
Jenkins’s argument, recognizing that the sunset is an important component of the act:
“Congressman, I think that the sunset provision was in fact an important provision of the
PATRIOT Act. I think that this hearing is part of the process of Congress deciding
whether to reauthorize those provisions or whether to reauthorize them subject to better
checks and balances” (Antiterrorism Investigations, 2003, p. 42). Moving on though,
Dempsey is able to effectively provide a counterargument to the connection between the
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premises and the conclusion drawn by Jenkins. Dempsey argues that the problems with
the Patriot Act extend well beyond the sunsetted provisions, and in fact, extend well
beyond the act itself, a part of the debate that becomes more and more vital as the debate
progresses, especially when moving on to the reauthorization phase:
I think, though, that a number of the things that we’re talking about today and a
number of the issues of concern to this Subcommittee do not arise under the
PATRIOT Act and are not subject to the sunset. So the Subcommittee and the
Congress is going to have to look at those as well. I think the FBI guidelines is
one of those. I think the use of FISA, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,
information in criminal cases, that provision, I think, does not sunset, and that is
an issue that will remain, that needs to be addressed. I think the pen register
authority and what that should be needs to be addressed. The use of data mining
technology is taking place, really, outside of the PATRIOT Act, and standards
and guidelines need to be established before that is implemented. So the sunset, I
think, is a symbol of Congress’s responsibility. But mere up or down on the
sunset doesn’t, doesn’t end the debate. (Antiterrorism Investigations, 2003, pp.
42-43)
According to Dempsey, the sunset is an important symbolic part of Congress’s
responsibility, but it should not be relied upon solely to ensure meaningful debate. That
would be a false sense of security.
Rosenzwieg also responds to Jenkins’s question. He wholeheartedly agrees that
the sunset provisions are important as well, without refuting the conclusion drawn by
Jenkins as Dempsey does:
I’m a firm believer in the sunset provisions in this and other laws that relate to
civil liberties, because to my mind, the fundamental check on executive excess
which may or may not arise, but in preventing it, is the continued conscientious,
nonpartisan engagement of Congress in oversight. And the sunset provisions are a
way of ensuring that the institutional barriers that live in this institution that
prevent activity sometime are overcome, in a sense binding yourselves to detailed,
thoughtful oversight because of the impending sunset deadline. I think it’s a great
idea. (Antiterrorism Investigations, 2003, p. 43)
Obviously, the sunset provisions are important components of the debate over the Patriot
Act. As far as the symbolism of the sunset goes, that is the biggest influence the House of
Representatives was able to impress upon the debate over patriotism. The idea that there
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was a patriotic obligation to seriously revisit the most controversial parts of the Patriot
Act again at the end of four years would not have come to fruition without the House of
Representatives fighting for them during the authorization stage. The Senate was not
prepared to fight for them, and the Justice Department certainly did not want them. The
sunset becomes a major focal point of deliberation in the next round of debate. In the
debate currently being analyzed, there is only one other mention of the sunset.
Mr. Feeney, a majority member, is the only person in the current debate to
express disagreement with the premise that the sunset is effective. Feeney argues, to Mr.
Rosenzweig in particular, that although he can identify with the reasoning behind
endorsing the sunsets, he ultimately thinks that it is a naïve position to take because it
creates much more bureaucracy than is necessary:
Well, thank you. And finally, Mr. Rosenzweig, I think a lot of the panel members
and the Members have voiced support for the notion that we’ve got some 4-year
sunset provisions on a lot of the applications. Maybe because I’m familiar with
the Heritage’s philosophy and tend to endorse it on most issues, maybe my
experience at the State level may be relevant, because I used to believe I was for
sunsetting every part of the chapter and code in the statute book. But what I found
was that every interested party and group in the world, when they were aware that
that sunset was coming up, and we were able on a routine basis to turn about three
pages of the statutes into 203 pages by the time we were done sunsetting
provisions. So we may get what we asked for on this one. (Antiterrorism
Investigations, 2003, p. 50)
Rosenzweig agrees that it would be silly to sunset every law, but because the Patriot Act
in particular deals with such a “vital issue,” sunsets are necessary:
I would not support sunsetting every provision of every law, for precisely the
same reasons that you’ve just alluded to, that it gives us the opportunity for a big
Christmas tree to be grown in the midst of Congress. In the context, however, of
this vital issue, the balance between civil liberty and national security, one that I
think is, frankly, the most important legal issue, domestic legal issue facing this
Congress this year—more important than Medicare, more important than Social
Security. The importance of getting it right and the importance of keeping
Congress engaged is, in my judgment, sufficiently great that artificial mechanisms
like the sunset are, I think, to be used cautiously, judiciously. Also, to be candid, I
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think on this type of provision, there’s pretty unlikely there are going to be a lot of
Christmas trees. (Antiterrorism Investigations, 2003, pp. 50-51)
Though not much detail is provided through these last two exemplars, the groundwork is
being laid for an extensive debate over the sunset during reauthorization. It is a critical
issue to the negotiation of patriotism.
Summary
To summarize: the debate is getting more divisive. Critics are very angry about
the way in which the authorization phase of the debate ended. They are angry with the
Justice Department for pulling the bait-and-switch at the very end of authorization, but
they are also angry with themselves for letting it happen. In Nadler’s opening statement,
he says “we legislated in hysteria” and now it is time to go back and do the legislative job
correctly. After accepting some blame for the legislative failure though, he turns the eye
on the Justice Department accusing them of being manipulative through the way in which
the final draft was passed through the House vote.
These ethos-related attacks should come as no surprise to anyone who has
followed this debate, given the way in which the authorization phase ended. The past is
not the only topic of criticism though, considering that a new line of argumentation is
made against the ethos of the Justice Department based upon the present: accusations of
new transgressions pertaining to the way in which the act has been implemented.
According to Nadler and other critics, the Department has not been forthright about the
disclosure of information, claiming that the missing information is critical for them to
conduct effective oversight. Dinh and his supporters stick to their guns. They never admit
to any mistakes; they maintain that they have a perfect record when it comes to balancing
safety with civil rights.
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The other significant part of this debate, as it relates to the negotiation of
patriotism, is the debate over the sunset. While it is not very thorough at this stage, a
preview is provided of the debate to come during reauthorization.
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Chapter 9
Two Ships Passing in the Night
The hearing on June 5, 2003 is entitled, The United States Department of Justice;
the purpose of the hearing is general oversight of the department—not necessarily limited
to the Patriot Act. It is interesting to note though that out of four and one-half hours of
testimony, only six non-Patriot Act questions were brought up. The single witness at this
hearing was John Ashcroft. Controversy provides context for the hearing; it had been
brewing over the act since the day it was rushed through the House and originally
authorized. While the conflict is certainly transparent during the April hearing with Viet
Dinh, John Ashcroft is the figurehead leader of the Justice Department—he is the one
most responsible for invoking the patriotic symbolism. So needless to say, in this hearing,
the attacks upon ethos are rampant: criticism of Ashcroft’s ethos is in full swing, and
likewise, criticism of the critics’ ethos is in full swing as well.
In light of this context, there is one point to make here, before diving into the
presentation of data. The point is (ethno)methodological in nature because it reflects upon
the way in which the instrument of analysis (my self) is changing and adapting to the task
of analysis. This point needs to be bracketed and made known to the reader as part of the
intersubjective nature of the hermeneutic method—and that is, to put it simply,
categorization is getting much more complex as the debate moves along from phase to
phase. In the very beginning of the debate, during the authorization phase, there was so
much unity, agreement, and cooperation expressed through discourse that creating
categories for the data was relatively easy compared to the present chapter. There was not
a whole lot of complexity because there was not a whole lot of disagreement, and what
little disagreement did occur, was easy to identify because it “stuck out like a sore
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thumb.” At the current stage of debate though, readers should be aware that defining
categories of ethos related arguments demands a much more difficult and time consuming
effort on my part. As emotionally charged and divisive as the debate over patriotism is
becoming, it is becoming more and more the case that logos and ethos are bleeding into
one another, making it more and more difficult to tease apart. This difficulty was alluded
to in the previous debate (the April, 2003 subcommittee hearing with Viet Dinh and
minority witnesses), but the tension intensifies during the hearing with Ashcroft.
The reasons why this hearing with Ashcroft is a critical turning point in the
difficulty of analysis is two-fold. One reason is quite simply that it is longer and more
drawn out with more participants. At the end of the debate Sensenbrenner reports that 26
different witnesses asked tough questions of Ashcroft. That according to him, is a sign
that the process is working. While Sensenbrenner’s claim about the success of the process
may or may not be true, it is definitely a sign that the process is getting more difficult to
analyze. To be sure, more people are asking more penetrating questions than at any time
prior in the legislative process. Another reason for the complexity, one that is definitely
related to the first, is the fact that Ashcroft is the symbolic leader heading up the charge
of patriotism. Those most critical of Ashcroft are so because of the fact that they feel
their input on the Patriot Act has been overlooked, and more generally, that the
democratic process is being bypassed altogether—in the name of patriotism. Those most
supportive of Ashcroft view the same process as being an effective—appropriate to the
situation—patriotic one. So, given the way in which the debate is framed, there is no
middle ground—no room for compromise, and this lends itself to highly polarized,
partisan debate evidenced by the facts that a) there is very little criticism of Ashcroft
made by Republicans—only two minor hints of criticism of Ashcroft’s ethos; and b)
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there is virtually no praise whatsoever of Ashcroft made by Democrats—notwithstanding
the obligatory “thank you’s” at the beginning of a questioning period.
This debate typifies the sort of debate that makes “two ships passing in the night”
an apropos metaphor for bad academic debate. There is no clash of any substance—the
information is simply not available for that to happen. Ultimately, as analysis progresses
into the next stage of debate, we find that Ashcroft gets the blame for that being the case.
He eventually resigns his post as the Attorney General in November of 2004, and did so
due to the divisiveness over the Patriot Act and other issues (King, 2004). While the issue
of Ashcroft’s resignation will receive greater attention later in analysis, the point is made
here to illustrate the observation that the either/or dichotomy—the hallmark of the Bush
Administration’s war on terror—has lost its magical appeal. At one point it was a source




Chairman James Sensenbrenner opens the oversight hearing on the Department of
Justice by describing the importance of the organization:
The Department of Justice is one of the world’s most important agencies and the
world’s premiere law enforcement organization. With an annual budget exceeding
20 billion and a workforce of over 100,000 employees, the Department is an
institution whose mission and values reflect the American people’s commitment
to fairness and justice (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 1).
So not only does the Justice Department have an important law enforcement function
according to Sensenbrenner, but symbolically, it represents American values.
Furthermore, Sensenbrenner reports that, “The importance of the Department has only
increased since the tragic events of September 11. On that day, America was struck by an
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adversary united only by its hatred of the values America represents” (United States
Department of Justice, 2003, p. 1).
After discussing the importance of the Justice Department, Sensenbrenner
describes the way in which the Judiciary Committee assisted the Justice Department in
the war on terror: “In the wake of these attacks the Judiciary Committee has acted with
bipartisan dispatch to provide the Department with the resources to effectively assess,
detect, prevent and punish those who threaten our security” (United States Department of
Justice, 2003, p. 1). Following description of the role of the Judiciary Committee as
having acted with “bipartisan dispatch,” Sensenbrenner describes his own personal role in
leading that charge from the beginning of the process: “When you last testified before the
Committee, Mr. Attorney General, I expressed strong support for equipping law
enforcement to meet emerging threats, while reiterating my commitment to preserving
the civil rights and liberties that distinguish us as Americans” (United States Department
of Justice, 2003, p. 1). He goes on to say, “I was pleased to introduce and lead
Congressional passage of the PATRIOT Act, which has strengthened America’s security
by providing law enforcement with a range of tools to fight and win the war against
terrorism” (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 1). Sensenbrenner then argues
that the process has been working and defends his argument by mentioning an example of
a couple of members of a terrorist sleeper cell who were convicted as a result of the
Patriot Act.
In the next segment of text, Sensenbrenner describes a “fundamental shift” in the
ethos of the Justice Department: “In a relatively short period the Justice Department and
FBI have made impressive gains toward assessing and preventing terrorist attacks before
they occur. This fundamental shift in focus is only beginning to pay long-term dividends
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for the security of all Americans” (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 1). This
shift in focus becomes a very, very important part of defining the ethos of the Justice
Department. Not only is it a pragmatic shift in operations, but also, as we have seen in
previous debate and as we will see in later testimony, the shift symbolically reconfigures
accountability to the American public. Traditionally, the Justice Department’s role has
been primarily to prosecute criminal behavior; now, the role changes to one that prevents
it—this shift means that they are now responsible for protecting the national security of
Americans. They are now more able to legitimately use “national security” as a
justification for secrecy, much like the military, whereas prior to the shift, this
justification was not quite as readily available.
As Sensenbrenner reiterates, he is a supporter of the shift; yet he does claim that
from the beginning of the process, he has been critical and will continue to be critical into
the future:
However, as I stressed during legislative consideration of the PATRIOT Act, my
support for this legislation is neither perpetual nor unconditional. I believe the
Department and Congress must be vigilant toward short-term gains which
ultimately may cause long-term harm to the spirit of liberty and equality which
animate the American character. We must maintain the fundamental commitment
to ensure the protection of Americans while defending the beliefs that make us
Americans. (United States Department of Justice, 2003, pp. 1-2)
So in principle, Sensenbrenner—a supporter of Ashcroft, agrees with the opponents of
Ashcroft in that there does need to be oversight.
Having established that oversight, very generally speaking, is important to all
involved, the difference in opinion is whether the concurrent level of oversight is
effective. According to Sensenbrenner, it most definitely has been: “To my mind, the
purpose of the PATRIOT Act is to secure our liberties, not to undermine them. In order to
ensure the proper application of the PATRIOT Act, the Committee has closely overseen
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its implementation” (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 2). He explains further
what he means by effective oversight:
On May 13 of this year, I was pleased to receive extensive responses to
comprehensive questions which I jointly submitted to the Department with
Ranking Member Conyers. These responses and testimony received at today’s
hearing will better enable Congress to continue to provide support and guidance
that strengthens our collective ability to meet and defeat emerging threats (United
States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 2).
Sensenbrenner continues to explain: “To further advance these goals <of oversight>,
several Subcommittees of this Committee have conducted oversight hearings which have
examined the operation and priorities of the Department” (United States Department of
Justice, 2003, p. 2).5 He argues further that he has been the driving force behind
supporting the Justice Department, and checking it at the same time:
As Chairman of the Committee, I have continued to help provide the Department
with the legislative resources to carry out its crucial mandates. At the same time,
this Committee has worked to ensure that the Department’s structure,
management and the priorities are tailored to best promote the purposes for which
it was established (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 2).
Sensenbrenner ends his opening statement by painting a rosy picture of the level of
cooperation that is occurring between the executive and legislative branches of
government:
Last year, Congress authorized the Department of Justice for the first time in over
20 years, a legislative accomplishment which reaffirmed our constitutional
obligation to maintain an active and continuing role in organizing the priorities
and overseeing the operations of the executive branch. By working in concert to
identify solutions to the growing challenges faced by Federal law enforcement,
5 As I have noted earlier, by my count, there has only been one subcommittee hearing
focused on the balance between safety and liberty—the only other hearing that I know of,
which dealt with the Patriot Act, was in the Financial Services Subcommittee and their
discussion was focused on whether or not the Patriot Act was adequate to the task of
cutting off funding to terrorist organizations—an important hearing of course but not
necessarily the type of oversight which Sensenbrenner is portraying. Whether or not my
count of the total number of oversight hearings is correct, and whether or not my
assessment of the hearings not analyzed in this project is accurate, I am certain that
Sensenbrenner’s claim of “several hearings” is an exaggeration.
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Congress and the Administration are better able to provide for the safety and
security of all Americans. (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 2)
Conyers
Given the press release cited in Chapter 4, provided by Conyers after the
authorization of the act was completed, I expected him to go after Ashcroft’s ethos rather
aggressively, in a very explicit manner. Though he does make it clear that he was not
happy with the way things have gone in the past, he seems to be very cordial about his
protests—certainly much more so than during the aforementioned press release. To
begin, he thanks Ashcroft for coming today, but then suggests that maybe it has been too
long since he has appeared before the committee: “Chairman Sensenbrenner and I want
to welcome, as we all do, the Attorney General of the United States, a person very
familiar with the legislative process, and we gather here today after missing your
presence for a while…” (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 2). The purpose
according to Conyers, it is two-fold: “The first, of course, is to support the Department of
Justice and the several agencies that work underneath it. The second is to oversight the
Department of Justice” (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 2). Conyers and
Sensenbrenner agree on the purpose of the hearing process. They just do not agree on the
level of success it has had.
Illustrating the point, Conyers suggests that the process devoted to oversight thus
far, has not been very fulfilling. He does so by looking to the future for a better process:
“I am very pleased to suggest that with Chairman Sensenbrenner and yourself, we are
looking at a longer-range way to examine all these functions that are under your
Department’s jurisdiction” (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 2). Then he
explains what why it is important to look to the future in terms of oversight and that is
because the current process is not adequate:
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In other words, it has been my view and the Chairman’s that we could have a
great little blast here today, but that it would be far more purposeful if we were to
have several meetings in which we break down the subject matter, because every
Member here is doing what they feel is important, with these kind of time
constraints, even though you have given generously of yourself today, frequently
don’t serve as useful a purpose. And I am happy that your initial reaction to this
proposal has been favorable. I hope that it can happen. (United States Department
of Justice, 2003, pp. 2-3)
Here, Conyers lets Ashcroft know in a nice way that he has not been impressed with the
amount of oversight available to the Committee, but acknowledges Ashcroft’s “initial
reaction” for an increased level of oversight in the future6. In the next segment of
Conyers’s speech, he articulates further, the importance of having more oversight,
claiming that it is the responsibility of the legislative branch to prevent the country from
approaching the war with a “no holds barred” attitude—a natural “national inclination”
during such a time:
And when you are engaged in war, there is always the national inclination to let’s
go get them any way we can, no holds barred. Well, we are a Nation of laws and
not men. And it is in that arena that this Committee, of all the Committees in the
Congress, has the jurisdiction over constitutional questions, the Department of
Justice itself, the FBI, immigration, the laws that control the entire Nation.
(United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 3)
Conyers continues by acknowledging that there definitely needs to be change in anti-
terrorism law, pointing to a great deal of controversy over the way in which the
Department has approached the change: “All of these things are up for reexamination,
and it is no secret that there has been a lot of questions and controversy about the way
some of the things have been done in the Department” (United States Department of
Justice, 2003, p. 3).
6 It is interesting though that the type of oversight Conyers describes does not occur until a
couple of years later when Congress is considering reauthorization of the sunset
provisions.
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Though there is promise of cooperation in the future, according to Conyers, the
hearing scheduled today is almost a joke because there is no way all of our questions can
even be asked, much less answered: “And so you have given me a very encouraging
signal that we can go about this from your point of view and ours to responsibly
categorize all of these different subject matters. I mean, to have one person come here
and talk about A to Z and anything in between is a bit of a task for anyone” (United
States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 3).
Conyers ends by re-emphasizing the sense of urgency for oversight, pointing out
that the “spirit” of cooperation is the reason everyone is here today and furthermore, that
the Congress’s place in history depends upon how well they work together:
It is in that spirit that we come together, Attorney General Ashcroft, hoping that
we can do our job. We are marching into history. This is not only being examined
in great detail right now, but it is going to be examined, as we all know, in far
more detail after it is over. And we want to acquit ourselves as honorably as we
can under these circumstances. And so I am very happy to welcome you here this
morning. (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 3)
Conyers finishes and then Sensenbrenner begins to introduce Ashcroft, the day’s only
witness.
Ashcroft
The introduction of Ashcroft begins with what could be interpreted as something
of a scolding, though the language is not direct enough to make quite that bold of a claim.
Sensenbrenner encourages the people in this process to engage in open, public debate
rather than through “sound bites” in the media, implying that maybe debate has not been
that open in the past:
And, you know, let me say that I think it is to the benefit of everybody to deal
with these issues publicly rather than through dueling press releases, sound bites
and the like, because we are dealing with very sensitive issues that involve
complex issues of law and ultimately the security of the American people. And I
think we all want to deal with this issue, these issues, in a bipartisan way. And I
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can tell you, Mr. Attorney General, that this will give the Justice Department
perhaps a better opportunity to present its side of the argument than what might
have been going on in the past. (United States Department of Justice, 2003, pp. 3-
4)
While at first, the reminder seems like a general warning to everyone, the fact that he
addresses Ashcroft specifically at the end and tells him that public debate would be a
better way for him to provide his point of view “than what might have been going on in
the past,” leads me to believe that it was a criticism against Ashcroft specifically.
Regardless of the potential of there being slight criticism proffered by Sensenbrenner
during the transition, his introduction of Ashcroft ends on a positive note:
It is my honor and privilege today to introduce Attorney General John Ashcroft.
General Ashcroft was sworn in as the Nation’s 79th Attorney General on
February 1, 2001. His tenure has been marked by national circumstances faced by
few, if any, of his predecessors. He is regarded by both supporters and detractors
as a strong advocate for law enforcement and has taken steps to focus the
Department’s investigative and enforcement priorities since the attacks on
September 11. (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 4)
According to Sensenbrenner, Ashcroft has had the toughest job out of any other Attorney
General preceding him. Furthermore, he has a reputation for being “a strong advocate for
law enforcement” by both his “supporters and detractors.” With that introduction,
Ashcroft is sworn in and is given the opportunity to make his opening statement.
It is noteworthy that Ashcroft does not begin his statement by saying that he is
eager to work with Congress on ways to improve the workings of the Department of
Justice; instead, he begins with a similar type of proclamation made by Dinh in the first
hearing of this phase and that is that he simply needs the chance to explain, and that
would make all criticism disappear:
Chairman Sensenbrenner, thank you very much. And Ranking Member
Congressman Conyers, thank you very much. I am grateful for the opportunity not
only to appear before you today, but for the time we spent together a few minutes
prior to this hearing talking about the capacity and the opportunity of the Justice
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Department to clearly explain the way in which we seek to secure the rights and
liberties of the people of the United States of America. (United States Department
of Justice, 2003, p. 4)
Continuing, he uses another familiar argument—the rhetoric of fear, to build up his case.
He quotes the 1998 fatwah issued by the al Qaeda’s top leaders—the one that supposedly
led to events that started the war on terror:
I come before this Committee having not forgotten the promise made to those
stolen from us by terrorism’s ideology of hate. The roots of this murderous
ideology can be found in the 1998 fatwah issued by al Qaeda’s founders, Osama
bin Laden and Ayman al- Zawahiri, declaring war on American civilians, the
international Islamic front for jihad. In it they wrote, ‘‘The judgment to kill
Americans and their allies, both civilian and military, is the individual duty of
every Muslim able to do so and in any country where it is possible.’’ I continue to
quote: ‘‘We in the name of God call on every Muslim who believes in God and
desires to be rewarded to follow God’s order to kill Americans and to plunder
their wealth wherever and whenever they find it.’’ (United States Department of
Justice, 2003, p. 4)
Certainly, the quotation is scary to read and significant in and of itself. But what is
perhaps more interesting from the standpoint of the focus of this analysis is the way in
which Ashcroft introduces it. He says, “I come before this Committee having not
forgotten the…murderous ideology” of the terrorists. He gives the impression that some
people in the debate have forgotten—and that he is taking it upon himself to remind them
of what happened on 9/11.
After presenting the problem, Ashcroft begins describing the solution. He
acknowledges the leader of the solution, President Bush, as proposing a strong, patient
means by which the terrorists will face justice. Also noticeable in the next quotation is
another fear appeal and a reminder that people suffered on 9/11: “On September 11,
bloodthirsty terrorists answered bin Laden’s call for killing. Twenty months ago
President Bush pledged that al Qaeda and the terrorist network would not escape the
patient justice of the United States, for we would remember the victims of terrorism”
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(United States Department of Justice, 2003, pp. 4-5). Other heroes serving as part of the
solution are mentioned—the brave members of the military who have vowed to carry out
Bush’s war on terror:
Today brave men and women in uniform abroad and at home answer our
President’s call for justice. Sworn to defend the Constitution and our liberties, and
motivated by the memories of September 11, they live each day by a code of
honor, of duty and of country, and they know that they must die preserving the
promise— that they may die preserving the promise that terrorism will not reach
this land of liberty again, for we are a Nation locked in a deadly war with the evil
of terrorism. (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 5)
Ashcroft continues to go on and on reminding the audience that people have suffered on
9/11, again, acting as if he is the lone voice left who remembers them.
As the speech continues, Ashcroft gets more specific by mentioning specific
names of people who have died. For instance, he says:
We will not forget…that in Afghanistan on the dusty road to Kandahar, Army
Sergeant Orlando Morales was killed on reconnaissance patrol 70 in a town called
Geresk. He leaves behind a wife and a 17-month-old daughter. Sergeant Morales
was in Afghanistan fighting to destroy the Taliban regime, terrorist operatives and
their training camps. His sacrifice was not in vain (United States Department of
Justice, 2003, p. 5).
Ashcroft continues to name names and provide personal stories to support his cause: “We
will not forget that in the battles in Iraq, Marine Lance Corporal David Fribley of
Warsaw, Indiana, was killed near Nasiriyah by Iraqi soldiers who pretended to surrender,
but then opened fire. Lance Corporal Fibley made the ultimate sacrifice to free the Iraqi
people and to eliminate a key sponsor of terror” (United States Department of Justice,
2003, p. 5).
In the next statement, Ashcroft takes a break from naming names to remind us
that true Americans do not shy away from danger, almost implying that untrue Americans
might: “We must not forget that this great fight for freedom did not end in Kabul. It will
not end along the banks of the Tigris and Euphrates. The fight continues here on
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America’s streets, off our shores and in the skies above. Americans do not shy away from
danger or turn away from threats to liberty” (United States Department of Justice, 2003,
p. 5). But then, he gets back to providing examples of who the heroes are:
On September 11 we saw our Nation’s finest ideals in action: Firefighters and
police officers who rushed to, not from, the World Trade Center. We saw
Americans embrace duty, face danger, and sacrifice their lives for their fellow
citizens and for freedom. On that tragic day, 343 firefighters and 71 police
officers died in the line of duty. (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 5)
Ashcroft is clearly going to great lengths to freshen the intense emotions of 9/11 to get us
sad, angry, and in a mood to want vengeance—an appeal to pathos that was so effective
during the authorization stage of the act. In his opening statement alone, Ashcroft uses
the rhetoric of remember-the-fallen heroes eight times including the next example, in
which he specifically uses the word “patriot”:
As we weigh the constitutional methods we will use to defend innocent
Americans from terrorism, we must not forget the names that unite us in our
cause: Cherone Gunn, Ronald Scott Owens, Ronhester Santiago, Timothy
Saunders, Lakiba Nicole Palmer. These are some of the brave men and women of
the USS Cole who were murdered by al Qaeda in 2000. A week ago when I met
with the families of those who died on the Cole, they pleaded with me not to
forget them or those who died. I am committed to those families and those
patriots (emphasis mine) not being forgotten. (United States Department of
Justice, 2003, p. 8)
In this quote, it is interesting that he turns these people’s pleas to not forget their dead
family members into support for his version of the Patriot Act.7
Ashcroft continues his opening statement by talking about specific details of the
lives of some of those people he just mentioned, such as the names of daughters, plans for
7 A bit later in analysis, we find a critic of Ashcroft, Jerrold Nadler (D NY) responding to
this sort of ethos by using the ethos of family members of those who died in the World
Trade Center as support for an argument in favor more restrictions on the act in the
direction of increased civil rights.
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after military service etc and then argues that all of these names are reminders that we are
at war with ruthless enemies, which we must be able to outthink:
The names that I have recalled today all bear silent, painful witness to the fact that
the United States is a Nation at war. We must never forget that we are in a war to
preserve life and liberty. We must not forget that our enemies are ruthless fanatics
and seek to murder innocent women and children, men, to achieve their twisted
goals. We must not forget that in the struggle between the forces of freedom and
the ideology of hate, our challenge in this war against terrorism is to adapt, to
anticipate, to outthink, outmaneuver our enemies while honoring our Constitution.
(United States Department of Justice, 2003, pp. 8-9)
Ashcroft is obviously using the rhetoric of fear again to generate support for his Patriot
Act, which he uses a total of five times during his opening statement, and a total of nine
times throughout his entire testimony.
I will display one more of these fear appeals, and then move on to other areas of
analysis. This one is particularly fear-inspiring because like in previous quotations, it
incorporates direct quotations from terrorists; it also includes an appeal to the ultimate
fear: weapons of mass destruction:
We must be vigilant. We must be unrelenting. We must not forget that al Qaeda’s
primary terrorist target is the United States of America. Even though recent
attacks were overseas, the terror network is committed to killing innocent
Americans, including women and children, by the thousands or even the millions
if they can. Nasser al-Fahd is a prominent extremist Saudi cleric known to have
significant connections to al Qaeda operatives who seek his religious justification
and his support for terrorist operations. Just last month he issued a new fatwah
entitled ‘The Legal Status of Using Weapons of Mass Destruction Against
Infidels.’ This fatwah lays out, last month, his religious arguments for the use of
weapons of mass destruction against Americans, including women and children.
Let me quote. He puts it this way, and I am quoting now, of course, translated:
‘Anyone who considers America’s aggressions against Muslims and their lands
during the past decades will conclude that striking her is permissible.’
Al-Fahd asserts, and I am quoting again, ’The weapons of mass destruction will
kill any of the infidels on whom they fall regardless of whether they are fighters,
women or children. They will destroy and burn the land. The arguments for the
permissibility are many.’ I quote further: ‘If a bomb that killed 10 million of them
and burned as much of their land as they have burned Muslims’ land were
dropped on them, it would be permissible. (United States Department of Justice,
2003, pp. 7-8)
236
The rhetoric of fear is of course not a new argument. It was used a great deal in the
authorization phase of debate, but now it seems to be used to greater effect because of the
fact that another 9/11 style attack has not occurred to this point. In other words, with the
Patriot Act, we can feel safe once again—as long as the crazy critics do not take it away
from us.
Ashcroft and those who support him can make the argument, and do so a total of
nine times, that the Patriot Act has directly prevented other attacks. One example of this
argument occurs in Ashcroft’s opening statement. It is a rather drawn out argument where
he gives some statistics building up to the main point. He begins by pointing out that
“alleged terrorist cells in Buffalo, Seattle, Portland, Detroit were arrested, along with
more than 100 other individuals who were convicted or pled guilty to Federal crimes as a
result of our post-September 11 terrorism investigations” (pp. 6-7). Ashcroft claims that
“we are shutting down the terrorist financial infrastructure…and building a long-term
counterterrorism capacity” because of the Patriot Act. But, “most important,” according
to Ashcroft, “no major terror attack has occurred on American soil since September 11”
(United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 7).
Though we can feel more safe because of the Patriot Act, Ashcroft does not want
us to become too comfortable because according to him, our success only makes the
terrorists more desperate for an attack:
Let me be clear. Al Qaeda is diminished, but not destroyed. Defeat after defeat
has made the terrorists desperate to strike again. Bombings in Tel Aviv, Israel,
Bali, Indonesia, Casablanca, Morocco, and Riyadh, Saudi Arabia are bitter
reminders that the cold-blooded network of terror will continue to use the horror
of their heinous acts to achieve their fanatical ends. Innocent American and Saudi
citizens died in the Riyadh compounds last month at the hands of al Qaeda.
(United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 7)
The intense threat Americans are still faced with by terrorism is reinforced.
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Afterward, a direct connection is made to the ethos of the people involved in the
present debate. This is accomplished by bringing in the all-or-nothing dichotomy
instigated by Bush at the very beginning of the war on terror. I would make a couple of
notes though about the argument before displaying the exemplar. One note is that the
false dichotomy was not noticeably present during the previous hearing with Viet Dinh; it
is Ashcroft who brings it back to the table under the framework of formal, public debate.
Another note is that still—to this point in the debate, I cannot recall one single argument
made by anybody involved with the legislative process articulating any kind of a desire
that provisions of the Patriot Act are not necessary. Recalling analysis of the hearing with
Dinh and the minority witnesses, my interpretation included a great deal of surprise at
how subdued the minority witnesses’ responses were. Their response to virtually every
provision of the act is that it is necessary and useful for winning the war on terror. The
criticism is very simply that there needs to be more sharing of information so that
oversight is more effective. Some rewording is suggested for certain provisions of the
Patriot Act, as well as for some legal precedent that is being modified by the Patriot Act,
but NO ONE, to the best of my interpretation, suggests that the act is not necessary.
Even the more antagonistic critics such as Nadler believe that anti-terrorism
legislation similar to what is found in the Patriot Act is necessary. Keep this in mind
when reading this next quotation by Ashcroft:
Despite the terrorist threats to America, there are some, both in Congress and
across the country, who suggest that we should not have a USA PATRIOT Act.
Others who supported the act 20 months ago now express doubts about the
necessity of some of the act’s components. Let me state my view as clearly as
possible. Our ability to prevent another catastrophic attack on American soil
would be more difficult, if not impossible, without the PATRIOT Act. It has been
the key weapon used across America in successful counterterrorist operations to
protect innocent Americans from the deadly plans of terrorists. (United States
Department of Justice, 2003, p. 8)
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Ashcroft completely ignores the complexity of the debate and jumps straight into an all-
or-nothing assumption that those who criticize his act do not see a need for legislation at
all. While his statement may be applicable to some “conspiracy theorist” critics outside of
the debate, I have not seen one actual participant in the legislative debate display the
attitude that we should not have anti-terrorism legislation resembling the Patriot Act.
Ashcroft groups all critics into the same category, and symbolically labels them as
unpatriotic.
In the next segment of the transcript, after spelling out the group of unpatriotic
individuals (his critics), Ashcroft continues to define who the patriots are. We know from
above, that members of the military, the heroes of 9/11, those who were killed in 9/11
and their family members are all patriots. But at the end of the speech, he also defines
other groups of people as patriots as well. First and foremost, the members of the
Department of Justice are patriots according to Ashcroft:
The United States Department of Justice has been called to defend America. We
accept that charge. We fight in the tradition of all great American struggles with
resolve, with defiance and honor. We fight to secure victory over the evil in our
midst. We fight to uphold the liberties and the ideals that define a free and brave
people. Every day the Justice Department is working tirelessly, taking this war to
the hideouts and havens of our enemies so that this never again touches the hearts
and homes of America. (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 9)
Furthermore, those who support the Justice Department are patriots. For instance, those
in Congress who gave Ashcroft the “constitutional weapons” are patriots: “I thank you
for this opportunity to testify today. I thank you for the constitutional weapons that you
have provided that make the war against those who fight freedom a war whose conflict
will be resolved in victory” (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 9).
Additionally, those Americans who have “faith” in Ashcroft’s cause are also patriots:
“And I thank the American people for their support and their faith in the justice of our
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cause” (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 9). At this juncture, Ashcroft brings
his opening statement to a close and opens the floor to questions.
Before moving to the next section of analysis, we must recognize the docile,
passive nature of Ashcroft’s patriotism. Patriots put faith in the Justice Department and
provide it with the “constitutional weapons” it needs to fight the enemies.
Arguments of the Critics
We Are All Still Outraged by 9/11
Maxine Waters (D CA) responds to Ashcroft’s all-or-nothing dichotomy by
reminding him that everyone is outraged by 9/11 and that no one has forgotten about
those who died: “I first want to say that we all were shocked and still are outraged by
what happened on 9/11. We, too, denounce terrorism in any form” (United States
Department of Justice, 2003, p. 13). When she says we “TOO” are all mad, she
substantiates the claim that Ashcroft at least made some people believe that he was
questioning their sense of patriotism through the all-or-nothing dichotomy. Only
someone who was not loyal to the country could not be mad, not want to prevent
terrorism, and/or not remember the heroes of 9/11. In many ways, this response is very
similar to the “I want to prevent terror…but…”ethos that was so prevalent during the
authorization stage except here, the argument becomes more offensive in tone—Waters
seems indignant that she even feels the need to clarify her anger over 9/11.
Another member of the committee, Howard Berman (D CA), also feels obligated
to defend his ethos as a patriotic American who wants to fight hard in the war on terror.
He reports that Congress has demonstrated bi-partisan support for a whole list of things
proposed by the Justice Department—things that are needed to become a crime
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prevention agency rather than a criminal prosecution one…but… the list of “institutional
failures” provided by the Inspector General is troubling. His testimony follows:
Look, I think the Congress has demonstrated on a bipartisan basis our
commitment to join you and the Administration in this battle against what you
described accurately as a fanatical and ruthless enemy while at the same time,
using your words, honoring the Constitution and respecting the rule of law. We
have authorized two military campaigns in the use of force, we have passed the
PATRIOT Act, we have appropriated money, we have done the most massive
reorganization of the executive branch premised on the need to be more effective,
not simply at prosecuting, but at preventing terrorism. I appreciate your response
to the Chairman in the context of the consultations with the Congress and even
your comments with respect to the Inspector General. I mean, what concerns me,
when the Inspector General provides a list of institutional failures at DOJ,
prolonged detentions without charges; a policy referred to as hold until cleared
that led to average detentions of 80 days, but sometimes up to 200 days; a policy
of obstruction of access to counsel, and an unwritten policy of denying bond for
all aliens, a policy not restricted to suspected terrorists; some of that is very
troubling. (United States Department of Justice, 2003, pp. 17-18)
From the very beginning of his statement, when he begins by saying, “Look…”
annoyance is detected. He is trying to set the record straight and does go on to detail the
things that the current critics have signed on to; he then says…but…and sets the record
straight about the egregious alleged offenses that they can not overlook. The form of the
argument certainly takes on the “I support fighting terrorism…but…” ethos of the
authorization stage, but close analysis of the content of the message suggests a different
tone behind it.
Six different minority members in this debate formulate arguments in a similar
fashion. The debaters who use the argument form are Waters, Berman, Nadler, Meehan,
Sanchez, and Schiff. While they still seem to find the need to justify their credibility as
patriots, resentment has developed over this being the case.
Not Enough Oversight—Lack of Cooperation
As mentioned in the introduction to this particular debate, and as a theme running
throughout the entire analysis, critics of Ashcroft have real problems with the democratic
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process utilized to oversight the Patriot Act and are very vocal about that issue. The
Justice Department, according to some critics, has simply not been very cooperative with
the legislative branch of government. Conyers, in his opening statement, puts forth this
underlying argument and it is extended eight different times throughout the course of this
debate, once by a majority member—Sensenbrenner ironically enough and then by
various minority members: Conyers, Jackson Lee, Schiff, and Watt. It is interesting that
Sensenbrenner, after praising the way in which the process has worked so well during his
opening statement, begins with this type of criticism. He accuses Ashcroft and the Justice
Department of not cooperating with Congress over the alteration of the Levy guidelines,
an issue brought up in the previous debate with Viet Dinh:
Mr. Attorney General, last May during the Memorial Day recess of Congress, you
revised the Justice Department investigative guidelines that were first
promulgated by Attorney General Levy during the Ford administration after
extensive consultation with the Congress and updated by his successors. To what
extent did the Department of Justice consult Congress before issuing the revised
guidelines in August of last year? And what justified departing from the tradition
of consulting Congress? Do you think further revisions are necessary, and if
further revisions are planned, do you intend to return to the spirit of cooperation
which typified the earlier revisions? (United States Department of Justice, 2003,
p. 10)
Although the argument does not deal with oversight of the Patriot Act directly, it does
very much speak to the ethos being negotiated by debate over the Patriot Act. In fact,
Ashcroft’s response to this question, which is displayed below under the heading, “The
Spirit of the Patriot Act,” provides a rhetorical link between the symbolism of the Patriot
Act and practically every single action taken by the Justice Department since 9/11.
Melvin Watt (D NC) is the next person to make the lack of cooperation/oversight
argument, and applies it specifically to enactment of the Patriot Act. He claims that the
current hearing is “long overdue,” which is unfortunate because the oversight process is
the key to putting the public at ease:
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Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Attorney General, for being here. I know
you have been very busy, but I think this hearing is long overdue, because I think
the American people want to see the creative tension that you are talking about
here and have the sense that this Committee and Congress, in general, is involved
in trying to help define what the appropriate balance is between protecting
ourselves and safeguarding individual and group rights. And this setting helps to,
I think, set the American people at ease, and I want to thank the Chairman and
Ranking Member for facilitating this. (United States Department of Justice, 2003,
p. 32)
Toward the end of this statement, he does submit that the current hearing helps to put the
public at ease, but following, he also goes on to say that he would have to wait about
expressing some of his “global concerns…until the next opportunity when the Chairman
and Ranking Member and yourself work out a process for going into greater detail”
(United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 32). Sheila Jackson Lee (D TX) is the
next critic to bring up the lack of oversight and in doing so, gets a bit more personal with
her attack against Ashcroft.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Attorney General, it has been too long,
but we welcome you back. All of us experienced the righteous indignation that
you have so eloquently expressed in your testimony today post-9/11, during 9/11,
and continuously as we support the war on terrorism. But my fear is that we may
go to the point of changing the culture of America, the first amendment
protections, the fourth amendment protections. So frankly, I believe we owe a
debt of gratitude to Glenn Fine, the Inspector General of the United States
Department of Justice, for several reasons. Let me quickly cite these and raise
some questions of my concern. (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 50)
Jackson Lee begins in a rather subdued way—in much the same manner as Watt and
Conyers stated similar arguments earlier. She begins by simply saying that, “it has been
too long.” However, she quickly gets more personal in her attack by accusing Ashcroft of
“righteous indignation.8”
8 The latter part of the quote demonstrates another line of argumentation to be analyzed a
bit later in analysis dealing with the debate over Glenn Fine’s ethos—the Inspector
General who had just released a scathing report of the Department of Justice’s treatment
of illegal immigrants detained for an indefinite period of time following 9/11.
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An exemplar from Adam Schiff (D CA) ends demonstration of this line of
argumentation. Here he refers to the last hearing where he “raised the possibility of
having a classified hearing so that we could not only have the opportunity we already
have to review the classified information…but ask questions and get timely responses,
and I just would like to make a further request that we have the opportunity to do that”
(United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 62). So, without getting personal
whatsoever, Schiff expresses disappointment in the lack of opportunity to have questions
answered in a “timely” manner.
The “Culture of Concealment”
So the initial line of argumentation is simply that there has not been appropriate
opportunities for oversight; extending upon that, additional argumentation is provided
claiming that even during the few opportunities available for questions, not enough
information is released by the Justice Department to ask meaningful ones—officials are
not being forthright in terms of the evidence disclosed to Congress in a public forum.
Several different critics made this argument a great deal in the previous debate with Dinh;
here, William Delahunt (D MA) aggressively extends it in the current debate. He begins
by saying, “Now today, the reality is that many Americans are increasingly uneasy about
some of these measures…” (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 23) and
mentions section 215 (the Library provision), the Carnivore program, the TIPS program
for informants, and the Total Information Awareness Project as examples.
While these programs are in and of themselves, according to Delahunt, cause for
fear, the real fear comes from the appearance that the government is not disclosing the
way in which these programs are being implemented:
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It appears that the Government or the American people feel that the Government
is intent on prying into every nook and cranny of people’s private lives while, at
the same time, doing all it can to block access to Government information that
would inform the American people as to what is being done in their name (United
States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 23).
Delahunt then explains the impact of the policy of non-disclosure: “As Judge Keith wrote
in the Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, and I am quoting now, ‘‘Democracies die behind
closed doors. When Government begins closing doors, it selectively controls information
rightfully belonging to the people. Selective information is misinformation’’ (United
States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 22).
After making the implication that the Administration is letting democracy die,
Delahunt reiterates the cause of that death: “the Department of Justice has persisted at
withholding information from the courts, congressional Committees, and the public. It
has made novel and sweeping claims of executive privilege and, I submit not to protect
the national security, but to shield officials from embarrassing revelations” (United States
Department of Justice, 2003, p. 23). The government is “obsessed with secrecy…a
culture of concealment” (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 23), Delahunt
concludes.
The Power Grab Argument
So after establishing that officials have found a means around oversight, the
groundwork is laid to expand upon the implications of unfettered power—essentially,
according to critics, government officials can do whatever they please from within the
culture of concealment. Jarrold Nadler (D NY) argues that the Bush Administration has
shielded itself off from oversight so much so that “some bureaucrat” within the
Department could imprison virtually anybody she wanted to in the name of national
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security. He then contextualizes his argument historically through a reference to the
Magna Carta (similar to a quote from Nadler in the previous debate):
The Justice Department claims in briefs before the fourth circuit and other courts
that the President has the untrammeled power to designate anybody, any
American citizen as an enemy combatant, and that the courts lack the jurisdiction
to question his determination. That would give the President the power on his say-
so or really, on the say-so of some bureaucrat, because he doesn’t do the
investigation, to imprison any American or anybody else forever with no legal
process, no due process, not even a writ of habeas corpus. That is the claim of
executive power that except for Mr. Mugabe, nobody in English-speaking
jurisdiction has made since before Magna Carta. (United States Department of
Justice, 2003, p. 26)
A bit later in the debate, Jackson Lee reports that indefinite detention by the Justice
Department occurred despite being advised it is unconstitutional:
Clearly, the Supreme Court has said that you have to charge a detained person
within 48 hours and holding someone longer than that without a charge
presumptively violates the Constitution, and no court has ever said that it is okay
for someone to be held for weeks or months without charge, and there is no
distinction as to whether or not this is a citizen, illegal alien, or otherwise. I would
also say that Department officials were advised that holding detainees in this
manner violated the fourth amendment. They were on notice. (United States
Department of Justice, 2003, p. 50)
Then several pages later in the transcript, Schiff adds another little twist to the argument
that deserves attention.
He utilizes his ethos as a former assistant U.S. Attorney to make the power abuse
argument. Schiff begins by arguing that because there is no significant distinction
between a criminal and a terrorist, according to the Justice Department, it can pick and
choose the easiest route to prosecute a terrorist depending upon the level of evidence
attained: “if the evidence isn’t sufficient to prove in a court beyond a reasonable doubt,
then we will treat them as an unlawful enemy combatant, so the lesser the quantum of
evidence will mean that they are characterized in a way that you never get put to the
proof in court” (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 63). Then Schiff claims
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that as somebody who used to be in a similar position to Ashcroft, he would not want that
kind of power: “I was an assistant U.S. Attorney for six years. I wouldn’t want the
unbridled discretion to designate an American as an enemy and lock them up without
judicial review. Why not go to court and have someone review the work of the Justice
Department?” (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 63). So, Schiff adds a bit
more credibility to the power grab line of argumentation by asserting his ethos as a
former member of the Justice Department.
In all, the direct accusation that the Administration has intentionally abused its
power—whether it be through detaining individuals illegally or concealing the evidence
that would lead to oversight, was made by critics a total of 12 times by five different
individuals (all were minority members of the House): Waters, Nadler, Jackson-Lee,
Delahunt and Schiff.
The Defense of Ashcroft
From the very beginning, during the authorization phase, the entire ethos behind
the Department’s message has been that we must fear the terrorists and that we have to
fight the war against terrorists beginning right now—we do not have time to talk, but do
not worry according to officials, because “you can trust us.” Though it may sound like a
broken record, the “you can trust us” argument has to be a part of the Department of
Justice’s argument for credibility, in order for their message to be successful. Given the
way in which the act was passed, and all the leeway needed to make the necessary
changes going on in the department, they have to try and argue that they are trustworthy
and will do good by the new authorities they have been granted—this is the thrust of
Ashcroft’s argument for ethos.
247
So the simple fact that they make this argument continuously throughout the
debate is not surprising, and frankly, not terribly interesting—it is to be expected. But it is
interesting and challenging to observe and analyze the various ways in which the attempt
is made to extend the argument during this phase of the debate. Ashcroft’s defense of the
Justice Department’s ethos gets more and more complicated as critics begin to ask more
and more questions.
The level of complexity rises. As Delahunt points out, the Committee was
overwhelmed at the time in which the Patriot Act was passed. They knew some change
was needed so they went ahead and enacted the Patriot Act without asking a whole lot of
questions. The authorization phase was a simple process. But the sunset of the Patriot Act
provisions would ensure that the tough questions do get asked:
Mr. Attorney General, you last appeared before this Committee some 18 months
ago and asked us to enact the PATRIOT Act. At that time we were all struggling
to absorb the magnitude of the assault on the country and the loss of innocent
lives. Now, those are tough circumstances in which to find the proper balance
between national security and the freedoms and the values which define us as a
people. That is why the Committee insisted that the PATRIOT Act include a
provision to sunset many of the new powers granted to the Government to
conduct covert surveillance. (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 22)
Clearly, given the nature of the argumentation by the critics here, and the questions asked
of Mr. Ashcroft, the time has come to begin asking those questions. Ashcroft’s response
to those questions is quite complicated, but very interesting to say the least.
The “Spirit” of the Patriot Act
The most interesting defense of ethos by Ashcroft, one that would set the tone for
much of his argumentation throughout the rest of his testimony, is offered to the audience
during the very initial line of questioning conducted by Sensenbrenner. Sensenbrenner’s
question, which was analyzed above, pertains to the revision of the Levy guidelines and
asks Ashcroft why his Department did not cooperate with Congress and consult with
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members prior to making the changes. Ashcroft argues, among other things, that he
thought the alterations to the Levy guidelines were appropriate because of the “spirit” of
the way in which the Patriot Act was passed:
Following September 11, the Department consulted very extensively with this
Committee and Members of the Congress about the PATRIOT Act. I remember
within days after September 11, I think by the next Sunday, we all met together,
numbers of us, and we worked very closely on that. In terms of the change in the
guidelines which govern the internal operation of the Justice Department, the
consultation was not substantial or significant. Perhaps I came to the conclusion
that extending those guidelines in the same spirit as the PATRIOT Act had been
extended was something that would be appropriate and would meet with the
approval of the Congress. But I must say that we did not have extensive
consultations about this exercise of executive responsibility to define the way in
which the executive branch would conduct investigations. (United States
Department of Justice, 2003, p. 11)
Ashcroft’s response provides a rhetorical link between the Patriot Act and virtually every
other anti-terrorism action taken by the Department of Justice in the post 9/11 world and
verifies the accuracy of the rhetorical framework from which this project began as
discussed in the introduction.
The way in which the acronym of PATRIOT is used as the title of antiterrorism
legislation transcends beyond the level of “referential symbolism” (Edelman, 1964)
because of the way in which it moves beyond a simple description of the actions taken.
When the title of the act shifted from the Mobilization Against Terrorism Act of 2001, to
the USA PATRIOT Act, the entire value system of the Bush Administration in relation to
the war on terror became bottled up in one phrase. The word PATRIOT becomes a
“condensation symbol” (Edelman, 1964) for the entire war on terror and is largely
responsible for the way in which the act was rushed through Congress. Thus, when
Ashcroft refers to the “spirit” of the Patriot Act applied to other contexts, he clearly
indicates that he feels he has the green light to do whatever he deems necessary. The
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implications of the power of PATRIOT as symbol would be impossible to deny after
reading this exemplar.
Later on in the debate, during the reauthorization stage, the symbolic implications
become even more concrete when critics end up grouping arguments against a wide
variety of Bush policies under the rubric of debating the Patriot Act. The reason is
because there was no other way to voice dissent—the debate over the Patriot Act became
a smokescreen for an entire array of Bush policies such as the torture of enemy
combatants, the NSA domestic spying program, and etc. No oversight whatsoever was
occurring over those policies proper; thus critics attempt to bring attention to them
through the Patriot Act9.
The Patriot Act has Prevented Further Attacks
Much of Ashcroft’s strategy in this hearing is to extend the original “spirit” of the
Patriot Act by reminding us of how urgent a need there is for it. Much of this strategy
depends upon an argument very familiar to those who are following this debate closely:
fear the terrorists because they are evil, crafty, and now desperate for another attack, as
Ashcroft reminds us in his opening statement. However, this reminder is not something
that is forgotten as the debate progresses. In all, the “fear the terrorists” argument, in its
original authorization form is made a total of nine times by Ashcroft specifically during
the course of the debate.
In the debate, fear the terrorists is extended in a form unique to the
implementation stage of oversight. The unique form of the argument is that Ashcroft and
9 However, that they expand the scope of the Patriot Act debate to the various other
topics is ultimately what brings the debate to an abrupt halt. Sensenbrenner gets angry
over the extra-topical discussion and shuts critics down. This then leads to the attempt at
filibuster championed by Russell Feingold in the Senate, which does lead to the debate
being extended past the original sunset date and gaining more time to debate the act.
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the Patriot Act have been successful in preventing further attacks. Perhaps the best
exemplar comes from John Hostettler (R IN):
I thank the Chairman. General Ashcroft, thank you for being here and thank you
for your service to our country. I believe that the Office of Inspector General
report does a grave disservice to yourself and all of the other dedicated Justice
Department employees who work tirelessly to protect us from another devastating
terrorist attack in the days immediately following 9/11. While the report pays lip
service to the incredible stresses that you as well as the men and women of the
Justice Department faced and the responsibility that all of you bore for thousands
of American lives, it attacks your response to the terrorist strikes even after we
have learned the stunning success of your efforts. There has not been another
major terrorist attack on American soil since 9/11. The credit belongs largely to
you and the Department. I am not sure that we would be in the same situation if
you had been constrained by the inconsistencies brought out by the Office of
Inspector General. (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 30)
Not only does Hostettler paint Ashcroft and the entire Department of Justice as the
patriots who saved the day, but he also paints the Inspector General, as well as the other
critics he represents, practically as terrorists who are intentionally standing in the way of
Ashcroft’s saving of the world.
We will come back and examine the ethos of the Inspector General in detail later.
The focus now is upon Ashcroft’s ethos and another great exemplar comes from Howard
Coble (R NC):
I recently heard a speaker who is nationally recognized as a highly regarded
writer, and in his speech he said it is miraculous that we have not been attacked
subsequent to 9/11. He furthermore said one of the persons to be credited for that
is John Ashcroft. Now I know you have been beneficiary of criticism, Mr.
Attorney General, so I have just laced that criticism with a glowing compliment.
(United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 36)
The fact that another terrorist attack had not been successful since 9/11 and the idea that
Ashcroft and the Patriot Act had something to do with it is obviously an enhancement of
Ashcroft’s ethos, but it also reinforces the “fear the terrorists” argument with an
emphasized sense of urgency. In all, the argument that Ashcroft and/or the Patriot Act
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have prevented another terrorist attack occurs 10 times and is made by seven different
majority debaters: Ashcroft, Hostettler, Coble, Forbes, Chabot and Flake.
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We Consult (even though we’re perfect)
Leading up to this exemplar, Ashcroft had just stated that he altered the Levy
guidelines in line with the “spirit” of the Patriot Act. Here, he promises the
misunderstanding on that issue was an honest mistake because he appreciates
consultation:
I believe that there is value in consultation, and I would look forward to
consulting with Members of this Committee about guideline adjustments in the
future, because I think we can do a good job when we work together. And I—
and any assumptions that I might have made that presumed that the kind of ideas
of extending the guidelines to extend them in the same way that we had worked
collaboratively to extend the law in the PATRIOT Act may have been one that
presumed in a way that overestimated our previous consultation. (United States
Department of Justice, 2003, p. 11)
This response is surprising. I am not accustomed to hearing Ashcroft admitting any kind
of fault whatsoever. To the best of my interpretation and recollection, this exemplar
marks the first time during the course of the entire process where he, or any of his
colleagues for that matter, do so. Afterward, he finishes his response to the question
about the lack of cooperation by again, admitting there was not substantial collaboration,
then saying that he looks forward to future collaboration on the issue.
He ends this argument by again admitting a mistake and promising that he views
consultation as beneficial:
So I would say this: That the consultation was not substantial. I would look
forward in further changes to guidelines regarding the conduct of the Department
to improving those guidelines in the way that I could best do so, and I think
including consultations would be helpful to an end product which was of value to
the American people (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 11).
Again, for Ashcroft to admit fault is an anomaly during analysis. On every other issue,
even while promising more cooperation with third parties, he vehemently defends the
Department of Justice as having acted in perfect accordance with the Constitution.
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In the following response to a line of argumentation by Maxine Waters represents
a more typical response from Ashcroft. Waters, by referencing the Inspector General’s
report, has just claimed that the way in which the indefinite detention of immigrants took
place in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 was unconstitutional. Ashcroft denies any
mistakes whatsoever in the process:
The last point I would make, and I’m sorry that my answer has been a little
disjointed on this, in all of the conduct of the activities of the Justice Department,
we have not violated the law, and we will not violate the law. We will uphold the
law. If there are ways for us to improve the way in which we uphold the law, we
are interested in doing so and will work together with the Inspector General to do
that as we have in time after time, but, you know, previously criticized us because
we don’t hold people that went out and committed crimes, whether it was the
serial murder in Texas, or whether it was the other situations where individuals
were not detained. In this case, we simply said that given the nature of this
activity, terrorism, given the circumstances in the country, given the fact that
illegals ordered for deportation are not entitled to be released, we did not release
them. (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 16)
In this response, he promises that his department did not break the law and that they
would never break the law; however, at the same time, they are always willing to
collaborate on how to do an even better job in the future.
A bit later, in a response to Berman on the same issue, he claims the same thing.
He says that they carried out the entire process in a lawful manner. He goes on to say that
though, that in the future, he would like to see the process carried out more quickly, but
sticks by his ethos that they did everything perfectly under the circumstances:
Given the fact that these were a category of individuals associated with this
investigation, we felt that before we released a person in this setting, we should
have clearance, and so we asked the FBI to help clear these individuals. God
forbid if we ever have to do this again, we hope that we can clear people more
quickly. We would like to clear people as quickly as possible. There is no interest
whatsoever that the United States of America has in holding innocent people.
Absolutely none. It is costly. It takes up resources. It makes it difficult for us to do
what we need to do with other people who are threats. But we felt in the aftermath
of that event, with the idea that even from the general population that 85 percent
abscond and just take off if they are let out and don’t show up for their
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deportation, can’t be found, we ought to be more cautious in this setting, given the
circumstance, and frankly, that is a caution which I think was well taken.
Can we do a better job? I would hope that we will also continue to do a better job
in everything we do. And our effort in that respect is something that we will
continue to try and improve. (United States Department of Justice, 2003, pp. 19-
20)
In this statement, not only do we see an exemplar of the category being analyzed, but we
also see why Ashcroft’s ethos is so difficult to analyze. On the one hand, he
acknowledges that in this instance, his department valued safety over liberty when he
says, “God forbid if we ever have to do this again…” Do what again? If everything was
done according to the letter of the law and no rights were violated whatsoever, then what
is there for God to forbid? He finishes the sentence by saying “…we hope that we can
clear people more quickly” (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 19). However,
in the next paragraph, he states that his department made the perfect decision under the
circumstances. Then at the very end of this statement, he asks, “Can we do a better job?”
which almost sounds as if he is going to admit some sort inadequacy, but then he defers
to a very generic answer of, “I would hop that we will also continue to do a better job in
everything we do” (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 20). So, reinterpreting
the answer…it is “no…we did a perfect job, but, since I am trying to convince the
audience that I am a cooperative fellow, I’ll acknowledge that we are always trying to do
a better job—in a generic sense—in everything that we do” (the quotation marks indicate
this is my re-interpretation of what Ashcroft said).
Hopefully, the complexity of interpreting Ashcroft’s ethos is better understood as
a result of this line of argumentation. He says, “Sure, I am willing to cooperate…but to
be honest, there is really no need for it, we have it all under control” (again, this quotation
is my interpretation of Ashcroft’s ethos, not his own words). But it illustrates why he was
not an effective Attorney General. He claims perfection when perfection is not even
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possible under the circumstances. The entire Bush Administration sees themselves from
their own myopic lenses—they are perfect—they managed to find a perfect balance
between safety and liberty, when nobody else in the history of crisis in America has ever
managed to do so. Ultimately this is what led to Ashcroft’s resignation. Alberto Gonzales
stepped in and admitted mistakes. He also re-defined what it means to be a patriot
(whether he believes the re-definition or not is another issue).
We Need Leeway for National Security
Also a part of the ethos arguments related to 9/11 is the idea that protecting
national security is such a hard job that the Justice Department needs to protect its
independence by not releasing certain information about what it is up to. This message
was a significant part of Dinh’s message in the previous debate and is extended here by
Ashcroft. As a premise to the argument, Ashcroft establishes that in order to protect
national security, the Justice Department has had to undergo a sea-change about the way
it goes about its business; it has had to think more like a crime prevention agency rather
than a prosecutorial agency:
Well, first of all, let me just say that the entire effort of the Department of Justice
has undergone a significant evolution from the idea that we somehow existed so
that we could prosecute crimes that had been committed, and in that sense we
waited ’til a crime was committed and then sought to prosecute, to find a way to
prevent a crime from being committed. We came to the conclusion rather quickly
at 9/11 that waiting for a crime to be committed and then prosecuting was an
inadequate way to protect the American people when the perpetrators of the crime
extinguish themselves purposely in the commission of the crime, and when they
extinguish the lives of 3,000 people in the commission of the crime, the potential
for prosecution is not a very rewarding potential. So we had to make a shift in the
way we thought about things. So being reactive, waiting for a crime to be
committed, or waiting for there to be evidence of the commission of a crime
didn’t seem to us to be an appropriate way to protect the American people.
(United States Department of Justice, 2003, pp. 11-12)
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So, they have a very tough job to do. The whole face of homeland security is shifting.
Along with major structural changes such as the Homeland Security Department being
created, the Justice Department also has to change its function—they have to be crime-
stoppers now as opposed to their previous role of crime prosecutors—very much in the
same vein as the CIA except obviously in the context of domestic issues.
In order to accomplish this shift in mindset, they need to be able to maintain a
level of secrecy so that terrorists do not come to know their methods and strategies for
prevention. This means not disclosing some of their information for the purpose of
national security—much the same argument Dinh makes in May, 2003. In the following
exemplar, Ashcroft is responding to Delahunt’s previously mentioned accusation of
creating a “culture of concealment: “Let me just make some remarks. First of all, the
rationale for not releasing anything is the national interest. There are lots of times,
especially in international intelligence, security matters, when we don’t release things
because it is not in the national interest to do so” (United States Department of Justice,
2003, p. 23). So, the argument continues; the Justice Department’s ability to protect
national security hinges upon their ability to keep certain things secret. Ashcroft makes
this argument a total of four times during the course of the debate.
Don’t Worry…We Don’t Stand For Abuse
The reason to trust the Justice Department, according to Ashcroft, is because “we
do not stand for abuse” (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 15); “we have not
violated the law, and we will not violate the law…we will uphold the law” (United States
Department of Justice, 2003, p. 16). Furthermore, when abuses occur, “we will
investigate those cases” (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 15). It is
interesting though, that investigation is internal to the Department, conducted by either
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the Civil Rights Division or the Inspector General. The following exemplar is actually a
continuation of the quotes provided above that delves a little bit deeper into the way in
which the Justice Department checks itself for abuse. The example again goes back to the
accusation lodged by the Inspector General the illegal immigrant roundup and indefinite
detention was against the law. In the same report, the Inspector claimed that physical
abuse had occurred during the timeframe. Ashcroft is responding to the claims of
physical abuse:
We do not stand for abuse, and we will investigate those cases. There are 18 cases
that were brought to our attention. Fourteen of those cases have been investigated.
The investigation is ongoing, although in 14 of those cases the Civil Rights
Division has indicated that it did not find adequate predicate to bring criminal
charges in those cases. The other four are going to be continued to be
investigated. We don’t tolerate violence in our prisons, generally. We don’t
tolerate violence in holding individuals. That’s not a policy of the Department,
and in those situations we’ll seek to correct those situations. (United States
Department of Justice, 2003, p. 15)
So, when the Inspector General, who is employed under the Justice Department makes a
claim that abuse has occurred, the case is sent to the Civil Rights Division (also of the
Justice Department) who investigates the claims and decides if criminal prosecution
should be pursued. In the previous example we see that in most (if not all) cases, it is
decided that no member of the Department did anything wrong. Furthermore, the
person’s ethos that even suggested these abuses might have occurred—the Inspector
General, was attacked, almost to the point of being accused of siding with the terrorists
(this argument is analyzed later in this chapter). While I certainly do not want to jump to
conclusions and assume that abuses were committed, I would very much like to see an
independent, third party check on the potential for abuse—as would all critics discussed
in this project.
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In the next example, we again gain insight into the internal way in which the
Department of Justice checks its own abuse. This quotation goes back to the argument
over the change in the Levy guidelines, which essentially allows any non-uniformed
Justice Department agents walk into any event—religious or otherwise—as an
undercover informant without probable cause or any level of reasonable suspicion
required. The guidelines were written up originally because of the abuses that occurred
with COINTELPRO—a FBI program that began in 1956 “to suppress political
association” (Chang, 2002, p. 29) and did not end until 1976. As mentioned earlier,
Ashcroft altered these guidelines, in the “spirit” of the Patriot Act, to essentially make
them null and void. But do not worry… says Ashcroft, who describes the internal
mechanism by which agents ensure abuse does not occur:
So those are the basic—that’s the frame of reference. We have authorized people
to do things that are not reactive after a crime has been committed, but are
proactive to keep a crime from being committed. FBI agents are not authorized to
go anyplace that a local policeman can’t go, or the highway patrolman can’t go, or
the constable or sheriff or sheriff’s deputy can’t go, or any member of the public
can’t go. We’ve allowed FBI agents to go where the public can go on the same
terms and conditions as the public when it comes to seeking to thwart terrorism,
and we’ve asked that no records be kept regarding those visits unless they are
records relating to the commission of a crime. Now, it seems to me that’s the right
safeguard and balance necessitated by the fact that we must move from reaction
and prosecution into a situation of anticipation and prevention when the lives of
Americans are at stake in terrorism. (United States Department of Justice, 2003,
p. 12)
In this defense, we also see the reference to the whole scale change happening within the
Department. Essentially, each agent is responsible to herself for not committing abuse
according to the guidelines. If no illegal activity is occurring, then no record is kept of the
content of what was discussed at a particular gathering.
In the following exemplar, Ashcroft and Hostettler (R IN) continue to build up the
Department’s ethos when it comes to protecting civil liberties. Together, they make the
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argument that while making national security decisions, the Justice Department considers
all the facts and is very conservative on the side of civil liberties. This particular
exemplar is doubly interesting because they apply a percentage to the scenario to come
up with an equation demonstrating just how conservative they are. The beginning of
Hofstettler’s line of argumentation was actually analyzed above when he was found to be
praising Ashcroft for preventing another terrorist attack post 9/11. Also in his line of
argumentation is a critique of the Inspector General’s ethos, which is a category of
analysis to come later; having awareness of the critique though is integral to
understanding what is happening in the current exemplar.
Hofstettler begins a question to Ashcroft by criticizing the Inspector General
claiming he had two different reports that were contradictory of each other. Accordingly,
in one report, the Inspector General claims that immigrants should have been released
earlier than were during the initial post 9/11 round-up; in the second report, the Inspector
General said that 87% of released illegal immigrants ignore deportation orders. After
arguing the two reports contradicted each other, Hofstettler referred to a point in the
debate at which Ashcroft referred to the second one in a way that reflected 85% rather
than 87%. At that point, based upon a 2% error, Ashcroft is portrayed as someone who is
conservative to err on the side of civil rights:
You were being conservative earlier when you said 85 percent absconded. And
that is all right with me personally for you to be conservative, but it was actually
87 percent had absconded, according to the IG. Yet this week’s Inspector General
report spends much of its time ruing over the fact that the illegal aliens who were
detained as part of the terrorism investigation didn’t get an opportunity to be
bonded out. (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 31)
Ashcroft responds by first explaining the decision making calculus, arguing that the
expediency to which people could be cleared in that case had to be weighed against
safety, especially considering that New York was still “smoldering:”
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Obviously, in an ideal world, we would like to be able to have cleared people
instantly. We would like to know any time someone is charged in the very
shortest period of time, whether innocent or guilty, or whether they were
associated with terrorism or not. And I have some sympathy for the Inspector
General’s desire to have us do a quicker job. I think all of us in the ideal world
would like jobs done more quickly. But as I mentioned earlier, much of this
focused in the New York community, and you have to remember what the
situation was in New York when this was happening, was still smoldering. The
FBI was operating out of a parking garage following alot of leads and uncertain
about what might happen next, not only what happened last. And in addition to
those individuals who had been detained, there were a lot of other individuals that
were individuals about whom we had serious questions and we, on a daily basis,
get information about the potential of attacks. (United States Department of
Justice, 2003, p. 31)
In actuality, this quotation would be a better fit in the previous section—but it sets the
next quotation up so nicely; so, I will keep it here. Ashcroft proclaims that he was doubly
conservative—erring on the side of civil liberties, but not forgetting about the value of
safety:
So I think we just had to balance the risk. The risk of sending people back into the
culture with, according to the statistics of the previous report, 94 percent of one
cohort and 87 percent of the other. I did use—I was doubly conservative. I
knocked it all back to 87 and I subtracted 2. You would think I was negotiating to
buy something, driving the price down. But that risk, 85 percent, you know, is a
very high level of risk, and so we process these individuals as fast as we can. I
hope we can do better. (United States Department of Justice, 2003, pp. 31-32)
The argument that the Justice Department is careful when it comes to civil rights is made
a great deal in one form or the other, whether it is that “we are conservative with civil
rights,” “we won’t stand for civil rights abuses,” or “we are currently investigating a civil
rights investigation,” the argument is made a great deal throughout the course of this
debate. This argument combined with the one mentioned above demonstrating the way in
which the Department claims to value consultation, forms the “you can trust us” stance in
this phase of debate. It is made 24 times during the course of the debate, mostly by
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Ashcroft, but as we have seen a couple of majority members have affirmed his claim:
Hofstettler and Chabot.
The Perfect Balance??
Ashcroft could have done wonders for his own ethos if he had just admitted that
9/11 forced the country to make tough decisions and that because humans are not perfect,
some mistakes may have been made; i.e. we erred on the side of safety…now, let us see
how we can improve in the future and make a law that everyone thinks is necessary, a
little bit better. However, with very few exceptions, he maintained that his department
has been perfect since 9/11.
In the following exemplar, which is a response to a question posed by Maxine
Waters, Ashcroft argues that the Department of Justice made decisions in the aftermath of
9/11 based upon national security interests. The question concerns the indefinite
detention of illegal aliens and references the Inspector General’s report stating the actions
taken by the DOJ were illegal. Here is Ashcroft’s response:
Let me just say this: That all of the individuals, the subjects of that report, were in
the United States illegally. The policy of the Department, for which we do not
apologize, was that until individuals apprehended who were here illegally, who
have no—don’t have a right to bail or bond, who are here illegally, before we
would release them prior to their deportation, we wanted to have them cleared.
We believe that’s the right policy to protect the American people.
You’ve got to remember the FBI in New York, for example, at that time was
working out of a parking garage because we assigned so many people to New
York to try to solve those problems. We made interest judgments about the best
national security interests of the United States when we couldn’t prosecute—some
individuals we did prosecute. Other individuals who couldn’t be prosecuted, we
simply had to say we’d better deport these people with the clear understanding
they are never to come back to the United States. (United States Department of
Justice, 2003, p. 15)
Ashcroft acknowledges that they had to make a decision to detain immigrants indefinitely
in the interest of national security. He says that he does apologize for that decision even
though there was no evidence whatsoever that they had done anything wrong, other than
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being in the United States. According to law, it is of course lawful to deport illegal
immigrants out of the country, but what is not lawful, according to the Inspector
General’s report, is to detain them indefinitely while trying to scrounge up some evidence
of terrorist activity. It is a cut-and-dried case that mistakes were made during this time,
but Ashcroft will not likely ever admit it. Alberto Gonzales, the person who would later
replace Ashcroft as the Attorney General, acknowledges that the policy was misguided
and because of that, he gains more respect and cooperation from his critics.
In the next exemplar, we find the all-or-nothing tone embedded within the
national security argument. Mark Green (R WI) asks Ashcroft a very general question
about the library provision, just to give Ashcroft the opportunity to clarify any
misunderstandings critics may have. Ashcroft begins the response by noting that the
Justice Department has always investigated suspected criminals’ use of the library and
that in fact, the infamous Unabomber was captured due to a library investigation10. Then
he makes the comparison that the same standards of criminal investigation ought to be
applied to terrorism and argues that “most Americans” would agree that counterterrorism
intelligence is important:
Now, for foreign intelligence, should we be able to use tools in foreign intelligence
that we use in other criminal proceedings? I think most Americans say hey, look,
intelligence relating to counterterrorism is very important. We ought to be able to
do that. So the PATRIOT Act authorized some very limited things regarding
libraries (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 20).
Underlying this response is the accusation that critics of the library provision are
somehow against the idea of counterterrorism intelligence in general.
10 Later in the debate, Nadler clarifies Ashcroft’s claim about the Unabomber and the
library provision. He points out that the Unabomber was caught because his own brother
reported him and that the use of the library was not investigated until enough evidence
was gathered for a search warrant (p. 26); whereas the Patriot Act decreases the standard
of evidence needed and some say the wording is vague enough to the point of allowing
general sweeps of the library.
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In the next exemplar, Ashcroft almost acknowledges that there may actually be a
tradeoff between safety and liberty. The response begins with Watt questioning Ashcroft
about the Neighborhood Watch Program in which the Justice Department began “asking
neighborhood groups to report on people who were either ‘unfamiliar’ or ‘suspicious’ or
‘not normal’ (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 33). He tells Ashcroft that a
lot of his constituents are uneasy about that sort of request from the Justice Department
and asks for a response. Ashcroft explains the purpose of the program and explains how
good judgment by the people can lead to the arrests of terrorists:
In terms of the Neighborhood Watch, generally, asking American citizens to be
alert, we just ask them to use their judgment. Frankly, people using good
judgment on the airplane when the shoe bomber was there saved the lives of
many, many people. And people using good judgment in the settings—a sheriff’s
deputy using good judgment in Washington State helped us detect a cell which—
an alleged cell in Portland. (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 35)
Then, Ashcroft goes on to describe that some innocent people being investigated is a
“cost of doing business,” an understandable tradeoff:
So that’s really what we’re talking about. You see people who are working with
precursors or that might be the potential for bomb making, and frankly, there have
been cases where you always get some reports that are—that lead you to things
that were innocent but looked guilty. But we don’t prosecute those. We don’t
charge those. And that’s one of the costs of doing business. We remember the
story of a woman who overheard some people who may have been trying to pull a
joke on her talking about making a bomb or conducting terrorist activities.
Frankly, we think people should report that. The stakes of not reporting it are too
high. (United States Department of Justice, 2003, pp. 35-36)
Here is the one example, out of the entire transcript, in which it seems as though Ashcroft
may be acknowledging a tradeoff between safety and civil liberties—even though that
tradeoff is not very clearly expressed. Again though, if Ashcroft had attempted more of
this type of compromise, he may have been more effective as an Attorney General.
264
In the next exemplar, again, there are parts of the discourse in which it seems as
though Ashcroft and his supporter are acknowledging an inherent tradeoff between safety
and liberty, and maybe they are in some indirect way, but looking closer, we find the real
reason the issue is brought up in the first place is to help paint a picture of the Justice
Department as a protector of civil rights. In other words, the exemplar is not a clear
indication that Ashcroft is admitting any sort of inadequacy. In fact, looking further into
the example, we find that it turns into an opportunity for Ashcroft to explain that he is
perfect. The argument developed is that the internal checks the Department places on
civil liberties should make the rest of us feel secure knowing that democracy is being
preserved.
It is Steve Chabot (R OH) who introduces Ashcroft with the opportunity to
address the balance of safety and liberty by bringing up some problems with police abuse
in the city of Cincinnati. He is praising the Justice Department, and Ralph Boyd in
particular, the person in charge of the Civil Rights Division within the department, for
their cooperation in resolving matters of civil liberties.
Attorney General, for being here this morning and this afternoon, and I want to
thank you for the job and the service that you’ve been doing for our country and
that you’ll continue to do. I also want to thank you and your Department for your
willingness to work with my city, with the City of Cincinnati and the Police
Department recently, especially to iron out the issues that arose from the police
patterns and practices agreement. As you know, we have had some difficult times
in the city in the last couple of years. And whereas we absolutely have to protect
the civil rights of every person in our community, at the same time we do not
want to handcuff the Police Department and make it tougher for them to do their
job. And they, after all, are the folks that are principally responsible for protecting
the law abiding citizens in our community. And I want to especially thank Ralph
Boyd, the head of your Civil Rights Division, for his leadership on this important
matter, especially recently, when he went out of his way to work with our police
and with the leaders of Cincinnati to resolve an issue which had come up. And
I’m hopeful that the City of Cincinnati and the Police Department and the
Department of Justice can continue to cooperate and work together to heal our
city. (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 46)
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Chabot goes on to say: “And whereas we absolutely have to protect the civil rights of
every person in our community, at the same time we do not want to handcuff the Police
Department and make it tougher for them to do their job” (United States Department of
Justice, 2003, p. 46). This takes on the form of the “I want to be tough on terror…but…”
except is works in the opposite direction. It says: “I want to protect civil rights…but…”
Incidentally, this is not the first time during the debate for which this type of
argument shows up. Earlier in the debate, Ashcroft himself says, “We should be careful
and we should be restrained, but we should also know that we, in our care and restraint,
have to be realistic” (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 24). This quotation
clearly spells out an ethos of wanting to err on the side of safety but placing faith in the
Justice Department for making sure things do not get too far out of hand.
But back to the response Ashcroft provides Chabot. It is interesting and leads into
the next category of argument when he begins by spelling out that civil rights abuses are
important matters:
Well, this is a matter of great concern to us. We think that the right relationship
between police and citizens is very important. We take very seriously any
abuses, obviously, and we think that the approach taken in Cincinnati should be a
model. And for this reason we immediately went to work with all the parties in
Cincinnati to achieve a settlement that we could work together to improve things.
That’s the way we ought to do things. (United States Department of Justice,
2003, p. 46)
The abuse in Cincinnati was so important that we took immediate action, according to
Ashcroft, and the parties in Cincinnati of course cooperated with us on improvement. The
argument continues though in an effort to demonstrate that the Justice Department has
things under control. Ashcroft calls that police abuse “a little glitch in the system”
(United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 47) that was easily fixed because the
Justice Department can adapt to change:
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We had a little glitch in the system and we got everybody back together and
worked it out again. And when we can work together to make—to respect the
rights of American citizens and to make sure we have the right approach to law
enforcement and the use of force, that is what we consider a win-win situation. So
we are very pleased. (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 47)
Ashcroft then makes a little analogy to illustrate what he is talking about. Police brutality
is but a little wind that causes a little change in direction, and because we are in control,
“course correction” is easily fixed:
If you take off in an airplane from Cincinnati and come to Washington,
somewhere along the way the wind will change and there has to be a little course
correction. You have the right destination, but you have to make some course
corrections to get here. I think the effort in Cincinnati needed a little fine-tuning, a
little course correction. I am very glad that Ralph was able to go out and others
cooperated. We made the course correction, and we are still going to the right
destination. I am very pleased. And thank you for your cooperation, your help. It
takes everyone in the community to work together for us to improve the
circumstances, and thank you very much. (United States Department of Justice,
2003, pp. 46-47)
The ethos put forth in this statement is that everything is okay—we are doing a good job.
The key to the resolution of the problem is that the Justice Department was in charge the
whole time. We have balanced civil liberties, we will balance civil liberties, but we need
the authority to make those decisions on our own for the safety of the nation…but do not
worry, you can trust us. The claim that the Justice Department has to make tough
decisions in order to protect national security is made 15 different times, mostly by
Ashcroft, but Mr. Chabot chimes in once in this regard as well.
The Deliberative Process is Working
In light of all the attention to controversy over the deliberative process present in
this debate, it should definitely be noted that a plethora of people involved feel that the
process has been splendid. The views articulated in this section contribute to the “you can
trust us” perception that the Justice Department and supporters are trying to put forth.
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Amidst the accusations that the Department has not been forthright, as well as the ones
stating that the Congress acted out of hysteria when the act was passed, the argument is
simply made that both Ashcroft and the Committee have done their jobs.
Ashcroft has Done His Job
Steve King (R IA) provides us with a great example to begin demonstration of
this category. He compliments Ashcroft and says the way in which he prepared for this
hearing is inspiring; it demonstrates the way in which he has idealized the deliberative
process since he first began study of civics:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Attorney General, I want to thank you for coming
here to testify today and I want to thank you particularly for the effort you have
put into the preparation and the demonstration of the command of all of these
issues that you have delivered today. That is how I envisioned it as I studied
civics as a young man (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 48).
Bob Goodlatte (R VA) takes the praise a step further by saying that Ashcroft has brought
integrity BACK to the office, implying it was not there prior to the Bush presidency:
“Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Ashcroft, welcome, and thank you for the dedication
and integrity that you have brought to our Nation’s chief law enforcement position. It is
very refreshing” (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 24). Jeff Flake (R AL)
welcomes Ashcroft and says, “Mr. Attorney General, I just want to say how much we all
appreciate the difficult balancing act you have in this regard, particularly with the
PATRIOT Act” (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 60).
The examples could continue. Obviously, there are people who are very happy
with not only the way in which Ashcroft has protected America, but also the way in
which he has fulfilled his democratic duty of submitting his activity to oversight by
Congress. Ashcroft is praised in this way a total of seven times during the course of this
debate; not surprisingly, all of them came from majority members: Flake, Chabot,
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Sensenbrenner, Goodlatte, Forbes and King. The defense of Ashcroft’s integrity in
general, and his commitment to the deliberative process also contributes to the “you can
trust us” ethos.
The Committee has Done its Job
Another defense of the ethos of the process comes from Sensenbrenner, who
understandably has an individual interest as well as a communal interest, in
demonstrating that the process has been an effective one—especially from the
perspective of the Judiciary Committee. He makes this appeal at the very beginning of
the hearing during his opening statement, as well as at the very end of the hearing as he
concludes. Since we have already seen a close textual analysis of his opening where he
says that he is a critic and that the whole Committee has been given the opportunity to be
critical, let us examine his concluding remarks at this juncture:
Now, I know that you feel like coming before us is like appearing before the
inquisition. And I think that, given the wide ranging nature of the questions, all of
which are legitimate—and I have added it up, and 26 Members of the Committee
did avail themselves of time to ask questions of you directly. I think this shows
that the system is working, and I would like to express my appreciation to your
staff whom I am certain have been spending countless hours of putting together
the material on that real thick binder that is in front of you so that you can be
properly prepared to answer the questions. (United States Department of Justice,
2003, pp. 67-68)
This is how the hearing ends. Sensenbrenner is proud. Based upon a statistical quality
control mechanism, he concludes that the system is working. Because 26 members asked
questions, then obviously, the deliberative process is an effective one.
Ashcroft’s Consubstantiation
In A Rhetoric of Motives, Kenneth Burke (1969 rpt.) explains consubstantiation,
or identification, as a powerful means to persuasion. Simply put, if one can demonstrate
that they share a likeness with somebody else then they can consciously or
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subconsciously become more believable. For instance, if a “Dead Head” (a die hard fan
of the musical band, The Grateful Dead) is listening to somebody else deliver a
persuasive message and during the course of delivering that message, the arguer discloses
that she is also a “Dead Head,” she is likely to become that much more likable to the
audience member, even if it is at a subconscious level—contributing to the extent to
which her persuasive message has a chance of being effective. During the course of this
debate, Ashcroft overtly utilizes consubstantiation a number of times to become more
believable to the audience.
I used to Be in Congress
The identification strategy utilized most by Ashcroft is the announcement that he
used to be a member of Congress. The following exemplar overlaps with a previous
category and is a good one to demonstrate the point. Here Ashcroft is responding to the
criticism of Delahunt—the criticism that Ashcroft has created a “culture of concealment”
within the Justice Department. Ashcroft had just made the point that he finds it amusing
anyone would accuse him of secretly trying to change the law, because that would violate
his principles. He then uses consubstantiation to emphasize that he will “do his best to
assist Congress”:
I used to be a Member of this Congress; I enjoyed the opportunity of casting
votes. I miss it sometimes. And I would do my best to assist the Congress. And
when it adapts the laws to reflect the need to confront the evolving threat against
the safety and security of the American people, that it does so in ways that will be
effective. That is what my job is as Attorney General. And to the extent that I can
do that, I am going to do it, and I can pledge to you today that that is the way in
which we will operate in terms of changes to the law. That is the constitutional
way. (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 24)
In all, Ashcroft makes this appeal to the audience five times. Bob Goodlatte (R VA),
acknowledges Ashcroft’s ethos a page later in the transcript of the debate, by referring to
Ashcroft’s experience as a Senator:
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Let me ask about one other area that is of great interest to myself and to you, I
believe. When you were Senator Ashcroft, you joined with me on the Senate side
in pushing forward legislation which assured that American citizens would be
secure in the use of their computers by promoting the use of strong encryption,
getting an ancient Government policy reversed which has assured privacy, has
assured the ability of individuals to fight crime, and for U.S. software and
hardware companies to be able to be competitive in the world market in offering
their products. (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 25)
Goodlatte enhances Ashcroft’s effort at consubstantiation while also portraying Ashcroft
as a leader who is very sympathetic to privacy.
I’m a Religious Man
The next category of consubstantiation only reveals one exemplar, but it is an
interesting one and deserves attention. Steve King (R IA) is questioning Ashcroft about
the Levy guidelines alterations and suggests that maybe there should be a quota on the
amount of times the FBI can go into a mosque because of the risk of violating the
freedom of religion. Ashcroft responds saying that since no law is specifically aimed at
Muslims that there is no problem with the changed guidelines. In the middle of his
response, he uses his participation in the Assembly of God church as a hypothetical
scenario:
Now, it is possible to, I believe, have an individual’s rights infringed because a
group has been infringed, and we observe that in the history of our country, and
we are sensitive to that and don’t want that to be the case. If a law would say
that—I happen to be a participant in the Assembly of God Church—no one can
vote who is a member of the Assembly of God Church, that would be a law which
is directed at a group that deprived me of a right. So I am sensitive to the fact that
sometimes discrimination against a group infringes the right of an individual, so it
is in that context that I understand these rights. (United States Department of
Justice, 2003, p. 49)
He is identifying with people who are allegedly at risk for abuse. Because he shares
religiosity with Muslims, he knows how important the freedom of religion is and would
never allow the Justice Department to commit religious profiling.
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Attacks on the Ethos of Critics
Aside from just building their own ethos back up, Ashcroft and his supporters also
go on the offensive. They attack the ethos of critics and portray them in a way such that
they have no business criticizing the Attorney General. The following exemplar by J.
Randy Forbes (R VA) demonstrates a general attitude taken toward critics. Initially, he
thanks Ashcroft and praises him for his patience in putting up with the vacant shots being
taken at him: “Mr. Attorney General, thank you for your patience and for being here”
(United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 52). While at this point, my interpretation
may seem like a stretch, after reading the next paragraph of transcription, it may make a
little more sense:
The older I get, the more my wife and children point out to me that I am not
perfect and have a lot of imperfections, and I know the longer you are in this
office, you realize that you are not perfect and your Department is not perfect, but
I just want to thank you, on behalf of my constituents and so many individuals
that I see, for the work that you have done. The irony is, and I hope you convey
that to the people in your Department, the irony is that the individuals who should
be thanking you the most do not even realize it because they haven’t become
victims because of the work of the Department and what you have done. (United
States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 52)
This quotation overlaps with another category—the one claiming that Ashcroft has
prevented another attack. It also overlaps in a contradictory way, with Ashcroft’s own
claim that he is perfect. But the exemplar also introduces a new type of argument—an
attack upon the ethos of the critics. Forbes claims that critics, for whatever reason, are
just not bright enough to realize what a wonderful job Ashcroft is doing. If critics had
been victims of an attack, according to Forbes, then they would obviously have a greater
appreciation for the job of the Justice Department.
It is interesting to note that a bit earlier in the debate, Martin Meehan (D MA)
utilized the ethos of the victims in a bit different way—in fact, quite opposite to that of
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Forbes. He begins his argument by telling the audience stories about a few of the people
from his own district in Massachusetts who died on 9/11. Then, as the following segment
indicates, he works it into a plea made specifically by a family member of one of the
victims who urges the Congress to ensure civil liberties:
And I think of Alexander Filipov, who was 70 years old, from Concord,
Massachusetts, on United Flight 175, and his wife Loretta, and their three
children. And Loretta Filipov was at my house the last time I saw her and she
looked me in the eye and she said you know, Marty, there isn’t a day that doesn’t
go by that I don’t think of my husband and miss him, nor do my children. And she
said, “But you’re my Congressman and you have a responsibility to balance the
loss of these innocent victims with making sure we maintain the freedoms and the
values that makes this country great.’’ And she said, ‘‘I’m going to rely on you to
balance that in your role.” (United States Department of Justice, 2003, pp. 41-42)
Even the people directly affected by the 9/11 attacks are divided over how best to
conduct the war on terror. Some want a no-holds-barred, get-them-at-all-costs
approach—and some, like the woman quoted here, want a more rational, restrained
approach to fighting terror.
The Inspector General
In the previous section, Forbes demonstrates criticism of critics in general, but it
is important to note that criticism of critics’ ethos gets much more specific. As already
mentioned multiple times throughout the course of this chapter, the Inspector General—
Glenn Fine, who issued a scathing report of the Department of Justice over its treatment
of immigrants in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, had his ethos severely attacked during
this debate. Hostettler (R IN) initiates the attack in the same quotation provided above in
the section devoted to the argument that Ashcroft prevented another attack; so, additional
context could be referenced above, but the following represents the observation made
here specifically:
I thank the Chairman. General Ashcroft, thank you for being here and thank you
for your service to our country. I believe that the Office of Inspector General
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report does a grave disservice to yourself and all of the other dedicated Justice
Department employees who work tirelessly to protect us from another devastating
terrorist attack in the days immediately following 9/11. While the report pays lip
service to the incredible stresses that you as well as the men and women of the
Justice Department faced and the responsibility that all of you bore for thousands
of American lives, it attacks your response to the terrorist strikes even after we
have learned the stunning success of your efforts. (United States Department of
Justice, 2003, p. 30)
The claim that he Inspector General has “done a great disservice” to those who are
working hard to defend our nation could be construed to imply that Glenn Fine is aiding
the terrorists. The possibility of that interpretation being accurate becomes even more
plausible when considering the next attack upon his ethos. Hostettler accuses Fine of
being more concerned about illegal aliens than a terrorist attack because he wants to place
deadlines on agents as a limit for how long immigrants can be held without a charge:
The Inspector General recommends that the FBI impose deadlines on agents to
complete background investigations, and that point is important, because even the
Inspector General recognizes that the Department is acting within statute as well
as Supreme Court precedent when it comes to your detention of these illegal
aliens. It appears to me that the Office of Inspector General is more concerned
about the inconvenience suffered by illegal aliens who are being detained than
about ensuring that not one alien terrorist is released on to our streets. (United
States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 30)
The natural conclusion Hofstettler draws then, is that Fine must “be suffering from short
term memory lapse”:
It follows that it seems that the IG may be suffering from short-term memory
lapse. Just this February, the IG issued a report that found that the Immigration
and Naturalization Service, which was previously in the Department, only
succeeded in removing 13 percent of nondetained aliens in removal proceedings
after they were ordered removed (United States Department of Justice, 2003, pp.
30-31).
He is of course now referring to the supposed contradiction between two different reports
made by Fine (this context is provided above in the section related to the argument that
Ashcroft prevented another attack). Then after referencing the contradiction again, he
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begins to praise Ashcroft for being conservative when it comes to balancing civil
liberties.
Ashcroft responds to the attack on the Inspector General’s ethos. While he is
much more restrained than Hofstettler, there seems to be a bit of condescension in his
remarks. This may be a duplicate exemplar, as it also demonstrates Ashcroft’s
commitment to cooperation and protecting national security. Nonetheless, it is important
to see again because of the way in which we can detect a sense of indignation over Glenn
Fine’s report:
Obviously, in an ideal world, we would like to be able to have cleared people
instantly. We would like to know any time someone is charged in the very
shortest period of time, whether innocent or guilty, or whether they were
associated with terrorism or not. And I have some sympathy for the Inspector
General’s desire to have us do a quicker job. I think all of us in the ideal world
would like jobs done more quickly. But as I mentioned earlier, much of this
focused in the New York community, and you have to remember what the
situation was in New York when this was happening, was still smoldering. The
FBI was operating out of a parking garage following alot of leads and uncertain
about what might happen next, not only what happened last. And in addition to
those individuals who had been detained, there were a lot of other individuals that
were individuals about whom we had serious questions and we, on a daily basis,
get information about the potential of attacks. (United States Department of
Justice, 2003, p. 31)
When Ashcroft begins by saying, “in an ideal world…” he implies that the Inspector
General is naïve about the risk to national security. Furthermore, when he says, “I have
some sympathy…” for the Inspector’s request that we do a better job, he implies that the
request does not have much prima facie value. When one has sympathy for someone, the
implication is that the person feels sorry for the other person. In this case, Ashcroft says
that he has sympathy for the report, implying it is so laughable that most people would
not take it very seriously. Furthermore, he qualifies his level of sympathy by saying
“some sympathy;” in other words, it is difficult to muster up a great deal of sympathy
275
because it is almost too laughable—but Ashcroft managed to find some value in a report
that is seemingly useless on its face. Ashcroft reifies my interpretation again,
immediately after ensuring the audience that he is “doubly conservative” when it comes
to civil rights, and along side of the claim that “we did not violate the law:”
But we did not violate the law, and we will—frankly, I like to view the report of
the Inspector General, in spite of the fact that there is tension between this report
and the previous report—the previous report criticizing us for not being able to
deport people and this report criticizing us for holding people. Yes, there is
tension there, but I like to view these as what can we learn from this that will help
us improve our operation. And frankly, that is what we are going to do. (United
States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 32)
The way I am reading this quotation, from within the context in which it is stated,
Ashcroft is essentially agreeing with Hofstettler that Fine is a moron, but instead of
dwelling on it, Ashcroft is going to take the higher ground and try to learn from the
implicit contradiction between the two reports.
Later in the debate, Sheila Jackson Lee (D TX) comes to the defense of the
Inspector General. The following quotation also overlaps with an exemplar from earlier
in the debate, but it provides important context to the defense of Fine’s ethos:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Attorney General, it has been too long,
but we welcome you back. All of us experienced the righteous indignation that
you have so eloquently expressed in your testimony today post-9/11, during 9/11,
and continuously as we support the war on terrorism. But my fear is that we may
go to the point of changing the culture of America, the first amendment
protections, the fourth amendment protections. So frankly, I believe we owe a
debt of gratitude to Glenn Fine, the Inspector General of the United States
Department of Justice, for several reasons. Let me quickly cite these and raise
some questions of my concern. (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 50)
According to Jackson Lee, we owe “a debt of gratitude” to Fine for having the courage to
come out as a critic of the Justice Department. Even later in the debate, Linda Sanchez (D
CA) also affirms Fine’s ethos, a bit less directly, when she describes some of the doubts
she has had about the Patriot Act. She says, “Sadly, my concerns and questions only seem
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to have been validated by the report from the Office of the Inspector General. His report
calls into question detention conditions and practices, among other things” (United States
Department of Justice, 2003, p. 54). Though she does not go out of her way to express
thanks to Fine, the way Jackson Lee does, she does acknowledge that she has faith in his
critical report.
Critics in Congress
The attacks upon the ethos of the critics in Congress are subtle and demand
careful reading and scrutiny to be able to see that their ethos is being attacked. For
instance, in Ashcroft’s opening statement, after reminding the Congress of all the people
who suffered because of 9/11, he says, “Despite the terrorist threats to America, there are
some, both in Congress and across the country, who suggest that we should not have a
USA PATRIOT Act. Others who supported the act 20 months ago now express doubts
about the necessity of some of the act’s components” (United States Department of
Justice, 2003, p. 8). The all-or-nothing dichotomy as stated here, and as a general
principle of Ashcroft’s ethos, generates an inherent critique of anyone’s ethos that
opposes his actions in any way. In the following example, we see a similar sort of
inference made—calling into question the intelligence of anyone in Congress who
disagrees. Goodlatte (R VA) provides Ashcroft with an opportunity to make this appeal
with a question about encryption laws—laws that Ashcroft helped pass as a Senator:
Let me ask about one other area that is of great interest to myself and to you, I
believe. When you were Senator Ashcroft, you joined with me on the Senate side
in pushing forward legislation which assured that American citizens would be
secure in the use of their computers by promoting the use of strong encryption,
getting an ancient Government policy reversed which has assured privacy, has
assured the ability of individuals to fight crime, and for U.S. software and
hardware companies to be able to be competitive in the world market in offering
their products. (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 25)
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Obviously, this overlaps with the consubstantiation effort establishing Ashcroft’s ethos as
a former Senator. It also functions as a “you can trust” argument uncovered in the
previous debate with Dinh—the one in which it is claimed that there are bureaucratic
structures external to the Patriot Act protecting Americans from civil liberties abuse.
After describing the encryption laws, Goodlatte goes on to pose the question to Ashcroft
and it is a question that clarifies the idea that the Patriot Act does not alter the past
encryption laws designed to protect people’s privacy on the Internet.
Ashcroft responds by saying that he wishes everyone were as smart as Goodlatte
when it comes to the “computer world”: “Let me just say how grateful I am that there are
people with your understanding of the computer world in the Congress who guide and
shape intelligently the way in which this world is dealt with governmentally, and we hope
that voices that have that kind of intelligent approach speak into this Administration as
well as the Congress” (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 25). In other words,
people who do not see things the same in which Ashcroft and Goodlatte do just do not
understand. But thank goodness, according to Ashcroft, that somebody in Congress does
so that hopefully, the truth can be explained to all those who doubt it. At the end of the
statement, he refers to the hope that intelligence can be spoken into both the
Administration and Congress, but by placing the quotation into the context of the rest of
the debate, it is clear that the Administration already has the one true understanding in
Ashcroft’s opinion, as does anyone else who happens to believe the truth.
The Courts
The court system also becomes a focus of criticism by Ashcroft during his
testimony. An essential point that the Justice Department tries to make is that they do not
amend law substantially through the Patriot Act. The Department claims that they could
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and should have had the same amount of authority to do what they are currently doing
prior to the Patriot Act. A main theme of argumentation repeated throughout the process
is that they have had the same sort of authorities in relation to the mafia, drug dealers and
other criminals for a long time, and in some cases, they have been able to gain the same
type of authority to investigate terrorism suspects, but not in other cases. The reason for
this lack of consistency, according to the Bush Administration, is because some courts
are not interpreting the law correctly and that the primary reason for the Patriot Act, is to
clarify the law for the courts so that there is more national unity over how to respond to
terrorism.
The following exemplar best illustrates the attitude of the Bush Administration
toward the courts who disagree with their interpretation of the law. It actually references
a continuing problem with the courts post-Patriot Act, demonstrating that the
Administration is still not quite happy with some of the courts. Mark Green (R WI)
begins by asking Ashcroft about weaknesses in the current law, as it exists even after the
Patriot Act was passed. Ashcroft explains that an effective strategy in the war on terror
has been to charge people with material support, pointing out that a number of courts
have agreed with that interpretation of the law:
One of the charges that has been effective in the war against terror has been to
charge people with material support for terrorism, that they have become a part of
the terrorist operation in supporting it. We think that going and joining the
operation is providing material support. A number of courts have agreed with that,
that it is material support. (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 20)
Unfortunately though, according to Ashcroft, some courts are still not on board with the
war on terror:
There are some courts, though, that say going and taking training and joining up
with the operation does not mean that you are helping the operation. Well, our
view is that that could be clarified. We had individuals, I am sorry to say, in the
United States of America who after September 11, went to get terrorist training.
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We had individuals in the United States of America who after September 11, left
the United States of America in an attempt to go and fight against our own Armed
Forces in Afghanistan. It is hard to imagine. It is. I think it is hard to imagine for
anyone on the Committee. I mean there are differences between some of us on
this Committee and in this room, but I don’t think there are any differences in that
respect. (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 20).
Therefore, Ashcroft argues that “we need for the law to make it clear that it is just as
much a conspiracy to aid and assist a terrorist, to join them for fighting purposes, as it is
to carry them a lunch or to provide them with a weapon” (United States Department of
Justice, 2003, p. 20).
Debating Public Opinion
It is interesting to note the way in which interlocutors in this debate attempt to use
public opinion as backing behind their arguments. During the course of analysis, we have
seen both Ashcroft supporters and critics utilize the ethos of people who have been
directly affected by 9/11 as support for arguments, and we have also seen references to
what Americans in general want to see happen in terms of the way in which the war on
terror is fought. The theme of public opinion as argument is analyzed more thoroughly by
Levasseur (2005) in the context of the federal budget process—one of the more critical
pieces reviewed in Chapter 2. He found public opinion to be utilized in much the same
way there—politicians presume to know what Americans want and accordingly, that
knowledge gives them greater credibility in making their appeals during the
policymaking process. In this debate, it is an interesting irony to me to note that
according to my count, public opinion is utilized equally amongst the camp of Ashcroft
supporters and Ashcroft detractors. Both sides claim public opinion as support for their
arguments five times. Statistically speaking, it is not an overwhelming number, but given
the way in which the change in public opinion over the Patriot Act becomes such a large
part of the Bush Administration’s campaign after this debate is over, observing it as a
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category within the confines of this debate seems important. In fact, it was not long after
this phase of debate when Ashcroft went on his infamous public tour in defense of the
Patriot Act. This public tour becomes a focus of analysis at the beginning of the next
chapter; here though, we pay attention to the way in which the current debate stages that
tour. The primary strategy is that Ashcroft and supporters try to undercut the credibility
of the critics…again!!!
Critics are Confused…We Just Need to Explain
Bob Goodlatte (R VA) typifies the government’s attitude toward the growing
anti-Patriot Act public sentiment described at the beginning of the chapter, and
demonstrated throughout by various members of Congress. In fact, in the following
question, Goodlatte makes specific reference to the increasing number referendums on
the Patriot Act that communities are making at the local level. In his question to Ashcroft,
he describes these referendums as being the result of mass confusion, and asks Ashcroft
what the Justice Department can do to correct the confusion:
The gentleman from Wisconsin noted the confusion and concern that the U.S.
PATRIOT Act has engendered in many quarters. In fact, as you may know, a
number of cities have passed resolutions or other measures that ban their
employees from cooperating with Federal authorities that are attempting to utilize
powers granted by the law. What, if anything, can and will the Department do to
correct these misunderstandings and to assure cooperation from these
municipalities, and have you encountered any specific instances where employees
of any of these cities have refused to cooperate with the Department? (United
States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 24)
Ashcroft response is that they must simply do a better job of explaining the Patriot Act to
participants. Obviously, those who are critical of it simply do not truly understand it
because they have not received correct information about it:
Well, first of all, I think information is the friend of the American people, and that
is one of the values that the Chairman recited to me and Ranking Member
Conyers recited, that when we discuss the law, and we can take some of the myths
away from the law, we can show the American people how the law is framed,
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how the rights of individuals are protected and safeguarded in the law. We will
work with State and local authorities very aggressively on PATRIOT Act issues
and other issues to help them understand why doing what we are doing is in the
national interest, including the local interest. And I would just have to say this,
that the overwhelming, vastly overwhelming response of State and local
authorities has been excellent. (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 25)
Critics have bought in to the myths about the act and do not understand the way in which
it actually protects civil liberties. They do not understand that it is implemented for the
sake of the national interest—another contribution to the all-or-nothing ethos of the
Patriot Act; those who oppose it for any reason simply do not understand that national
security is at stake and that something must be done. So, Ashcroft claims to take it upon
himself, and other members of the Justice Department, to correct the myths about the
Patriot Act.
The Press Leads to “Disinformation”
An argument introduced in the earlier debate by Viet Dinh, one that even Paul
Rosenzwieg—a minority witness from that debate acknowledged as true, is that often
times, the press does not report precisely on the implementation of the Patriot Act. In the
following example, Ashcroft takes it a step further, much like Dinh does, to imply that all
information from the press is “disinformation:”
Now, there has been a lot of disinformation about it, and there was a suggestion at
one time by a newspaper, for example, it got a lot of coverage in the Hartford
Courant, that alleged that the FBI had installed software on the computers of the
Hartford Public Library that lets agents track a person’s use of Internet and e-mail
messages, and the article even said that an individual’s library use could be
surveilled even if they weren’t suspected of being a terrorist. Well, as a matter of
fact, the FBI obtained a single search warrant to copy the hard drive of a specific
computer that had been used to hack into a business computer system in
California for criminal purposes. That is totally different than the FISA situation.
No software was installed on that computer. The Hartford Courant has retracted
the story in full, but these problems persist. (United States Department of Justice,
2003, p. 22)
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According to the argument, one mistake by one newspaper is cause to call all criticism of
the Patriot Act in the press, “disinformation.” In fact, later in the debate, Ashcroft comes
back to this one example, to again imply that the press cannot be trusted and that their
disinformation is the cause of all cynicism in the public sphere of discourse. In the
following example, he is talking specifically about local law enforcement officials who
might have potentially read an article like the one found in the Hartford Courant :
And we recently apprehended an individual who had been the subject of a many-
year manhunt, not too far from your district, he was in the neighboring State,
local law enforcement. When the Portland cell was first, the alleged Portland cell
was first discovered, it came as a result of a tip-off by a deputy sheriff who
noticed people involved in training activities, and it was in a neighboring State.
So an alert went out to an aggressive team of people interested in the security of
the United States, including local law enforcement. They are our best friends. And
I think as they understand the truth of what the PATRIOT Act is; you know, they
might have read the Hartford Courant article which they subsequently withdrew.
But you know what they say, you are charged with the offense that is on the front
page and the retraction goes in the classified ads. They might not have read the
classified ads yet, but we need to make sure that message gets out. (United States
Department of Justice, 2003, p. 25)
This quotation is interesting for a number of different reasons. For one thing, it overlaps
with the national security discussion from earlier. It buys into the all-or- nothing
argument by referring to an “aggressive team of people interested in the security of the
United States,” implying there are some people who are not interested in the security of
the United States. But for another thing, Ashcroft brings up the one Hartford Courant
article again that was retracted and implies that if the local law enforcement officials had
read that one article, the scenario of stopping terrorists in this case may not have turned
out as well as it did. Fortunately, they understood though, and the Portland Cell was
disrupted.
The next example turns attention away from the one Hartford Courant article and
onto another newspaper—the Washington Post. Getting to the credibility of the article
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itself demands some build up to the argument. Jerrold Nadler (D NY) cites an article
from the Washington Post talking about the Moussaui trial that was going on around the
same time as the hearing was. The argument states that the government is violating the 6th
amendment because Moussaui was not allowed to bring witnesses forward. He is being
tried, according to the argument Nadler is developing, in a criminal court with the
standards of a military tribunal being applied as the measure of due process. In other
words, Nadler, by citing the article, claims that Moussaui could be put to death without
due process. Wrapping up the argument, Nadler cites the Post again to claim that the
Government is in the position of being able to pick and choose the way in which people
are prosecuted in the war on terror based upon the best way to get the desired outcome,
not necessarily on a consistent standard of justice. This then leads into a question posed
to Ashcroft about the scope of the power of government in relation to holding people
without a trial, or due process of any kind:
The Post then says, alternatively, the Government could drop the case against Mr.
Moussaoui and either hold him as an enemy combatant or try him before a
military tribunal. In other words, what the Post is saying is that if it is
inconvenient for the Government because of contrary considerations to allow a
defendant to have the benefit of a witness who might say he is not guilty, then the
Government can try that defendant in a military tribunal and not have the benefit
of that witness, so you can put to death somebody who might be innocent for lack
of the testimony of someone who would establish innocence, or you could hold
him as an enemy combatant forever and not bother with a trial. So my question is,
are you claiming the power to hold people forever without benefit of trial, without
benefit of due process, without benefit of habeas corpus, just because you say he
is an enemy combatant, and are you claiming the power in the American courts to
say because it is inconvenient or not even—more than inconvenient, very
damaging to the Government, we won’t bother with the sixth amendment right to
produce a witness who may show a court that the defendant is, in fact, innocent.
(United States Department of Justice, 2003, p.27)
Ashcroft responds to the question by citing Article II of the Constitution and then the
Qurin case in the Supreme Court, which happened at the end of World War II, to explain
that the President has the authority to designate people as enemy combatants. He says at a
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certain point, the struggle against terrorism becomes a military matter, not a criminal one.
So Nadler and Ashcroft debate over that for a little bit, and in doing so, Ashcroft accuses
the article Nadler cites as being superficial, even though he admits he has not even read
it. He refers to the superficial argument as being “common in this discourse:”
So I find some of the arguments that are common in this discourse to be rather
superficial. I know that you were quoting a newspaper and I don’t want to make
comments about their article without reading their article, but there are
considerations which are at the secondary and tertiary level of analysis that relate
to the national interest, and those, thankfully, those items come into play when the
decisions are being made about these issues, whether or not they come into play
when the articles are being written. And I think the national interest of the United
States is worth defending in this setting, and we have to be able to understand that
we want to be able to extradite from foreign soil individuals who have inflicted
great injury against the United States and in order to do that, a number of our
foreign counterparts are going to demand that they have Article III judicial
process and not enemy combatant or military tribunal standing. (United States
Department of Justice, 2003, pp. 29-30)
Here again, criticisms of the Justice Department—whatever they might be, just do not
take into account the national security of the United States. The all-or-nothing dichotomy
is thrust into the Justice Department’s ethos again. Any suggestion that there may be
better ways to preserve the balance of liberty in the war on terror is automatically a
“superficial” argument that reflects a lack of understanding about the war on terror.
Later in the debate, Martin Meehan (D MA) joins the debate over the ethos of the
press and points out that the Wall Street Journal, a newspaper known for leaning more to
the right than to the left on the political spectrum, published a story on questionable
practices of the FBI:
And there was an article written recently, not in the Washington Post, not even in
the Hartford Courant, but that left wing publication known as the Wall Street
Journal on May 22 carried a story on massive increases in data collection and text
mining by the FBI and local police. And the article reported the FBI violent gang
and terrorist organization file had been expanding rapidly since 2002. This
database now includes all subjects of FBI domestic terrorist investigations,
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including such groups as anarchists, black extremists, animal rights extremists.
(United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 42)
Interestingly, in this argument, Meehan references the previous mentions of the Hartford
Courant and the Washington Post, to make his point about the Wall Street Journal, and
seemingly, about the credibility of the press in general. Furthermore, he makes the point
in a rather sarcastic way by referring to the Wall Street Journal as being known as “a left
wing publication.”
Local Law Enforcement Officials
Another important line of argumentation related to the debate over public opinion
is the debate over local law enforcement officials. Even though they obviously play a
more substantial role in the war on terror than the layperson, they must change their local
practices to adhere to the change in federal policies. Furthermore, they are very much a
part of the growing anti-Patriot Act sentiment in the public sphere, spearheading the
locality-based legislation rejecting some of the Patriot Act provisions. This issue comes
up a number of times during the course of the legislative process.
First and foremost, it is interesting to note that this issue brought about criticism
of the Justice Department from a majority member of Congress—something that
happened only two, maybe three times during the course of this particular debate.
This morning I met with a university president from Arizona who noted that one
of his students has actually been arrested recently for suspected terrorism.
Apparently they approached the FBI, the university administration, and asked if
they could help or if they could get some information and wondering if they might
be able to provide needed information to the FBI and felt that they were given
kind of the cold shoulder. What is the policy of the Justice Department in terms of
cooperating with local, not just law enforcement officials, but other administrators
who may have information that would be helpful? (United States Department of
Justice, 2003, p. 61)
Obviously, Flake is not being very aggressive in his questioning. He simply points out
that somebody in the local community, a university president, was given a cold shoulder
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to the offer of helping with a terrorism investigation, and this leads to the question of
explaining the policy the Justice Department follows as far as cooperating with law
enforcement officials and others local officials. Ashcroft responds:
Our policy is to take the help where we can get it within the framework of the law
and the Constitution, and if we are not doing that, we are not doing as good a job
as we ought to be in helping protect the American people. If you don’t mind
helping me understand more completely the situation which you have described, I
would like to make sure that we don’t allow any failure to cooperate to prejudice
the security of our people. (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 62)
So, he acknowledges that maybe a mistake was made and he asks for help in fixing the
problem…again, an anomaly in analysis11.
In the next example, which actually occurred chronologically ahead of the
previous one, a minority member implies that the Justice Department has damaged the
relationship with local law enforcement agencies. Furthermore, the question does not
directly interact with the Patriot Act, like many of the other questions throughout the
hearing do, but it has to do with the broader war on terror and is certainly within the
scope of the hearing. Linda Sanchez (D CA) brings up the State Criminal Alien
Assistance Program (SCAAP) guidelines initiated by the Justice Department. The
guidelines elicit help from local authorities in apprehending criminal aliens and offers
reimbursement to the local authorities when they are able to do so. According to her
argument, the policy penalizes local authorities when they apprehend aliens that are not
criminals and in turn, alienates the locals against the Justice Department. She cites a letter
from the National Immigration Forum, which was submitted for the record to help make
11 I find it interesting that the only other time he admits a mistake may have been made is
very early in the debate when Sensenbrenner asks him about changing the Levy
guidelines without consulting Congress. That is the only other time I have come across in
which Ashcroft acknowledges that something may not have been carried out perfectly by
the Justice Department. It is not a coincidence I am sure that in both instances, it was a
majority member asking the question.
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her argument. In that letter, there are a plethora of oppositional statements from state and
local law enforcement officials:
And this document includes 14 pages of quotes from police departments, sheriffs’
offices, police associations and others, all expressing opposition to local law
enforcement having to enforce immigration law. In addition, local law
enforcement officers join with counterterrorism experts and Federal intelligence
agents in emphasizing that identifying high-risk subjects that may pose a threat to
national security begins with positive relationships between law enforcement and
the community. (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 55)
Sanchez asks a number of other questions and notes that due to the short time constraints,
she did not expect Ashcroft would be able to answer all of her questions today, but that
she hopes he will get back to her through written correspondence. She was right, Ashcroft
did not provide much of an answer to her question over the SCAAP program. He noted
her concern, acknowledged that border-states had a more difficult time with that program
than non border-states, and moved on with his testimony.
The relationship between the Justice Department and local communities has
obviously become a huge part of the debate over the Patriot Act and the war on terror.
While only one other participant in this debate brings up the criticism of the deteriorating
relationship between local law enforcement agencies and the Justice Department, the
issue is obviously becoming a huge part of the debate given that hundreds of
communities have passed referendums on the Patriot Act, and the fact that shortly after
this hearing, Ashcroft makes plans to go on his infamous public tour in defense of the act.
Ashcroft, though, does not wait for his public tour to address his growing public
relations problem. In fact, he begins to preview the theme of his public tour in this
debate. The best way to begin to illustrate is to go back to a previous exemplar, one of the
ones used to illustrate the critics are confused argument made above. Ashcroft says that
“information is the friend of the American people…we can take some of the myths away
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from the law, we can show the American people how the law is framed…” etc (United
States Department of Justice, 2003,p. 25). At the end of the quotation, Ashcroft says:
We will work with State and local authorities very aggressively on PATRIOT Act
issues and other issues to help them understand why doing what we are doing is
in the national interest, including the local interest. And I would just have to say
this, that the overwhelming, vastly overwhelming response of State and local
authorities has been excellent (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 25).
He seems to give many state and local authorities credit for understanding when many
other Americans cannot. Then he demonstrates how cooperative local law enforcement
agencies have been and provides the example, also mentioned above, in which a tip from
local law enforcement allowed the Justice Department to disrupt a terror cell in Portland.
Ashcroft reports:
They are our best friends. And I think as they understand the truth of what the
PATRIOT Act is; you know, they might have read the Hartford Courant article
which they subsequently withdrew. But you know what they say, you are charged
with the offense that is on the front page and the retraction goes in the classified
ads. They might not have read the classified ads yet, but we need to make sure
that message gets out. (United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 25)
They understand the Patriot Act despite efforts by the press to provide disinformation on
the issue. The bottom line, according to Ashcroft, is that the Justice Department does not
need to change a thing—it only needs to educate the public.
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Librarians
One final category of argument that deserves attention in this analysis is the
tension existing between the American Library Association and the Patriot Act. Section
215 of the Patriot Act, or the “Library Provision,” as it has come to be known, is one of
the most infamous aspects of the debate. Foerstel (2004) focuses an entire book on this
struggle—the way in which librarians have tried to protect the privacy of the patrons and
the way in which the government has responded to those efforts. In the current debate so
far, in various other examples, we have seen discussion over the value of the provision.
At one point in the debate though, discussion shifts from the value of the law itself to the
ethos of the librarians who have tried to thwart some of the perceived intrusiveness of the
Patriot Act. Mark Green (R WI) is the one who brings up the question of the ethos of the
librarians. He asks Ashcroft if they have been obstructing anti-terrorism efforts:
A question with regard to the libraries. A lot of libraries have made a practice of
destroying computer records and other records in defiance of the PATRIOT Act.
They are saying that they don’t agree with it, therefore, we will make it more
difficult for the Justice Department to come in and actually search those records.
To your knowledge, has any investigation been stymied? Has the Justice
Department sought information that was then denied by any of the libraries?
(United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 61)
Unfortunately, Ashcroft gets a little confused—he had lost his place in his notes and is
unable to respond to the question. He apologizes and says it has been a long day. This is
certainly understandable, as it was 4.5 hours into his testimony at that point. It is
unfortunate though, as I would like to read his answer to the question.
Summary of the Implementation Stage
During the oversight stage of debate, the tone of dialogue shifted from one of
cooperation and unity, to polarizing disunity. Critics of Ashcroft, predominately minority
members of the House, accuse Ashcroft, the Department of Justice, and the entire Bush
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Administration of abusing their expanded powers, withholding information from the
oversight process, and generally being unavailable to the deliberative process. On the
other hand, Ashcroft and his proponents consisting of other Justice Department witnesses
and majority members of the House, accuse the critics of being confused about the Patriot
Act, paranoid about the balance of civil liberties, and of being in the way of the war on
terror—contributing to the all-or-nothing ethos proposed by the Bush Administration at
the very beginning of the war on terror. In the case of the Patriot Act, the all-or-nothing
dichotomy came out as, “anybody who opposes, in any way, the Justice Department’s
ideal anti-terrorism legislation must not recognize the importance of fighting terrorism in
the post 9/11 world.” Critics though, again and again, attempted to remind
Administration officials that they by and large agree with the premises underlying the
legislation; the criticism is simply that there needs to be more oversight of its
implementation—it needs to be more transparent to the legislature and, when appropriate,




The result of the growing tension from the Implementation stage of debate is that
the House of Representatives, as a legislative body, finally built enough momentum to try
and limit the power of the Executive branch granted by the Patriot Act. Immediately
following the hearings analyzed in part II, a bipartisan group of members took action. On
July 22, 2003, the “Otter Amendment,” named after its sponsor, C.L. Otter (R ID) was
passed in the House. The amendment was an addendum to the Commerce, Justice and
State Departments funding bill, and specified that, “none of the funds…could be used to
execute ‘sneak and peak’ warrants” (EPIC v. Department of Justice, 2005) authorized
under section 213 of the Patriot Act. Interestingly, the amendment “passed by an
extraordinary margin of 309 to 118, with 113 Republicans voting in favor” (Dauenhauer,
2003). Also interesting is that the “House vote was preceded by a unanimous vote in the
Senate last week to deny funding for the domestic cyber-surveillance system known as
the Terrorism Information Awareness (TIA) project—recently renamed from ‘Total
Information Awareness’” (Dauenhauer, 2003). According to Laura Murphy, Director of
the Washington legislative office of the American Civil Liberties Union, “Congress is
beginning to respond to what regular Americans have been saying at backyard barbecues
and across their kitchen tables for months now: we can—and must—be both safe and
free” (Dauenhauer, 2003). Recognizing that many view the ACLU as a biased, partisan
and political voice, we turn to another source to back the claim that public sentiment
toward the Patriot Act has shifted as a result of the 2003 legislative debate. Toni Locy, a
reporter for USA Today, writes, “The administration faces a public relations challenge.
Now that the panic over 9/11 has largely subsided, some Americans worry as much about
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forfeiting cherished rights as they do about terrorism” (Patriot Act blurred in the public
mind, 2004).
The USA PATRIOT Act Outreach Initiative
As we recall from the legislative debate itself, according the Justice Department
and proponents, public criticism is simply the result of disinformation and hence,
confusion on the part of critics. So, in response to the Otter Amendment and the public
dissent accompanying it, the Justice Department led by Ashcroft began an outreach
initiative to educate the public on the ways in which the Patriot Act is crucial to
protecting national security.
The “Guy A. Lewis Memorandum” to United States Attorneys
Thanks to the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) through a Freedom
of Information Act battle, we are able to examine the origins of the outreach initiative
(EPIC v. Department of Justice, 2005)—a memorandum sent out to “All United States
Attorneys” (Guy A. Lewis Memorandum, 2003, p. 1) via electronic mail by the
Department of Justice. The actions required of the U.S. Attorneys are to:
1) Call and/or meet with Congressional Representatives in your district as you
deem appropriate to discuss the USA PATRIOT Act and Otter Amendment by
August 29, 2003; 2) Conduct community meetings in your district to discuss the
USA PATRIOT Act in August/September; 3) Report back to EOUSA on
meetings and contacts by September 3, 2003. (Guy A. Lewis Memorandum, 2003,
p.1)
Then the memo provides the background from which U.S. Attorneys are to approach
their educational outreach effort. Accordingly, the Patriot Act has “enhanced our ability
to prevent, investigate, and prosecute acts of terrorism.” Furthermore, “While the results
have been important, the USA PATRIOT Act provided for only modest, incremental
changes in the law; in many instances simply taking existing legal principles and
adjusting them to meet the challenges posed by a global terrorism network” (Guy A.
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Lewis Memorandum, 2003, p. 1-2). Originally, according to the memo, “Congress
recognized the necessity of the USA PATRIOT Act to help fight the war on terrorism
when it enacted the Act by an overwhelming majority with the support of members from
across the political spectrum” (Guy A. Lewis Memorandum, 2003, p. 2). Unfortunately
though, according to the memo, “The USA PATRIOT Act’s positive effects, however,
have been diminished by negative attacks and proposed Congressional Amendments
designed to limit its scope” (Guy A. Lewis Memorandum, 2003, p. 2). Thus, “The
purpose of the initiative described in this memorandum is to continue to educate the
public concerning the Act’s effectiveness in protecting our nation against terrorists” (Guy
A. Lewis Memorandum, 2003, p. 2).
After the background section of the memo comes to a close, the document goes
into more detail about the initiative itself. Accordingly, the section begins:
The Attorney General is requesting the assistance of all United States Attorneys
(USAs) to educate the public regarding the USA PATRIOT Act. USAs are on the
front lines in the war on terrorism, are using the tools contained in the PATRIOT
Act, and therefore are in the best position to deliver the message that the USA
PATRIOT Act plays an essential role in fighting the war on terrorism, and
deserves the support of every American. (Guy A. Lewis Memorandum, 2003, p.
2)
Then the memo alerts all U.S. Attorneys that they have the discretion to approach the task
as they see fit according to the specific needs of their communities. Following, the
announcement is made that,
On August 19, 2003, the Attorney General will ‘kick-off’ the initiative in
Washington, D.C., by announcing a strategy in support of the USA PATRIOT
Act. This ‘kick-off’ will begin a 16-state, 18 city PATRIOT Act tour ending on
September 9, 2003. At each location, the Attorney General will speak to a
selected group of law enforcement and public officials and will also meet with the
local media” (Guy A. Lewis Memorandum, 2003, p. 2).
The head of the Justice Department was leading the public defense of the Patriot Act.
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Critics are Hysterical
The very initial speech given on the tour, to the American Enterprise Institute in
Washington, D.C. reveals nothing too out of the ordinary or especially interesting as per
Ashcroft’s standard line of argumentation in defense of the Patriot Act. He begins with a
fear appeal using an example that had just occurred the morning of the speech of a
terrorist attack occurring in Baghdad that killed 13 people and injured a lot more—
upwards of 120 other people. From this example the ethos of the terrorists is constructed
in typical fashion:
This morning’s attack again confirms that the worldwide terrorist threat is real
and imminent. Our enemies continue to pursue ways to murder the innocent and
the peaceful. They seek to kill us abroad and at home. But we will not be
deterred from our responsibility to preserve American life and liberty, nor our
duty to build a safer, more secure world. (Ashcroft, 2003, Aug 19, p. 1)
At this point, Ashcroft makes the connection from the attack in Baghdad to 9/11 stating,
“Nearly two years have now passed since American ground was hollowed by the blood of
innocents” (Ashcroft, 2003, Aug 19). Then he adds a mythic appeal to American history,
by adding the three attack sites of 9/11 to “a familiar list of monuments to American
freedom…places like Bunker Hill, Antietam, the Argonne, Iwo Jima, and Normandy
Beach” (Ashcroft, 2003, Aug 19, p. 1).
Moving on to the resolution of the problem, Ashcroft continues the appeal to
mythos by referencing Abraham Lincoln who in 1863 “stood on the hallowed ground of
freedom at Gettysburg and expressed the sense of resolution familiar to anyone who has
looked into the void at Ground Zero, surveyed the wreckage of the Pentagon, or seen the
gash in the earth left by Flight 93” (Ashcroft, 2003, Aug 19, p.1). The resolution,
according to Ashcroft who quotes Lincoln this time, involves being “dedicated to the
unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced” (Ashcroft,
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2003, Aug 19, pp. 1-2). The “they” in this quote refers to those who already started
fighting back in the war on terror: the passengers of flight 93, the firefighters, the police
officers, and all the “unknown heroes,” who acted courageously on September 11, 2001.
Their “spirit” according to Ashcroft, “is the measure of hope we take from that terrible
day” (Ashcroft, 2003, Aug 19, p. 2). The “cause for which these men and women gave
the last full measure of devotion…has become the cause of our time” (Ashcroft, 2003,
Aug 19). Their cause, according to Ashcroft, “has transformed the mission of the Justice
Department” (Ashcroft, 2003, Aug 19, p. 2); in fact, it has created a new “ethos of
justice:”
Where a culture of law enforcement inhibition prevented communication and
coordination, we have built a new ethos of justice, one rooted in cooperation,
nurtured by coordination, and focused on a single, overarching goal: the
prevention of terrorist attacks. All of this has been done within the safeguards of
our Constitution and its guarantees of protection for American freedom.
(Ashcroft, 2003, Aug 19, p. 2)
The rest of the speech is spent explaining how the new ethos of justice has been
successful, beginning by appropriating a quote from Winston Churchill who, in 1941,
“appealed to the United States for help in defending freedom from Nazism with the
phrase, ‘Give us the tools and we will finish the job.’ In the days after September 11, we
appealed to Congress for help in defending freedom from terrorism with the same refrain:
‘Give us the tools and we will finish the job’” (Ashcroft, 2003, Aug 19, p. 2). From that
point on, example after example is given explaining how the Patriot Act has prevented
terrorist attacks, allowed the capture of terrorists, and etc. Ashcroft summarizes the
success by saying, “Two years later, the evidence is clear: If we knew then what we know
now, we would have passed the Patriot Act six months before September 11th rather than
six weeks after the attacks” (Ashcroft, 2003, Aug 19, p. 3). In other words, the Patriot
Act, in Ashcroft’s mind, would have prevented 9/11.
296
Since the speech is not officially a part of the data set, I will not dwell on every
detail of it. The point to bring away from it though is that much to my surprise, given the
context from which the education initiative arose, the ethos of the critics was not called
into question. The speech focused on the ethos of the terrorists and the successes of the
Patriot Act; there was no mention of those who had just initiated an amendment to moot
out a provision of the Patriot Act.
That restraint would not last forever though. The next speech I looked at as part of
Ashcroft’s public tour occurred in New York City on September 9, 2003—two days
before the anniversary of 9/11. The speech was very much the same as the initial one, just
a bit of reorganization; in fact many paragraphs are word for word nearly identical to the
August 19th speech. One difference that stood out to me though is the way in which
attacks on the critics’ ethos began to creep into Ashcroft’s presentation. The following
quotation occurs toward the end of the speech, after setting up the fear appeals and
providing examples demonstrating how great the Patriot Act is. He begins to wrap his
speech up by saying, “Only two years have passed…yet some Americans may have
forgotten how we felt that day. And it was only yesterday that the 343rd firefighter to die
in the World Trade Center attack was buried” (Ashcroft, 2003, Sept. 9, p. 5). This was the
one line in the whole speech that spoke to the ethos of the critics, but it does so in a rather
uniquely aggressive sort of way. In the second hearing examined in the oversight stage of
debate, we certainly find Ashcroft making the inference that his critics have forgotten
about the pain and suffering of 9/11, but here, he comes out and expresses it directly.
In the next speech I looked at as part of the Patriot Act tour, Ashcroft’s criticism
of the critics’ ethos becomes more a primary purpose of his presentation. The speech
occurred on September 15, 2003 and was given to the National Restaurant Association in
297
Washington, D.C. He begins the speech by saying: “The genius of our system of
government is that in America, we believe that it is the people who grant the government
its powers. We believe that it is the people’s values that should be imposed on
Washington—not Washington’s values on the people” (Ashcroft, 2003, Sept. 15, p. 1).
Then having established the importance of the “people” in the democratic process
generally, he praises the ethos of the people he is presently speaking to: “Your
willingness to visit this city is a valuable reminder of the patriotism and entrepreneurship
that make this nation great. These are the values that should sustain our hearts and inform
our actions in these perilous times” (Ashcroft, 2003, Sept. 15, p. 1). Here, he conjures up
the image of economic patriotism and how that should be the spirit of patriotism that
drives this country forward during such “perilous times.” After doing so, he begins to
make the argument that the critics in Washington are detracting from that spirit of
patriotism: “Of course, Washington is often known as a town filled with debates where
people lose sight of the issues most important to the citizens. Your visits and your voices
remind this city of the values of the people-the values that are truly important” (Ashcroft,
2003, Sept. 15, p. 1). Then comes the ad hominem attack; Ashcroft says, “Unfortunately,
at this moment, Washington is involved in a debate where hysteria threatens to obscure
the most important issues” (Ashcroft, 2003, Sept. 15, p. 1). The bottom line is finally put
on display: critics of Ashcroft are hysterical. He explains further what he is talking about:
If you were to listen to some in Washington, you might believe the hysteria
behind this claim: “Your local library has been surrounded by the FBI.” Agents
are working round-the-clock. Like the X-Files, they are dressed in raincoats, dark
suits, and sporting sunglasses. They stop patrons and librarians and interrogate
everyone like Joe Friday. In a dull monotone they ask every person exiting the
library, “Why were you at the library? What were you reading? Did you see
anything suspicious?” (Ashcroft, 2003, Sept. 15, p. 1)
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Ashcroft concludes the particular attack by noting, “According to these breathless reports
and baseless hysteria, some have convinced the American Library Association that under
the bipartisan Patriot Act, the FBI is not fighting terrorism. Instead, agents are checking
how far you have gotten on the latest Tom Clancy novel” (Ashcroft, 2003, Sept. 15, p. 1).
Ashcroft not only displays indignation and arrogance toward his critics, but he
completely overlooks the real debate that is happening in the legislature. The real debate
in the legislature simply asks Ashcroft to disclose more information so that the public can
be sure abuses are not taking place. Furthermore, the provision that was actually revised
by Congress according to the Otter amendment—the one which sparked the whole
outreach initiative in the first place, had nothing to do with libraries—it placed limits on
section 213—the delayed notice search warrant. We should also keep in mind that the
amendment did not eliminate delayed notice search warrants; it simply created higher
evidentiary standards for utilizing them. But that is a moot point in the context of the
outreach initiative that took place because Ashcroft never even addresses the Otter
amendment in any of his speeches on the tour (at least any that I found). Instead, Ashcroft
lumps all critics of his Patriot Act into one category and characterizes them as hysterical.
He frames owners of restaurants as being more patriotic than members of Congress who
are working hard to help find the right balance between safety and liberty in the war on
terror. Why? Because according to the tenets of economic patriotism, true patriots get out
of the way, go about their business of playing their parts in the economy, while the true
heroes (members of the Executive branch of government) go after the bad guys.
Ashcroft continues to spend time answering the accusation that the whole purpose
of the Patriot Act is to find out what Americans are reading. He says, “The hysteria is
ridiculous. Our job is not” (Ashcroft, 2003, Sept. 15, p. 1). Furthermore, he says, “It
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would be a tragedy if the hysteria surrounding certain aspects of our war against terror
were to obscure the important evidence that the Department of Justice has protected the
lives and liberties of the citizenry, and not just in the very real world of anti-terrorism”
(Ashcroft, 2003, Sept. 15, p. 1). Then interestingly, he spends much of the rest of his
speech on this occasion discussing the drop in the general crime rate—crimes that have
absolutely nothing to do with terrorism.
Three days later, speaking to a group of law enforcement officers in Memphis,
Tennessee, Ashcroft’s construction of the ethos of the critics gets even more obnoxious
and arrogant. He begins this speech by saying that the Justice Department has
successfully changed its mission to meet the threats of terrorism, and that the people
before him on this day “have brought new meaning to sacrifice and new depth to duty”
(Ashcroft, 2003, Sept. 18, p. 1). He says, “we are committed to a new strategy, a strategy
as serious as the threats we face; a strategy grounded in reality, measured by results, and
accountable to the people of the United States of America” (Ashcroft, 2003, Sept. 15, p.
1). As soon as he says that his strategy is “grounded in reality,” the anticipation of the
attack on the critics’ ethos builds because when there is a strategy distinguished by the
statement that it is “grounded in reality,” there has to be one that is not grounded in
reality. The anticipation is accurate. The very next sentence of Ashcroft’s speech gets
back to accusations of hysteria by the critics: “That said, if you listen to some of the
rhetoric coming out of Washington recently you might have a, shall we say, less serious
view of what we’re up to. You might, for instance, believe the hysteria behind this claim:
‘Your local public library is under siege by the FBI’” (Ashcroft, 2003, Sept. 15, p. 1).
Again he puts words into the mouths of critics and lumps them all together in one big
category of conspiracy theorists, completely overlooking the rational criticisms made
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during the actual legislative process. The lumping continues in the next sentence when he
compares critics’ ideas to an episode of the X-Files:
If you were to pay too much attention to some in Washington you might conjure
up harrowing images of agents working around the clock. Like in the X-Files,
they are raincoated, dark suited, and sporting sunglasses. But unlike the X-Files,
their subjects aren’t treacherous space aliens but readers and librarians. And no
one escapes their grinding interrogation. In a dull Joe Friday monotone, they ask:
‘Why were you at the library? What were you reading? Did you see anything
suspicious? Just the facts, ma’am. Just the facts.” (Ashcroft, 2003, Sept. 15, p. 1)
So, Ashcroft utilizes much of the same language as he did in the previous speech but gets
even more antagonistic by comparing the critics’ ideas to an X-Files episode; he
generalizes past the arguments being made in the context of the real, meaningful debate
being attempted in Congress—at least the debate analyzed in this project coming from
the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives.
Negative Reactions: Anti-Lobbying Accusations
At this stage in the public sphere debate over the war on terrorism, rational-
critical discourse is back in full force. The days are gone when the public, led by its
congressional representatives, are guided by shock, fear and disbelief so much so that
they are willing to go along with executive leadership decisions—regardless of what they
entail. Alongside the legislative efforts at curbing executive power, President Bush’s
approval rating is still on a steady decline; by September of 2003, it had fallen to below
55% (President Bush’s Approval ratings, 2005). Along with the decline of Bush’s
approval ratings, Ashcroft was also losing popularity. On a USA TODAY/CNN/Gallup
Poll there is a question that asks Americans, “Do you have a favorable or unfavorable
opinion of Attorney General John Ashcroft?” Between the beginning of February 2003
and the end of September, the “favorable” rating fell from 58% to 49% and the
“unfavorable” rose from 24% to 31%. (USA TODAY/CNN/Gallup Poll Results).
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Furthermore, the number of communities passing legislation as a referendum on the
Patriot Act is also rising at this point. Foerstel (2004) tells us that by the middle of
August 2003, “more than 140 cities and counties, in addition to state legislatures in
Alaska, Hawaii, and Vermont, have passed resolutions against the Patriot Act” (p. 169).
In the face of the growing public relations problem, it seems as though Ashcroft is
attempting to turn back the flow of public opinion; in effect, he is making one last mythic
attempt to conjure up the magical unity so prevalent in the wake of 9/11. Much of the
bombastic rhetoric toward his critics found in speeches from his public tour resonates
with some of his original rhetoric in defense of authorizing the act to begin with. Recall a
quotation from Ashcroft’s testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee on
December 6, 2001, cited in Chapter 1:
We need honest, reasoned debate; not fearmongering. To those who pit
Americans against immigrants, and citizens against non-citizens; to those who
scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost liberty; my message is this: Your
tactics only aid terrorists-for they erode our national unity and diminish our
resolve. They give ammunition to America’s enemies, and pause to America’s
friends. They encourage people of good will to remain silent in the face of evil.
(DOJ Oversight)
It is obvious at this point in the debate that Ashcroft is not interested in “reasoned
debate,” and that it is he who is engaged in “fearmongering.” Undoubtedly he has critics
outside of Congress (and perhaps even some inside of Congress) who have also engaged
in fearmongering as well, but the legislative debate to this point in the Patriot Act
legislative process has, according to thorough, rigorous analysis, proven to involve a
great deal of reasoned debate. Ashcroft simply chooses to ignore it and pass it off as
“hysteria” because his image of the one, true post 9/11 patriotism is absolute deferment to
the branch of leadership he is a part of—an image of patriotism that was shared by 90%
of Americans in the aftermath of 9/11.
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The “educational outreach initiative” in August and September of 2003 is a last
ditch effort to bring that magical unity back into existence. Unfortunately for Ashcroft,
his appeal to fear failed him; not only did it not solve his public relations crisis—it
worsened it. It is likely that too many people shared the views of Representative Bernard
Sanders (I VT), who reacts to Ashcroft’s educational outreach effort/public tour with
disgust. Sanders, in a press release on August 21, 2003 describes the growing anxiety
over Ashcroft’s veil of secrecy and describes the public tour as a guise for meetings in
front of chosen audiences—a chance for scripted advertisements. Sanders explains:
Over 150 cities and towns representing some 18 million people, three state
legislatures and 44 state library associations have all passed resolutions
expressing their concerns about the Patriot Act. Organizations from across the
political spectrum - from the right to the left and everywhere in between—have
joined together against the Patriot Act and for protecting American civil liberties.
Attorney General Ashcroft is clearly on the defensive and said he would hold
public hearings on the Patriot Act nationwide. Now we find out that's not true.
Instead of holding real public meetings, he's holding closed meetings with
selected audiences where he gives scripted remarks for the television cameras. It's
time for Attorney General Ashcroft to stop hiding and to meet with the American
people. (Sanders Challenges Ashcroft to Hold Open Public Meetings on Patriot
Act, 2003, August 21)
Sanders concludes this particular press release by accusing Ashcroft of avoiding any
public scrutiny whatsoever:
It is a bit ironic that Attorney General Ashcroft is using closed meetings to try to
build public support for a law that expands secret court proceedings. That's the
way the Ashcroft Department of Justice likes to operate - without any public
scrutiny or accountability. That's just wrong. If he supports the sweeping new
powers for federal agents in the Patriot Act then he should be prepared to defend
that position in the court of public opinion. (Sanders Challenges Ashcroft to Hold
Open Public Meetings on Patriot Act, 2003, August 21)
On the same day, John Conyers also releases a press release and in it is contained the text
of a letter he wrote to John Ashcroft. The letter was in response to the memorandum
issued by the Justice Department to all U.S. Attorneys asking them to also take part in the
educational outreach initiative. This is the first sign that anybody outside of the Justice
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Department knew anything about the memorandum. Conyers addresses Mr. Attorney
General and writes:
I am writing because of my concern that your national tour along with recent
public relations efforts by your United States Attorneys to stem criticism of and
generate support for the USA PATRIOT Act, the U.S. Department of Justice’s
enforcement of that law, and proposed extensions of that Act violate not only
prohibitions on propaganda efforts by the Executive Branch but also the Anti-
Lobbying Act. In my judgment, it would be a far better use of taxpayer funds if
you were to work with the Congress to rationalize and curtail the existing
authorities you have, rather than to travel around the country defending your
actions. (Conyers Criticizes Ashcroft’s Public Relations Campaign, 2003, August
21)
We of course know that Ashcroft did not end the public relations campaign despite the
accusation of violating the Anti-Lobbying Act.
In fact, the Justice Department had anticipated that this accusation would come
and had warned the U.S. Attorneys as recipients of the letters about how to avoid the
charges. Toward the end of the USA PATRIOT Act Outreach Initiative (Guy A. Lewis
Memorandum, 2003, August 14) memo issued by Guy Lewis, there was a section
entitled, “Note Important Ethical Information Before You Make Any Congressional
Contacts” (Guy A. Lewis Memorandum, 2003, p. 3). The section begins by saying
“Before you make any congressional contacts, please review this important information
in order to comply with the Anti-Lobbying Act” (Guy A. Lewis Memorandum, 2003, p.
3). It goes on to say, “As the presidentially-appointed United States Attorney, you are
authorized to make these requested congressional contacts to educate the congressional
representatives in your district on the PATRIOT Act, and the Otter Amendment and their
impact on law enforcement efforts to fight terrorism” (Guy A. Lewis Memorandum,
2003, p. 3). Then it specifies that, “You are authorized to make this contact through a
personal visit and/or a personal telephone call. No one else in your office, even at your
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request, is authorized to make these congressional contacts” (Guy A. Lewis
Memorandum, 2003, p. 3).
Ashcroft Resigns
Conyers did go ahead and press the Justice Department about the potential Anti-
Lobbying violation. In a letter to Glenn Fine, the Inspector General, he requested that the
allegation be investigated. According to a Fox News report, “Conyers based his request
on a Government Accountability Office report that showed Ashcroft’s tour and a pro-
Patriot Act Internet site had cost more than $208,000 and also had involved activities by
80 of the 93 U.S. Attorneys” (Persky, 2004). Fine did investigate the tour and reported
back that, “Neither the Anti-Lobbying Act nor the appropriations provision prohibited the
attorney general and the U.S. attorneys from making public speeches conveying DOJ’s
view regarding the merits of the Patriot Act and discussing the DOJ’s use of the law’s
provisions” (Persky, 2004).
Despite the fact that Ashcroft and the Justice Department were cleared of any
legal accountability, they were still held accountable by the public. According to a
Washington Post article, the anti-Patriot Act campaign kept growing. On February 4,
2004, “New York City, site of the country’s most horrific terrorist attack, Wednesday
became the latest in a long list of cities and towns that have formally opposed the
expanded investigatory powers granted to law enforcement agencies under the USA
Patriot Act” (Garcia, 2004, Feb. 5, p. A11). To be exact, there were 246 of these
“municipalities and counties and three states that have passed legislation in opposition to
the Patriot Act” (p. A11). Additionally, according to the previously cited USA
TODAY/CNN/Gallup Poll results (2004, Feb. 25), Ashcroft had dropped to a 42%
favorable rating and a 36% unfavorable rating.
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Amidst the continuing decline of popularity, Ashcroft resigned his position as the
Attorney General of the United States on November 9, 2004 (King, 2004). In his
handwritten resignation letter, Ashcroft recognizes a need for new leadership of the
Department of Justice:
The demands of justice are both rewarding and depleting. I take great personal
satisfaction in the record which has been developed. The objective of securing the
safety of Americans from crime and terror has been achieved. The rule of law has
been strengthened and upheld in the courts. Yet, I believe that the Department of
Justice would be well served by new leadership and fresh inspiration. I believe
that my energies and talents should be directed toward other challenging horizons.
(Text of Attorney General John Ashcroft’s resignation letter, 2004, November 9)
Then, he makes his request to resign official by saying, “Therefore, I humbly state my
desire to resign from the office of United States Attorney General” (Ashcroft, 2004,
November 9). That next day, on November 10th 2004, President Bush nominates Alberto
Gonzales to be Ashcroft’s successor.
Gonzales is Confirmed
The confirmation of Alberto Gonzales was contentious to say the least. In fact, the
congressional hearings over the matter could probably serve as the subject of another
dissertation topic. Nonetheless, because his confirmation relates to the current topic, it
demands a modicum of attention here. To begin, the vote to confirm Gonzales was 60-36
in the Senate—all the rejection votes came from Democrats. Though, according to an
Associated Press article on February 3, 2005, “The ‘no’ votes were the second most ever
lodged against a successful nominee for attorney general;” the only vote that was any
closer was ironically John Ashcroft whose Senate confirmation count was 58-42 (Senate
confirms Gonzales for attorney general: Memo on torture fails to derail nomination,
2003, February 3). By and large, the controversy over Gonzales stems from the fact that
he is an insider to the Bush presidency. Serving as Bush’s legal counsel in the White
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House and before that as Governor of Texas, it was feared that Gonzales was too close to
Bush philosophically and personally to be willing to say “no” to the President when
necessary. Charles Schumer (D NY) in fact is cited as saying this verbatim: “He was so
circumspect in his answers, so unwilling to leave a micron of space between his views
and the president’s, that I now have real doubts whether he can perform the job of
attorney general” (Senate confirms Gonzales for attorney general: Memo on torture fails
to derail nomination, 2005, February 3). Schumer reiterates: ”In short, Judge Gonzales
still seems to see himself as counsel to the president, not attorney general, the chief law
enforcement officer of the land” (Senate confirms Gonzales for attorney general: Memo
on torture fails to derail nomination, 2005, February 3).
A more specific example from which critics base their opinions of Gonzales
comes from a line of questioning over the Abu Ghraib prison abuse story. During the
hearing, Gonzales was continually asked about the justification of torture in the war on
terror and the pictures of abuse at the Abu Ghraib prison. Though he claimed to be
“sickened and outraged by those photos,” he refused to answer questions about whether
he thought criminal activity had taken place, “citing ongoing prosecutions” as the reason
(Gonzales faces tough questions at hearing: Dems grill attorney general nominee on
torture, 2005, January 6). In response, Joseph Biden (D DE) “accused Gonzales of hiding
behind a ‘straw man’ to avoid answering questions” (Senate confirms Gonzales for
attorney general: Memo on torture fails to derail nomination, 2003, February 3). More
poignantly, Biden said, “That’s malarkey…You are obliged to comment. That’s your
judgment we’re looking at. …We’re looking for candor” (Senate confirms Gonzales for
attorney general: Memo on torture fails to derail nomination, 2003, February 3).
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Another example, along the same lines as the Abu Ghraib line of argumentation,
that deserves mention is a controversial January 2002 memo from the Department of
Justice office that was addressed to Gonzales (legal counsel to the President at the time).
“In that memo, the Justice Department argued the terrorism fight ‘renders obsolete [the
Geneva Conventions’] strict limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners and renders
quaint some of its provisions” (Senate confirms Gonzales for attorney general: Memo on
torture fails to derail nomination, 2003, February 3). Additionally, “then-Assistant
Attorney General Jay Bybee wrote, ‘we conclude that torture as defined…covers only
extreme acts’” and furthermore, that “U.S. law defined ‘severe’ pain as that ‘equivalent in
intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure,
impairment of bodily function or even death’” (Senate confirms Gonzales for attorney
general: Memo on torture fails to derail nomination, 2003, February 3). Patrick Leahy (D
VT) asked Gonzales “if he agreed with that position at the time,” and “Gonzales
answered: ‘I don’t recall today whether or not I was in agreement with all of the analysis.
But I don’t have a disagreement with the conclusions then reached by the department’”
(Senate confirms Gonzales for attorney general: Memo on torture fails to derail
nomination, 2003, February 3).
Hope for More Cooperation??
The rather vague response by Gonzales to questions about the torture memo
typifies the reasoning behind complaints lodged against him during the confirmation
hearing. He was accused of not being forthcoming, of generalizing past the content of
specific questions, and generally just being too much of an insider to the Bush
Administration to stand strong as an independent agency. In other words, Democrats
viewed his ethos as being too much like his predecessor John Ashcroft. However, toward
308
the end of the hearing, we get some sense that maybe his ethos in context of
policymaking debate may differ a little from Ashcroft. Gonzales was asked a general
question about whether he has made any mistakes in conducting the war on terror.
Gonzales responded, “I will be the first to admit I am not perfect and I make mistakes.”
Leahy “then exclaimed, ‘Glory hallelujah, you’re the first on in the administration that’s
said that” (Senate confirms Gonzales for attorney general: Memo on torture fails to derail
nomination, 2003, February 3). So, this leads to some anticipation that the debate over
the Patriot Act could shift gears a little bit in terms of the way patriotism is negotiated
during the legislative process concerning reauthorization.
Summary
The purpose of this chapter is to provide context for the final stage of legislative
debate—the reauthorization of the Patriot Act. It describes an enormous turning point in
the debate. For the first time, legislators actually took a stand to curb the powers sought
by the Justice Department in the form of the “Otter Amendment.” Even though that
amendment did not derive from the Judiciary Committee, it still symbolized the growing
distrust of the Executive branch and the Justice Department in particular. More and more,
public opinion was creating the discursive space for criticism; patriotism was for many,
political once again. The magical unity of the 9/11 religious patriotism had lost much of
its power. In response, Ashcroft stayed the course. He was not about to back down, He
made one last effort to conjure up the magic once again. He accused critics of not just run
of the mill paranoia, but downright craziness—the hallucinogenic kind. He grouped all
criticism together in one category, making no effort whatsoever to distinguish between
legitimate criticism and exaggeration; he generalized past the critics by accusing them of
watching too much “24” and other popular stories that convey a particular kind of reality
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to the general public about the FBI. He refuses to accept any criticism whatsoever; from
his perspective, he is God-like.
Well, his mythmaking had lost much of its impact. His popularity was sliding; he
took much of the blame for the growing distrust of the government. Public opinion
indicated that more and more people were beginning to take at least some of the
criticisms made against the Patriot Act seriously. In the midst of that public relations
disaster—the fallout from the “Patriot Act Tour, Ashcroft resigned and Gonzales took the
helm of the Justice Department. Many critics were afraid that the new Attorney General
would not be much of an improvement over Ashcroft and thus the debate over his
confirmation at the hearing was quite contentious. Gonzales was perceived as being too
close to the President, given that he was Bush’s legal counsel for years—even prior to
getting to the White House. Despite the contention, some signs did emerge that perhaps
he would be a little more willing to cooperate: his admission that he was not perfect was
acknowledged by the minority leader of the Senate, Patrick Leahy as being a big first step
toward developing a more cooperative atmosphere. Gonzalez’s confirmation though was
the second closest vote ever in the history of America over the confirmation of an
Attorney General who was not rejected. The only vote that was any closer was John




A New Leader, A New Promise of Patriotism
The debate over the Patriot Act does indeed shift gears moving into the
reauthorization stage of debate. The sheer quantity of debate is the first indication that
things had changed. In the first stage of debate, analyzed in Chapters 4-6, there was not
much debate to speak of. Most of the negotiations occurred behind closed doors and what
little did occur in a public forum entailed a great deal of agreement and unity. The
agreement was that updated antiterrorism legislation was needed so badly and so quickly
that the real debate over the balance between safety and liberty would have to come later,
and the sunsets would ensure that it happened. In retrospect though, evidence suggests
that the critics of Ashcroft assumed the real debate would have happened much sooner
than it did however, especially after the way in which the authorization ended with so
many people being disgruntled with the Justice Department. Many members of Congress
indicate that they expected the robust debate to occur during the implementation stage of
oversight. However, the expected quality of debate does not seem to have occurred given
that much of the criticism during that stage was aimed at the deliberative process itself:
claims that a) there were not enough opportunities for public debate; b) the Justice
Department was not transparent enough about the implementation of the Patriot Act so
that meaningful questions could be asked; and c) the observance of the all-or-nothing
dichotomy and the way in which it stood in the way of questions being answered in a
meaningful way.
Given the rhetoric of Ashcroft’s public tour, the momentum was building toward
a very similar framework for discourse as seen previously. He accused critics of having
forgotten about the tragic impact of 9/11 and of generally standing in the way of the
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patriots who were on the front lines of the war on terror. Furthermore, as observed from
the controversy surrounding the confirmation of Alberto Gonzales—Ashcroft’s
replacement, it did not seem as if critics had a great deal of hope at first that the
deliberative process would improve even with change in leadership, at least not until the
very end when his admission to not being perfect provided a subtle hint that maybe there
was some potential. The possibility existed for Gonzales to be more cooperative.
Opening Statements
Sensenbrenner
Chairman Sensenbrenner (R WI) calls the committee to order and introduces the
purpose of the debate by first drawing attention to the death and destruction that occurred
on 9/11: “On September 11, 2001, 19 terrorists turned four planes into guided missiles
that killed more than 3,000 innocent men, women, and children, caused approximately
$100 billion in economic losses, and triggered U.S. military action in Afghanistan” (USA
PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 1). Then, he describes the purpose of the Patriot Act and why
Congress passed it in the first place:
In response to the failure of the Nation’s law enforcement and intelligence
communities to discover and prevent these attacks, Congress passed the USA
PATRIOT Act. The objective of this bill was to modernize both Federal law
enforcement and intelligence investigative tools and to ensure that the information
collected was shared between the law enforcement and intelligence communities.
(USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 1)
Not only does the Patriot Act modernize investigative tools and information sharing
practices utilized by Federal law enforcement agencies, but through the act, Congress
created effective oversight mechanisms to ensure civil liberties violations would not
occur:
The PATRIOT Act is an important part of the overall framework to protect our
Nation. In passing the PATRIOT Act, Congress established standards and
oversight for the use of the Act’s provision. For example, section 1001 of the
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PATRIOT Act requires the Inspector General of the Department of Justice to
determine and report to Congress civil liberties violations. I would note that this
includes any violations of civil liberties by DOJ, not just those alleged to have
occurred under the provisions of the PATRIOT Act. (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005,
p. 1)
This quotation is very important because it references a very formal, legal connection
between the Patriot Act and other Justice Department activities. Section 1001 requires
that the Inspector General investigate any alleged civil liberties violations and report
them to Congress—not just violations related to the Patriot Act. At the end of this phase
of debate, this connection becomes a major source of controversy as Justice Department
critics try to expand the debate based partly on section 1001 and proponents, mainly
Sensenbrenner himself, try to narrow the debate in an effort to bring discussion to a close.
Ironically, debate over this section ends up being a headache for Sensenbrenner, but for
now, it serves as evidence of successful deliberation over the Patriot Act. Sensenbrenner
wraps up this argument pertaining to section 1001 to a close by noting, “To date, the
Inspector General has issued six reports and not found a single example of a civil liberties
violation relating to authority granted under the PATRIOT Act” (USA PATRIOT Act,
2005, p. 1).
He then discusses another aspect of the Patriot Act that has major influence upon
ethos in this debate—the sunset provisions. He initially describes those provisions as
being a positive influence upon the debate by saying, “To further address concerns that
enhanced law enforcement tools could lead to civil liberties violations, Congress included
a sunset provision for 16 sections of the PATRIOT Act” (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p.
1). But then, he makes it very clear that he does not wish to see any of those provisions
actually expire: “These 16 sections, set to expire this year on December 31, are aimed at
updating investigative tools and improving information sharing and go to the very heart
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of our Nation’s response to a changed world in which terrorists plot to destroy our very
way of life” (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, pp. 1-2). What is not clear in this quotation, or
anywhere else during the course of this hearing for that matter is whether Sensenbrenner
agrees with the idea of extending these provisions into the future with an additional
sunset, or whether he wishes to make them permanent? This seems to be the issue with
regard to the sunset in this debate. No one, to my knowledge, indicates that they would
like to see any of the 16 provisions expire. Many wish to see them passed with another
sunset attached to them as well as perhaps additional standards of oversight. Interestingly,
the desire to pass them again with a sunset is backed by bipartisan support. A total of five
people express this view: three majority members (Lungren, Ghomert, and Flake) and
two minority members (Lofgren and Delahunt). Only two people overtly express a desire
to see these provisions be made permanent and they are both on the majority side of the
debate: Gonzales and King (a majority member of the House). The topic of sunsets will
be addressed again and again throughout the course of analysis of this phase of debate
and later with more attention devoted to the actual discourse of the debate pertaining to
the topic. It comes up at this juncture the due to the curiosity I felt in wanting to know
what Chairman Sensenbrenner’s stance is on the issue. Later in the debate, Sensenbrenner
demonstrates that he was definitely very much in favor of the sunsets to begin with, when
he says to Gonzales, “as you know, I was instrumental in putting the sunset into the
PATRIOT Act because I felt that the Congress should have a chance to have the
opportunity to review the effectiveness of the Act’s provisions as well as a tool to do
oversight over the Department of Justice” (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 48). But then,
he proceeds to ask Gonzales what he thinks about the need for sunsets in the future, and
does not tell us exactly what he himself thinks about that possibility.
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Unfortunately, closely reading the entire transcript of this hearing does not reveal
how Sensenbrenner feels about continuing the sunsets as part of the reauthorized Patriot
Act. However, he leaves no ambiguity whatsoever on his view of the provisions
themselves, regardless of his stance on future sunsets. As shown, he has alluded to the
“fear the terrorists” appeal already during his opening statement—an argument that had
been reserved more for Ashcroft in previous debates, but here Sensenbrenner takes it
upon himself to remind the audience that the terrorists are quite capable of causing
destruction and that the Intelligence Community needs every possible tool at its disposal.
In the following exemplar, he is transitioning from his discussion of the sunsets and
suggests that if the 16 provisions do expire that law enforcement and intelligence
agencies will be restricted again:
As we learned from the 9/11 attacks, procedures needed to be streamlined for law
enforcement and the Intelligence Community to react in real time. In this war on
terrorism, we are racing against the clock. Terrorist cells operate throughout the
world, including within our own borders, and actively plan attacks against U.S.
citizens. Law enforcement and the Intelligence Community must be able to
quickly protect the public from future attacks. (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 2)
He works the fear appeal into the claim that reauthorizing the expiring provisions of the
Patriot Act is the most important task Congress has for the entire year.
Sensenbrenner brings his opening statement to a close by describing the
upcoming hearing schedule and describes it as “ambitious;’ one that will ensure that
safety and liberty in balance with one another:
Accordingly, the Committee plans an ambitious hearing and oversight schedule
beginning with today’s full Committee hearing with Attorney General Alberto
Gonzales. After this hearing, the Committee will hold eight Subcommittee
hearings through April and May on the PATRIOT Act provisions that are set to
expire on December 31. Finally, I anticipate the Deputy Attorney General and the
Inspector General will testify before the full Committee soon after the
Subcommittee hearings are completed. These hearings reflect this Committee’s
continued commitment to monitor the implementation of anti-terrorism
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legislation, to conduct active oversight over the Department of Justice, and to
ensure that law enforcement has the tools necessary to fight and to win the war on
terrorism and to fight crime in general. (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 2)
At this point, Sensenbrenner congratulates Gonzales on his very recent confirmation, tells
him that he looks forward to his testimony, and turns the floor over to John Conyers (D
MI).
Conyers
The ranking member of the minority party immediately begins his opening
statement by calling into question the patriotic ethos constructed by Ashcroft for those
who question the Patriot Act. Conyers announces that he resents the accusation of being
sympathetic to terrorists simply because he wants changes to the Patriot Act:
As we begin our review of the PATRIOT Act, let me start at this very important
point. Those who oppose the passage of any parts of the PATRIOT Act, want
changes, who question its utility, who are concerned about the Government’s
demand for new and unnecessary powers after September 11 are not those who do
that because they have any sympathy with terrorists or those that support them. I
personally resent on the part of all Americans any one, particularly in the
Government, that takes that point of view. (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 2)
He goes into more detail regarding the patriotic duty of Congress and the Judiciary
Committee in particular:
In the Congress and in the Judiciary Committee, that’s even more important
because we make the laws. We pass the laws. These are our responsibilities. This
is what we took the oath for. So we have a historic and legitimate concern
regarding the misuse and the abuse of Government power, any Government
power, but particularly coming from the Department of Justice, not only under the
PATRIOT Act, but under the entire array of authority unilaterally assumed in
many instances by the Administration since September 11. (USA PATRIOT Act,
2005, pp. 2-3)
Essentially, according to Conyers, if Ashcroft’s portrayal of what it means to be a patriot
is correct, then Congress cannot do the job for which it took the oath—to check
government abuse—and not just over the Patriot Act, but over all “unilaterally assumed”
authorities taken by the Bush Administration since 9/11. Conyers exemplifies the
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types of abuses to which he refers by listing off some of the actions he describes: “the
mistreatment of detainees, the condoning of torture, the designation of enemy
combatants, the immigration sweeps, hundreds of them, the excessive collection of
personnel data, the closing of immigration proceedings, the unchecked military tribunals,
and the abuse of our material witness statutes” (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 3).
Essentially, according to Conyers, the Justice Department has resorted to racial profiling:
When our own Government detains and verbally and physically abuses thousands
of immigrants for unknown and unspecified reasons with no time limits, targets
tens of thousands of Arab Americans for intensive interrogation, I, sir, see a
Department of Justice that has institutionalized racial and ethnic profiling without
the benefit of a single terrorism conviction. (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 3)
Not only is racially profiling an affront to liberty but it has not even led to any greater
degree of safety by virtue of obtaining “a single terrorism conviction.” Conyers continues
to justify criticism by the Congress and others by claiming that through unilateral action,
the President has ignored the Constitutional principle of separation of powers:
When our President takes upon himself to label United States citizens as enemy
combatants without a trial, without charges, without access to the outside world, I
see an executive branch that has placed itself in the constitutionally untenable
position of prosecutor, judge, and jury, and is ignoring, to my shock and dismay,
the principles of the separation of powers. (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 3)
This not only undermines our democratic notion of freedom but in doing so, it also makes
us less safe in the process:
When our Justice Department condones the torture of prisoners at home and
abroad, authorizes the monitoring of mosques and religious sites without any
indication of criminal activity, I see a course of conduct that makes our citizens
less safe, not more safe, and undermines our role as a beacon of democracy and
freedom in the world. (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 3)
Conyers provides a specific example of Brandon Mayfield, a completely innocent citizen
who was harassed by the FBI; furthermore, in this case according to Conyers, the
harassment was a direct result of Patriot Act application.
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Conyers begins to close the opening statement by once again, directly attacking
Ashcroft’s notion of patriotism. Conyers refers specifically to “your (Gonzales’s)
predecessor” in making the argument:
In the past, your predecessor has stated that those who would criticize this
Administration are aiding the terrorists and giving ammunition to America’s
enemies and chastise us as searching for phantoms of lost liberty. Well, I’m here
to say that these incidents are not phantoms, thousands of them. They involve
real people with real families whose civil liberties have been abused in the war
on terror. (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 3)
Interestingly, Conyers directly references testimony given by Ashcroft from the very
beginning of the debate over the war on terror. This testimony is quoted in Chapter 1 of
this project as well as above in this chapter toward the end of the section entitled,
“Negative Reactions: Anti-Lobbying Accusations.” Despite having plenty of other
ammunition to choose from in demonstrating his point—such as language from the most
recent round of speeches given by Ashcroft during his public tour, Conyers chooses to
reference language from four and one- half years prior. He makes the point that Ashcroft
has been using patriotism as a manipulative rhetorical symbol from day one of this
debate—the accusations of having “phantoms of lost liberty,” “aiding the terrorists,” and
“giving ammunition to America’s enemies” have set the tone for the entire debate over
the Patriot Act and the entire public sphere of discourse surrounding the Bush
Administration’s war on terror.
After attacking the Bush Administration’s notion of patriotism in reference to
Ashcroft’s rhetoric, Conyers describes his own patriotic ethos:
This Member will not be bullied or intimidated or rushed into backing down from
my legislative and oversight responsibilities. Many of us remember a time when
the powers of the FBI and the CIA were horribly abused. We know what it means
to face racial profiling and religious persecution. Many of us know that our
Nation has too frequently overreacted to threats of violence in the past by
clamping down on legitimate protests and law-abiding citizens and immigrants.
(USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, pp. 3-4)
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A patriot according to Conyers will not back down to executive pressure on dissenters—a
patriot loves her country too much to shy away from oversight responsibilities, and
history proves that doing so is in the best interest of the country.
The opening statement comes to a close with the form of argument that became so
familiar to us during the initial phase of debate—the “want to fight terror…but…” form
of argument:
To me, the lessons of September 11 are that if we allow law enforcement to do
their work free of political interference, if we give them adequate resources and
modern technologies, we can protect our citizens without intruding on our
liberties. We all fight terrorism, but we want to work with you to fight it the right
way, consistent with our Constitution and in a manner that serves as a model for
the rest of the world. (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 4)
Given the context of this statement though, the tone is different than the way in which the
form of argument has been used in the past, especially the way in which it was used
during the authorization stage. It indicates a more offensive tone, as opposed to the
defensive tone uncovered during the authorization phase. In the initial phase of debate,
this form of argument was used to try and fit in with Ashcroft’s ideal patriotism while
tweaking it ever so slightly. Here though, Conyers is trying to completely re-define the
Bush Administration’s agree- at-all-costs notion of patriotism.
Gonzales
Following Sensenbrenner’s opening statement, a number of people submitted
their own opening statements and third party testimonies for the record and then it was
time for Gonzales to give his opening statement. Sensenbrenner introduces him and
swears him in. Gonzales begins by reminding the audience about the collaborative and
bipartisan way in which the Patriot Act was originally authorized. He also asserts that the
process was effective at finding a balance between safety and liberty:
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Following the attacks of September 11, the Administration and Congress came
together to prevent another tragedy from happening again. One result of our
collaboration was the USA PATRIOT Act, which was passed by Congress with
overwhelming bipartisan support after carefully balancing security and civil
liberties. (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 33)
Because of the collaboration and bipartisanship, the law has been very successful at
helping the Government carry out the war on terror: “And since then, this law has been
integral to the Government’s prosecution of the war on terrorism. We have dismantled
terrorist cells, disrupted terrorist plots, and captured terrorists before they could strike”
(USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, pp. 33-34).
Then, through a fear appeal, Gonzales reminds the audience that terrorists are still
a “grave threat;” letting the sunsetted provisions expire would be relinquishing the best
tools in the war on terror:
Many of the most important authorities in the Act are scheduled to expire on
December 31 of this year. I believe it is important that they remain available. Al-
Qaeda and other terrorist groups still pose a grave threat to the security of the
American people and now is not the time to relinquish some of our most effective
tools in the fight. (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 34)
In this quotation, there is an implication that there are a lot of people involved in the
debate who do not see a need for the types of legal updates provided for in the sunsetted
provisions of the Patriot Act—an integral part of the way in which the all-or-nothing
dichotomy was constructed in earlier phases by Ashcroft.
Gonzales continues to build upon the all-or-nothing ethos of the Bush
Administration’s notion of patriotism. In the following quotation, we find Gonzales
claiming to be open to suggestions of clarification, but implying that any substantive
changes in the Patriot Act would be tantamount to weakening the government in the war
on terror—something he just cannot support:
As Congress considers whether to renew these provisions, I am open to
suggestions for clarifying and strengthening the Act and I look forward to meeting
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with those both inside and outside of Congress who have expressed concern about
some of these provisions. But let me be clear that I cannot support any proposal
that would undermine our ability to combat terrorism effectively. (USA PATRIOT
Act, 2005, p. 34)
Next, he extends the argument that critics are hysterical—though perhaps in a more
subtle way than his predecessor. He begins by giving critics the benefit of the doubt—
recognizing that “all of us” have the objective of protecting the security of the nation, but
continues by inferring that perhaps critics in this debate are irrational:
All of us continue to have the same objective, ensuring the security of the
American people while preserving our civil liberties. I, therefore, hope that we
would consider reauthorization in a calm and thoughtful manner and with the
understanding that while the tools of the PATRIOT Act are important, they are
not extraordinary. Many of these authorities to deal with terrorists have long been
available to prosecutors to deal with ordinary criminals, and actions under the Act
often must occur with the approval of a Federal judge. Our dialogue should be
based on these facts rather than exaggeration. (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 34)
Though the claim is subtler than Ashcroft’s accusation of “hysteria,” the same
implication still seems to be present. He implies that critics are making a huge deal over a
policy that does not alter the status quo very dramatically—which by definition fits the
notion of “hysteria.”
To this point in Gonzales’s opening statement, the text of his testimony reads very
similar to that of Ashcroft. The arguments build toward the all-or-nothing dichotomy so
characteristic of the Bush Administration’s war on terror. Gonzales’s tone is about to
change a little bit though. Immediately after implying that the critics of the Justice
Department make their arguments in an irrational manner, he tries to show them that he
will do a better job of helping them see the truth. Under his leadership, the
implementation of the Patriot Act will be done in a more transparent fashion than under
Ashcroft’s leadership. In a show of good faith, he announces that he is about to disclose
some information that had previously been classified: “And because I believe that this
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discussion must be conducted in an open and honest fashion, I will begin my testimony
today by presenting this Committee with relatively new information recently declassified
about the use of certain PATRIOT Act provisions” (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 34).
He proceeds to disclose some statistics related to the way in which some of the
controversial provisions of the Patriot Act have been utilized. For instance, he tells us that
section 215 (the infamous “library provision”) has only been used 35 times and none of
those applications sought library, book store, medical, or gun records; they have only
used 215 to obtain drivers license and credit card records12. Gonzales then draws the
conclusion that “some of the concerns expressed about section 215 have been based on
inaccurate fears about its use” (p. 35), going back to the notion that critics’ fears are
irrational but sort of acknowledging that the irrational criticism may be due to not having
enough information. But now, with the knowledge that section 215 has only been used 35
times, the fear should go away.
Another way in which he attempts to shape his ethos in a way that appears more
flexible than Ashcroft is the notion that he is open to amendments; however, only
amendments that clarify the Patriot Act—not ones that would change it substantively. In
the same sentence as the one above where he argues that many criticisms are based on
“inaccurate fears of its use” (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 35), he proceeds to
acknowledge that, “other criticisms have apparently been based on possible ambiguity in
the law” (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 35). According to Gonzales, even though there is
12 Though it should be noted here that library records have been obtained in other ways
aside from enforcing 215. In fact, as Foerstel (2004) and others have documented, often
times, librarians have begrudgingly volunteered library records out of fear that 215 would
be enforced. Assistant Attorney General Comey speaks to this in more detail during the
debate on 6/8/05.
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no real potential for abuse of the Patriot Act, he is willing to support amendments
clarifying the law:
The Department has already stated in litigation that the recipient of a section 215
order may consult with an attorney and may challenge that order in court. The
Department has also stated that the Government may seek and a court may require
only the production of records that are relevant to a national security
investigation, a standard similar to the relevant standard that applied to grand jury
subpoenas in criminal cases. The text of section 215, however, is not as clear as it
could be in these respects. The Department, therefore, is willing to support
amendments to section 215 to clarify these points. (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p.
35)
So essentially, Gonzales declares the Patriot Act to be in perfect shape substantively, but
if amendments can clarify the perfection further, then he is on board. He implies that the
only way to change 215 substantively would be to raise the standard for obtaining records
from a relevance standard to a probable cause and since 215 is used as only a preliminary
mode of investigation, and change would render it a “dead letter” (USA PATRIOT Act,
2005, p. 35). He brackets out the possibility of changing it in any other way.
Continuing to disclose recently declassified information, Gonzales moves on to
talk about section 206, the roving wiretap provision. He points out that in the pre-Patriot
Act world, roving wiretaps were already applied to criminal investigations and that now
in the post-Patriot Act world, they are also applied to FISA investigations as well.
However, any fears of abuse should be put to rest according to Gonzales because “as of
March 30, this provision had been used 49 times” (p. 35); furthermore, “section 206
contains ample safeguards to protect the privacy of innocent Americans” (USA
PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 35) given that a warrant for a wiretap cannot transfer from target
to target; in order to spy on any person, permission must be obtained from a court.
Gonzales then moves on to disclose information about another controversial provision of
the Patriot Act—section 213, the delayed notice search warrants. He says, “The
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Department uses this tool only when necessary” (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 36) and
then exemplifies:
For instance, from enactment of the PATRIOT Act through January 31 of this
year, the Department used section 213 to request approximately 155 delayed
notice search warrants, which have been issued in terrorism, drug, murder, and
other criminal investigations. We estimate that this number represents less than
one-fifth of 1 percent of all search warrants obtained by the Department during
this time. In other words, in more than 499 of 500 cases, the Department provides
immediate notice of the search. In appropriate cases, however, delayed notice
search warrants are necessary, because if terrorists or other criminals are
prematurely tipped off that they are under investigation, they may destroy
evidence, harm witnesses, or flee prosecution. (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 36)
With this statistical analysis of how conservative and careful the Justice Department is
with new authorities granted under the Patriot Act, Gonzales begins to wrap up his
opening statement.
He ends by first, suggesting that the new information that he has declassified and
shared since taking over the reigns of the Justice Department should “demystify” the
confusion surrounding the Patriot Act: “I hope that this information will demystify these
essential national security tools, eliminate some of the confusion surrounding their use,
and enrich the debate about the Department’s counterterrorism efforts” (USA PATRIOT
Act, 2005, p. 36). Furthermore, he conveys his ethos as one that encourages open
dialogue and collaboration: “I look forward to working with the Committee closely in the
weeks ahead, listening to your concerns, and joining together again to protect the security
of the American people” (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 37). However, we cannot forget
that he will only support changes clarifying the existing statute—not any that
substantively change the Patriot Act, because their process of invention (the first canon of
classical rhetoric) has been perfect; the only changes that may be needed are superficial
changes to help clarify the ideals of the Justice Department.
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The Case of the Critics
As in previous full committee hearings, the arguments extended throughout the
debate do not stray too far from the case laid out by Conyers in the opening statement. In
fact, much of the argumentation coming from the critics is very much the same as what
was presented in previous debates. The central theme is that the Justice Department,
specifically under Ashcroft’s leadership, has not been transparent enough about
implementation of the Patriot Act for critics to ask the most meaningful of questions.
Despite the fact that the central theme does not change much, the application of that
theme gets more specific. The story behind the theme becomes clearer and the response
of Gonzales to the story allows some progress to be made in the debate, whereas with
Ashcroft in charge, it seemed as if wheels were spinning without any traction
whatsoever—the proverbial ships were passing in the night.
Questioning The Spirit of the Patriot Act
Perhaps the argument standing out as most important to me while reading
Conyers’ opening statement, at least in terms of the way in which the meaning of
patriotism is negotiated, is the way in which he defends the democratic tradition of
criticism—especially during the deliberative process, as being a patriotic duty. To be
sure, this theme has emerged in previous stages of this debate, but here, the argument is
crystallized and Ashcroft’s exact language is called into question by Conyers.
Specifically, the infamous “phantoms of lost liberty” and “giving aid to America’s
enemies,” coming from the very beginning of the authorization stage of debate is
mentioned by Conyers, who makes the point that Ashcroft created the spirit of the Patriot
Act as one that magically goes along with whatever the executive branch sees fit with the
war on terror. This spirit was extended in the implementation stage of debate, where we
325
find Ashcroft specifically referring to it as “the spirit of the Patriot Act” in defense of the
unilateral decision to alter the Levy guidelines so that FBI agents could randomly go into
Mosques and any other place open to the public, in street clothes, to spy on the general
public.
It is important to note that in previous debates, the argument that the government
abused power has certainly been made, and made quite vociferously, but it had not been
personally directed at Ashcroft. In fact, at various points throughout previous analysis,
we find critics telling Ashcroft that “you have done a good job,” “don’t take these
criticisms personally,” and “no one can do this by himself.” But now, after Ashcroft’s
public tour when he tries to conjure and reinvigorate that spirit of magical unity/the
visceral instinct, suggesting that criticism is unpatriotic, critics seem to make a personal
and emotional connection between the Patriot Act and John Ashcroft. Enough time had
lapsed to where the need for criticism was no longer tempered by the need for national
healing. Especially since Ashcroft resigned in the midst of controversy surrounding his
public tour, and his popularity according to public opinion had plummeted the way it did,
the time was ripe for critics to not just question the Patriot Act, but also the “spirit of the
Patriot Act;” i.e. the condensation symbol constructed around the anachronistic title and
the people who constructed the web of meaning embedded within it.
To exemplify, Sheila Jackson Lee (D TX) takes a more cynical view than
Conyers. She expresses to Gonzales that her cynicism is not personally directed toward
him and that she likes him and his family, but then claims that perhaps the time has
passed the point at which the democratic spirit of disagreement can be reclaimed. She
argues that the “tone” of the debate over the Patriot Act has “done us in:”
I say that because we seemingly have conceded to losing our rights because of the
horrific act of 9/11. I think we are consistent in this Congress and in this Judiciary
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Committee to acknowledge, and I think you have acknowledged it, General, along
with the President, that our highest responsibility is to secure the Nation and to
secure the people of the United States. I don’t step away from that responsibility. I
would argue, however, that the tone in which we have proceeded in the legislative
initiatives have really done us in…(USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 63)
Noteworthy is the fact that she utilizes a “I want to secure the safety of America…but…”
form of argument; yet obviously, the “…but…” condition is strategically offensive in
nature as opposed to the way in which the form was utilized at the beginning of the
debate over the Patriot Act. The condition to which Jackson Lee refers is described in the
past tense, whereas the condition standing as the object of the “but” during the
authorization stage is in the future tense. The form of the argument shifts from a polite
suggestion that “we have to be careful” to a more offensive attack on the ethos of the
Patriot Act that says, “we have been done in.”
Perhaps more noteworthy is the fact that the failed condition Jackson Lee speaks
of is not limited toward the legal precedent of the Patriot Act, but the “tone” created by
it—the tone that has been carried through during this particular debate, the debate over
Iraq, the debate over the NSA spying program, and the rest of the debates pertinent to the
war on terror. To illustrate, Jackson Lee finishes her previously quoted sentence by tying
the tone of the Patriot Act to the debate over immigration:
…and I say that because your beloved Texas now seems to be under the eye of the
new Minutemen, Minutewomen. Border watchers have eyes on Texas. So because
we have either created this atmosphere of fear, because we have either not done
our job, we have not protected civil liberties, we have not enforced laws that we
already have dealing with border security, we now have men taking up arms and
placing themselves on the border, even to the extent that Border Patrol agents
have said it may be a dangerous condition. So I’m concerned about the tone.
(USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, pp. 63-64)
Jackson Lee then links the tone of the Patriot Act to another important debate going on in
the war on terror—the Guantanamo Bay detention center and the authority assumed by
the Bush Administration of labeling a person as enemy combatant:
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It is the tone that has been created, and frankly, I don’t believe that the PATRIOT
Act provisions really have made us safer. I hope that we will vet them at a very
high standard as to the standard of how they have denied our civil liberties, how
they’ve created an atmosphere for Guantanamo Bay, and I do not criticize the
military that is doing their job. I do criticize the existence of Guantanamo Bay for
no reason. I criticize the existence of a determination of enemy combatant, which
seemingly has no basis in law. (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 64)
It is important to recognize that what Conyers and Jackson Lee argue here is not entirely
new. They feed the power abuse argument that has been a growing part of the
deliberative process; what is a new evolution in their argumentation is the way in which
they seem to recognize the full extent of the symbolic power of PATRIOTism. While
obviously they have some problems with the legal precedent of the Patriot Act, and wish
to see executive authorities checked more rigorously, it seems as though some are coming
to the realization that the change in the legal precedent established through the Patriot Act
pales in comparison to the way in which the national mood, or the tone has changed.
It is almost as if Conyers and Jackson Lee are recognizing the Patriot Act as a
smokescreen, or a deliberative decoy from what else that is going on in the Bush
Administration, at least in terms of the war on terror. In the next exemplar, Melvin Watt
(D NC) is questioning Gonzales about a very important component of the critics’
perspective on the Patriot Act and that is the idea of a review mechanism independent of
the Justice Department. He claims that while Congress supports the idea, the
Administration has stood in the way of this board having subpoena power, and further,
the President has not funded it. Thus, according to Watt, the review board idea is rather
impotent. In this context, he claims, “You’ve superimposed this intelligence reform stuff
on top of the PATRIOT Act” (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 73) and then asks the
Attorney General if he “thinks it’s important to have a Privacy Review Board” (USA
PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 73). Gonzales and Watt go on to debate the quality of support
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given the idea of the review board by President Bush, a very important point to note as it
exemplifies the idea that most (if not all) critics have not rejected the legal updates
implemented by the Patriot Act (this topic is addressed more specifically in the next
section of analysis); they, for the most part, simply want a stronger review mechanism for
the extended power of the executive branch.
Now, as the debate has gone on for over four years, it seems as though critics are
recognizing that the legal change implemented by the Patriot Act, in and of itself, is not
necessarily the biggest concern—the biggest concern is the way in which the powerful
symbolism of the Patriot Act has set a “tone” for the entire war on terror such that the
Bush Administration can “superimpose” anything it wants on top of the Patriot Act. In
Chapter 9, we find Ashcroft referring to this phenomenon as the “spirit of the Patriot
Act,” while justifying the alterations to the Levy guidelines without consultation with
Congress. During reauthorization, critics are linking this “spirit of the Patriot Act” to the
ambiguous enemy combatant labeling authority, the perceived justification for the torture
of terrorists, and a host of other policies, such as the NSA spying program for instance,
that were also implemented unilaterally by the Executive branch. The symbolism of
patriotism evoked through the Patriot Act is being treated as one of the most, if not the
most important topics of this legislative process.
It’s Not the Law Per Se…
By bracketing the symbolism of the Patriot Act, i.e., the “spirit” of the Patriot Act,
participants in this debate make great strides toward clarifying a line of argumentation
that seems to be a significant cause of the breakdown in communication between
Ashcroft proponents and critics. The symbolism of the act has finally been bracketed as
something separate from the legal changes found therein. The symbolism is the link
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between the Patriot Act and every other Bush Administration policy in the war on terror.
After gaining the perspective of hindsight, critics are more able to articulate the problems
with the “tone” set by the Patriot Act—they seem to realize that the biggest problem with
the Patriot Act is not necessarily the legal changes found therein but the tone set for the
nation—the creation of the discursive space that allows for other war on terror policies to
be implemented with zero consultation with Congress. This distinction is important to
understanding the debate over the Patriot Act—it recognizes the importance of the act as
a symbolic phenomenon—one that has no material existence like the legal provisions
contained therein do.
Exemplifying this distinction, Jerrold Nadler, one of the debate’s more outspoken
critics, discloses that his biggest problem is not the Patriot Act per se, but the Presidential
Administration enforcing it. To use his exact words, he says: “Mr. Attorney General, my
basic problem with all of this is that the Administration, the current Administration that’s
enforcing the PATRIOT Act seems to have no sense of limits and no sense of due process
whatsoever when dealing with real or alleged terrorism cases” (USA PATRIOT Act,
2005, p. 59). He then cites a couple of non-Patriot Act issues to illustrate his point. First
of all, he cites the previously mentioned torture memo. Nadler says, “I will cite, for
instance, the memo that you wrote justifying torture, which I am sure you won’t
characterize as such, but I will” (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 59). Secondly, he also
references the previously mentioned enemy combatant status example and calls that a
form of tyranny, making historical reference to the Magna Carta:
Number two, the whole doctrine of the enemy combatants that Mr. Schiff talked
about in which the President has claimed the power to point his finger at any
American citizen—or non-citizen—but any American citizen and say, you are an
enemy combatant because I say so on the basis of secret information which I
won’t reveal to you or anyone else, and by that declaration, I have the power to
throw you in jail forever with no due process, no hearing, no evidence, no
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nothing. Nobody, to my knowledge, no executive in an English-speaking country
has made such a claim of tyrannical power since before Magna Carta, and yet—
and the Justice Department under your predecessor had the nerve to say to the
Federal courts that they didn’t have the jurisdiction to even question the fact or
the authority of the President. (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 59)
While he has made this reference to the Magna Carta before, he provides greater
clarification this time that the fundamental problem is not the Patriot Act per se, but the
symbolic stamp of approval generated by the spirit of the Patriot Act. The debate over
patriotism is changing. An important part of the change is to recognize the way in which
the debaters themselves are developing clarity over the important distinction between the
symbolism of the Patriot Act and the alterations to legal precedent found therein.
Problems with the Deliberative Process
In the following quotation from Nadler, a continuation of the previously
mentioned line of argumentation, he begins to describe his thoughts on the Patriot Act
proper, whereas in the previous quotation, he was talking about other policies tangentially
linked to the Patriot Act. Even here though, Nadeler does not point to one provision of
the act as a legal problem. In fact, he says liberty and safety may very well be in balance
under the Patriot Act. His biggest concern is the legislative process used to authorize and
oversight the act:
Third, you stated in your opening statement that the PATRIOT Act was well
considered and well balanced. Well, maybe it’s balanced and maybe not, but it
certainly wasn’t well considered. If you recall how it passed here, this Committee
considered in detail a PATRIOT Act, considered for four days, voted on
amendments, marked it up, unanimously reported the bill on a Thursday, I
believe. Over the weekend, the leadership of the House together with the
Administration took the well-considered bill, which I thought was balanced, and
threw it in the garbage, wrote over the weekend an entirely new bill, presented
this 200-and-some-odd-page bill to the House with two copies available, one for
the Democrats, one for the Republicans, warm to the touch at 10 in the morning.
We started the debate at 11 and voted on it at 1 and nobody had a chance to read
it. So it’s certainly not well considered. It may be well balanced, but certainly not
well considered. (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, pp. 59-60)
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That the Patriot Act was rushed too quickly through Congress in the first place is an
argument that we have heard since at least the end of the authorization stage of debate, if
not even before that. It is made at least three times in this debate from three different
people, all minority members: Mr. Berman and Ms. Jackson Lee in addition to Nadler.
Nadler’s quotation though provides a concise summary of the extent to which the Patriot
Act was rushed through the legislative process. It leads me to think that maybe the Patriot
Act, from a constitutional standpoint, might not be that bad, and that it is the spirit of the
Patriot Act driving the controversy.
A related argument, also one very familiar to this analysis, is the observation that
the Bush Administration has not been forthright with the disclosure of information
necessary to the process of checks and balances. Adam Schiff (D CA) is the first person
in this debate to mention this as a criticism:
At the same time, efforts that I’ve made to learn information from the Justice
Department and the Defense Department about our Government’s own policies of
when we treat someone as an enemy combatant or when we treat them as a
criminal defendant—when we treat them as a defendant with all of the rights that
attach to that, when we treat them as an enemy combatant with none of the due
process that attaches to that, I have been unable to get really any meaningful
information, even in classified form. When you gave a speech to the ABA a year
or two ago, it was the most information I had ever heard about how we were
deciding when to treat someone as an enemy combatant. More information than
you gave publicly was denied me in classified form. That cannot persist. (USA
PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 53)
There are a few different interesting things about this quotation relevant to this analysis.
One is that, like above, the Patriot Act is not the specific target of criticism—the enemy
combatant policy is. But secondly, in making the argument that information was denied,
he seems to be suggesting that perhaps Gonzalez’s leadership of the Department of
Justice will be more transparent than Ashcroft’s. In Chapter 12, we find out that this was
indeed the impression.
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Schiff is of course not the only person to make this sort of criticism. Some other
names, also familiar to this analysis also speak up about the matter. William Delahunt (D
MA) uses one of his favorite phrases to describe the Bush Administration (again, not
focusing arguments on the Patriot Act per se—but in reference to a dramatic increase in
the extent to which papers are classified) when he refers to the “culture of concealment”
(USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 76). Anthony Weiner (D NY) makes a similar sort of
argument—but directly referencing the Patriot Act when he refers to the “cloak of
secrecy that has dominated the discussion over the last four years” (USA PATRIOT Act,
2005, p. 78). We will be examining this quotation in full, more thoroughly at the end of
this chapter. It actually serves as a nice summary of the critics’ case. But readers should
know now that in it, he speaks directly to the idea that critics probably would not have a
problem with the Patriot Act if the government were just more transparent about the way
it was implemented.
Others chimed in with this sort of analysis as well. In all, I count this argument
made 13 different times in this debate by mostly minority members: Delahunt, Weiner,
Schiff, and Lofgren, but interestingly, I found one majority member who also makes the
argument—Louie Gohmert (R TX). We have not heard Gohmert’s name come up in the
debate before because he was not sworn in until January of 2005, approximately three
months before this stage of the debate even began. His line of questioning is important
however, because he reminds the audience that criticism of the process is not limited to
only the minority side of the aisle (even though that is how it may seem at times):
Also, there’s obviously been a lot of concern about the sharing of information,
and as you’ve heard from both sides of the aisle, nobody’s meaning this personal
to you, but apparently, there was a precedent back in the early 1970s that had a
counsel that was abusive enough he had one FBI file, went to prison for it. And
then I hear tell there’s even been a White House Administration so corrupt they
might have even had 1,000 FBI files and didn’t have an Attorney General with the
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wherefore to go ahead and prosecute such a terrible abuse. So you can understand
why there’d be some concerns about those things if it’s true that you could really
have that kind of abuse at the highest levels. I’m not concerned about you or this
good President, but you never know. You can have a President like that. (USA
PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 65)
He makes an historical reference to justify why there should be concern from both sides
of the aisle. He also depersonalizes the criticism and assures Gonzales that the criticism is
not lodged at the current Administration but at the potential for abuse that may occur
down the line with a precedent set for not sharing information. Most importantly from
this quotation however, is the notion that Democrats are not the only ones critical of the
Bush Administration. Though Gohmert is the only majority member in this debate who
questions the symbolic patriotism of the Patriot Act, he is not the only majority member
to ask serious questions of the Patriot Act. In fact, during opening testimony, Chairman
Sensenbrenner himself poses what I think are critical ideas to consider in terms of
implementing the Patriot Act. Perhaps the most telling evidence though of the growing
bipartisan criticism comes from analysis of context leading up to this debate and noting
that the infamous Otter Amendment originated from a Republican. Furthermore, the
SAFE Act has had bipartisan sponsorship etc.
Before bringing this section to a close and moving onto the next, analysis
concerning the problems with the deliberative process would be remiss without
mentioning that the entire blame for a poor process is not placed on the Bush
Administration. As we have seen in previous debates, members of Congress have placed
some of the blame for a poor process on itself, claiming that as a legislative body, they
have not asked enough questions. Schiff expounds on this argument by saying:
I find it odd that there aren’t more voices in the Congress raising this issue, that
aren’t demanding that Congress act to set limits on the detention of Americans, to
set due process for the detainees at Guantanamo. Of course, all this thing, not
done for the terrorism suspects but done for all the rest of us, to protect our civil
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liberties and our due process. I find it very odd there have been so few voices in
the Congress on this issue… (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 53)
John Conyers also speaks to the issue in his opening statement when he professes that he
will not back down from his (patriotic) duty of criticism. In making this statement, he
implies that some members of Congress have.
It’s Not All-or-Nothing
The biggest obstacle to meaningful debate over the Patriot Act has been
Ashcroft’s generalization that the Patriot Act is an all-or-nothing issue; anybody who
questions the Patriot Act is searching for “phantoms of lost liberty.” Critics have
responded to this false dichotomy in a variety of ways—it is embedded within almost
every theme of every argument they make; perhaps the most direct way in which they
have responded though has been through the “we want to fight terror…but…” form of
argument found during every phase of the debate thus far. Also in answering the all-or-
nothing dichotomy, critics have made it very clear that there is a “consensus” laws need
to be updated in the ways that the Justice Department proposes—they just want to make
sure there are substantial checks on authority. As Chapter 5 notes, the argument began in
very much a defensive tone. Critics at that point, seemed to be just as concerned (if not
more so) with establishing common ground between themselves and Ashcroft proponents
as (than) they were with playing the role of critics. They bought into the unity of the
message of the Patriot Act. However, as Ashcroft continues to dichotomize the debate
from phase to phase, the argument changes tone. As Chapters 8 and 9 indicate, the form
of argument becomes more offensive in nature. Critics use the form of argument in such a
way that they are not defending their own ethos as much as they are attacking the ethos of
Ashcroft proponents.
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The form of argument continues in the reauthorization stage, and it gets even
more specific. Now that some specific proposals had been proposed by some of the
critics—such as the ones discussed earlier in Chapter 10, critics can demonstrate through
specific policy proposals that they do see eye to eye with the Justice Department on the
necessity of fighting terror, and even the means with which to do so. In leading up to
discussion of one such proposal, Howard Berman (D CA) claims that most members of
Congress feel that all of the sunsetted provisions should be extended with some refining:
The PATRIOT Act sunset provisions you’ve discussed, I frankly think most
Members of Congress have come or will come to the conclusion that many of
these sunsetted provisions should be—perhaps all of them should be continued,
perhaps refined. Mr. Chairman, I would hope this review, though, would also take
into account a number of unilateral actions—Mr. Schiff certainly brought up one
in the context of the enemy combatants issue—that we should be considering that
weren’t part of the PATRIOT Act but were developed in response to September
11 and in our effort to fight a more effective war on terror. (USA PATRIOT Act,
2005, p. 56)
Justice Department critics do agree in principle with the logistics of the Patriot Act.
Berman gets even more specific in the next quotation when he mentions the Civil
Liberties Restoration Act as a policy proposal that he supports:
Today, Mr. Delahunt and I are introducing a law we call the Civil Liberties
Restoration Act. It doesn’t repeal any part of the PATRIOT Act. It doesn’t
impede in any way the ability of agencies to share information. Our goal is simply
to ensure there are appropriate checks and balances on a number of PATRIOT
provisions as well as an opportunity for Congress to address some of the
unilateral policy decisions that I just mentioned. They’re all drafted, we think, in a
way that tries to achieve the balance that you and others have talked about. I
would hope at some point you might have a chance to take a look at some of the
proposals contained in that legislation. (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 56)
Here, he spells out very specifically that neither he, nor Delahunt—two of Ashcroft’s
most vocal critics throughout the entire deliberative process, wish to “repeal any part of
the PATRIOT Act…our goal is simply to ensure there are appropriate checks and
balances” (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 56).
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A Good Summary of the Critics’ Case
As promised earlier, we come back to a speech delivered by Anthony Weiner (D
NY). He provides a good summary of the position of many of the critics. I doubt that
every critic would agree, but certainly, based upon my analysis, Weiner wraps up the gist
of the criticism of the Justice Department’s implementation of the Patriot Act. In many
ways, his summary also becomes a meta-analysis of why the deliberative process has not
been substantially effective to this point—an analysis that I would have to agree with due
to my own careful analysis of the debate from the beginning.
He begins by noting the idea that the primary strategy behind the war on terror,
and the Patriot Act in particular, is for the government to assume greater authority so that
terrorists can be stopped. In asking for this, government officials are inherently asking for
a greater level of trust than before:
I hope you recognize by this point in the hearings, both in the other body and
here, what the fundamental problem is that you face with Congress now, is that, in
essence, what the PATRIOT Act reflected was a desire on the part of the
Administration of greater authority, and you essentially said to Members of
Congress like myself, trust us that we’re going to use it wisely, that we’re going
to use it with discretion, we’re going to use it with restraint. (USA PATRIOT Act,
2005, p. 78)
In the next segment of the speech, Weiner goes on to say that most people were/are
supportive of this notion, given the level of threat we were exposed to. However, in order
for that trust to work, the implementation would have to be transparent. That it has not
been is where the Justice Department, according to Weiner, has lost support:
And where you’ve lost so many of us, including people like myself who have
been eager, as a New Yorker and someone who considers himself as a moderate
on law enforcement things, is this cloak of secrecy that has dominated the
discussion over the last four years. Obviously, a rise in FISA activity and yet
there’s less information than there has perhaps ever been. Reports of secret arrests
and detentions without charges. What it does is it makes us, who were happy
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about a sunset, completely unwilling to say either, first of all, extend them, or
even further, to eliminate the sunset altogether. (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 78)
In the next segment, Weiner specifies that in order for support to be regained, basically
all that has to happen is for more information to be obtained. He even speaks for
Delahunt and Schiff while saying this—two people who have been the most vocal critics
during the deliberative process. He also references people from the other side of the aisle:
So that what Members like myself and Mr. Delahunt and Mr. Schiff and folks on
the other side of the aisle are speaking to is this notion that you made a compact.
Give us more authority and entrust us to use it wisely. In order for that compact to
be successful, in order to get us to say, okay, we agree four years later that that
has been the case, there has to be more information. (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005,
p. 78)
Weiner then summarizes the implications of the lack of information for the debate. He
claims that it causes exaggerations on both sides of the debate; some proponents
exaggerate the benefits and some critics exaggerate the intrusions to privacy:
And what has this attitude on the part of the Justice Department brought? Well,
it’s brought on one side you saying, well, people are creating phantoms of lost
liberty, and I think some on the left have said, well, there’s enormous intrusions
on our lives. Only with more full disclosure to Congress, only with a more full
debate that goes on between you and the American public is this going to happen.
And frankly, that hasn’t happened. You have exaggerated its value. I believe
many on the left have exaggerated the harm it’s caused. (USA PATRIOT Act,
2005, p. 78)
The only way to stop the exaggeration, according to Weiner, is for more information to
be disclosed. In the next portion of Weiner’s speech, he claims the problems with the
Patriot Act are easy to fix—it is simply a matter of the Justice Department cooperating
more with Congress. If there was some fundamental problem with the goals of the act or
the significant provisions of the act itself, then this would not be the case. However,
cooperation has not occurred and this has let many people in Congress down, and
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according to the polling information cited toward the beginning of this chapter, the lack
of cooperation has let many in the general public down as well. Weiner says:
But fundamentally, you’ve lost the trust of so many in this Congress. When
people like myself and Paul Wellstone of blessed memory vote for the PATRIOT
Act, it is because fundamentally we believe it’s important to make things safe and
we trust those in positions of power to enforce it wisely, and I think you’ve let us
down. You’ve let us down because you’ve let us down in ways that are
fundamental and easy to fix. When Congress asks for cooperation, as Mr.
Delahunt says, your first reflex shouldn’t be no. (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p.
78)
In the final segment of Weiner’s speech to be displayed here, he urges to the Department
of Justice to “talk more freely” and that that would in and of itself would help resolve the
controversy:
When there’s questions about secret arrests and detentions, you know, frankly, if
your concern is about reinforcing the idea that the Justice Department is operating
prudently, talk more freely. Have a frank discussion about what’s going on in the
world. We should not wait until the day of a Senate hearing to find out that there
are 35 instances that section 215 was used and 155 times that the sneak-and-peek
provisions were used under the PATRIOT Act. It is that level of information that,
frankly, I think might have even helped your side of the argument if they had been
released more steadily over the course of the last four years. So that, I would
argue, is your problem. (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 78)
Interestingly, he cites information that Gonzales gave in his opening testimony—the
statistics related to the use of the “library provision” and the “sneak-and-peek provision”
and claims that had that type of information been disclosed over the course of the last
four years, it would have helped their side of the argument.
The Response of the Justice Department
The tone of the Justice Department in this stage of debate, under Gonzales’s
leadership is markedly different. For sure, there are some of the lingering effects of
Ashcroft’s tone—mostly by way of some majority members of the House who are
vehement supporters of Ashcroft. We will briefly consider some of that discourse at the
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end of this chapter. But the most important observation to make about the response of the
Justice Department is the difference in tone Gonzales brings to the discourse and the way
in which minority members of the House recognize the change.
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A Different Tone
From the very beginning of the hearing, as Gonzales gave his opening statement,
we had already noticed some difference. For one thing, Gonzales disclosed some
information about a few of the controversial provisions that had until recently been
classified. This disclosure, according to Gonzales, should “demystify” much of the
confusion over the act. To some extent, it seems as though he is correct. For another
thing, Gonzales claimed that he was ready to cooperate and make amendments to
improve the Patriot Act’s effectiveness. However, it was noted that the amendments he
would be amenable to are limited to amendments that further clarify the Justice
Department’s current intent. Nonetheless, a marked difference in tone from Ashcroft is
noted as Gonzales begins his testimony. The difference continues to be noticed as
Gonzales goes on to answer questions from Committee members.
We Made Mistakes
Anybody who has read at least a paragraph of this work to this point, or who
followed the debate over the Patriot Act to any extent when it was happening knows that
Ashcroft is not eager to admit mistakes. Even in the face of the Inspector General’s
report, a report that originated from inside the Justice Department, offering scathing
criticism of the way in which the Justice Department handled the detention of illegal
immigrants, Ashcroft maintained that perfect adherence to the Constitution was achieved.
Thus the following quotation, when Gonzales acknowledges that mistakes were made,
denotes a different tone coming from the Justice Department. Gonzales is responding to
an accusation made my Adam Schiff, which is analyzed earlier, claiming that the Justice
Department has been too secretive about the war on terror. Gonzales addresses that part
of Schiff’s concern:
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You’re right. We waited too long, in my judgment, to respond, to explain to the
American people what we’re doing and why, and it was one of the things that I
mentioned in that speech you referred to, is that we waited. We waited a long
time because of concerns that we didn’t want to say anything that might help the
enemy, might jeopardize something that we’re doing. But we finally
acknowledged that we were hurting ourselves, that the American people and the
Congress really needed to know what we were doing and why, and that was—I’m
delighted to know about your speech, because I did, I think, talk a lot about the
process that we used in designating someone as an enemy combatant or having
them go through the criminal justice system. (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 54)
He points out that they kept information secret because they wanted to make sure it
would not hinder their efforts to protect security, but at the same time that it was a
mistake to wait as long as they did to make certain information available to Congress and
to the public. It ended up hurting their cause in the long run according to Gonzales.
In the next exemplar, Gonzales is answering a line of questioning from Mr.
Berman, who asks Gonzales to react to the issue of immigration as it pertains to the
aforementioned Civil Liberties Restoration Act. Gonzales admits to not knowing too
much about immigration, but Berman asks for his opinion anyway and Gonzales
responds: “Well, I think that there were mistakes made, quite frankly, and I think if you
look at the IG report about the detentions of immigrants, there were some mistakes made.
We’ve worked very, very hard—the Department has worked hard to try and address and
respond to the recommendations made by the IG” (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 57).
Here, Gonzales refers specifically to the Inspector General’s report and acknowledges
that there were mistakes made with the detention of illegal immigrants following 9/11,
and that based upon the Inspector General’s report, the Justice Department was
attempting to correct those flaws.
Remembering back to Chapter 9 when the Inspector General’s report was brought
up to Ashcroft, he scoffed at the report by saying it was full of contradictions and hence
was not credible; furthermore, one of Ashcroft’s supporters practically accused the
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Inspector of being a terrorist for even coming forward with the report—a much, much
different reaction than Gonzales. Now, it should definitely be noted that a couple of turns
later in the debate, Steve King (R IA) asks if the Inspector General had reported any civil
rights abuses pertaining specifically to the Patriot Act. Gonzales replies that he has asked
the Inspector several times and the response has been “no”—the mistakes were not
Patriot Act related. Nonetheless, the acknowledgment that any mistakes have been made
at all, as well as the acknowledgment of the credibility of the Inspector General’s report,
is a marked shift away from Ashcroft’s rhetoric.
Another exemplar in which Gonzales admits mistakes have been made occurs
when he is responding to a bipartisan line of criticism coming from Spencer Bachus (R
AL) and Chris Van Hollen (D MD) concerning flaws in the terrorist watch list. Bachus
begins by claiming the watch list is overly broad:
You know, I guess what aggravates this, when we hear, and you’ve got questions
about this, when we hear that people that are on the Terrorist Watch List can
purchase guns and then you get a guy that when he was 18 years old had a
disorderly conduct thing and he can’t work at his job, it raises all kinds of
questions. And I know that what I’ve been told is the list is overly broad and it has
a lot of inaccuracies in it, but, you know, it’s being used every day when people
try to move around this country. (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 81)
Van Hollen jumps in and notes a contradiction in the terrorist watch list by citing a GAO
report pointing out that terror suspects can be detained at airports but then can turn
around and buy 20 semiautomatic guns at the gun shop. He asks Gonzales if that makes
any sense. Gonzales replies that they have to enforce the laws. Van Hollen implies that
Gonzales did not quite answer the question, so he repeats it. At that point, Gonzales
agrees that we do not want terrorists with weapons. Van Hollen then asks one last
important question: what mechanism is in place for people who are wrongfully placed on
343
the list to appeal the decision? Gonzales responds by saying he is not sure and that he
would have to get back with that information.
Van Hollen uses the rest of his time by summarizing the arguments related to the
terrorist watch list and then Gonzales takes the last word by acknowledging that while the
terrorist watch list is an important tool, mistakes have been made and more work is
needed to improve the process: “I think the Watch List has been a valuable tool. I think it
has been helpful in dealing with a terrorist threat. Obviously, there have been mistakes
that have been made, but I look forward to working with you” (USA PATRIOT Act,
2005, p. 83)
Patriots Question Authority
After analyzing Gonzales’s opening statement in which he discloses previously
classified information that had been the source of controversy for much of the duration of
this debate, as well as the handful of times during questioning in which he admits that the
Justice Department has made mistakes in the war on terror, it became quite clear to me
that he is attempting to change the image of the Justice Department away from the one
espoused by Ashcroft—characterized by such phrases as “the culture of concealment”
and “a cloak of secrecy.” This indeed speaks to the nature of what it means to be a patriot
from within the political system of democracy. As our country’s founders indicate, at
least by way of their quotations cited in Chapter 1, a democracy has to be transparent so
that patriots can question authority. In this particular debate, William Delahunt (D MA)
speaks to this notion in the context of a post 9/11 public sphere grounded in democracy—
recognizing that it is a “balancing act”:
I think it’s critical in a viable democracy to emphasize that the concerns of a
citizen to their privacy are absolutely essential, and at the same time that as much
transparency as possible is important in terms of the confidence of the American
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people in its Government, in the integrity of its Government. It’s a balancing act,
and I understand that. (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 76)
When Gonzales admits the Justice Department made a mistake in withholding
information, he recognizes that the standard of transparency had swung too far in the
direction of secrecy.
His admission of this goes a long ways toward transforming a notion of what it
means to be a patriot. Yet, in the following exemplar, he addresses this notion more
directly. He defines the word patriot as someone who questions authority: “I think this
country was founded by people concerned about the exercise of power in our home
country and I think it is appropriate to always—to question and to examine the exercise
of power by the Government, and so I welcome—that’s why I welcome this debate”
(USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 57). It probably goes without saying that this
understanding of what a patriot does, is a far cry from Ashcroft’s statement that the critics
only comfort the terrorists by creating phantoms of lost liberty, and that now is not the
time for questions.
It makes sense that Gonzales would be charged with the task of changing the
image of the Justice Department. As analysis of context from Chapter 10 indicates, the
image needed to be changed because of the way in which it was impacting the overall
image of the Bush Administration. Ashcroft’s popularity was declining, as was Bush’s
approval rating. So, Gonzales tries to change the image and by many accounts, he was
successful. Thus, we turn to the analysis supplied by some of the critics, who at this
point, seem to acknowledge subtle change in the Department’s willingness to cooperate
over the Patriot Act. Though it should be noted that their praise of Gonzales is still rather
tentative—they do not seem to have completely made up their minds.
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The first exemplar of this recognition comes from Howard Berman (D CA) who
makes a direct comparison between Gonzales and Ashcroft: “Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman, and thank you, Mr. Attorney General, for being here and for at least conveying
the impression that you sometimes hear and even understand the questions we ask. That’s
already an improvement over your predecessor” (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 56). So
Berman is not ready yet to call Gonzales a bastion of democracy; in fact, after re-reading
this quotation in the context in which it was provided, it comes across as perhaps a little
snide in the sense that he is not giving Gonzales a great deal of credit—only recognizing
that he is an improvement over Ashcroft. But that he makes the recognition is important
to the analysis of patriotism as argument.
Another exemplar of this category comes from Delahunt, a very outspoken critic
of the Justice Department. In fact, recalling from previous debates, he coined phrases
such as “the culture of concealment” and “democracies die behind closed doors” to
describe the Justice Department under Ashcroft. The first of two quotations makes a
direct comparison between the discursive practices of the Justice Department under
Ashcroft and those under Gonzales:
To segue the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Flake, you referenced you have
confidence in Congress to exercise its oversight responsibilities and functions in
our constitutional order, but I share the same concern that my colleague to my
left, Mr. Schiff, articulated earlier to you about the lack of cooperation during the
course of the past four years in terms of providing that information to Members of
Congress so that we can exercise our oversight. So I would suggest that when we
talk about sunsets, sunsets have played a very, I think, important role because now
we seem to be engaged hopefully in a new way. (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p.
75)
Here, Delahunt references the sunsets that are about to expire as being integral to the
different type of engagement going on in this debate as opposed to what has been going
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on in previous debates13. A paragraph or two later, he specifically calls attention to the
language Gonzales uses: “So I really hope that we are moving, and I listened to your
words and I respect those words, but I hope we’re moving in a different direction in terms
of the relationship between this branch, this Committee, and the Department of Justice”
(USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 76).
Remnants of Ashcroft’s Patriotism
As mentioned above, there are themes of patriotism present in this debate leftover
from Ashcroft’s leadership. Given the new tone of the Justice Department just described,
the remnants of Ashcroft’s patriotism have less impact—or at least an altered impact, but
they are present and need to be addressed.
All-Or-Nothing
Iterations of Ashcroft’s all-or-nothing ethos are present in the debate, though
certainly not as prevalent as when Ashcroft was leading the charge. However, to not
mention the presence would be to not give an accurate interpretation. In fact, in looking
back to the very beginning of the debate, the all-or nothing dichotomy is constructed
prior to the point at which any of the changes to ethos are noticeable.
In Gonzales’s opening statement, we find the point at which he utilizes the
rhetoric of fear to remind the audience that, “Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups still
pose a grave threat to the security of the American people and now is not the time to
relinquish some of our most effective tools in the fight” (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p.
34). In the very next paragraph, Gonzales claims that he is open to suggestions, but then
says, “But let me be clear that I cannot support any proposal that would undermine our
ability to combat terrorism effectively” (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 34) This sort of
13 The sunsets as stimuli to the debate over patriotism become a particular focus of
analysis later.
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response fails to recognize that there are other proposals claiming to offer the same tools
as the Patriot Act, but with greater safeguards for liberty. In fact, as the interpretation of
the critics’ case above reveals, there is virtually no one in this debate who thinks that the
provisions of the Patriot Act are not useful in terms of fighting terror. However, Gonzales
seems to group all other proposals for substantive change to the Patriot Act, into the
category of undermining “our ability to combat terrorism effectively” (USA PATRIOT
Act, 2005, p. 34). Gonzales believes that the only responsible reform of the Patriot Act
would be clarification of the standards already existing within it.
In the next exemplar, we find a majority member of the House, Daniel Lungren
(R CA), making reference to a speech by Gonzales given outside of the legislative
process, in which Gonzales warns Congress that the Patriot Act is the only way to go.
Lungren says: “Mr. Attorney General, you have said here and you’ve said before, and I’ll
quote an article in the New York Times that quotes you as warning Congress that we
cannot afford to assume the quiet of the day will mean peace for tomorrow and the
terrorist threat will not expire, even if parts of the PATRIOT Act are allowed to” (USA
PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 51). Implicit in this quote within a quote is the notion that those
who would consider not reauthorizing the sunsetted provisions do not believe the terrorist
threat has gone away; i.e. there is no other way to approach the war on terror other than
the Patriot Act.
The Critics are Confused
Along with the new tone of the Justice Department comes a lessened attack on the
ethos of the critics. Though, it is certainly present throughout the debate. The extension
of the all-or-nothing dichotomy suggested by Gonzales is an attack on their ethos, but
aside from that, there are no accusations of hysteria or paranoia made by Gonzales
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specifically. All he says along these lines are that there is a lot of bad information out
there and that any constitutional problems do not come from the Patriot Act, but from
other sections of the law associated with the Patriot Act:
And as I travel around the country and I’ve encouraged other officials within the
Department of Justice to go out and try to solicit examples of where real abuses or
misuses of the PATRIOT Act have occurred, there’s a lot of misinformation, a lot
of disinformation out there. Some people believe that because certain provisions
may have been struck down, that means that the PATRIOT Act was somehow
found unconstitutional, and we discovered that, no, it related to a provision that
was passed by the Congress years before the PATRIOT Act. (USA PATRIOT
Act, 2005, pp. 58-59)
Interestingly, Gonzales’s description here is actually, in a sense, defending the ethos of
the critics from a more visceral, ad homonym attack upon them. He is addressing an
argument posed by Steve King (R IA) who, had just accused the critics of demagoguery:
Would you care to expand on that? I guess the question comes to me is why do I
continually hear the stories about civil liberties being violated—and I’d expand
my question a little more in that I’m inclined to support eliminating the sunset on
the PATRIOT Act for the very reason of the demagoguery that I hear about the
abuse of the PATRIOT Act and not finding evidence of it. (USA PATRIOT Act,
2005, p. 58)
So, Gonzales here is actually defending the critics in a sense by backing down from the
accusation of demagoguery and deferring confusion to a lack of good information.
We’ve Been Conservative…Trust Us
Gonzales, like his predecessor, utilizes the “we are always careful” argument
quite a bit in this debate; in fact, I count it nine times. But unlike his predecessor, he
provides his questioners with at least some reason to believe him given the different tone
that seems to be present. In the following exemplar, Gonzales is actually discussing the
ethos of the Justice Department prior to the Patriot Act. He is responding to a question
from Jeff Flake (R AZ) who asks Gonzales about the infamous “wall” existing between
the law enforcement community and intelligence officials prior to the enactment of the
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Patriot Act. He argues that that barrier to communication was not concretely a legal one
but rather a cultural phenomenon. In other words, the Patriot Act did not change legal
precedent much; it simply clarified legal precedent for the war on terror (an argument
made a few different times during the debate).
Gonzales replies by acknowledging that the wall was more of a cultural
phenomenon than a legal one. The wall was artificially constructed because the Justice
Department is always very conservative when it comes to protecting civil liberties:
Well, there certainly was a culture that existed. Rightly or wrongly, I think people
wanted to be very, very careful because people in—most people in Government
really do—are concerned about doing the right thing and not doing things that in
any way infringe upon the civil liberties of ordinary Americans. And so, you
know, I certainly wouldn’t characterize it, I mean, as a—I think people were just
doing what they thought was the right thing to do. (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p.
74)
Certainly, there are other places where Gonzales talks about how the Justice Department
is careful when it comes to civil rights and how the President is very serious about them
as well. Since this theme is one that has been investigated thoroughly in previous
analysis, we will move on to other themes—leaving this one knowing that it is still
present, but perhaps more believable given the perception of the new tone of the debate
encouraged by Gonzales.
The Process Has Worked
The claim that the deliberative process has worked is another theme that has been
a part of the Justice Department’s message throughout much of the debate. Because it has
been analyzed in previous chapters, I hesitate to expend too much energy on it here, but
analysis would be incomplete without acknowledging its presence. Sensenbrenner, as the
Chair of the Judiciary Committee, obviously has an interest in arguing for the success of
the deliberative process. He does so in his opening statement analyzed earlier.
350
Gonzales too, argues for the success of the process. Even though he acknowledges
that mistakes have been made in the way in which information has been disclosed, he
does not mean that he questions the overall vitality of the deliberation-as-democratic
process. In fact, he seems to think very highly of it in the grand scheme of things. For
instance, in the following quotation, Gonzales had just finished describing the level of
misinformation related to the Patriot Act (a previously analyzed exemplar). He says that
in reality, the record of the Justice Department is very good and attributes some of that
success to the job Congress did in finding a good balance between safety and liberty: “I
think that, again, I think the record of the Department is a very good one regarding the
use of the PATRIOT Act. I think that the record also reflects that Congress probably was
effective in achieving a good balance between protection of civil liberties and protection
of this country” (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 59).
The Debate Over the Sunset
The debate over the sunset of the controversial provisions is perhaps the most
important part of the debate. As previous analysis recognizes, critics generally support
most, if not all, of the fundamental ideas behind the Patriot Act; they simply would like to
see more checks on its implementation. Since the sunsets are the biggest check on
implementation and are the reasons why the Patriot Act is finally being debated with
some deliberative rigor, they become an important focal point of analysis. They are
significant horizons to the way in which patriot as symbol is negotiated. According to
people from both sides of the political aisle who speak up about the sunsets in this debate,
the patriotic thing to do is keep them in place. Those who support making the provisions
permanent are by far in the minority. Of the seven people to comment directly about the
potential of future sunsets in the reauthorized version, five support keeping them in the
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future. Interestingly, three of them are Republicans (Lungren, Ghomert, and Flake) and
two of them are Democrats (Lofgren and Delahunt). The only two people in this debate to
reject the idea of future sunsets are Gonzales and Steve King (R IA).
The first time the sunset comes up is very early in the debate while Sensenbrenner
is asking questions to Gonzales. He points out that he was instrumental in adding the
sunset to the Patriot Act and then asks Gonzales if he thinks it should be repealed:
Attorney General Gonzales, as you know, I was instrumental in putting the sunset
into the PATRIOT Act because I felt that the Congress should have a chance to
have the opportunity to review the effectiveness of the Act’s provisions as well as
use that as a tool to do oversight over the Department of Justice. Do you believe
that the sunset should be completely repealed, or do you think that there should be
another sunset put in, and if so, how far in the future do you think we should
force another review? (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 48)
Sensenbrenner is obviously proud of his role in enacting the sunset originally, but as
noted earlier, it is frustratingly unclear as to whether he supports the sunset into the
future. He never makes this clear throughout the course of this debate.
In answering Sensenbrenner’s question, Gonzales articulates that he would
definitely like to see the provisions made permanent. He explains that the Patriot Act has
a success record and that Congress should be able to trust the Justice Department with the
new authorities:
Mr. Chairman, it was my understanding that the sunset provisions were included
in the Act because of concerns about whether or not the Congress had achieved
the right balance between protecting our country and securing our civil liberties.
We’ve now had a period of time to evaluate how these provisions work, how the
Department has used these provisions. I think it’s a strong record of success. I
think the Act has been effective. I think the Department has acted responsibly. I
think there is sufficient information for the Congress to make a determination
that, in fact, these provisions should be made permanent. (USA PATRIOT Act,
2005, p. 48)
Furthermore, Gonzales adds that “as a matter of reality,” Congress does not need the
sunset to do its job of oversight:
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As a matter of reality, we all understand that the Congress at any time, the next
year or the year after, could at any time evaluate whether or not certain provisions
should be discontinued, and so even if the decision were made to remove the
sunsets, that would not, in my judgment, in any way affect the ability or the right
or the authority of Congress to examine and reexamine the way that these
authorities are working and the way that the Department is using these authorities.
(USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 48)
Gonzales’s point is made that the sunset is not necessary—there is no real need for it, but
what strikes me is that he does not make an argument that the sunsets are in and of
themselves a bad thing. In other words his arguments are all defensive in nature.
A few pages later in the transcript, Steve King (R IA) provides some offense to
the justification for getting rid of the sunset provisions; however, the argument is not very
rational in nature—it seems to be out of spite to the critics who are, according to King,
“demagogues.” The following quotation is utilized as an exemplar earlier in this analysis
but part of it warrants a second look while discussing the debate over the sunsets14: “I’m
inclined to support eliminating the sunset on the PATRIOT Act for the very reason of the
demagoguery that I hear about the abuse of the PATRIOT Act and not finding evidence
of it” (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 58). We know from previous analysis, that in this
instance, Gonzales disagreed with King and steered away from the justification of spite
due to demagoguery. Nonetheless no real justification for why the sunsets are bad and
hinder the Justice Department’s war on terror is offered.
It is not until Chapter 12 that we find a good reason provided for future sunsets.
There, James Comey, Deputy Attorney General refers to the notion of the Patriot Act as
cultural change—and argues that because the Patriot Act changed the culture of the
relationship existing between law enforcement agencies and the intelligence community,
such that they can more openly share information with each other. Thus, the argument for
14 To gain more context behind this quote, readers should refer back to the section
entitled, “Critics are not Demagogues…They’re just confused.”
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getting rid of the sunsets is that cultural change cannot be fully embedded as long as
critical parts of the act are provisional. Keep in mind though that this argument is not
articulated in this particular debate. In fact, we actually find some evidence that Gonzales
may have begun to back down from his insistence on the sunsets being repealed.
This evidence comes during an answer to a question by a majority member of the
House, Jeff Flake (R AZ). Very briefly, Flake provides a reason for continuing with the
sunsets, claiming that they are in fact necessary for meaningful debate, and then asks
Gonzales again what he thinks about them: “Very quickly, before my time runs out, let
me just be clear about the Justice Department’s preference or position, I guess, on
sunsets. I want to commend the Chairman for insisting on the sunset. I think to the extent
that we’ve been careful and circumspect, it’s largely as a result of the sunset provision”
(USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 74). Aside from articulating the notion that the sunset is
the reason why Congress has performed effective oversight, he also says something very
interesting about Sensenbrenner. He points out that Sensenbrenner insisted on the sunset
and that he was instrumental in having the sunset in the first place—something that was
noted during Sensenbrenner’s opening statement. Then, after arguing for the continuance
of the sunset, Flake asks Gonzales, “Are you saying that the Justice Department wants to
do away with the sunset provision?”
Gonzales’s response is quite interesting in that at the very beginning of the
answer, Gonzales claims to be unsure about the necessity of the sunsets. Further, his only
argument to justify that sunsets should not be a part of the reauthorized Patriot Act is
strategically speaking, rather defensive in nature. He simply claims that he trusts
Congress to do its job with or without the sunset:
I don’t know whether or not the sunsets are necessary. I fully trust Congress to
perform its oversight functions. I hope Congress doesn’t need the sunset
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provisions in order to perform its oversight functions. The sunsets were put in
there initially because of the fact that people were concerned that decisions had
been reached quickly about the bill. We now have a history of three-and-a-half
years, and so my view is that Congress has all the authority it needs to perform
the oversight necessary in the way that this Department exercises the authorities
under the PATRIOT Act. (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 75)
Earlier in the debate, when responding to a similar question by Sensenbrenner, he makes
a definite claim that he would like to see the provisions made permanent. Later in the
debate, after hearing the reasons for extending it, he claims that he does not “know
whether or not the sunsets are necessary.”
Before ending this chapter, it is necessary to more clearly spell out the reasons for
continuing with the sunset—the reason given by participants in this debate from both
sides of the aisle. Zoe Lofgren (D CA) Lofgren articulates well, the specific importance
of the continued sunsets:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am glad that we are having this hearing. I have
felt for the past several years that we should have had some oversight in a formal
sense in the Committee. And I think back to those days after 9/11 and the
Committee really did work closely together, and I remember over the weekend in
this very room personally being here and working on the drafts before the
Committee with Viet Din and others who were—and we had a unanimous vote, I
believe, out of this Committee. Key to that was a sunset to make sure that we
hadn’t made a mistake, and I think I’m going to want a continued sunset just so it
forces the Committee to review how this is going. (USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p.
66)
According to Lofgren, no meaningful debate whatsoever would have occurred if not for
the sunset; thus, he supports it for the future.
Summary
The debate is finally making progress. The Justice Department changed its tone
and in turn, the critics acknowledged the change, but not before taking a few parting
shots at Ashcroft. Conyers, at the very beginning of the debate, calls into question the
entire spirit of the Patriot Act by quoting Ashcroft’s “phantom of lost liberties” quotation
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from December of 2001. That quote set the tone for the entire debate under his watch,
and finally, critics are able to come out from underneath it. Others in the debate also took
parting shots at Ashcroft and compared Gonzales’s Department very favorably to
Ashcroft’s department. Memos and other forms of oversight had occurred prior to this
hearing, and members of the Committee seem to recognize that Gonzales is more willing
to cooperate and that generally speaking, the deliberative process is improving.
Gonzales continues making the effort to change the Justice Department’s image.
He acknowledges that mistakes have been made (though he is careful to specify that
those mistakes are not Patriot Act related). He also makes it clear that he is open to
amendments (but then is careful to specify amendments of clarification—not necessarily
substantive change). He also releases additional new information about the way in which
a couple of the controversial provisions have been utilized. Finally, Gonzales makes a
very direct statement about the nature of patriotism: he says that true patriots question
authority—a hallmark of political patriotism.
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Chapter 12
We are Really Debating Now
During the 4/6/05 hearing, discourse from both the new Attorney General Alberto
Gonzales as well as from some of the most vociferous critics in this debate thus far, leads
to the anticipation that the deliberative process was improving thanks in part to the new
tone of the Justice Department, one that recognizes the legitimacy of the questions
coming from critics—an important change in tone for the deliberative process. It should
be noted again that between the hearings on 4/6/05 and 6/8/05, nine different
subcommittee hearings occurred in the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security and that for methodological reasons of practicality, this discourse is
left out of analysis. Nonetheless, the 6/8/05 debate shows clear evidence that the
anticipation of more meaningful debate comes to fruition.
Opening Statements
Sensenbrenner
Chairman Sensenbrenner begins his opening statement by thanking James Comey
for coming today as well as by thanking Mr. Coble (R NC) and Mr. Scott (D VA) the
chairman and ranking member of the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland
Security. According to Sensenbrenner, the nine hearings held in that subcommittee were
quite effective at informing Congress and the public about the Patriot Act:
I would also like to thank Chairman Coble, Ranking Member Scott, and other
Members of the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, for
holding nine of the 11 hearings on the PATRIOT Act. These hearings have been
beneficial in informing Congress and the public about many aspects of the
PATRIOT Act, and also demonstrate this Committee’s continued commitment to
taking our oversight responsibility seriously. (Reauthorization of the USA
PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 1)
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More specifically, Sensenbrenner claims that through the hearings, we learned that the
Patriot Act is beneficial due to the way in which it tore down the wall between law
enforcement and the intelligence community and how it updated laws to match the
technology utilized by terrorists.
In the next portion of the Sensenbrenner’s speech, we find remnants of the all-or-
nothing dichotomy. He states that critics have no real basis for criticisms—that they are
all hypothetical complaints and then implies that those same critics want to refuse law
enforcement “vital anti-terrorism tools:”
In reviewing the authorities of this act, it is crucial to focus on the facts, and not on
hypothetical scenarios. In a post-9/11 world, it would be irresponsible to refuse to
provide our law enforcement authorities with vital anti-terrorism tools based solely
on the possibility that somewhere at some time someone might abuse the law.
Unfortunately, all Government powers have the potential to be abused; which is
why Congress provides penalties for such abuse. Additionally, Congress, the
courts, and the executive branch have created several protections against abuse
before, during, and after the enactment of the PATRIOT Act. Rather than base the
decision on whether to reauthorize the PATRIOT Act on scenarios on how it might
be abused, I think it is more constructive to focus our review on how the
PATRIOT Act has actually been used. (Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT
Act, 2005, p. 1)
The facts that have been uncovered according to Sensenbrenner have accomplished three
overarching goals demonstrating success of the Patriot Act.
The first goal accomplished that Sensenbrenner speaks of is the clarification
offered through the hearings concerning the infamous “library provision:”
I am pleased that these hearings have also been effective in dispelling public
misconceptions about the PATRIOT Act. For instance, the Attorney General
informed us that section 215, dubbed ‘‘the library provision,’’ has never been
used to obtain business records from a library or bookstore. However, the
hearings have also demonstrated the danger of carving out safe harbors or
exemptions that terrorists could exploit. As U.S. Attorney Wainstein testified,
the 9/11 terrorists used computers in public libraries to check on their travel
arrangements for the day of the attack. (Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT
Act, 2005, p. 2)
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Here, he invokes the idea that all criticism of section 215 is due to “public
misconceptions” and then utilizes the rhetoric of fear to justify its need.
The second goal accomplished in the previous hearings, according to
Sensenbrenner, also involves the Justice Department having the opportunity to explain
away misconceptions about the Patriot Act—specifically involving the probable cause
standard in relation to surveillance:
These hearings also corrected the erroneous claim that probable cause was no
longer necessary when law enforcement sought court approval for surveillance
orders. Probable cause is needed in both a criminal case or an intelligence case.
For a criminal case, there must be probable cause that a crime has been or is about
to be committed, and for an intelligence case, there must be probable cause that
the target of the surveillance is an agent of a foreign power. These probable cause
standards existed before the PATRIOT Act, and remain unchanged.
(Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 2)
Finally, the third goal accomplished by the previous nine hearings is that they provided
the Justice Department to explain the way in which the Patriot Act provides necessary
checks and balances on due process, including notification to suspected terrorists,
reporting to Congress, and providing the ability to challenge Justice Department actions
in court: “The hearings also provided the Members and the Department of Justice the
opportunity to discuss the adequacy of notice to suspected terrorists and criminals, the
need for reporting to Congress, and the ability to challenge the intelligence authorities in
court” (Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 2).
Finally, after establishing that the deliberative process has been successful thus
far, Sensenbrenner announces the purpose of the current hearing: “The hearing today will
provide Members the opportunity to address any issues that remain open and allow the
Deputy Attorney General to address any concerns that were raised during the previous
hearings” (Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 2). Having said that, Mr.
Conyers is recognized for his opening statement. However, for some unknown reason,
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Conyers elects not to give an oral statement and simply inserts his opening statement into
the record; thus, it is eliminated from analysis. This is rather disappointing to me simply
because thus far during interpretation, the opening statements have served the purpose
well of previewing the key arguments that would be extended throughout the debate. In
academic competitive debate terms, they have served as effective constructive speeches.
Unfortunately, in this debate, the critics were not represented through a constructive
speech.
Comey
Comey’s opening statement begins by extending the new patriotism espoused by
Attorney General Gonzales in a very direct way. He articulates his belief that people
should question the authority of the Government and be very skeptical of it:
I believe that people should question authority; that people should be skeptical of
Government power; people should demand answers about how the Government is
using its power. Our country, I was taught, was founded by people who had a big
problem with Government power and worried about Government power, and so
divided our powers and then added a Bill of Rights to make sure that some of
their concerns were set out in writing. I think it’s incumbent upon the Government
to explain how it’s using power, how its tools have been important, how they
matter, and to respond especially to the oversight of the legislative branch. I think
citizens should question authority, and should demand the details about how the
Government is using its power. (Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act,
2005, p. 4)
Then, after defining criticism of government as a patriotic duty, Comey goes to even
greater lengths to symbolically separate the new leadership of the Justice Department
under Gonzales from the way in which it was lead under Ashcroft. Comey admits there
was a time when he did not ever think the Patriot Act would receive the proper debate
that it deserved—largely because the information was not available to engage the debate:
I worried very much a year ago that we were never going to find the space in
American life to have a debate, a real informed discussion about the PATRIOT
Act. Instead, where we had found ourselves was people on both sides of the issue
exchanging bumper stickers; people standing around at a barbecue or a cocktail
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party and talking about all manner of things, and someone saying, ‘‘Isn’t the
PATRIOT Act evil?’’ and people would nod and then go on talking about whether
the Nationals were going to be a real baseball team or current events of some sort,
and that we were missing a discussion from both sides, a demand for the details
and a supplying of the details. (Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005,
pp. 4-5)
Though I can agree with much of Comey’s synopsis of the debate, I would have to point
out fault with the last sentence when he claims that there was not “a demand for the
details” (Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 5). I think very clearly,
after interpreting the debate from the beginning, there has been a persistent demand for
details. Perhaps not enough people were demanding details, or perhaps just not the right
people were demanding details, but throughout the debate, we find critics who demand
details and complain of not receiving them. Despite the one glaring inaccuracy however,
his synopsis of the debate is correct when he says the deliberative process governing the
authorization and implementation of the Patriot Act has not been effective.
He is happy to report though that the most recent round of debate governing the
reauthorization of the act has reassured him that the democratic process is working:
I worried very much about that. I needn’t have worried. Thanks largely to the
work of this Committee and to your colleagues in the Senate, we have had, as you
said, Mr. Chairman, a robust discussion and debate about these tools over the last
months. And I think the American people understand them better. I think all of us
have had an opportunity to demand details and respond to the questions.
(Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 5)
In the spirit of continuing the process, Comey looks forward to answering more
questions, especially questions that demand the details. Then he introduces a phrase that
becomes sort of a buzz phrase at various points throughout this round of debate. He
argues that the “angel is in the details,” and claims that as details about the
implementation of the Patriot Act become more available, the effectiveness of the act
becomes more transparent:
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I look forward to answering any and all questions, especially those about the
details. I believe that the angel of the PATRIOT Act is in those details. The angel
is in demonstrating that these are tools that make a difference in the life of this
country and in our ability to protect people in this country. I think the angel is also
in the details that demonstrate to folks that the PATRIOT Act is chock full of
oversight, in a lot of ways that regular criminal procedure is not; full of the
involvement of Federal judges, full of the involvement of the Inspector General,
full of the involvement of this Committee and other Committees in Congress to
conduct rigorous oversight in response to our reporting about what we’re doing.
(Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 5)
He begins to wrap up his opening statement by providing the bottom line—his belief that
not only should the sunsetted provisions be reauthorized but also that they should be
made permanent:
The bottom line, I believe, is that the PATRIOT Act is smart; it’s ordinary in a lot
of respects; it’s certainly constitutional. We ought to make permanent the
provisions that have meant so much to the people that I represent: the men and
women in law enforcement and in the intelligence community fighting the fight
against terrorism and crimes of all sorts. (Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT
Act, 2005, p. 5)
Finally, Comey ends by again, separating his ethos (as part of the new Justice Department
under Gonzales) from Ashcroft’s, by claiming that he will try to answer questions rather
than talking past them: “So I thank you for this opportunity. I look forward to a robust
discussion and debate. And I will try my best to answer any and all questions, and not
talk past a question, but respond directly. So thank you, Mr. Chairman” (Reauthorization
of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 5)
The Case of the Critics
After a couple of non-penetrating questions of clarification from Sensenbrenner as
the first questioner, it is Conyer’s turn and we can begin to piece together the arguments
that he might of emphasized had he chosen to provide an oral opening statement. During
his line of questioning, he brings up three main arguments. First of all, he mentions that
some questions submitted to the Department of Justice several weeks ago have still not
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received any response. Secondly, he references an argument that began to surface
recently—during the debate with Gonzales, pertaining to the idea that the “spirit of the
Patriot Act” links it to so many other Executive Branch activities that have gone
unquestioned. Thirdly, he alludes to the “murky circumstances” (Reauthorization of the
USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 22) under which the act was initially authorized.
The first and third of these arguments posed by Conyers are remnants of the
debate that occurred during the implementation stage of debate. They were cornerstones
of the critics’ arguments; their overall claim was that they could not debate the Patriot
Act effectively because they could not obtain any meaningful information about its
implementation. In general, the Justice Department under Ashcroft’s leadership did not
value Congress’s input. However, in the first debate analyzed in this chapter, with
Gonzales as the witness, the anticipation of a new attitude of cooperation and information
disclosure is noticeable. Based upon the way in which the current debate transpires and
reflects upon the nine subcommittee hearings previously mentioned, it seems that the
anticipation came to fruition, and that debate is more effective at uncovering the real
controversy underlying the Patriot Act. So, the analysis of the case of the critics here is
divided into two main sections. First of all, I examine how critics acknowledge an
increased level of cooperation coming from the new leadership and how that
acknowledgment leads to more transparent, rational debate. Then secondly, I examine the
true underlying controversy exposed due to the new tone of cooperation—the controversy
over the symbolism of the Patriot Act.
The Deliberative Process Has Improved
The accusation that the Justice Department does not value consultation, for the
most part, fades away as an issue of the past. Statistically speaking, the number of
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arguments leading to that conclusion is relatively low compared to past debates. But also,
a close textual analysis of the content of those arguments reveals that even when they are
made, they are made in such a way that does not necessarily question the good will, or
the ethos, of the current Justice Department; they are made in such a way that
acknowledges a deliberative process in transition to greater quality. When putting the
remnants of the old criticism into perspective of the other arguments related to
acknowledging the new level of cooperation, it becomes rather clear that the level of
cooperation by the Justice Department has increased noticeably.
Criticism Reflects a More Collaborative Tone
To begin to break down what seems to be a rather complicated turning point in
the debate, it seems necessary to illustrate that even though there may be remnants of old
criticisms, such as a lack of cooperation, these criticisms reflect a more collaborative tone
than in previous stages of debate. Conyers reminds us that the process is still not perfect
at the very beginning of his turn to question Comey by mentioning an instance in which
he did not receive answers to important questions:
Several weeks ago, Mr. Deputy Attorney General, Members of the Committee
have submitted questions to the Department of Justice, and we’ve not had any
response. And if you could help expedite a response to those questions—they are
all in the record of the some-11 hearings that have been held—we would be
grateful. (Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 22)
Conyers is obviously displeased about not having questions answered, but nowhere in
this argument is found an accusation that the lack of information is the result of the
Justice Department being manipulative. In the previous stage of debate, the lack of
information argument was embedded inside a much more totalizing critique that the
Justice Department is not forthcoming, and is withholding information intentionally for
manipulative reasons. In this case though, Conyers seems to recognize that the answers
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are coming; he expresses confidence that receiving the answers is just a matter of Comey
expediting the response—it is an honest mistake.
In the next exemplar, a similar request is made with a similar sort of tone. Zoe
Lofgren (D CA) is referencing a question about section 218 which she posed specifically
to Gonzales during the first hearing of this stage of debate. She points out that Gonzales
could not answer the question on the spot, and further that she never got an answer after
the hearing was over:
Let me ask another question. And it goes back to our need to review the whole
situation, not just what is being sunsetted. I guess in a way it goes back to the
earlier comment about oversight and how much time and effort is being put into
answering the questions that Congress has posed. And I assure you, I don’t
question that you are putting in a considerable amount of time. But after the
Attorney General, Mr. Gonzales, appeared before the Committee, I had two
questions that he was not able to answer on the spot. One had to do with section
218, how many prosecutions for non-terrorism-related crimes had been a result of
this section, and then further, about the material witness section, under 3144 of 18
U.S. Code, how many individuals actually ended up testifying before a grand jury.
I never—he wasn’t able to answer it on the spot, which I can understand. I never
got the answer afterwards. Do you know the answer today? And if not, will you
promise to get me the answer? (Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005,
pp. 38-39)
Lofgren is obviously displeased that the answer to her question has not been provided,
but at the same time, she makes it clear that she is not questioning the good will of the
Justice Department. For instance, before even making the argument, she preempts any
notion that she is questioning the effort of government officials by acknowledging that
they “are putting in a considerable amount of time” (Reauthorization of the USA
PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 38). Furthermore, after making the argument, she explicitly
states that she “can understand” why it was not possible to provide the answer “on the
spot” and goes on to express confidence in Comey’s ability to follow up on the question.
Comey responds by saying he does not know the answer due to the fact that the
data has not been collected yet; however, he promises that it is being collected presently
365
and that the Department will supply it as soon as it becomes available: “I don’t know the
answer, and I will promise to get you the answer. And I can do that with some
confidence, because I know it’s being worked on very hard. They’re collecting—we’re
going out to the field to collect the information so that we can supply it” (Reauthorization
of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 39). Obviously, Comey’s promise in and of itself is
not enough evidence to substantiate the claim that cooperation is increasing, nor is the
observation about the changed tone in which the criticism is lodged. But, if we consider
these observations with the fact that these two exemplars are the only ones found in the
entire debate where people complain of not having questions answered, along with the
categories of analysis to come, the picture of increased cooperation begins to be painted.
The other lack of cooperation claim lodged by Conyers during his line of
questioning is the reminder of the way in which the bill was initially passed: “And I don’t
want to take you into ancient history, but I think you know the rather murky
circumstances of which the original bill this Committee passed was substituted for a bill
that came from the Department of Justice to the Rules Committee the night before it
came to the floor” (Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 22).
Obviously, this is a major complaint lodged by Conyers against the deliberative
process. But by the way in which Conyers refers to it as “ancient history,” he seems to be
letting it go by the wayside— a point that should not be forgotten but also, a point of
separation between the Ashcroft Justice Department and the one led by Gonzales. This
seems to ring especially true since Comey himself, during his opening statement,
acknowledges how poor the deliberative process had generally been prior to the
reauthorization stage. Furthermore, Comey seems to recognize the history of bad
deliberation again in response to the current argument being made by Conyers. After
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making the previously quoted argument, describing the way in which the act was initially
authorized, Conyers asks Comey, if he was aware of how everything happened. In
response, Comey says he was not directly aware of it because he was not a part of the
Justice Department at the time, but that he had heard about it through “press accounts”
(Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 22).
Even William Delahunt (D MA), one of the more antagonistic critics in this
debate praises the current Justice Department for its collaboration:
I happened to catch your reference to congressional oversight as being a check, if
you will, on behavior of the executive branch. And I agree with that. And I know
you’re sincere in that comment. And I also want to acknowledge that there has
been very good input from the Department of Justice during the hearings by the
Crime Subcommittee on the reauthorization. And I should commend the Chair for
directing Chairman Coble in conducting those hearings. I think it’s been very
fruitful. (Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 51)
To end the exemplar here would be a little misleading though. Delahunt is not ready to
forgive and forget for past grievances—he remains skeptical of the executive branch in
general:
And I think that there’s the potential for some consensus on some of the
substantive issues. But I’ve said this publicly at these hearings, and let me just
repeat it once more. I think there’s a natural disinclination on the part of the
executive—and I’m not referring specifically to the Department of Justice, but to
all executive agencies—to cooperate on an ad hoc basis, when it suits their
particular agenda, with Congress. I look back four years now, when we were in
the process of passing the PATRIOT Act. And as you well know, it came out of
this Committee with a 36-to-nothing, unanimous vote; which was extraordinary. It
subsequently was changed, to the chagrin of some of us. But I keep hearing the
comment from witnesses and from others saying that, “We have to make this
permanent.” (Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 51)
Though he remains very critical, Delahunt is careful to note that he is not referring
critical comments specifically to the current Justice Department. The past is the source of
his continued skepticism. The present is the source of a rejuvenated optimism.
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A Direct Comparison to Ashcroft
Arguments verifying the observation that the process is improving occur when
critics in the debate make direct comparisons to Ashcroft. At the end of the hearing,
perhaps what is the most interesting example of this argument occurs. Sensenbrenner
agrees with Delahunt’s assessment of the deliberative process and makes a very direct
comparison to Ashcroft to illustrate his point:
Mr. Comey, thank you very much for coming here and for your testimony. I
would like to echo the words of Mr. Delahunt. I believe that in the last year and a
half the Justice Department has been much more forthcoming on the PATRIOT
Act and on other issues than in the two and a half years prior to that. And this
Chair has both publicly and privately expressed to former Attorney General John
Ashcroft that an ‘‘I’ve got a secret’’ attitude on legitimate oversight that does not
involve classified information is self-defeating. I would like to salute both you
and Attorney General Gonzales. I think that there has been a change in attitude
that has been particularly marked in the hearings that we’ve had on this. You help
your cause by coming up here and answering questions in the way that you did,
and the way that your boss did a couple of months ago. And I hope that continues.
(Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 52)
To be honest, I do not recall an instance in which Sensenbrenner admonishes Ashcroft in
such a way as he does here. He has been found to disagree with Ashcroft over very few
substantive issues, such as the importance of the original sunsets, but questioning
Ashcroft’s ethos like this in the past is something that comes out of the blue. In fact, my
analysis finds Sensenbrenner praising the deliberative process from start to finish.
Nonetheless, the fact that he is admonishing Ashcroft’s ethos of secrecy in this moment,
which is toward the end of the reauthorization stage of debate, is significant. The fact that
he and Delahunt (two people who have been in direct disagreement with each other
throughout much of the debate) can agree with each other over any aspect of the current
nature of the deliberative process, speaks volumes about the extent to which that process
seems to have improved during the reauthorization stage of debate.
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The next exemplar is also interesting because of the way in which Robert Scott (D
VA) gets Comey to comment specifically on the rhetoric of Ashcroft and the way in
which it had the effect of chilling public debate. Scott begins the line of questioning by
referring to a generic statement made by Comey during his opening statement pertaining
to the necessity of open debate; then he compares Comey’s statement to a direct
quotation made infamous by Ashcroft:
You mentioned in your opening remarks that there is certain language that is not
helpful in promoting an honest dialogue about this legislation. Would that include
language such as, ‘‘To those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost
liberty, my message is this: Your tactics only aid terrorists; for they erode our
national unity and diminish our resolve’’? (Reauthorization of the USA
PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 29)
Comey’s response is of course very politically correct; yet, at the same time, it is not at
all unclear what he meant in his opening statement:
I may be a short-timer, Mr. Scott, but I would prefer not to focus on anybody’s
words in particular. Any words that chill aggressive questioning of Government
authority I think are not helpful. As I said in my opening, I think people should
demand to know—all points of the political spectrum. I think Republicans should
have as big a problem with Government power as Democrats. (Reauthorization of
the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 29)
Scott does not want to let Comey get away from the question without a specific
connection established between Comey’s attitude and Ashcroft’s. So, Scott simply asks,
“You recognize the words?” and Comey responds, “I’ve heard them before, yes, sir”
(Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 29). So, without having to come
out and directly say it, it becomes evident that the answer to Scott’s question is an
implied “yes…Ashcroft did chill public debate” and that everyone should question the
power of Government.
Cool Down the Rhetoric
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The following exemplar demonstrates an effort by a minority member of the
Committee who has been a very vocal critic of the Justice Department to respond to the
notable change in attitude by the Justice Department by attempting to strike a symbolic
compromise. Zoe Lofgren (D CA) acknowledges the validity of a claim made by Comey
during his opening statement—where he said that some people do need to “cool down the
rhetoric” (Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 37), pointing out this
advice applies to people on both sides of the aisle:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Mr. Comey. I, to some extent, agree
with the comments that we need to cool down the rhetoric on the PATRIOT Act. I
think we’re here, and it’s important that we’re here, to review the details not just
of the sunsetting provisions of the act, but all of the act. And yet, having said that,
there are people in the country that everything they don’t like they believe is
because of the PATRIOT Act. And I constantly challenge, ‘‘Where in the act is
this misbehavior?’’ There’s things I don’t like, too, but it’s not all in the
PATRIOT Act. At the same time, I think it’s a terrible mistake to criticize those,
or to question the patriotism of those who are legitimately engaging in oversight
to make sure if we have preserved the balance between our civil liberties and our
need to have vigorous law enforcement; which is what we’re doing here today.
(Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 37)
In light of her calling attention to the inflamed rhetoric, and asking people from all sides
of the debate to “cool down,” it is worth noting that again, people from all sides of the
debate have done so to a great extent—thanks largely to the new attitude portrayed by the
change in the Justice Department.
There are exceptions to this cooling down effort though. From the left, the
example comes from Jerrold Nadler (D NY). Recalling from the last stage of the debate,
Nadler accused the Bush Administration of being tyrannical. In the current debate, he
refers to their new powers as arbitrary and “un-American:”
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, first of all, before I ask my questions, let me
say I want to associate myself with the comments of the gentleman from
California, Mr. Berman. It seems to me that what he was driving at, the need for
specificity in some of these with some of these tools, really defines the difference
between due process and arbitrary power. And much of what we’re doing, or what
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we’re dealing with, is very high risk of the use of arbitrary power; which is un-
American, our tradition. And that’s what we’re getting at. (Reauthorization of the
USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 33)
The remarks made by Berman, to which Nadler refers, are examined below; however,
readers should know that while the content of the association Nadler tries to establish
may be related, the style is not. Berman does not call anybody in this debate un-
American. Nadler’s antagonistic comment here is the only such one coming from the left
side of the political aisle.
From the right side of the aisle, we have a couple of comments from Louie
Gohmert (R TX) and one from Comey. In Ghomert’s case, he begins with what seems
like an appeal to do just what Lofgren was calling for earlier—to “cool down the
rhetoric;” but in actuality, he just wants to take a couple of partisan shots at liberals. He
begins his statement by noting his offense at individuals who have described Guantanamo
Bay and Abu Ghraib prison camps as being like gulags—which is fair enough, but then
he goes to describe those people as having “their head up an earthen or biological hole”
(Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 39), which would seem to inflame
the rhetoric:
First of all, I want to address something that was brought up earlier very quickly.
And that is the so-called abuse or torture some people referred to, whether at Abu
Ghraib or Guantanamo. And I’m deeply offended when I hear that individuals
indicate that Abu Ghraib was some type of gulag. They need to go back and read
the accounts of what happened to our fly-boys in the Pacific in World War II,
when they had internal organs removed to be cannibalized by their captors; or had
holes drilled in the head while their brain was probed while they were alive, to see
what parts responded to what probing; to have bones repeatedly broken; to be
handcuffed from behind and be hung by the wrists. These people that think that
we are running gulags either have their head up an earthen or biological hole
somewhere. I’m concerned. (Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p.
39)
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Then a second comment by Gohmert also caught my attention as being rather extraneous
and inflammatory. He indicts the ethos of a former President who advocated the closing
of Guantanamo Bay by accusing him of not protecting American soil when in the
position of needing to; in other words, the President to which he refers is not very
patriotic:
But anyway, also to read in a local tabloid today that a former President believes
we should close Guantanamo, when perhaps he didn’t protect the country when
we had American soil attacked and our own people taken hostage and nothing
meaningful was done for over a year to ever try to get them out, I have to take that
with a grain of salt. (Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 39)
Gohmert does not specifically name the President he is referring to. Based upon the
context of the quotation, it sounded like maybe it was Jimmy Carter. To firm that context
up, I did a little research to try and figure out to whom he was referring and it was indeed
Carter. Interestingly though, in the same news source I learned that, I also learned that a
couple of weeks after this hearing, Bill Clinton also called for the closing (Clinton urges
Guantanamo Closing, 2005, June 20). Ironically, the same article also gave examples of
those who have called Guantanamo a gulag. Democratic Senator Dick Durbin
“compared interrogation practices at the prison to those used under Hitler and Stalin”
(Clinton urges Guantanamo Closing, 2005, June 20) and “Amnesty International has
branded it ‘the gulag of our times’” (Clinton urges Guantanamo Closing, 2005, June 20).
So, we note that inflammatory rhetoric has come from all sides of the war on
terror debate—probably an observation that could go without saying, but since it comes
up specifically as part of the data, it is worth noting. The only other comments I noticed
as being potentially inflammatory come under the category of “critics do not understand
the Patriot Act”—a category to be discussed in more detail later. Even though that
category, in and of it self, is not what I would call inflammatory, some of the ways in
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which it is made in this debate are. For instance, Comey calls skeptics in the public
“bobble dolls” (Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 44) who are willing
to go along with whatever they hear. But, since this category is given more attention later
in analysis while the case of the Justice Department is being made, we will wait until then
to explore further. The big picture observation to come away with in this section is that
not only does the rhetoric in general seem to be “cooling down” to a third party observer
(notwithstanding some notable exceptions), but the participants in the debate are
themselves drawing attention to the “cooling down” period.
There are Still Issues, Despite Progress
The critics do go to great lengths here to credit the Justice Department for
changing its tone in such a way that makes debate more meaningful. However, that does
not mean that their concerns have gone away. In fact, due to the heightened sense of
transparency, their issues have come more to the forefront. As uncovered during the
previous debate, one result of the increased transparency of the Justice Department in
terms of fighting the war on terror is that critics are able to see that the Patriot Act in a
vacuum may be the least of their domestic worries. A much more general issue that came
to light during the implementation stage of debate is the license assumed by the Justice
Department to do what it felt necessary to protect the safety of Americans. They assumed
an inherent trust was instilled in them (to be fair, a lot of people did instill trust in them),
to act on their ideas quickly without the need to waste time by checking with
policymakers first. Since the terrorists had the ability to act quickly and decisively,
unilateral decision making was the way to go, and to use Ashcroft’s own words cited in
Chapter 9, it was “the spirit of the Patriot Act” allowing the Executive Branch to do so.
The Patriot Act seems to have become a symbolic decoy of sorts—a magnet of attention
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drawing so much political controversy that perhaps other executive branch policies
slipped by under the radar. Thus, critics in this debate attempt to draw those other
policies into the debate over the Patriot Act.
Furthermore, aside from the “spirit of the Patriot Act” being a symbolic
connection to other war on terror policies, there may yet be more direct, legal
connections. The Justice Department has acknowledged that they have made mistakes.
As we will see once we get down to the point in analysis where their case is made, they
divert blame away from the Patriot Act and onto other issues. Critics are not completely
convinced of the validity of this diversion, but at the same time, they also have a difficult
time in either explaining the connection or in verifying that the diversion is logically
sound. The reason for this difficulty is the fact that there is still a lot of confusion over
what exactly the Patriot Act does. In fact, once we get down to the point in this analysis
where the Justice Department makes its case, it seems as though they use this confusion
to their advantage.
So in response to this confusion, part of the case of the critics is to say that even if
the Patriot Act—in a vacuum, does perfectly balance the tension between safety and
liberty as is, there still needs to be a great deal more discussion to understand how and
why that is the case. The Patriot Act is massive; it intersects with and alters so many
different parts of the criminal code, that according to the case of the critics, this round of
hearings in which the Justice Department has finally begun to open up a little toward the
questions raised, should represent the beginning of the debate over the Patriot Act—not
the end.
The Scope of the Debate is too Narrow
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The biggest part of the critics’ case against the Patriot Act is that the scope of the
debate is too narrow. Conyers makes this point very clear early on during the questioning
of Comey:
Now, let’s be frank about this subject that we’re on. We’ve had lots of hearings,
but here is the problem. We haven’t been discussing much more than the expiring
provisions in the PATRIOT Act. Which is fair enough: we’ve got to make sure
we want to keep them, or we want to let them go. There have been a few added,
but let me review with you the matters that have not come before the Committee
at this point: The torture and abuse of detainees, Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo,
and other places; The outsourcing of torture; that is, rendition, sending people to
countries where we know torture is a standard activity; The practice of closed
immigration hearings; The indefinite detention of thousands of people who
responded to the Department of Justice and then end up being kept and held
without notification to their families or without them being able to contact a
lawyer; The racial profiling of many of the more than 30 countries with Middle
Eastern origins; And, the use of FISA authorities on non-terrorism cases. Now,
what we are trying to do here—and we’re in the process of deciding this within
the Committee—is whether we’re going to just review mostly the provisions that
are expiring, or whether we’re going to have an opportunity to look at the whole
PATRIOT Act. (Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 22)
Conyers claims that the “whole” Patriot Act needs debate—not just the sunset provisions
that were the foci of this round of reauthorization hearings, other non-sunsetted
provisions that did not necessarily receive a great deal of attention in these hearings, and
generally, the ethos of the Justice Department and the relationship it has with the United
States Congress. All of these things should be considered, according to Conyers, when
deciding whether or not to reauthorize the expiring provisions of the Patriot Act.
A few pages later in the transcript, Howard Berman (D CA), the next minority
member to have a turn to ask questions, puts forth a similar argument:
General Comey, as I mentioned to you in my office, I have a number of concerns
about actions that aren’t part of the PATRIOT Act, but relate to unilateral actions
taken by the Administration on issues that fall squarely within the jurisdiction of
this Committee; even though in these areas we haven’t at this point offered input.
(Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 25)
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Berman provides examples of a few different policies related to immigration including
the detention of non-citizens without notice of charges (i.e., the issue that has been
discussed as part of the infamous Inspector General’s report) and the “blanket closure” of
immigration proceedings as a result of the “Creppy Memo” (Reauthorization of the USA
PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 25). Essentially, the Justice Department has instituted a “one size
fits all” (Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 25) policy according to
Berman, and has done so without consulting the Judiciary Committee. Even though he
defines these criticisms as “concerns about actions that aren’t part of the PATRIOT Act”
(Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 25), Berman argues they do
deserve attention while considering reauthorization because the Patriot Act embodies the
ethos of unilateral action assumed by the Administration.
Berman continues his argument by pointing out that he has raised these issues
before during a previous hearing, and that Attorney General Gonzales had even
recognized mistakes were made; however, despite that acknowledgment, no real solutions
have been taken seriously. Berman exemplifies by bringing up the Civil Liberties
Restoration Act (C.L.R.A) as a solution that would not take away authorities granted by
the Patriot Act. As he gets into a description of what the C.L.R.A. accomplishes, a direct,
more legalistic connection between the “spirit” of the Patriot Act and many of these
“outside the Patriot Act” issues becomes more clear:
First, on the issue of notice of charges to detained non-citizens, we provided in
section 412 of the PATRIOT Act a way for you to hold aliens suspected of
involvement in terrorism for up to six months without approval of a judge, subject
only to issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, as long as they were given notice of
the charges against them within seven days. As far as we’ve been told, that power
has never been used. And instead, it was circumvented in favor of a policy put in
place before the PATRIOT Act that allows people to be held for indeterminate
periods of time with no notice of charges. Our bill would leave section 412
undisturbed, but replace the policy the Department put in place with a
requirement that a notice to appear be served on every non-citizen within 48 hours
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of his arrest or detention, and that those held for more than 48 hours be brought
before an immigration judge within 72 hours of arrest. You’d still have the 412
authority to hold for up to seven days, and then to keep in detention in cases of
suspected terrorism, espionage, and other provisions set forth in 412.
(Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 26)
It is very interesting that Mr. Berman, through an effort to criticize the ethos of the
Justice Department—i.e. the unilateral decision making authority claimed via the spirit of
the Patriot Act, is actually defending a provision of the Patriot Act to do so. He suggests
that there is an appropriate mechanism in section 412 to balance civil liberties with
safety; however, the Justice Department has found the wiggle room to circumvent that
mechanism. Thus, Berman argues that the C.L.R.A. proposal should be adopted because
it amends laws enacted prior to the Patriot Act so that the section 412-civil liberty
protection mechanism would have meaning.
There are a couple of other important exemplars illustrating the extent to which
critics attempt to connect the Patriot Act to other domestic war on terror policies. One of
them has already been presented earlier in analysis—in the section entitled “Criticism
Reflects A More Collaborative Tone.” In introducing her claim that she asked questions
of Gonzales in April of 2006, which still have not been answered as of June, 2006, Zoe
Lofgren prefaces the importance of the question by saying, “And it goes back to our need
to review the whole situation, not just what is being sunsetted” (Reauthorization of the
USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 38).
In another exemplar, Delahunt makes the connection between the limited scope of
the debate and the need for continued sunsets on the provisions to be reauthorized.
Analysis of the debate over the continued sunsets is being reserved as a topic in and of
itself for the end of this chapter. We will definitely come back and take a very close look
at that exemplar later. The importance of mentioning it here though, as well as the
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Lofgren exemplar, is that what is at stake in the debate over the Patriot Act is not just the
legal provisions found therein—which is not to say that the legal provisions are excused
from scrutiny though. It just broadens the scope of what does need to come under
scrutiny: the nonsummative implications of the Patriot Act upon every law in the legal
code. This speaks to how obtuse the Patriot Act is and how difficult it is to assess the
final results in the balancing act between safety and liberty—a task that demands more
time than it was afforded.
Given the various uncertainties over the Patriot Act debate, the one argument
standing out, as the thrust of the critics’ case is that the debate needs more debate; i.e., the
legislative process is too limited in scope. This argument, along with the ensuing debate
over the sunset provisions, provides evidence of the recognition of the fact that the
meaning of patriot being negotiated within the halls of Congress bleeds into every other
debate in the war on terror. The debate is about the ethos of the Justice Department, the
Bush Administration in general, and the ethos of the critics of the Bush Administration.
Perception is Real
Connected to the notion that the scope of the Patriot Act debate is too narrow in
scope, is the notion that given how ubiquitously dense the act is, there is no way to
evaluate its effectiveness in the time allotted. This again is an argument garnering more
attention in the analysis below concerning the debate over the sunset. The idea is that
regardless of how much the Patriot Act truly does protrude legally into the lives of
American citizens, the perception created by and through the act is real and important.
The fact that it has created so much anxiety, which has been intensified, if not created, by
the “culture of concealment” (Delahunt’s words used multiple times during the course of
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the legislative process), illustrates just how important it is to generate more debate over
the Patriot Act
Zoe Lofgren (D CA) speaks to the symbolic implications of rigorous oversight.
To do so, she must first address legal implications revolving around section 215—the
“library provision.” The argument calls into the question the significance of the claim
made earlier in the debate by Comey who said that the Justice Department has only
utilized the provision 35 times and never to obtain library records. Lofgren’s claim is
essentially that the logic of the Justice Department’s thinking is a little off considering
that if it is not utilized to obtain library records, then there is no real security related
reason to have the law in the first place. She then makes a cost-benefit-analysis and
weighs the lack of a security-related benefit against the disadvantage of the public
anxiety caused by the provision:
Along those lines, I want to go back to section 215. In your testimony, you state
that the FISA court has issued 35 orders, but that none were issued to a library. At
the same time, you say if we exempt or change 215 relative to libraries, you
know, it’s the end of the world. The roof will fall in; terrorists will make libraries
safe havens. And I guess I’m skeptical of that. And I’m wondering if there isn’t
some intermediate provision that would assist with the anxiety that is afoot in the
land. People are afraid that their reading habits are going to be interfered with.
Their first amendment rights are in fact being chilled today, because of what
people think is happening, even if it’s not happening. (Reauthorization of the
USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, pp. 37-38)
This gets to the heart of the symbolic importance of oversight, debate and amendment,
claiming that regardless of the actual legal ramifications of the Patriot Act, its perception
is causing first amendment rights to be “chilled.” Given that the provision is not used
much—and never in a library search, Lofgren expresses a lack of understanding over why
it absolutely cannot be amended in any way.
Comey responds by addressing the public’s perception and claiming that the
Patriot Act does not need to be amended; the public’s understanding is what needs to be
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fixed: “Something is broken, but I think—and I may be impossibly naive—but I think it’s
people’s understanding of 215, and not 215. And if what’s broken is their understanding,
I’m going to work till I have no more breath to try and fix that; rather than change 215
just because folks don’t understand it” (Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act,
2005, p. 38). This argument—criticism of public’s perception, is taken up more directly
later in analysis. In fact, we find Comey calling critics “bobble dolls” for being critical.
But sticking to the analysis of this section, Comey continuing to address the
warrant of Lofgren’s argument—the idea that if a particular application of the Patriot Act
does not get used to protect safety, then there is no real need for it in the first place.
Comey acknowledges that the suggested change would not be a terrible hit on the Justice
Department’s ability to protect safety; however, it would send the perception to a “bad
guy” that the library is a safe-haven: “I don’t know why we would do that, though,
because that would—I don’t think the sky would fall, but you would create a sanctuary in
those particular places. Because a bad guy would know, “That’s a place I can go”
(Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 38). So, Comey is quite aware of
the symbolic meaning—in fact, it is very much a part of the strategy in the war on terror.
The Justice Department’s New Ethos
Extending the New Patriotism
Without question, the new Justice Department under Gonzales has a different
working relationship with Congress than under Ashcroft. They have sent a different
message and critics acknowledge the new message. Even though critics obviously feel
that there is a long way to go and that they have only recently chipped away at some of
the ice, some progress is being made toward making the Justice Department transparent.
Patriotism in the public sphere is shifting away from the notion of trust the government at
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all cost—a magically unified sense of loyalty to the nation, to a more political one; i.e. a
patriotism grounded in the values of being critical of government and holding officials
accountable. Comey continues to extend this message forward.
Looking back at the very beginning of Comey’s opening statement, the very first
thing he mentions is the idea that patriotism means questioning the authority of
government. This is an attempt, similar to that of Gonzales, to establish a different ethos
than Ashcroft’s Justice Department. It worked, at least up to this point of the
reauthorization stage of debate, given that even the critics (including minority and
majority members) recognize a better tone, and a willingness to disclose Patriot Act
information. A few critics have even drawn very specific comparisons between the new
patriotism and the old Ashcroft patriotism—one of chilling debate.
Comey spells out this new notion of patriotism again in a response to a question
by Trent Franks (R AZ). Franks asks Comey what he perceives to be the greatest
weakness in the Patriot Act. Comey provides the response that the biggest weakness
would be if in the future, people stop checking the authority of the government. However,
he spends a great deal of time leading up to the answer, and while leading up to the
answer, he more specifically articulates the new notion of patriotism:
That’s a great question, Congressman. To start with the premise, I agree with you
completely. I said this to Senator Craig in the Senate. I don’t think it came out the
way I meant it. I said to him, ‘‘You shouldn’t trust me.’’ I mean, I didn’t mean
that. I mean, you should, and I trust me, and I like the people who lead the Justice
Department and the Executive Branch now. But I meant that, when I say we are a
country of laws, not men, we can’t devise the systems based on who’s in the
office; because you could have other people there. But second, good people make
mistakes when under great pressure. I mean, if, God forbid, there’s another attack
in this country, there will be tremendous pressure from the American people to
respond to it. And we need these laws and this oversight in place. I think the
greatest risk is that—to pick on something Congressman Lungren said—that
oversight won’t mean anything; that gradually the culture will drift to a point
where people doing this work understand that nobody in Congress reads the
reports, and so just, you know, send them up there; that there’s no real check. We
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need a check on our power. I do. And I need to know that someone is going to
look at what I do. It helps me. It helps me when I’m tired not to make a mistake. It
helps me when I’m overeager sometimes not to make a mistake.
So if there’s a risk, I think the PATRIOT Act is chock-full of what we need:
judges, inspector general, and oversight. But if the culture of that drifts and five
years from now it’s sort of a myth, or 10 years from now nobody even looks, you
could have problems. Because it happens. We have a history of it happening.
(Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 50)
Comey goes into some detail about the importance of rational patriotism. He points out
that the government needs to have their authorities checked for a number of different
reasons. For one thing, it is possible that untrustworthy people could take office some
day. Even though the people in office now are trustworthy, it is always possible for that
to change. Secondly, according to Comey, even good people make mistakes. He
acknowledges that he gets tired and even overeager at times; however, knowing that
somebody is going to examine his work makes him slow down so that he can be sure and
do his work well. Ultimately though, the answer to Franks’ question is that there is no
weakness in the Patriot Act; it provides plenty of opportunity for checks of authority. The
potential problem may be that if someday, the culture changes and those responsible for
oversight according to the Patriot Act do not do their jobs.
Another exemplar comes from Howard Coble (R NC) who at one point refers
back to Comey’s opening statement and acknowledges that patriotism means holding
government accountable: “Mr. Comey, you are indeed correct when you said earlier that
governmental authority should be challenged and questioned. We have provided many
forums for that. Our Subcommittees had nine hearings, as you probably know”
(Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 25). Coble confirms that
government authority should be checked. He then suggests that the hearings held over the
course of the last couple of months have done the job.
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We’ve Made Mistakes…
Another component of the new patriotism is the willingness on the part of the
Justice Department to simply admit that its members are not perfect, the laws are not
perfect, and that they make mistakes. This is integral to the notion that government needs
to have authority checked. It inspires confidence that checking the authority is
meaningful. In the previous debate with Gonzales, he admits that the Justice Department
has made mistakes. The biggest mistake according to Gonzales was simply not disclosing
enough information about the implementation of the Patriot Act in a timely fashion.
Doing so, according to him, would have cleared up a lot of the presumed problems in the
first place. In this debate, Comey acknowledges a similar sort of mistake—noted earlier
during the section of analysis directly comparing the ethos of the Gonzales led Justice
Department to the one led by Ashcroft. He, in not so certain terms, acknowledges that
Ashcroft’s rhetoric had a chilling effect on criticism.
Other mistakes are admitted to by Comey in this debate as well. Early on, Comey
is responding to a line of questioning by Conyers—one examined earlier in this analysis.
Toward the end of his turn to ask questions, Conyers begins bringing up some examples
of mistakes made in the war on terror so that he can ask Comey to respond. Issues
brought up include: the Abu Ghraib abuses and the Brandon Mayfield case (an example
of an instance in which someone was held due to misidentification). Conyers then asks
Comey if he can assure us that no one else is being held under those circumstances.
Comey replies by first setting the record straight, claiming that no one is currently being
held due to misidentification: “Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Conyers, starting with the
last one, I am not aware of anyone who’s being held anywhere in the Federal criminal
justice system based on a case of mistaken identity. If I were to learn of that, I wouldn’t
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be here today. I’d be working to try and fix that” (Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT
Act, 2005, p. 24). Having said that, he goes on to acknowledge that mistakes have been
made in the past. For instance, Comey acknowledges that the Mayfield case was a
mistake: “You’re correct; Mr. Mayfield was held, by order of a court, on application of
the Government, for two weeks, as I recall, as a material witness, based on a mistake”
(Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 24). He also acknowledges that
there appears to be illegal activity in the Abu Ghraib scenario as well, but that the Justice
Department has no jurisdiction over that—it is a Department of Defense responsibility
and they are dealing with it.
A few pages later in the transcript, Comey is responding by questions from
Howard Berman (D CA). The dialogue elicits a series of exemplars demonstrating the
extent to which the new leadership of the Justice Department is attempting to change the
ethos from that of the old leadership. Context for these exemplars comes earlier while the
case of the critics is being displayed. Berman is making the argument that the scope of
the debate is too narrow. In fact, as mentioned earlier, here he provides what is perhaps
the best explanation coming from the critics as to why the scope of the debate is too
narrow. Recall that Berman actually defends section 412 of the Patriot Act as having
better due process mechanisms than the policy actually utilized by government officials.
His claim is that officials are able to circumvent 412 by falling back on a law existing
prior to the Patriot Act. In effect, the Justice Department is able to apply a one-size-fits-
all standard to illegal immigrants when according to Berman, each case should be looked
at individually. One example of the way in which this one-size-fits-all policy is applied,
is the blanket closure of immigration proceedings.
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Comey’s response to Berman begins with deference to the idea that the issue is
difficult to debate here because it falls outside of the Patriot Act (this argument is given
more specific attention later in analysis). He does say though that he can address parts of
Berman’s question. The way in which he begins to do so is very interesting. At the very
beginning of the quotation, he preempts his answer by saying, “maybe revealing that I am
a short-timer…” and then goes on to make the argument. By saying this, he indicates that
the party line has changed under Gonzales. As he continues his point, he agrees with
Berman that the blanket closure of immigration proceedings is not a sound policy—
however, he also promises that the proceedings are now done on a case-by-case basis:
Maybe revealing that I am a short-timer, I never liked the blanket closure of
immigration proceedings, because it’s a one-size-fits-all approach. And if our
lawyers can demonstrate that it ought to be sealed, we’ll get that from the judge
and so I think—and that’s where we are now. We proceed on a case-by-case
basis. To say all of a certain class must be closed, frankly, is not smart, and makes
us take a hit that we don’t need to take. I mean, if we can demonstrate it, let’s
demonstrate it. If we can’t, let’s have it be an open hearing. (Reauthorization of
the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 27)
Comey clarifies further that “there are no immigrants who are arrested on immigration
charges who are held without notice of their charges” and furthermore, “there is a
requirement that they brought before an immigration judge to have an application—
opportunity to apply for bond and to have notice of the charges” (Reauthorization of the
USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 27).
At this point, Berman asks Comey specifically about the infamous Inspector
General’s report on the investigations of Justice Department procedures after 9/11.
Unlike Ashcroft who to the bitter end of his term in office defended the indefinite
detention of illegal immigrants as constitutional, Comey refers to it as a “screwup:”
Well, the Inspector General found in the practice in the months after September
11th that there were a whole bunch of people who were sort of held until cleared,
and that was a screwup; that that was not consistent with what the policies and
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procedures that the regulatory regime lays out are. (Reauthorization of the USA
PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 27)
Comey continues to explain that being held in a “limbo state” was inappropriate.
However, he does say that the due process policies in place are actually very good; they
were just not followed at the time. So, the rules cannot be blamed—only the people who
did not follow them:
My understanding of what the regulatory regime is is that you have to have—it’s
sort of—there’s a lot of due process—I was frankly surprised when I tried to
educate myself on it—that people have an opportunity to appear promptly before a
judge, to apply for bond, to obtain counsel if they wish, to contact family
members, and that the problems that the IG found were that procedures were not
followed, and that people were held in kind of a limbo state that was inappropriate;
that they were not given notice of why they were held, they didn’t have a
reasonable opportunity to contact counsel or family members. And those are things
that were the subject of the IG’s report. But I’m not sure the procedures are
broken. (Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 27)
Here again, like Gonzales did in the April hearing, Comey presents a tone that is much
different than Ashcroft’s in this debate. Even though we must keep in mind that neither
Gonzales nor Comey have admitted to any flaws in the Patriot Act specifically (all
mistakes acknowledged technically fall outside the Patriot Act—at least according to the
way the dialogue plays out), that they acknowledge the Justice Department is not perfect
and that mistakes have been made is a new development to this stage of debate.
We Agree to Amendments (of clarification)
One of the first arguments in Gonzales’s opening statement analyzed in Chapter
11 that exemplifies a change in patriotic tone was his claim of being willing to listen and
to be open to suggestions. However, after reading and re-reading his testimony, it seems
that maybe he is only open to suggestions that clarified the Patriot Act—not ones that
altered it substantively. Though percentage-wise, not a major part of Comey’s testimony,
it is present in the current debate and thus, deserves mention.
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In the first exemplar, Comey is responding to Nadler about section 505—the
National Security Letter (N.S.L.s) provision which amends the law so that field agents
can administer N.S.L.’s whereas prior to the Patriot Act, only an Assistant Attorney
General or above could do so. Comey begins the question by citing a New York District
court case, Doe v. Ashcroft, claiming that National Security Letters under the Patriot Act
are unconstitutional because there is no judicial review and the gag order is indefinite.
The Justice Department’s position is that they do not see N.S.L.’s that way nor do they
enforce them that way. So, Nadler asks Comey if he would work with the committee to
draft legislation specifying that a recipient of an N.S.L. has the right to challenge as well
as amending the law so that there is a 90-day limit on a gag order with the possibility of
extending it to 180 days. Comey replies:
We will work with you on all of that. I know there is legislation that’s pending to
address some of those. I don’t think we’ve taken a position on it. But a lot of it is
smart and reasonable. I don’t have that same feeling about the 90-day/120-day.
Given the nature of the people that we’re dealing with in intelligence
investigations, I think the balance has to be struck in favor of indefinite.
(Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 35)
He essentially says that when it comes to amendments, we will be happy to clarify our
already existing standards but changing the substance of the Patriot Act is not an option;
the gag order needs to remain indefinite.
In the next exemplar, Comey responds to an argument by Debbie Wasserman
Schultz (D FL) who has an issue with section 215—the “library provision.” She begins
by expressing the source of her concern, which comes from listening to her constituents15:
15 This quotation is noteworthy because a) public opinion as ethos has been an important
part of the discourse and b) even in this stage of the debate, some critics still feel like
they have to justify their credibility by preempting arguments with, “I support much of
what is in the Patriot Act…but…” form of argumentation—the first of only two times it
is utilized during this debate. I wonder if Wasserman-Schultz being a brand new
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And I agree with the gentlewoman from California when she talks about the
balance that we need to strike. I strongly support much of the provisions in the
PATRIOT Act. This is the most disturbing provision. It’s the provision that I hear
the most about, unsolicited, when I’m not even talking about the PATRIOT Act at
home. At town hall meetings people bring up their concern about the library
provision. (Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, pp. 41-42)
After disclosing the source of her concern comes from town hall meetings, she states
specifically the issue which is that the FBI has too much power given that they do not
have to show proof that the subject of an investigation is an agent of a foreign power—
the standard for investigation is merely “suspicion.”
Comey’s response is that agents have to show the standard that Wasserman
Schultz describes and that the Justice Department has always understood it in such a way.
However, he acknowledges that it is not very clear in the act. So, the Department
supports an amendment in this instance: “Right. They have to show—and we’ve always
understood the statute to say this, but it’s not explicit, so it’s one of the things that we
would support adding—that the records sought are relevant to a foreign intelligence or
foreign counterterrorism investigation” (Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act,
2005, p. 42).
Defending the Patriot Act: New Arguments Emerge
The post Ashcroft Justice Department recognizes that putting forth a cooperative
ethos, as opposed to Ashcroft’s arrogant, go-it-alone ethos is the way to proceed through
the reauthorization hearings. The way in which Gonzalez kicked off the new approach
during the first hearing of this stage of debate seems to have been successful, and given
the feedback from critics in this debate, so too do the subcommittee hearings. Thus,
Comey makes it a point to extend that same cooperative ethos here. But of course, in
congressperson had anything to do with her feeling the need to defend her patriotism in
this way?
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doing so, he does not give away the position of the Justice Department. Comey explains
that they want and need for the Patriot Act to remain in tact and unchanged. A couple of
arguments that are built into the fabric of the message will not be over analyze here
except to the extent that they may overlap with some of the newer—reauthorization based
arguments. They are: a) fear the terrorists, and b) the process is working—especially now
that there is new leadership in the Justice Department. Aside from these arguments that
have been prevalent since the very beginning of the debate, some newer arguments
emerge here in the reauthorization stage.
Don’t Blame the Patriot Act…It’s Nothing New
It is interesting that after assuming responsibility for making a mistake in the
Mayfield case, Comey comes back to that example later in the debate and points out that
the mistake was not Patriot act related:
The Mayfield case from Oregon was mentioned earlier, where the fellow was
arrested as a material witness and held for two weeks based on a mistaken
identification of his fingerprint from a bag in a van near the Madrid bombings.
But that’s not the PATRIOT Act. I mean, he was detained under the material
witness provision, which has been a part of the criminal code for many, many
years. (Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 49)
This is a strategy that Justice Department members get very good at over the course of
the debate—diverting blame for mistakes away from the Patriot Act and on to something
that is not being debated. It is some other legal component that is to blame for anything
wrong with implementation of the Patriot Act. The act is intricately put together such that
it is only indirectly involved with this particular mistake in the sense that it helped lead to
the scenario in which another law kicked in and caused a mistake to be made.
In this particular case, section 213 of the Patriot Act—the delayed notification
provision was invoked to investigate Mayfield, which in turn, led to his detention as a
material witness. Thus technically, according to Comey’s argument, the violation is not
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directly the result of the Patriot Act. Blame is diverted. The Patriot Act becomes insulated
from criticism. In this particular case, the Patriot Act is actually doubly insulated from
criticism given that earlier in the debate, section 213 had already been explained away in
a similar fashion. Bob Goodlatte (R VA) asks a question to Comey giving him the
opportunity to clarify confusion over 213. He prefaces his question with an indictment of
critics (an argument we will come back to and analyze specifically later) by saying that,
“Some have used section 213 and other provisions of the PATRIOT Act to scare the
public, claiming that this is a new authority that allows law enforcement to enter your
house and secretly search it” (Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 32).
He then asks if section 213 is “a new authority, or a codification of existing court
decisions?” (Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 32). Comey responds
that it is not new and that he had been using that authority for a long time prior to the
Patriot Act. Section 213 of the Patriot Act simply codifies the pre-existing authority.
The same thing is said in the next exemplar, except it goes into more detail about
the explanation of the way in which section 213 codifies existing law for those interested
in reading about it. Comey is responding to a similar sort of question from Lamar Smith
(R TX) who gives Comey the opportunity to clarify section 213 (and indict the ethos of
the ACLU at the same time):
Okay, thank you, Mr. Comey. My next question deals with a television
advertisement that has been run by the ACLU, that claims that section 213 of the
USA PATRIOT Act allows law enforcement to search out homes ‘‘without
notifying us;’’ implying that this provision gave Federal law enforcement the
authority to conduct searches without ever providing notice to the individual
whose property is searched. Is this an accurate description of section 213?
(Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 28)
Comey responds:
No, sir, it is not. And it’s one that I’ve spent a lot of time talking to folks about,
and it’s driven me a bit crazy.
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We have had for years—decades—delayed-notice search warrants in this country.
That’s what we in law enforcement call them, because it’s accurate. You don’t—
there’s never a circumstance when you’re doing a criminal search that you never
have to tell that the search was conducted. What was the circumstance before the
PATRIOT Act is that in a limited set of circumstances—I would estimate
probably 50 times a year in the whole country—a judge would give you
permission, based on a written showing of probable cause and a written warrant,
to conduct a search and simply delay—not get rid of, but delay telling the bad
guys that you were there; to save lives, to preserve evidence, to protect witnesses.
The PATRIOT Act simply enshrined that in black-letter law so we have the same
standard across the country, and gave judges the ability to set periods of time that
they believe reasonable, based on their knowledge of the facts, to delay notice. It
will be given.
I have personally used—and I won’t take the time here—but I’ve personally used
delayed-notice search warrants many times, and I think that in the process we’ve
saved lives, in my career as a prosecutor. And if we lost that tool, anybody who
understands it—and I think people at all points understand it—would realize we
were less safe. (Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 29)
A big part of the defense of the Patriot Act by the Justice Department is that it does not
introduce anything new as far as governmental authority is concerned. The legislation
simply codifies existing law and streamlines it so that it is easier to use and updated to
account for modernizing technologies.
A Convenient Misunderstanding
Given the way in which the Patriot Act is insulated from criticism, it becomes
rather easy for the Justice Department to say to critics that, “well, you may have a good
point about problem X but because it is not directly Patriot Act related, it is difficult to
debate the issue in these proceedings.” Comey demonstrates the way in which this
argument is utilized in response to a line of questioning that has been examined quite
extensively thus far, and that is the one from Mr. Berman concerning the connection
between the Patriot Act, immigration issues, and the C.L.R.A. proposal. The following
quotation is actually the very initial response from Comey to Berman.
As a reminder for what Berman is arguing, he is essentially defending section 412
of the Patriot Act claiming that it has fairly effective civil liberty protection mechanisms.
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His criticism is that the Justice Department circumvents 412 by falling back on pre-
Patriot Act legal provisions. Comey begins his response to this argument by saying that a
lot of people confuse a lot of issues with the Patriot Act:
Thank you, Mr. Berman. And as you said, these are not PATRIOT Act issues, per
se; which is one of the challenges we have in dealing with the PATRIOT Act.
Folks sort of—you know they’re not, and I know they’re not, but people tend to
lump them together. But they’re important issues, nonetheless. (Reauthorization
of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 27)
Berman acknowledges the confusion by saying, “And I take your point about the
confusion out there as to what is or isn’t. It’s quite widespread” (Reauthorization of the
USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 27). Then Comey proceeds to use that as an excuse to get
out of a debate over immigration: “Yes, big challenge. And I pretend to know a lot about
a lot of things. The one I will not pretend to know a lot about is immigration laws. I think
I confess to you.” (Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 27). Comey does
proceed to briefly comment on a couple of Berman’s issues, but not very thoroughly. It
never gets covered thoroughly because it is technically, not a Patriot Act issue.
This section of analysis is short because Comey himself does not use it very
much. In fact, I’m not sure it would have struck me as being terribly significant without
having had the opportunity to look ahead to the hearing on 6/10/05—where
Sensenbrenner utilizes this very argument as a reason to prematurely end the hearing. As
we will see, Sensenbrenner accuses critics of breaking the rules of the legislature by
being non-topical in their argumentation. He claims that since the purpose of the hearings
is to reauthorize the Patriot Act, and that critics are talking about non-topical issues such
as immigration, de-facto torture policies, and other important post 9/11 civil liberty
issues, that he has the right and obligation to end the hearing from an administrative
perspective.
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So, while maybe not a huge issue in the debate with Comey, the argument
analyzed in this section, ultimately leads to the controversial breakdown of a discussion
that had finally found some rational-critical momentum. Part of the breakdown could be
blamed on Sensenbrenner’s impatience and inherent loyalty to the Bush Administration,
but also, some of the blame could also be placed on the critics for not better explaining
the ideas that immigration is a Patriot Act issue, the material witness statute is a Patriot
Act issue, and that other “non Patriot Act issues” are Patriot Act issues. So often in this
debate critics have let this convenient misunderstanding stand in the way of even more
meaningful debate by not doing a better job of connecting the dots.
Looking back at the case of the critics, we find so many exemplars of the critics
themselves introducing an argument as “not a Patriot Act issue…but an important one.”
In fact, Berman’s analysis of section 412—analysis that has been a major catalyst of
analysis throughout much of this chapter, is the best explanation of the connection
between “non-Patriot Act” issues and the Patriot Act. However, even in this instance,
Berman lets Comey get away with this convenient misunderstanding.
How is it that one can debate the Patriot Act without also debating all those other
issues? The Patriot Act has the nonsummative effect of making those other laws on the
books prior to the Patriot Act easier to apply to a wider range of people. This connection
is made concrete in section 218 in which “the wall” between intelligence agencies and
law enforcement agencies is figuratively torn down; thus the standards that used to only
apply to those who were suspected of having committed a crime, now apply to those
individuals who are suspected of being “agents of a foreign power.” It is much easier for
a prosecutor in the Justice Department to convince a judge that a person who needs to be
investigated is an agent of a foreign power than it is to supply enough evidence to
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convince a judge that a person has probably committed a crime. Thus, because of the way
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act is amended through the Patriot Act, every part
of the federal criminal code now has a different meaning and should be a part of the
debate over the Patriot Act. This discussion is given more detail during a hearing that is
actually not a part of this analysis—demonstrating a major weakness of this study.
Section 218 is the topic of a Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security Subcommittee
hearing on April 28, 2005 entitled “Oversight Hearing-Section 218 of the USA
PATRIOT Act-If it Expires will the “Wall” Return?” Perhaps close analysis of that
debate might reveal a better explanation of this phenomenon of nonsummativity. But
whether that additional analysis of the subcommittee hearings would or would not help
clear up the misunderstanding (the legal connection between the Patriot Act and other
Justice Department activities), it definitely needs to be made more clear in front of the
Full Committee—for the sake of better debate.
There is only one instance in which the relationship between section 218 and
other parts of the Patriot Act is brought up in this debate like it needs to be. Robert Scott
(D VA) initiates an important discussion between himself and Comey on the topic:
On roving wiretaps, when you have gotten probable cause, not that a crime has
been committed, but the probable cause that the target is an agent of a foreign
government—which means you can get the wiretap without probable cause of any
crime, just that you’re trying to get intelligence information which may not be
criminal, just, you know, information on a trade deal, something, no crime as a
predicate—and then you expand this as a roving wiretap, is it important that you
ascertain before you start listening in that the target is actually in the location
where you’ve placed the bug? (Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005,
p. 30)
Comey’s response is one that has become commonplace to this debate and that is
essentially, we should fear the terrorists and err on the side of safety:
It may be important as a practical matter, because we don’t want to waste time.
But in intelligence investigations, given the nature of the people we’re following
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and surveilling, both with spies and terrorists who are trained to look for us and to
be very careful, I’m troubled by an ascertainment requirement; which would
require us, as you said, Mr. Scott, as we do in the criminal context, to know that
the target is the one on the phone or the target is the one near the bug.
(Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 30)
Scott responds and the discussion continues. This is an important discussion to read
because it sort of gets at uncovering the source of the misunderstanding—the impasse if
you will between those who think the scope of the debate should be expanded and those
who are comfortable with the scope of the present debate. The discussion continues and
Scott explains how by amending FISA, the lines blur between a criminal investigation
and a foreign intelligence investigation. According to Scott’s analysis, it becomes
possible to conduct a criminal investigation without probable cause:
Mr. SCOTT. Well, I say this because we’ve heard from witnesses before, like the
Attorney General, that some of these—you know, we reduced the standard from
the purpose of the wiretap being foreign intelligence to a significant purpose,
which invites the question: If it wasn’t the purpose, what was the purpose? And
the answer, of course, is you’re running a criminal investigation without probable
cause. Now, since you’re running a criminal investigation, isn’t it important that
the people you’re listening in are actually targets of the wiretap? I mean, you
could put these all over town where the target may be using the phone. If he
leaves, shouldn’t you stop listening?
Mr. COMEY. Well, you’d like to, because you don’t want to waste the time, but
the way——
Mr. SCOTT. Well, no, no. No, you’re not wasting time. You’re listening
in to people you wanted to listen in to. I mean, because you’re running the
criminal investigation under the auspices of this less strict standard of foreign
intelligence. Should you be able to take advantage of the criminal investigation
with the lower standard by listening in, when the target isn’t even there?
(Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 30)
At this point, the discussion overlaps with another category of analysis to be examined
shortly; Comey responds to Scott’s question by portraying an ethos of being tough on
civil liberties:
Mr. COMEY. Well, first of all, you’d better not, if you work for me, be
conducting an investigation to obtain criminal information using FISA unless the
following is true: Significant purpose, as you said, Mr. Scott, is to obtain foreign
intelligence. And if there is an additional purpose to obtain criminal information,
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it’s only criminal information related to foreign intelligence crimes, terrorism
crimes or espionage crimes. That’s what the FISA court of review has told us is
the law, and so we’d better—we are following the law. (Reauthorization of the
USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 30)
In this quotation, Comey also falls back on FISA law and the way it protects civil
liberties. As the discussion continues, Scott points out the law changed under the Patriot
Act: and Comey seems to generalize past that point:
Mr. SCOTT. Well, we changed the law under the PATRIOT Act.
Mr. COMEY. Well, I’ve heard that said, but the court of appeals
that governs this has said you may only collect information of foreign intelligence
crimes if that’s an additional purpose to the collection of foreign intelligence.
(Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, pp. 30-31)
In the next segment of the discussion, as Comey continues his response, explanation of
the civil liberty checks in response to the way in which FISA laws were changed due to
the Patriot Act is attempted but gets cut off very short due to time restraints. Comey
continues with the previous turn:
But the ascertainment—the way we collect intelligence information, we strike a
balance. Because of the nature of the target, we stand off a little bit more. We
collect, and don’t necessarily review real-time what’s being collected. And we
account for that with the rules that govern the storage and dissemination of that
information. And that’s a balance that’s been struck to recognize that criminal
investigations are different, and I think it’s a reasonable one. When you drill
down and look at the way we follow spies and follow terrorists, it would make it
much more difficult to operate intelligence investigations if the agents were
required to ascertain in every circumstance that the target is there at the bug or
there on this particular phone.
Mr. SCOTT. Could you——
Mr. COMEY. Rather than collecting and minimizing it later, and strictly
controlling what you do with U.S. person information. I’m sorry, sir.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired.
(Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 31)
The way in which the direction of the conversation turned, Comey made it seem as if the
only check on civil liberties depends upon the judgment made by FBI field agents at the
point of investigation. Whether this is accurate or not, that is the way it comes across
during this short discussion.
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The answer is “we stand off a little bit…” and that is the way in which the
blurring of the lines between foreign intelligence investigations and criminal
investigations is accounted for, at least according to this particular discussion pertaining
to the relationship between section 218 of the Patriot Act and every other part of the
criminal code. So, it would seem that the expansion of the debate is justified.
Unfortunately, as we will soon uncover by briefly looking at the 6/10/05 debate,
Sensenbrenner prevents the expansion from happening.
“The Angel is in the Details”…Critics are “Bobble Dolls”
Under the assumption that there is a concrete distinction between the Patriot Act
and other war on terror policies, including the criminal code, it is very easy for Justice
Department officials to testify that, “you see, there have not been any civil liberty
violations as a result of the Patriot Act…all the mistakes that have been made are due to
misapplication of other laws.” At this point in analysis, the debate comes back full circle
to the way in which it started—by Comey saying, the “angel is in the details.”
In the following exemplar, Comey is responding to a question from Tom Feeney
(R FL). It is important to note that as we get to the purpose of the following exemplar,
and Feeney asks Comey the question which we are focusing on, he had just finished up a
defense of why the sunset on the controversial provisions need to be a part of the
reauthorized Patriot Act. We will get to that debate within the debate later in analysis.
The argument to pay attention to in this section begins by Feeney arguing that there are
so many myths about the Patriot Act and that so many people blame a lot of things on the
Patriot Act based upon these myths; then he works into a question that asks Comey to
identify a way to educate people about the reality of the Patriot Act:
But having said that, the PATRIOT Act is subject to a lot of myths out there. And
if you had—you know, when I get accosted on the street, just like, you know, my
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Subcommittee Chairman mentioned, people blame all sorts of ills that they
experience, whether it’s at airports, or discomfort, on the PATRIOT Act, which of
course have nothing to do with the PATRIOT Act. If you had 30 seconds or a
minute to explain the difference between the PATRIOT Act reality versus myth to
the American people, how would you convince us that much of what it has been
blamed for is simply not related to or the fault of the PATRIOT Act itself?
(Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, pp. 43-44)
Comey’s answer to Feeney’s question is to ask those critics for details. He states that
critics of the Patriot Act are “bobble dolls” who will go along with anything that is
suggested to them. So, his strategy is ask them for the details, and when they cannot
provide the specifics, they are left with no other option than to trust the details provided
by the Justice Department. According to Comey, “there’s an angel in those details”
(Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 44):
Thank you, Congressman. The first thing I would do is urge folks, all walks of
life, who have concerns about the PATRIOT Act to demand the details. Always,
always, always ask. When someone says, ‘‘The PATRIOT Act is evil,’’ say,
‘‘What do you mean, specifically? What part of it? And how is that different from
what they can do in a criminal investigation? And so you’re saying the PATRIOT
Act does what?’’ The reason that’s so important is it has become a vessel into
which people pour concerns about all manner of stuff that has nothing to do with
the PATRIOT Act. And I think if everybody demands the answer—doesn’t just
shake their head like one of those bobble dolls when someone says, ‘‘Isn’t the
PATRIOT Act evil?’’—they will find out that the stuff people are talking about
either is not in it, or what’s in it is reasonable, ordinary, and smart. Because it’s
mostly taking what we can do to track drug dealers and thugs, and give those tools
to people tracking spies and terrorist. And then, something breathtaking; which is
the destruction of the wall, the separation between counterterrorism intelligence
and counterterrorism criminal.
And if folks will simply demand the details, as hard as it can be, I think at the end
of the day they’re going to see there’s an angel in those details. (Reauthorization
of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 44)
The problem is of course that the details have not been examined yet; an appropriate
amount of debate has not been afforded the details. Even the policymakers, many of
whom are lawyers, have had a very difficult time analyzing the details because of how
obtuse the Patriot Act is. Furthermore, it is only quite recently relative to this stage of the
debate, that critics have received any semblance of cooperation from the Justice
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Department in the release of details. Even further, when the critics do want to examine
details about the relationship between immigration for instance, and the Patriot Act, they
are not given a full opportunity. The response from the Justice Department is that, “that is
not really a Patriot Act issue; thus, I can’t really speak to it.” So, to say that the case of
the critics is merely at a beginning point is an understatement. They need more time,
more cooperation, and more discussion before being able to provide an effective
evaluation of the Patriot Act. This is something that everybody (debate participants from
both sides of the aisle) agrees to during the debate over the sunset provisions—everybody
that is except for the Justice Department witnesses.
At this point, with only a precursory understanding of the way in which the
Patriot Act interacts with other parts of the legal code, the task of providing the details
and molding them for the purpose of reauthorization is left up to the Justice Department. I
doubt it is any coincidence that the details favor the notion that the Patriot Act is perfect.
The following exemplar is a continuation of an argument displayed above. Comey is
responding to Trent Franks (R AZ) who makes the argument that so much myth has been
built up behind the idea that the Patriot Act is intrusive and asks if any evidence exists
substantiating that claim. As shown earlier, Comey points out that the Mayfield mistake
was not a Patriot Act violation but a problem with the material witness provision; then he
reports that there are no violations whatsoever related to the Patriot Act: “But under the
PATRIOT Act, I’m very confident in saying there have been no abuses found; none
documented. Plenty alleged, but most of it turns out to be stuff that, again, has nothing to
do with the PATRIOT Act” (Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 49).
Comey gives an example of the kind of crazy complaints that come in about the Patriot
Act: “We had a lady call in and say there was a line across the top of her television
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screen, and she thought that had something to do with the PATRIOT Act. And you know,
we get a lot of stuff like that. And it all goes to the Inspector General, and he has to
decide what to do with it” (Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 49). The
implication of the example is that this level of paranoia is the closest anybody can come
to pinning down a problem with the Patriot Act. Accordingly then, this example is much
closer to pinning down a problem than the illegal detention of immigrants documented in
the Inspector General’s report because obviously, that has nothing to do with the Patriot
Act either.
In the next exemplar, Comey is responding to J. Randy Forbes (R VA) who brings
section 213 up again and asks for clarification that it does receive judicial review. But
before doing so, he thanks Comey for the way in which he has explained the myths about
the Patriot Act and also indicts the ethos of the critics by referring to all the
misinformation that is out there—some of which is intentional:
Mr. Comey, I want to thank you not just for your substantive knowledge of the
PATRIOT Act, but for the articulate way that you’ve been able to explain to us
some of the myths that we have been hearing about it. Piggybacking on what
Congressman Feeney said, I’ve seen few measures that have had more
misinformation than the PATRIOT Act; some of that unintentional, much of it
intentional. So I thank you for clearing some of that up. (Reauthorization of the
USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 46)
Comey begins clarifying section 213 by reminding the audience that it is a codification of
a law from 40 years ago and says that it is only used if one of five conditions is present.
Those conditions have to do with whether or not providing prior notice of a search
warrant can jeopardize safety. Then, he assures us that the tool is not used a lot and that
the Justice Department is very careful about when it is used:
And it’s a tool that, as before the PATRIOT Act, we don’t use much. As I said, I
think we use it about 50 times a year—once for each State, once a year. We use it
when it really, really matters; when people are going to get killed, bad guys are
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going to flee, people are going to get hurt. If we have to tell them that we were the
ones who went into the drug house and took their drugs—instead of having them
think it was stolen by rival drug dealers—if we tell them we went in, they’re
going to know who the informant was, and they’re all going to flee.
(Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 47)
We have seen this argument over and over again throughout the course of the debate. The
Justice Department assures us that they are careful about implementation of the Patriot
Act. In this round of debate though, they have a bit more evidence to back their claims
up. They have begun to release some statistics about the way in which the act is utilized.
While critics do acknowledge that this is an encouraging sign, it is sill rather curious that
all statistics released support the stance of the Justice Department and all statistics or
examples that offer some opposition are explained away as not being the fault of the
Patriot Act.
The Debate over the Sunset
Comey and other Justice Department officials are correct in saying that there is
not a whole lot that is brand new about the Patriot Act; it does however tweak so many
other parts of the legal code that to fully examine the details would require years and
years of rigorous debate amongst people whose professional lives are devoted to
understanding the twists and turns the act injects into the legal code. The effect of the
Patriot Act is again, nonsummative, meaning that the whole is greater than the sum of its
parts. To try and suggest that there is an appropriate ending point to the discussion over
its merits might be the worst possible way to conclude the reauthorization hearings—
something that virtually everyone in this debate seems to recognize except Comey. In this
case in particular, it seems that based upon the bipartisan support for continuing the
sunsets, there is one way to guarantee discussion over the Patriot Act remains robust.
Comey is the only one to suggest otherwise.
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Comey’s Argument Against Sunsets
During the first hearing of this reauthorization stage, we learn that Attorney
General Gonzales wanted to see the Patriot Act reauthorized without a continued sunset
on 12 of the more controversial provisions from the act: 201, 202, 204, 206, 207, 209,
212, 214, 215, 217, 218, and 220. Under the original Patriot Act, these sections would
“cease to have effect on December 31, 2005” (USA PATRIOT Act, 2001, 115 STAT.
295). Supporters of continuing the sunset who vocalized their opinions (three
Republicans and two Democrats) argued that the sunsets encourage necessary oversight.
Gonzales, in response, pointed out that Congress could and should conduct effective
oversight without needing the provisions. However, what he did not articulate during the
course of the hearing is a good reason to get rid of the sunsets. In other words, the
question not answered is, what is the harm in having them? Furthermore, after being
presented with good arguments for keeping them, Gonzales admitted that the sunsets
would not necessarily be a terrible thing, but that his preference would still be to get rid
of them.
Comey came to the current hearing ready to provide an answer to the question of,
what is the harm in keeping the sunset? Along with extending Gonzales’s claim that
Congress should not need sunsets to conduct effective oversight, he also argues that not
making the provisions permanent prevents a complete cultural change in the Justice
Department—a shift to a culture of information sharing not present pre-Patriot Act. The
most complete explanation of Comey’s opinion comes when answering questions from
Lamar Smith (R TX). Without expressing his own opinion on the sunsets, he simply
states that many people think they are necessary—especially for section 218 and asks
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Comey what he thinks about the sunset. Comey replies, and for the first time in front of
the full Judiciary Committee explains why continuing the sunsets would be a bad idea:
It would, in my opinion, be a very bad idea to continue the sunsets, generally, but
particularly with 218. Because what 218 does is foster cultural change, which—
all of us work in big institutions—is enormously difficult in big institutions. And I
worry very much that if we hung out there the prospect that the destruction of the
‘‘wall’’ might be reversed, we will never get people to embrace the idea that we
need to have everybody communicating, sharing information in the
counterterrorism realm. We’ve made great progress. Somebody who went to Mars
in the summer of ’01 would not recognize our counterterrorism operation today.
But we need to do better. And 218 is what has given us the space to knit together
everybody who matters in counterterrorism. And if people thought— sort of like
living in a house you think someone might come and kick you out of: You’re
going to maybe not unpack your stuff, because you might get kicked out. And I
don’t want people to think they’re going to get kicked out of 218.
(Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 28)
Afterward, Smith asks for clarification to see if Comey is against sunsets entirely. Comey
responds that he is against any sunsets because they send a discouraging message of
impermanence to the people working at the Justice Department. He does extend an
argument Gonzales makes though, that there should still be rigorous oversight without
the sunsets; in fact, he makes this point more vehemently than Gonzales did:
I do. I think the answer, though, is rigorous oversight. I think we ought to be
dragged up here and drilled and asked, ‘‘How are you using this power? Why
does it matter?’’ on a regular basis. I don’t think we need sunsets to do that, for
you to scrub how we’re conducting ourselves. And I support that. But the sunsets
send a message that there’s no permanence to these important tools, and that
undercuts the ability to get the bureaucracy to embrace them and to understand
they’re part of our arsenal. (Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p.
28)
The emphasis on needing rigorous oversight reiterates the attempt to change the patriotic
ethos of the Justice Department. At the same time, it also reinforces the argument for
getting rid of the sunsets. Comey makes a much more specific appeal for getting rid of
the sunsets than Gonzales did during the 4/6/05. He also comes across as very adamant
about his opinion toward the sunset. Interestingly, Comey—like Gonzales, backs down
403
just a little from his sense of urgency later in his testimony after Daniel Lungren (R CA)
presents a case for keeping the sunsets. It is also interesting too when Comey offers up
different reasons for getting rid of the sunsets—aside from or in addition to the one he
has already offered. But, let us examine the reasons provided for supporting the sunsets
first.
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Supporting the Continued Sunsets
The fact that Comey is the only person involved in this debate who expresses
support for getting rid of the sunsets is quite eye opening. In the previous debate,
Gonzales and only one other majority member of Congress expressed such support. Most
people who spoke up about the issue supported continuing the sunsets. This is even more
the case in this debate: five different people expressed support for continuing the
sunset—four majority members (Lungren, Gohmert, Feeney, and Franks) and one
minority member (Delahunt). No one else spoke up about the issue directly. But based
upon this evidence, it is hard to understand how limited of an influence that sunsets have
in the reauthorized version of the act.
Daniel Lungren (R CA) is the first to express support for the sunsets in this
debate. In his response, he speaks to the idea of “culture change” mentioned by Comey
by pointing out that the Congress needs a culture change of its own and that having the
sunsets in place is the only way to instill that change:
Having said that, there is this concern about the PATRIOT Act; whether it’s real
or imagined, whether it’s perception or reality. And for that reason, I lean toward
putting sunsets in this legislation; not because, Mr. Comey, I want to upset the
cultural change that’s trying to take place in the Justice Department. But I point
to a cultural change that’s needed in the Congress. I think we’re doing a
tremendous job of oversight here, I think this Committee is. And I think that we
have had good cooperation with the Department of Justice. But oversight has not
been the strong suit of Congresses in the past. And I wonder whether we would be
as vigorous if we didn’t have the obligation of this. And some of us have a feeling
that not only is it something necessary to effect the cultural change on the
executive branch, but also the legislative branch. (Reauthorization of the USA
PATRIOT Act, 2005, pp. 35-36)
He highlights both the symbolic and pragmatic (assuming the symbolism and pragmatism
can be truly separated in this case) importance of maintaining the sunsets. As a pragmatic
concern, Lungren doubts the ability of Congress to provide oversight to the act without
the sunsets, pointing out that the only reason the Patriot Act has had rigorous oversight as
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of late is due to the provisions set to expire at the end of December, 2005. As a symbolic
concern, Lungren notes the lack of clarity still existing over the Patriot Act. “There is
concern…whether it’s real or imagined, whether it’s perception or reality”
(Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 35) according to Lungren; so even
if the Patriot Act is perfect as it currently is, for symbolic reasons, there needs to be
continued rigorous debate and the sunsets are the only tools available to ensure that
happens. Following the Congressional culture change argument, Lungren asks Comey if
he thinks that sunsetting provisions, and names 215 as a specific reference point, would
be a big interference with what the Department is currently doing and plans to do in the
future.
In response to this question Comey changes his tone and his justification for
getting rid of the sunsets. He first admits that future sunsets would not be a “disaster,”
and at the same time compliments Chairman Sensenbrenner for providing “remarkable
oversight” (Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 36): “The honest answer
is I don’t think it would be a disaster. But here’s another reason why I don’t think it
makes sense. And I’m not in any position to talk about oversight, except that, as I said to
the Chairman, we have seen, I think, remarkable oversight, as you noted, here”
(Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 36). As kind of an interesting side
note, Sensenbrenner interjects to infer a criticism of Ashcroft’s leadership—overlapping
with a category of argument analyzed above. Sensenbrenner says: “The Chair thanks you
for that comment. I think some of your predecessors in your office would not have done
so” (Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 36). Then after admitting the
original adamancy over getting rid of the sunset may have been a bit of an exaggeration,
Comey explains that the level of oversight conducted during the reauthorization stage of
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debate is simply too much of a drain on the resources of the Justice Department. He
explains that the current round of hearings is important but that he hopes this level of
oversight is “rare:”
Well, the one thing I can tell you, though—and it’s hard for me to put this into
words without seeming small in my remarks—but we have devoted huge
resources and time to this, as we should. But we have hundreds—‘‘hundreds’’ is
fair—of people working on what we’ve done over the last six months, and
spending countless hours collecting information, responding, meeting. That’s an
enormous drain. And it should be. But I hope it’s a rare drain, and that we use it to
establish that the base line is sound; that what Congress did in September—after
September 11th was sound, and that what we can do going forward is rolling, and
not in a way that makes everybody and his brother in the Department of Justice
work on the effort. We live in a bit of a myth, and that is that we have limitless
resources. We don’t. And it is a major challenge for us to do this. And we’re
happy to do it, because it ought to be done. I just—to be very frank, and I won’t
be here, it would be really hard to do this three years from now, or another two
years from now, when we can substitute for it something that I think is as
effective, which is rigorous oversight. (Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT
Act, 2005, p. 36)
Lungren immediately raises the obvious question about whether there would even be
rigorous oversight if it weren’t required. He argues further that since it is so important to
reauthorize the Patriot Act, it is worth the time and the energy necessary to provide
rigorous oversight:
Well, it sort of begs the question of whether we would have rigorous
oversight…if we didn’t have this requirement. And you have talked about the
tremendous number of hours that have been put into it, precisely because the
Department thinks it’s important to have this reauthorized. And precisely because
many of us think it’s important to have it reauthorized, we are spending the time
to do that. (Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005,p. 36)
A few pages later in the transcript, Louie Gohmert (R TX) speaks up about the sunsets
and supports the view that they should be continued.
Gohmert begins his defense of the sunsets by first of all, telling Comey that he is
trusted implicitly. However, he does notice some loopholes in certain provisions naming
215 specifically that could be abused in the future. Then, if I am reading his statement
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correctly, he takes a partisan shot at liberals by suggesting the best chances of the Patriot
Act being abused would be if a liberal were to take office and become convinced that a
right-wing conspiracy existed and was out to undermine the Executive Branch. Under
those circumstances, according to Gohmert, the Patriot Act would likely be abused by the
Justice Department. To put this argument into context, we also have to remember a
couple of arguments made earlier by Gohmert that precede this one chronologically; they
are exemplified under the section entitled Cool Down the Rhetoric. In both exemplars,
Gohmert is berating liberals; so, he is basically continuing his rant here. Nonetheless, he
still argues that the sunsets need to continue:
Hypothetically, if you had a President, an Attorney General, or DOJ top officials,
that believed, perhaps hypothetically, there was some right-wing conspiracy out
there to undermine or hurt the Presidency, and that they may be involved in
clandestine intelligence activities, it just seems like the potential is there for using
this in ways that it was not intended by an abusive President or an AG.
You might hypothetically even have a DOJ that’s so callous that they may just
find a friendly judge—and we know some judges are more friendly to one
Administration than another—find a friendly judge that wasn’t supposed to hear a
case, just to go get an order to kidnap a child at gunpoint from people that are
holding them. I mean, those kind of things might actually happen. So I’m
concerned about removing the sunset review. You won’t be there next time. But
just so that there is that kind of attention. You foresee that possibility, if you’re
not there, there is somebody that could abuse their position? (Reauthorization of
the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 40)
The last exemplar to demonstrate here is an interesting dialogue between Delahunt and
Comey occurring at the very end of the hearing. The dialogue is an appropriate way to
end the hearing and an appropriate way to begin to bring this chapter to a close. It
presents a more rational—less asinine way of talking about the sunsets.
Delahunt, after acknowledging an increased level of cooperation on the part of the
Justice Department, claims that to make the Patriot Act permanent would be a mistake
because it is the only way to guarantee cooperation with the Executive branch:
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After, I think, eight or nine hearings by the Crime Subcommittee, I am now
convinced that that would be a mistake, to make it permanent. In fact, I would go
so far as to insist, or at least make an effort to have a sunset attached to the
PATRIOT Act, and maybe to other pieces of legislation that come before this
Committee for its considerations. Because it does really secure the cooperation of
the Executive—in this case, the Department of Justice—to be much more
forthcoming and to be much more cooperative. (Reauthorization of the USA
PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 51)
Following the argument, Delahunt asks for Comey’s response. He replies that he can
understand where Delahunt is coming from but then provides the same answers as above:
1) sunsets make it more difficult to change the culture and 2) the Congress has the ability
to provide rigorous oversight without the Patriot Act:
It’s not an unreasonable thing to say. The reason I would urge that we not do that
is a number of things. I think, as I said earlier, that especially with some of these
tools, if you sunset them again we will never be able to get people to completely
buy that the world has changed, particularly on information sharing. We’re trying
to change a culture, which is like turning a battleship. And if people think, ‘‘Well,
Congress might just take away the tug boats, then why are we all going to work to
turn that battleship?’’ That’s one worry. The second is, I think the tools are in
there. And maybe, you know, I overestimate the ability of oversight to get it done,
but I don’t think so. I mean, I think that, with the power of the purse and the
power of legislation, this Committee and the others have the ability to haul us up
here and demand to know what we’re doing. And if we’re not giving you the
information, to have some consequences for that. I think that’s a far better way to
proceed. (Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 51)
Delahunt disagrees with Comey by reminding him of the serious lack of cooperation on
the part of the Justice Department in the past, and not just in dealing with the Patriot Act,
but with all the other issues—many of which have been mentioned during the course of
this debate. Delahunt claims that the sunsets are the only leverage Congress has had for
oversight:
Let me reclaim my time. Because I really want to let you know that I disagree
with you. Okay? And it’s been the experience, I believe, of this Committee in a
variety of different areas, not just the PATRIOT Act itself, but where the lack of
cooperation has been frustrating, aggravating, and on different occasions has
required rather strong action, not just by the Chair of this particular Committee
but by other Committees, to secure cooperation. And if we don’t have some
409
leverage, we’re not going to get it. That’s been the conclusion that I’ve reached as
a result of my experience here. (Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act,
2005, pp. 51-52)
At this point, Delahunt’s time had run out and he was the last person to have a turn at
asking questions. However, Sensenbrenner gave him 30 additional seconds to finish his
argument. He does so by acknowledging the necessity of culture change in the Justice
Department but points out, by using Comey’s metaphor, that the sunsets are necessary
parts of the culture change—they serve to “keep the tug boats running well:”
In addition to the incentive—and I understand the culture change that you’re
talking about—you know, if the tug boats aren’t there—I think that was your
metaphor—I just want to encourage and incentivize the Department of Justice to
keep the tug boats running well. That’s what I see as the incentive. We’re
watching, and we do have leverage. And as long as those tug boats are steaming,
and steaming well, and not going off course, are charting a course that we can all
embrace and be proud of as Americans with our cherished core values of civil
liberties and privacy, then fine. But we’re going to incentivize. (Reauthorization
of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2005, p. 52)
He makes the appeal to patriotism and that’s essentially the end of the debate.
Sensenbrenner thanks Comey for his testimony; he then salutes him and Gonzales for
changing the “‘I’ve got a secret’ attitude” put forth by their predecessors (this comparison
to Ashcroft was analyzed thoroughly above) and the hearing is adjourned.
Summary
Despite the fact that there are still some remnants of the old Ashcroft patriotism,
evidence suggests that the legislative process has improved since the implementation
stage of debate. The only witness in this debate, James Comey, the Deputy Attorney
General of the United States, continues to extend the new tone put forth by Gonzales.
Furthermore, as recognized by Justice Department critics, Comey answers questions
much more directly and provides more information about the Patriot Act for debate than
Ashcroft does. The sharing of information and compromise over the way in which the
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deliberative process should work, allow for a rational clash of ideas. The participants in
the debate are able to more clearly see the substance of what it is that needs to be
debated—the biggest of which is the symbolism of the Patriot Act and the way in which
it paved the way for the Bush Administration to make non-Patriot Act decisions in the
war on terror without consulting Congress. According to many critics, debate over the
Patriot Act should expand to include oversight of those non Patriot Act policies as well
the Patriot Act provisions because of the way in which they were enacted via the “spirit
of the Patriot Act.”
As discovered in the next chapter, the agreed upon level of increased transparency
and quality of dialogue is for many minority members of the Committee, a chance to
finally begin this important debate over patriotism; whereas for Chairman Sensenbrenner
and perhaps other majority members, the perception of transparency is a sign that it is
time for the debate to end. The symbolism of oversight and the message to the public that
many members of this Committee want to take their functions as checks to the executive
branch of government very seriously by virtue of extending the debate and expanding its





With a new spirit of collaboration that developed in the House Judiciary
Committee’s hearings over the reauthorization of the Patriot Act, the minority party—
encouraged by the sense that real deliberation over the war on terror was finally taking
place, opted to extend the debate beyond the time originally allotted through a clause in
the Rules of the House of Representatives. The rule is in place to ensure that the minority
party has ample opportunity to express itself since for obvious reasons, the majority party
controls the content of much of the debate. As explained in Chapter 3—methodology,
this debate is not officially part of the data set. It will not receive the full, thorough
analysis afforded previous debates. But to not examine it at all would be to miss a critical
part of the context for this study. So, we will take a look at the very beginning and the
very end of this hearing which included the testimony of four minority witnesses: Carlina
Tapia Ruano (first Vice-President, American Immigration Lawyers Association), James
Zogby (President, Arab American Institute), Deborah Pearlstein (Director, U.S. Law and
Security Program), and Chip Pitts (Chair of the Board, Amnesty International USA). It is
noteworthy that this unplanned continuation of the reauthorization hearing is the only full
committee hearing in which minority witnesses are present; though, there is at least one
minority witness at each of the subcommittee hearings.
As is easily noticeable, any sense of cooperation that had developed between the




Chairman Sensenbrenner calls the hearing to order by saying, “This hearing has
been called by the Democratic Members of the Committee pursuant to clause 2(j)(1) of
Rule 10 of the Rules of the House of Representatives. They have chosen the witnesses.
They have also chosen the topic of the hearing, and the Chair now recognizes the
gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Conyers to make his opening statement” (Reauthorization
of the USA PATRIOT Act (continued), 2005, p. 1). That the Democrats have chosen the
topic is a critical component of the way in which Sensenbrenner begins the hearing.
So, Conyers take control of the hearing. He announces that the purpose of the
hearing is not limited to the sunsetted provisions of the Patriot Act but the general
manner in which the government uses its legal authority. This discussion was such a big
part of the 6/8/05 debate and the Democrats very much wish to extend it. According to
Conyers, the scope of the debate is important because our nation’s reputation as “a
beacon of liberty” is at stake:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, this is a special hearing brought by the request of the
Democratic side of the House of Representatives. I thank you for complying with
it. There are few issues more important to this Committee, and I might add, the
Congress, than the war against terror and the PATRIOT Act that accompanied it
from a legislative perspective. This not only affects the rights and privacy of
every American, but it impacts, the extent to which our Nation is able to hold
itself out as a beacon of liberty as we advocate for democracy, both here and
around the world. For many of us, this process of hearings is not merely about the
extension of 16 expiring provisions that sunset in the PATRIOT Act, but it is
about the manner in which our Government uses its legal authority to prosecute
the war against terror, both domestically and abroad. And as we hear from our
witnesses today, I think we will demonstrate that much of this authority has been
abused. (Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act (continued), 2005, p. 1)
Conyers then previews a few of the topics to be raised by the witnesses in the hearing:
Guantanamo Bay, the infamous Inspector General’s report documenting illegal detention
413
of immigrants post 9/11, and a policy of racial profiling embedded as part of the internal
changes to the Justice Department enacted without consent from Congress.
Following Conyers’ opening statement, Sensenbrenner recognizes himself in
response and this is when the recently expressed cooperative tone of deliberation begins
to break down. Sensenbrenner refers back to his very initial opening when he stated that
the Democrats chose the topic for the hearing—the reauthorization of the USA Patriot
Act, and then expresses that he is disturbed they are going outside the topic:
As I said earlier when I called this hearing to order, this hearing was requested by
the Democratic Minority. The Democratic Minority also stated what the scope of
this hearing would be, which would be the reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT
Act. I am disturbed that some of the testimony that has been presented in written
form by the witnesses today are far outside the scope of the hearing which the
Democratic Minority called and which they said in their letter. (Reauthorization
of the USA PATRIOT Act (continued), 2005, p. 2)
Mr. Conyers tries to raise a point of order but Sensenbrenner prevents that from
happening by snapping at him, saying, “I didn’t interrupt you, Mr. Conyers” (p. 2).
Sensenbrenner continues his retort to Conyers by claiming that he has been more than fair
to the minority party during the course of the reauthorization hearings. He talks about
how there have been so many hearings at which minority witnesses have been allowed to
testify and then suggests that he has been happy to expand the scope of the debate to
include non-sunsetting provisions and issues that are “only tangentially related to the
Patriot Act...so that there would be full and complete discussion of this law”
(Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act (continued), 2005, p. 3).
At this point, after defending his own sense of fair-mindedness, Sensenbrenner
goes on the offensive by suggesting that the extent to which the minority members are
now trying to expand the scope of the debate is “irresponsible and totally unfounded
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hyperbole” (Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act (continued), 2005, p. 3) and that
it cheapens the meaningful discussion that has been had about the Patriot Act:
Now, the American people expect and deserve that Members of
Congress will approach terrorism prevention in a thoughtful, factual and
responsible manner. All too often, opponents of the PATRIOT Act have
constructed unfounded and totally unrelated conspiracy theories, erected straw
men that bear no relation to reality, engaged in irresponsible and totally
unfounded hyperbole, or unjustly criticized or impugned the honorable law
enforcement officials entrusted with protecting the security of the American
people. These efforts that which often bear no relation to the reauthorization of
the PATRIOT Act, coarsen public debate and undermine the responsible,
substantive examination which must inform this Committee and Congress’
consideration of this critical issue. (Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act
(continued), 2005, p. 3)
Then, he warns witnesses that any testimony in which he deems to not be topical will not
be included as part of the hearing record pursuant to another rule of the House of
Representatives:
As the Members of this Committee know, I have great respect for the Rules of the
House, and believe they should be enforced fairly and uniformly. In keeping with
the spirit of those rules, it is the Chair’s intention to limit the scope of the hearing
to the topic that was chosen by the Democratic Minority that called this hearing
and chose the witnesses, which is the ‘‘Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT
Act.’’ This should be a serious hearing on a serious subject and not a forum for
assertions or complaints that concern matters unrelated to the PATRIOT Act.
Members and witnesses are advised that questions and testimony not falling
within the subject matter of the hearing chosen by the Democrats will not be
included in the hearing record pursuant to House Rule 11, section (k)(8).
(Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act (continued), 2005, p. 4)
Then, Conyers gets the chance to respond.
He begins by drawing attention to Sensenbrenner’s hostile tone, saying that
discussion does not need to proceed in such a way. He also rejects the notion that the
Democrats have ever agreed to limit the scope of the discussion in the way
Sensenbrenner describes. In fact, to even suggest the scope would be limited misses the
point of why its been called—a point that was developed quite extensively in the hearing
leading up to this point:
415
I want to, again, thank you for complying with the rules. But, I mean, we can do
this in a friendly tone or a hostile tone. I think that tells the story to everybody
about what the real environment is like here. But first of all, we have never had
the meeting that we were going to set. Number two, we have never, we have
never determined what the limits will be on this hearing, because I never talked
with you about it. Number four, it is very important that we understand that in this
Committee and in the other body, we have gone way beyond the 16 sunsetting
provisions as we all know and there are more coming every day. So to suggest to
me and our membership that we are now going to talk about the 16 sunsetting
provisions precisely misses the point of why we have asked for the hearing.
(Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act (continued), 2005, p. 4)
Sensenbrenner answers by saying that he is merely “complying with the rules, which
includes the Rules of the House of Representatives relative to pertinence and relevancy
and the Chair will enforce the rules as they are written” (Reauthorization of the USA
PATRIOT Act (continued), 2005, p. 4).
In Conyers final chance to respond before the first witness is called, he provides a
justification for expanding the scope that we have not heard before—and perhaps it might
have helped the cause of the minority party if we had. He talks about a provision of the
Patriot Act that has not received a great deal of attention during the course of the
deliberative process: section 1001 which authorizes the Inspector General to oversight all
alleged civil rights abuses by the Justice Department, not just ones related to the other
sections of the Patriot Act. Conyers explains how this in and of itself justifies an
expanded scope of the hearing:
Well, I am happy to have yielded for that information. But section 1001 of the
PATRIOT Act gave the Inspector General the responsibility of investigating
“complaints alleging abuses of civil rights and civil liberties by employees and
officials of the Department of Justice.” All of the topics today that are before us
with these four witnesses fall under this category. It does not say only civil
liberties abuses under the PATRIOT Act, but civil liberties in general in their
totality. And all of the witnesses today I claim are experts in this area.
So we didn’t come here to have a special hearing to be told that we are only going
to investigate 16 sunsetting provisions. That is what we have had, nine, 10, 11
hearings about. The question is about the issues of violations or abuses alleged of
civil rights and civil liberties. So we didn’t come here today to be muted by some
well-intentioned recitations of the rules by the Chairman. And, I thank you. And I
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return the time. (Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act (continued), 2005, p.
4)
Conyers adds to the layers of reasons justifying a significant expansion of the scope of
the debate. From the 6/8/05 hearing we heard that in addition to the symbolic reasons of
needing to keep the ethos of the Executive branch in check, that a minimum sections 215
(a sunsetted provision) and 412 directly connected the Patriot Act directly to outside
issues such immigration. Furthermore, the discussion of section 218 and the FISA law
amendment led to a connection between the Patriot Act and virtually the entire criminal
code. Now, by Conyers mentioning section 1001, a direct, legal connection seems to be
recognized between the Patriot Act and all other Justice Department activities.
Sensenbrenner will not relent however and reiterates that the previously
mentioned rule of the House of Representatives “requires that the subject matter of the
hearings requested under this rule be confined to that measure or matter, which was the
subject of the earlier hearing” (p. 4). Thus, according to Sensenbrenner, “in order to be
pertinent and relevant, (the testimony must) be on the subject of the reauthorization of the
USA PATRIOT Act, and that is specifically the 16 sections…which were sunsetted in the
law which was passed 31/2 years ago” (Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act
(continued), 2005, pp. 4-5).
Jerrold Nadler jumps in on the discussion at this point and simply asks what the
harm is in expanding the scope of the debate. He says that we should not be fearful of
finding out the truth:
I would wonder why the Chairman seems so fearful of elucidating any
information beyond what he thinks proper. Are we afraid of learning about this
misconduct by agents of the executive branch that traduce civil liberties? If that
happened, if it happened, we should know about it and we should discuss in this
Committee what actions to take about it. We should not be fearful of knowledge
and we should not be fearful of laying out to the American people such
information, officially laying out to the American people information, the readers
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of much of which the readers of any newspaper in the United States or the world
knows. Much conduct has occurred, I shouldn’t say that. Much conduct
has allegedly occurred which, if true, disgraces this country, spoils its good name
and action should be taken about that if true. And we should learn about it. And I
hope we are not fearful of learning about the truth or falsity of those statements
that we have all read in the general press. Thank you. I yield back.
(Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act (continued), 2005, p. 5)
Sensenbrenner does not respond and begins to swear the witnesses in. While he is doing
so, Sheila Jackson Lee (D TX) attempts to gain recognition on the floor by asking for a
point of order. But Sensenbrenner ignores her and continues to introduce the witnesses.
Once he is done doing so, Jackson Lee again attempts to raise a point of order.
Sensenbrenner responds by simply saying that Ms. Tapia Ruano is already testifying—in
other words—it is too late to raise a point of order.
The Even More Awkward Ending
The witnesses testify, and to no one’s surprise, they do bring up the issues, which
Conyers had previewed earlier—issues which had been so much a part of the 6/10/05
debate. Sensenbrenner, with the exception of a few rather rude declarations to “wrap it
up,” let the testimonies happen. However, after the witnesses had testified, and toward
the end of the questioning period, the hearing ended in a more awkward fashion than it
had begun. Sensenbrenner thanks the witnesses for testifying today but then admonishes
the Democratic members of the Committee for over-extending the scope of the debate.
He offers that as evidence that the Patriot Act is being used as a “buzzword” for anybody
who objects to the Bush Administration’s policies:
Let me say that the purpose for which this hearing was called and the scope of the
hearing was stated in a letter that was submitted to me, signed by the Democratic
Members, which was the reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act. I have sat
here listening very patiently to the testimony and the answers to the questions, and
much of what has been stated is not relevant to the 16 sections of the USA
PATRIOT Act which were sunsetted when the law was enacted in October of
2001. One of the things that people who are opposed to the PATRIOT Act have
been doing is stating that the PATRIOT Act was responsible for a whole host of
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frustrations or objections to Administration policy. This hearing confirmed that
fact, that the PATRIOT Act is being used as a buzzword for people who have
very broad-brush objections. I think that when Congress debates the
reauthorization of the PATRIOT Act, we ought to stick to the subject, and that
subject is the 16 provisions of the PATRIOT Act which we must consider and
decide whether to reauthorize, whether to lapse or whether to amend.
(Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act (continued), 2005, pp. 59-60)
Sensenbrenner goes on to mention some specific issues brought up in the current hearing
and claims they have “nothing to do with” (Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act
(continued), 2005, p. 60) the Patriot Act. He argues that lumping these issues with the
Patriot Act is “irresponsible and indicative of the broadbrush accusations”
(Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act (continued), 2005, p. 60) mentioned earlier.
At this point, Jackson Lee again, tries to gain recognition on the floor by asking,
“Will the gentleman yield” (Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act (continued),
2005, p. 60)? Rather than ignoring her, like he did the last time Jackson Lee tried to gain
recognition, Sensenbrenner said, “No, I will not yield—“ and continues on with his
tirade: “Let me say that I think this hearing very, very clearly shows what the opponents
of the PATRIOT Act are doing. They will talk about practically everything but what’s in
the PATRIOT Act and what this Committee is considering” (Reauthorization of the USA
PATRIOT Act (continued), 2005, p. 60). Sensenbrenner further argues that there was
only one relevant point made throughout the entire hearing and it was Chip Pitts’
testimony pertaining to section 215. Other than that, no other discussion was remotely
relevant to the Patriot Act reauthorization. Then, while both Jackson Lee and Nadler were
trying to gain recognition on the floor, Sensenbrenner adjourns the hearing prematurely
and the official record of the hearing comes to an end.
Fortunately, news reporters in the room kept reporting. According to the
Washington Post, “He (Sensenbrenner) completed his reproof of the witnesses and left
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the Rayburn House Office Building hearing room amid a cacophony of protests from
Democrats seeking to be recognized” (Allen, 2005, June 11, p. A04). C-SPAN 2
continued to televise the event for a few minutes after Sensenbrenner left. In fact, Nadler,
one of the members trying to gain recognition toward the end, kept talking: “The other
thing that I wanted to say—and that I will say at this point, even though the chairman is
not going to listen…” (Allen, 2005, June 11, p. A04) and then all of a sudden, his voice
faded—the microphones had been turned off. “’I noticed that my mike was turned off,’
Nadler said, speaking up, ‘but I can be heard anyway’” (Allen, 2005, June 11, p. A04).
The Aftermath and Reauthorization
The process that seemed to be transforming into a rather cooperative one in which
meaningful rational-critical debate was taking place quickly turned into a polarizing
demonstration of “politics as usual.” The way in which Sensenbrenner shuts down debate
at the end of this reauthorization process ruins any chance that Bush Administration
officials and critics of the Administration may have had to see eye to eye on the nature of
patriotism. Throughout this last stage in the deliberative process, critics begin to show
confidence that the democratic process can and will work according to a spirit of
cooperation and good faith. The breakdown occurs though due to the fact that the
confidence displayed by the critics is that the process is moving in the right direction
(present and future directed) whereas Bush Administration officials and supporters view
the process as having worked (in the past tense). This breakdown causes the public part
of the process to end in a very awkward fashion, leaving very little hope for compromise.
It seems as if the Bush Administration, supported by a majority in both houses of
Congress would once again pass its version of the Patriot Act as is, paying very little
attention to the feedback offered by legislators. However, as the debate moves toward the
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final vote, legislators muster a little influence through the democratic tactic of last
resort—the filibuster. This time though, it was the Senate stalling the process whereas
during authorization of the act, it was the House that had the most influence upon altering
the Administration’s plans—if only temporarily.
Rushing to meet the sunset deadline of December 31, 2005, “the House voted
251-174 to renew the 16 provisions after striking a compromise that altered some of
them” (Senate gives Patriot Act six more months, 2005, December 22). Though the vote
was a little closer in the House to reauthorize than it was to authorize, there was still not
enough momentum to slow down the Justice Department. It looked as if the expiring
provisions would be easily reauthorized and all made to be permanent, i.e. the sunset
would no longer exist. Once reaching the Senate for a vote though, the reauthorization
momentum slowed. Through a filibuster, the deliberative process was extended.
According to a CNN.com article, “Republican leaders tried to break the filibuster…but
could muster only 52 of the necessary 60 votes to do so.” (Senate gives Patriot Act six
more months, 2005, December 22). Four Senate Republicans crossed party lines in
support of the filibuster. Thus, the filibuster successfully staved off the Administration’s
rush to make all of the provisions permanent. But because no one wanted the Patriot Act
to go away entirely, a compromise was offered by Administration critics to extend the
original Patriot Act until February 3, 2006. Not doing so would have meant that the 16
most controversial provisions would have expired on December 31, 2005.
Stalling tactics continued to be successful for the Administration critics given that
in early February, just prior to the expiration of the original extension, a second extension
was passed by both houses of Congress. This time, the 16 provisions of the Patriot Act
were set expire on March 10. This would be the final extension though. On February 17,
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2006, the Senate defeated the final filibuster effort by a vote of 96-3. Then on March 9,
2006, a day before the final extension was set to expire, the Patriot Act reauthorization
was signed into law. The final draft included a number of additional safeguards that
according to Bush Administration officials represent successful compromise. According
to critics, the changes are not enough. Aside from a number of amendments of
clarification and of additional reporting requirements, the new Patriot Act bill placed a
four- year sunset on three provisions of the act: 215—the “library provision,” 206—the
roving wiretap provision, and the “lone wolf provision” (one not a part of the original
Patriot Act but added in 2004 during the drafting of another intelligence bill). Thus,
thanks to the sunset of a modest three provisions, the legislative process is not over.
Debate over the Patriot Act will continue in 2009.
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Summary of the Reauthorization Stage
Throughout the first two full committee hearings in this round of debate, and
presumably the subcommittee hearings happening in between, dialogue displays a robust,
healthy debate over the Patriot Act. Some concessions are made on both sides. Justice
Department officials admit mistakes were made (but not directly related to the Patriot
Act) and critics acknowledge that there is a better flow of information between the Justice
Department and the Judiciary Committee, thus providing more effective oversight.
Furthermore, everyone seems to agree—except for the Justice Department witness that
the sunsetted provisions of the Patriot Act need to remain sunsetted during the
reauthorized version. Almost every Committee member values the sunsets because they
guarantee that future debate will happen over the Patriot Act. Without the sunsets, the
fear is stated by members from both sides of the political aisle that the type of oversight
necessary will not occur. In other words, the sunsets are the key to maintaining a political
form of patriotism and that seems to be a source of agreement for the policymakers.
Debate seemed to be occurring in a democratically ideal fashion—much disagreement
but expressed by and large in a collaborative fashion. Unfortunately, at the end of the
debate, during the extension of the hearing process, a total meltdown occurred. Chairman
Sensenbrenner was hostile from the very beginning of the final hearing. Debate was
polarized once again and the deliberative process was extended by non-debate—a
filibuster that forced negotiations behind closed doors. However, the debate over the
Patriot Act is not over. It will pick up again in 2009.
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Chapter 14:
Summary and Discussion of Results
The primary purpose of this project is to interpret the way in which the meaning
of “patriot” is negotiated during the course of public policy debate governing the Patriot
Act. Given the unique (and awkward) way in which the word is anachronistically
constructed as condensation symbol (Edelman, 1964) through the titling of the act, it is
arguable that every argument found within the transcripts of the debate process
contributes to an understanding of patriotism. Thus, to limit the scope of analysis, I view
the debate from the purview that negotiating who is or who is not a patriot falls under the
argumentative typology of the Aristotelian notion of ethos, as distinct from pathos and
logos. The distinction is not to suggest that ethos could be analyzed in a vacuum without
noticing its interconnectivity to logos and pathos. This sort of artificial operationalization
could not even be meaningful from the confines of an experimental research design. But
by focusing the lens of observation and description upon ethos as argumentative proof, a
unique and important contribution is made in the effort to more fully understand the
Patriot Act. As Chapter 1 notes, most studies of the Patriot Act focus on the law itself—
the soundness of the legal precedent, or lack thereof. The symbolism of “patriot” is but a
secondary or tertiary issue at best during the course of those studies. The present study
however, treats the symbolism as a primary issue—an important task because as analysis
supports, the way in which “patriotism” was negotiated during the legislative process is
the one message that establishes “congruency” and “corroboration” (see Schuetz, 1986)
for the Bush Administration’s post 9/11 political strategy. The way in which the Patriot
Act was originally authorized became known as the “spirit of the Patriot Act,” a phrase
used specifically by John Ashcroft—the progenitor of the act (see Chapter 9, p. 282).
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This spirit set the tone for not just the legislative process governing the Patriot Act itself
but also for the entire “war on terror.”
Part I: Getting Started
Prior to jumping into analysis, some preliminary work was needed. To begin,
some understanding of “patriotism” as the object of analysis was necessary. For a study
in which the goal is to predict and control the outcome, this phase of research might be
considered as the “operationalization of the variables;” for this interpretive study
however, we call this phase understanding the “horizons” (Gadamer, 1960/2003) of
patriotic consciousness. Rather than hypothesizing the anticipated results of the study
prior to commencing the analysis itself, understanding in the hermeneutic sense of the
word means recognizing that understanding occurs differently for different people at
different times and places. Therefore, by describing the “horizons” of patriotism, we
attempt to bracket the boundaries around which understanding takes place—the
discursive space where different understandings can be understood. By turning to
Kramer’s (1997) theory of dimensional accrual/dissociation, this task becomes more
expedient. Building upon Gebser’s (1949/1985) work, Kramer (1997) suggests that
communicative expressions reveal a mode of awareness as those expressions are directed
toward particular objects of consciousness. As Chapter 1 explains, there are essentially
four types of expressivity: “magic/idolic,” “mythic/symbolic,” “perspectival/signalic,”
and a newly emergent integral style (Kramer, 1997, p. xiii). If the theory holds true then it
also holds true that there are four types of patriotic expression. Chapter 1 turns to the
example of flag burning to briefly illustrate what magic-mythic and perspectival
expressions of flag burning might entail. But more importantly in Chapter 1, in depth
studies supporting this theory of patriotic consciousness are cited.
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Most poignantly, Viroli (1995) distinguishes between a religious form of
patriotism and a political one. The religious form embodies a magic-mythic expression
whereby a patriot religiously supports the leadership of the country no matter what. The
two dimensionality of this expression is such that there is no distinction between the
country and leadership—the two are one and the same. Political patriotism, on the other
hand, reveals a three-dimensional awareness whereby a distinction is made between
country and leadership. According to expressions of political patriotism, it is possible for
a person to love her country enough that she is willing to stand against a country’s
leadership when that is what the country needs. This rational-critical perspective of
patriotism emanates from the mythos of democratic thinking handed down to the Western
world from Antiquity. The founding “fathers” of America were ideologically grounded in
the story of the ancient Greek philosophers, and this mentality served as justification for
revolution. Citations of some of the progenitors of America are cited in Chapter 1 as
examples of expressions of political patriotism.
Throughout the debate over the Patriot Act, we find both religious and political
ideals of patriotism expressed by many individuals. In many ways, patriotic
consciousness reinvented itself following the 9/11 catastrophe. While the attacks were
happening, an archaic-magic consciousness seems to have enveloped much of the nation.
As discussed in Chapter 1, at least for myself, the 9/11 attacks were space-less and
timeless events. Even though I was sitting in front of my television watching the attacks
“live,” they did not seem “real”—I could not believe what my eyes were telling me. I
went into shock due to so much fear, and when this happens, the natural response of the
body is to shut down and go numb. The brain stops being responsible and the body
protects one’s self by blocking neurons and preventing pain stimuli from reaching the
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brain. I sat there with my spouse speechless—we had nothing to say; there were no words
to describe what was happening—in my mind, it was not really happening—it couldn’t
be. I was not alone in speechlessness. We managed to pick up the phone and call a few
people to make sure that they were aware of what was going on and to see if we could
verify that someone had heard from one particular friend who was living in New York
City at the time—only blocks away from the World Trade Center. During one of these
short phone calls, the collapse of the first tower occurred and none of the participants in
the phone conversation said a word. We just stared at the television in disbelief. While
my body was awake, my awareness was dormant.
My awareness of 9/11 (or lack thereof), while it was happening, was not an
individualized experience. Virtually everyone whom I have talked to reports a similar
sort of awareness of the day’s events. No one could “wrap brains” around what was
happening—it was just happening. Students, colleagues, and family members report
similar reactions. Examples from popular culture also seem to identify 9/11 as a space-
less and timeless event. Alan Jackson’s song, “Where Were You When the World
Stopped Turning?” earned global acclaim for the success it had in capturing a sense of
the national consciousness, and according to the song, awareness of the world stopped—
unless Jackson meant that the world itself literally stopped turning. The national psyche
was in so much pain that it could not process it; so, it shut down. It needed to heal. It
needed to make sense out of something that was seemingly senseless—the rhetorical
function of myth (Rowland, 1990).
Our whole lives are governed by myth, from birth to death. Myths “narrate not
only the origin of the World, of animals, of plants, and of man, but also all the primordial
events in consequence of which man became what he is today-mortal, sexed, organized in
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a society, obliged to work in order to live, and working in accordance with certain rules”
(Eliade, 1963, p. 11). Everything one knows about how the world has operated in the past
is possible by virtue of the stories that pass knowledge from one generation to the next.
Without myth, civilization would start from scratch each and every time a new person is
born. Myths transcend time; they give us reason to look to the past in order to make
decisions about the present and the future. Whether historically true or not, myths must
be a true story in the sense that they convey “facts of the mind” (Campbell, 1972, pp. 10-
11). If a myth does not convey these so called “facts of the mind,” then the story in
question is more likely a folk-tale or a legend—not a myth (of course some stories
transcend the boundaries).
When 9/11 happened, a basic breakdown of our understanding of national security
took place. Not since the bombing of Pearl Harbor, roughly 60 years prior, had a battle in
a war been fought on American soil. The nation has been insulated from war, breathing a
sense of safety into the homeland. While the country had certainly felt the impacts of war
since then, the impacts were from afar—they originated from Viet Nam, Korea, Iraq, and
other places from around the world. Civilians living in the homeland were never
threatened during those wars. We were living a narrative that spoke of safety and
insulation. Prior to 9/11, it was unimaginable by most that anything like that could have
happened. We trusted the heroes in our safety narrative to make sure that nothing ever
like that could happen—then it did. Our understanding was shattered—our sense of
safety was no longer. Thus, we fell out of our mythic comfort zone and into the depths of
darkness, i.e. the unknown. It was George W. Bush’s job as President of the United States




Bush wasted no time in trying to rebuild the story of safety and security. Chapter
4 examines the rhetoric of Bush in the aftermath of 9/11. On 9/11 proper, he addressed
the nation very briefly to ensure us that the government was being held together and
measures were already being taken to identify the threat. He also assured Americans that
the problem would be rectified and that the culprits would be punished. On September
12th, the story took on a more offensive tone through the use of the word, “war.”
Throughout the course of his rhetorical response to 9/11, he told the story of Americans
in the process of fighting evil—it was an epic battle of good versus evil, lightness versus
darkness, civilized versus the uncivilized, and so forth. On September 20th, he famously
cemented the mythic duality of the story by saying that in the war on terror, “you are
either with us or against.” There is no middle ground, no room for debate, and no
negotiation. The true patriots are easily identifiable; it’s a black and white issue—the
bottom line is either “all or nothing.” The patriots are, aside from the rescue workers at
9/11 and the people who brought down Flight 93, the ones who support Bush’s
strategy—policymakers, soldiers, police officers, the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Justice Department, the FBI and etc.
Bush also spelled out the way in which average Americans could show their true
patriotism and that comes in the form of economic patriotism. Those who support the
country yet do not have a direct role in carrying out Bush’s strategy, e.g. the general
public, can show their patriotism by going back to work, spending money, and “getting
on board” by putting the economy back together. Members of the public should play their
parts through the functional fit of being consumers. Chapter 4 demonstrates just how
explicit Bush is about the separation between his role and the public’s role. From Bush’s
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worldview, the public does not need to be concerned with the Government’s response to
terror—he states specifically that the public fights terror through economic patriotism.
While consumerism is very much the product of rational-perspectival awareness and the
change in consciousness resulting from the industrialization of the economy, it has
become so embedded as a part of the American consciousness through advertising
(Ewen, 1976), that it has a tendency to become detached from its mythic, magic, and
archaic origins; i.e., it becomes a deficient form of rationality. In other words,
consumption occurs for consumption’s sake—it becomes its own myth—the myth of
“progress.” The end product gets confused for the means—the distinction is lost. Martin
Heidegger (1977) refers to this as a process of “enframing” which leads to a “standing
reserve.” He explains enframing as a dangerous phenomenon:
Enframing comes to presence as the danger. But does the danger therewith
announce itself as the danger? No. To be sure, men are at all times and in all
places exceedingly oppressed by dangers and exigencies. But the danger, namely,
Being itself endangering itself in the truth of its coming to presence, remains
veiled and disguised. This disguising is what is most dangerous in the danger. In
keeping with this disguising of the danger through the ordering belonging to
Enframing, it seems time and time again as through technology were a means in
the hands of man. But, in truth, it is the coming to presence of man that is now
being ordered forth to lend a hand to coming to presence of technology (p. 37)
Through economic patriotism, Bush insulates his strategy in the war on terror from public
criticism. Good consumers will not criticize the government because they are too busy
being patriots in their own way—which is very much distinct from the government’s
way. The enframing phenomenon detaches the public’s role in the process of questioning
government, which is exactly what Habermas (1962/1998) describes as the “decline of
the public sphere.” Habermas was cited in Chapter 1 and serves as an important
justification for this study. The very discourse of “patriotism” espoused by the President
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of the United States endorses the decline of the public sphere—the decline of a rational-
critical discourse.
In Chapter 5, we learn that Bush is of course not the only leader who desires little
criticism of the establishment’s war strategy. John Ashcroft, Attorney General at the time
of 9/11, also desired little to no discussion over the Patriot Act—a cornerstone of
homeland defense and an integral part of the war strategy. He accuses critics of rattling
off “phantoms of lost liberty” and of giving aid and comfort to the enemies. He also
argues that now is not the time for talk; it is a “time for leadership.” Furthermore, he over
generalizes criticisms made against the Patriot Act by speaking of a false dichotomy; i.e.
every criticism is an argument for rejecting the entirety of the act, whereas in reality,
most critics involved with the legislative process were for the act—they simply wanted to
make it better through greater accountability of its implementation. Thus all critics are
soft on terror according to Ashcroft. The all-or-nothing dichotomy is an extension of
Bush’s false dichotomy and represents the mythic dualistic element of the war on terror
message. Another interesting, highly significant part of this developing mythos of
patriotism is the fact that the title, “USA PATRIOT Act” was born.
The Administration’s message is heard loud and clear and is very effective from
its perspective. Cited repeatedly throughout the course of this project is the statistic that
the Bush Administration gained a 90% plus approval rating from the public. Remember
that the public’s psyche at this point is healing and the Bush Administration is seen as the
healer. Gebser (1949/1985) describes healing as a magical, unifying process—helping to
explain how Bush gained such a high approval rating;
The healing process is a descent whereby the believer in the one God descends
down to the darkness of the source ruled over by the sheltering mother: a descent
to the unity “below,” where the individual loses his individuality and is united with
everything. When the diurnal or wakeful consciousness is sufficiently depressed so
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that the surroundings are no longer present to the suppliant, and he “sinks” even
deeper where even the psychic reality of dream and image vanish, his individuality
is obliterated in the magic realm (of the grotto or cavern) and he becomes one with
the unity to which all differentiation is unknown. (p. 163)
The unification of the public left very little space for dissent in the public sphere—
including the legislature. While both houses of Congress held one hearing of the
Administration’s draft of the anti-terror legislation, only the House held a markup of the
bill. Only one Senator, Russ Feingold, expressed any desire whatsoever to markup the
bill and this one person’s desire did not come anywhere close to coming to fruition.
Even on the House side of the debate, where a majority of the debate occurred,
the dialogue was not very “robust” to use an adjective that kept recurring throughout
multiple phases of the debate. During the hearing, Representatives obviously felt quite
intimidated by the all-or-nothing dichotomy given that most criticisms were expressed
quite sheepishly. Chapter 5 illustrates that many critics felt as if they had to begin
arguments by defending themselves from the accusation of being unpatriotic. This
negotiation took place in the form of, “I really do want to be tough on terror…but…I
have a problem with x, y, and z.” Another similar types of response was, “I don’t want
this to turn into a debate…but…” This sort of negotiation typifies the way in which
critics posed their criticisms—they were very much concerned about the public image
and the risk of being seen as one who disrupts the healing process by differentiating
between healer and those being healed. Very few critics were what I would call
“outspoken.” Interestingly though, one of those very few who was outspoken, Bob Barr,
was registered as a Republican (though in reality, he is a Libertarian). Despite sharing a
party line, he was without question the most outspoken critic of the Administration on the
day of the hearing and interestingly, he was not re-elected. In fact, his electorate was re-
districted in such a way that it would have been virtually impossible to be re-elected.
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Nonetheless, despite the tenuous nature of the debate, critics did manage to win
the right to a markup of the bill whereas their counterparts in the Senate had no
aspirations. In response to this questioning, the Bush Administration went back to work
on its message. Prior to the markup of the bill as discussed in Chapter 6, the bill in
question was simply known as the “Antiterrorism Bill of 2001,” a referential symbol;
however, leading up to the markup, the title changed becoming a condensation symbol.
The title condensed the message of the establishment’s response to 9/11 into one
dichotomizing symbol: the USA PATRIOT Act.
With very little mention of the change in title, notwithstanding one criticism of
the title by Barney Frank submitted for the record after the fact, the markup commenced.
Chapter 6 demonstrates a high level of satisfaction with the work that had been
accomplished during the hearing in the House Judiciary Committee, so much so that they
passed up the opportunity to amend the bill during markup. There were many
amendments proposed during markup that were withdrawn by those proposing them. The
withdrawal was done in a premeditated sort of way so as not to slow down the process.
The examples of the withdrawal of controversy were demonstrations of good faith that
the amendment would be debated later. Enough had been done to satisfy the critic for the
time being and unity was the theme of the day. They acknowledged a need to get
legislation passed expediently. The only amendments passed were those that were
cosmetic changes—and non-controversial ones at that. There are a very few examples of
controversial amendments that were not withdrawn but these were swept under the rug by
the Chair of the Committee James Sensenbrenner. The all-or-nothing dichotomy was
utilized to do the sweeping, and quick votes were taken to reject those amendments. In
all, there was one example of what I would call “meaningful debate” in which a
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controversial amendment was proposed, debated from all sides of the issue, and voted on.
The vote was close enough that a roll call vote was needed to determine the decision.
Ultimately though, the amendment was voted down.
The theme of the day was unity and healing; additional rational-critical debate
would have to wait for another time. Legislators felt as if they had done enough for the
time being. Even Bob Barr, the most vocal critic from the hearing (Chapter 5), seemed
content that the process struck a proper balance between process expediency and
appropriate questioning. Things seemed to be going as well as possible under the
circumstances of having been attacked so ferociously the month before. People were
cooperating, and democracy was working—until that is, the agreed upon draft of the
Patriot Act went to the full House for a vote. At that time, divisiveness entered the debate
in such a way that would never be recovered from. At the very last moment, the night
before the vote, the Justice Department decided to ignore the debate and essentially go
back to the original drafting of the bill. In the heat of the moment, during the rush to get
the bill passed, no one bothered to read the final draft until it was too late. This generated
much anger; however, that anger would not have the chance to be expressed during the
official legislative process until years later.
Part III: Implementation
Between the time in which the Patriot Act was originally authorized and the first
oversight hearing took place in the House Judiciary Committee—over two years, the
“mood” of the public changed. Chapter 7 details the drastic decline that occurred in
Bush’s approval rating during that timeframe. Issues such as the war in Iraq, as well as
the Patriot Act, drew much criticism from the public. The steady decline in approval
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rating is signalic that the magical period of healing and unity was subsiding and that the
public psyche was once again ready to entertain criticisms of the country’s leadership.
As Chapter 8 illustrates, the first oversight hearing did not move too far along
before frustrations over the end of the authorization stage came pouring out. Jerrold
Nadler, minority leader of the subcommittee in which the hearing was taking place,
summarized the way in which the Justice Department pushed their agenda through
Congress and ignored the will of the House Judiciary Committee. He called it a
“shameful procedure.” During the questioning of witnesses, a new source of tension
emerged—the issue of whether or not the Justice Department was being open enough
with Congress and the American people about how the Patriot Act was being
implemented. Critics argue that officials were not transparent enough to provide a
sufficient means of oversight, claiming that the manipulative methodology of the Bush
Administration was being extended in a similar fashion as when the act was originally
authorized; i.e. that they were following a unilateral, independent paradigm of decision
making—trust the leaders, “we know what is best.” The Justice Department responded by
promising their respect for the process and claiming that there are checks in place (like
the 4th amendment and the sunset on Patriot Act provisions) to prevent abuse. For these
reasons, they deserved to be trusted and granted some leeway when secrecy was
necessary.
Chapter 9 examines a very important debate because the figurehead leader of the
Patriot Act, John Ashcroft, was the only witness. The debate took place in the full
Judiciary Committee and again, critics were in attack mode. Though, I must admit my
surprise when the attack did not begin as vehemently as expected. Conyers began the
criticism by very subtly suggesting that more debate needed to take place. However, by
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the time questions came around, the attack intensified. Critics accused the Department of
a lack of cooperation, not being forthright and of abusing civil liberties. William
Delahunt referred to the culture of the Department as the “culture of concealment.”
Ashcroft responded in a variety of different ways. First of all, he denied that the
Department was being secretive and claimed that they have been consulting with
Congress. But then, he argues that it is better to err on the side of safety, as opposed to
liberty, in the war on terror claiming that leeway is needed. But do not worry, Ashcroft
argues, because the Justice Department is very adamant about protecting civil rights that
no one has anything to worry about. They can be trusted with their enhanced power.
Toward the beginning of this dialogue between critics and Ashcroft, an example
comes up demonstrating the validity and significance of the symbolic meaning of
patriotism being negotiated here. James Sensenbrenner, chair of the Committee, was the
first to ask a question, and he asked what was surprisingly a rather penetrating question.
He questioned the way in which the Levy guidelines were changed without consultation
with Congress. The Levy guidelines are, to review, a set of standards that the Justice
Department must adhere to when decisions are made concerning the surveillance of the
public. They were changed without consultation with Congress. Ashcroft agreed that this
was the case, but that he made that decision based upon the “spirit of the Patriot Act.”
Part of
Ashcroft’s quotation cited in Chapter 9 is worth repeating here:
In terms of the change in the guidelines which govern the internal operation of the
Justice Department, the consultation was not substantial or significant. Perhaps I
came to the conclusion that extending those guidelines in the same spirit as the
PATRIOT Act had been extended was something that would be appropriate and
would meet with the approval of the Congress. But I must say that we did not
have extensive consultations about this exercise of executive responsibility to
define the way in which the executive branch would conduct investigations.
(United States Department of Justice, 2003, p. 11)
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The “Spirit of the Patriot Act” becomes its own separate issue, connected to but distinct
from the law itself. The quotation proves how significant the symbolism of the act is
given the way in which Ashcroft admits that its “spirit” served as the primary factor
leading to the changes in the Levy guidelines. The admission begs the question of, what
other policies were decided upon in the same “spirit?” This is the question that critics
would try to broach in the next round of debate. It is also the question that would lead to
the demise of the semblance of cooperation that began to develop during the course of the
next phase.
Part IV: Reauthorization
The reauthorization stage of debate began with a huge shift in direction. The
magic-mythic message of unity espoused by the Bush Administration, and John Ashcroft
in particular, had lost much of its magic. The “spirit of the Patriot Act” was no longer an
acceptable response to the public—they were demanding accountability. The national
legislature was beginning to pass legislation that would have limited the Justice
Department and all over the country, local communities were rebuking the Patriot Act. In
response the public outcry for rational-critical discussion, Ashcroft responded with more
mythic dualism. His public tour, called “the USA PATRIOT Act Outreach Initiative,”
was more than ever chock full of the earmarks of this dualism: critics are hysterical, the
Patriot Act is all-or-nothing, and etc. Chapter 10 examines several of the speeches given
by Ashcroft during this public tour, and not once does he acknowledge any credence to
any criticism whatsoever lodged by anybody. The issue is black and white: “you’re either
with us or you’re with the terrorists.”
This last mythic appeal is what finally did Ashcroft’s leadership in. His popularity
continued to plummet and so did public support for the Patriot Act. During the
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authorization stage, the public accepted the sort of mythos he (and the entire Bush
Administration) espoused—arguably, they needed it for the purposes of healing.
However, the psyche of the public changed to demand a more rational-perspectival
perspective—one that Ashcroft was unwilling (or perhaps unable) to entertain.
Ultimately, his leadership of the Justice Department became too much of a drain on the
Bush Administration and so, Ashcroft had to go. His replacement, Alberto Gonzales, was
feared to be too similar to Ashcroft to represent a meaningful change. However, after
being confirmed, a different tone did emerge. He acknowledged past mistakes related to
the dissemination of Patriot Act related information, released a great deal more
information than did Ashcroft, and defined patriotism much differently. Rather than
labeling all critics as hysterics and claiming that debate over the Patriot Act is inherently
a bad thing, his leadership claimed to welcome criticism and specifically defined a patriot
as one who would criticize. Chapter 11—the very beginning of the reauthorization stage,
displays this new tone involved with the transition to a more rational-critical discourse.
Critics directly attacked the tone created by Ashcroft; Gonzales acknowledged the
mistakes made, and then true “deliberation” finally began.
After the initial full committee debate, the deliberation broke off into several
subcommittee hearings. These hearings are not a part of the data set, but based upon the
debate analyzed in Chapter 12, it is inferred that deliberation was rather meaningful (at
least compared to the previous two stages of debate), that the new tone of political
patriotism continued, and that better policymaking was taking place. James Comey, the
Assistant Attorney General, continues to define a patriot as one who questions authority
and critics recognize that the deliberative process has improved significantly. In fact, a
direct comparison to Ashcroft is made to prove this point. There are still some serious
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disagreements—but the participants in the debate recognize the other side of the
disagreements as legitimate. There is a spirit of cooperation that seems to exist in this
debate. Ultimately though, one disagreement in particular, the notion that the scope of the
debate was too narrow, could not be resolved and ultimately caused polarization and
divisiveness once again.
Chapter 13 analyzes the beginning and the end of the very last debate over the
Patriot Act in the House Judiciary Committee. The Democrats, building upon the
momentum of cooperation that had been building, exercised their right as the minority
party to extend the debate. However, Sensenbrenner, whether acting on his own or
perhaps in cahoots with the Bush Administration, would have none of it. As far as he was
concerned, there had been enough debate and he used his administrative authority to end
this last debate prematurely. The purpose of the extended debate was to widen the scope
of the debate to examine other acts of the Administration that are perhaps only
tangentially related to the Patriot Act. Despite the arguments that there were both legal
and symbolic connections between the Patriot Act and the other acts to which the
Democrats referred, Sensenbrenner would not hear it. He ended the debate—practically
in the middle of an argument being made by one of the critics, and left the room and the
country in awe. Any momentum that had been built toward developing an ethos of
cooperative rational-critical discourse was destroyed. The room was in awe, and so was
the rest of the country. The debate over the Patriot Act very quickly turned divisive once
again, this time though, it was more of the result of a deficient mental expression of
divisiveness rather than a mythic-dualistic one. It was a breakdown of rationality, as
opposed to the previous level of divisiveness, which was a conflict between mythic and
mental modes of expression.
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At this point, the public debate ended and negotiations carried on behind closed
doors and during House-Senate Committees. As Chapter 13 explains, the divisiveness
continued to intensify—especially in the Senate. In fact, a filibuster occurred in the
Senate that extended the debate past the original December 31st, 2005 deadline. An
agreement was made to keep the then current Patriot Act in tact until the debate could
come to an end. Ultimately, there were two other similar sorts of extensions before the
Senate eventually overrode the final attempt at filibuster. Though critics were not happy
in the end, they did influence the final draft. From among various amendments, mostly
calling for more reporting and accountability by the Justice Department, the most
significant result is the three provisions that were sunsetted for four years—a much
smaller number than the 16 provisions that were originally sunsetted, but still, an





As this project comes to a close, deference must be given to the notion that the
analysis of patriotism in the post 9/11 public sphere is only just beginning. Patriotism as
communicative phenomenon must continue to receive attention from all different vantage
points. It is a mood that links residents of a country together into a common sphere of
discourse. Regardless of various differences in ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic
backgrounds existing across any country, everyone interacts with the idea of patriotism.
Whether the interaction is transparent or latent, every person has a relationship with the
country they live in. Prior to 9/11, my own personal relationship with my country was
very much taken for granted—it was latent. As stated in Chapter 1, I was “shocked into
awareness” (Zaner, 1970) after discovering just how oblivious I was to the importance of
understanding such a relationship. I became confronted with the task of understanding the
phenomenon with more depth. By considering patriotism as argument during the course
of deliberative debate in the House Judiciary Committee, we have analyzed many
different expressions of patriotism and have observed the way in which participants in the
debate negotiate back and forth between the horizons of magic-mythic expressions of
religious patriotism and rational-critical expressions of political patriotism.
Neither form of patriotic expression is ever a pure form of that horizon.
Expressions exist in relation to other expressions as well as expressions of other related
phenomenon. Yet, the post 9/11 world has provided to us, through very unfortunate
circumstances, the opportunity to come as-close-as-is possible to seeing the phenomenon
reinvent itself. We have witnessed the way in which religious patriotism inspires healing
and unity during times of crisis. We have also witnessed the way in which political
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patriotism can produce very meaningful policymaking debate. Both expressions of
patriotism have value and play an important role in the discourse of making our country
work. Sadly though, we have also seen what happens when those expressions of
patriotism exist in their deficient manifestations—the most poignant of which is the effect
of what happens when the rhetorical situation calls for political expressions of patriotism
and a country’s leadership remains steeped in mythological rhetoric. The Bush
Administration’s legacy will be the story of what happens when this is the case.
This project is but a small part of the effort to try and describe the way in which
the debate is unfolding before our eyes. Perhaps through concerted efforts, we may come
to understand patriotism as an integral phenomenon—one that includes rational, mythic,
magic, and archaic origins. But now, as this particular project comes to an end, it is
necessary to briefly summarize the contributions, acknowledge limitations, and look
forward to the future direction this analysis will take.
Contributions
The introduction to this chapter encapsulates the primary importance of this study,
but as Chapter 1 previews, the contributions are broken into smaller parts. The first
contribution is that this study proves to be quite a unique study of the Patriot Act. It
differs from other studies in that the primary focus is the negotiation of what it means to
be a patriot. While a few studies such as Etzioni (2004) and Foerstel (2004) broach the
subject, its importance is as a segue into a legal analysis. As this project demonstrates, an
analysis of the symbolism of the Patriot Act is of equal importance. Thus, this study
begins to fill a gap in the knowledge base pertaining to the Patriot Act. Not only does this
study though contribute a specific knowledge base related to the Patriot Act, but it also
seems to demonstrate an innovative method to study congressional debate more
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generally. This study builds upon prior work to achieve a unique, thorough way to
analyze the legislative process. The input of the hermeneutic methodological tradition
adds an increased level of attention to the specific language of the debate as well as a
philosophy of communication that views subjectivity as real and empirical.
A second contribution then is an increased focus on the legislative process. As
Scheckels (2000) points out, the legislative process is surprisingly not covered very well
in the discipline of communication studies. Chapter 2 provides a plethora of reasons why
this is the case—mainly revolving around the notions that politicians are too interested in
politics to have meaningful debate and that studying transcripts of congressional debate is
too tedious. Chapter 2 also provides though, reasons why the study of congressional
debate is actually very important. Cain (1954; 1955) for instance, argues that while the
political game is important to politicians and that the game does detract from the quality
of arguments made while policymaking, meaningful debate does ultimately occur and
that important decisions are based upon the debate that takes place. Cain also alludes to
another reason why congressional debate is an important subject of scholarship and that
is the way in which it interacts with the public sphere of discourse. Accordingly,
policymaking debate is both a reflection of the will of the public but also an educational
influence upon it. Though this function would seem to diminish given the cynicism
displayed by some of the authors cited in Chapter 2, it seems to be very prevalent given
the results of the study. By continuously referencing context during the course of
analyzing the text, a connection is made between the legislature and public opinion. As
the Bush Administration’s approval rating declined, debate in the House Judiciary
Committee seemed to become more critical. There is a relationship between the House
Debate and public opinion, even if that relationship is rather indirect and vague. The
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thread of patriotism, as demonstrated throughout the course of this project, weaves in and
out of the legislative process and connects it to the broader phenomenon of public sphere
discussion.
The increased focus on the legislative process leads into the third contribution of
this study and that is to facilitate a stronger connection between the legislature and the
public. Habermas (1962/1998), as cited in Chapter 1, argues that a decline in the public
sphere is occurring for a variety reasons. At the heart of those reasons lies the impact of
technology on the public’s rational-critical sensibilities. Because it so easy for citizens to
sit at home and watch Fox News, MSNBC or CNN to catch up with what is going on in
the world, that we as a society are slowly losing our ambition to go seek information on
our own. Furthermore, because of the way in which the media market is shrinking and is
becoming more and more a sensationalized experience, the information coming from
those news sources is becoming less reliable. Even though CSPAN is readily available
for consumption, few people watch it because they can get a quick summary elsewhere
(Herman and Chomsky, 2002). Unfortunately, as participants from all sides of the
legislative debate acknowledge, the media has grossly distorted the debate over the
Patriot Act. This distortion is largely to blame for the success of Ashcroft’s all-or-nothing
dichotomy. It was easy for him to identify uncalled-for paranoia in the public sphere of
discourse because it was there. There were indeed many people who made wild
accusations about the Patriot Act when they knew very little about it. Thus, meaningful
criticisms fell by the wayside because Ashcroft, as well as other Bush Administration
officials, successfully lumped all criticisms into the category of paranoia.
Finally, the fourth contribution of this study is that hopefully, it can become a
small part of what it takes to improve the legislative process. It stands to reason that the
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greater extent to which policymakers’ performances in debate are scrutinized from a
scholarly perspective, that they will be encouraged to prepare even harder than they do
and be even more focused on quality argumentation. While this may be a far-fetched,
idealistic goal, it is not unreasonable; John Conyers substantiates the validity of that goal
during a quotation provided in Chapter 1 and restated here. Conyers is speaking directly
to John Ashcroft at a hearing on June 5, 2003:
It is in that spirit that we come together, Attorney General Ashcroft, hoping that
we can do our job. We are marching into history. This is not only being examined
in great detail right now, but it is going to be examined, as we all know, in far
more detail after it is over. And we want to acquit ourselves as honorably as we
can under these circumstances. (p. 3)
So, the current analysis contributes to the understanding necessary to evaluate and re-
evaluate what happened during the course of this historic debate.
Limitations
Perhaps the biggest limitation, one that is mentioned a great deal throughout the
course of analysis, is the limited data set. To begin, the Senate side of the debate was not
a part of the data—except for a few references as context. But for pragmatic reasons, a
decision had to be made and it seemed that for a variety of reasons described in Chapter
3, limiting analysis to the House Judiciary Committee made the most sense. Nonetheless,
not accounting for the Senate side of the debate is a limitation. I suspect that there would
be similarities to the debate in the House, but I also suspect that there would be some
differences as well. Furthermore, as the end of Chapter 13 alludes to, the debate in the
Senate arguably turned more contentious than in the House given the fact that the
filibuster stalling the final decision over the reauthorization took place in the Senate.
Another limitation regarding the data set is the fact that even after deciding to
limit the analysis to the House Judiciary Committee, some other limitations were
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necessary for pragmatic reasons. The limitations were not necessary until reaching the
reauthorization stage where the amount of debate expanded by a multiple of 6, when
compared to the previous stages. Thus, the decision to only analyze full committee
debates was made, eliminating the nine subcommittee hearings from the data. Though
sound methodological criteria were used to limit the data, any limitation of data is a
limitation of the completeness of the study.
Direction for Future Study
Aside from accounting for the limitations described above and examining the nine
missing subcommittee hearings from the House, and then examining the Senate side of
the debate, there are at least five directions that could and should be taken in future
research. One is, of course, to remember that the debate over the Patriot Act is far from
over. Three provisions of the reauthorized act are set to expire in 2009; so undoubtedly,
there will be at least one more round of debate over them. At that point, a different
Presidential Administration will be in office and so it is likely that the tone of the debate
will be much different.
A second direction to take with this research is to analyze other post 9/11 debates
to see if/how patriotism appears elsewhere. The debate about the Iraq war would be an
obvious data choice. Another obvious and important choice would be an analysis of the
ways in which additional provisions allowed the DOJ under the Patriot Act were used and
misused. Just one example is the FBI’s underreporting of its use of the provisions that
force businesses to turn over customer information (see, for example, “FBI Patriot Act
probes underreported, audit shows” as reported by CNN.com, March 9, 2007).
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A third direction for future study involves conducting a comparative analysis of
this debate over the Patriot Act and other debates in American history that are similar in
context. For instance, it would be fascinating to compare the debate over the Patriot Act
to the debate over the anti-terrorism legislation that was implemented after the Oklahoma
City bombing. During that time, Bill Clinton was in office and I suspect that the tone in
that debate would be much different than the tone of the Patriot Act debate simply
because there was a different Administration and a different Congress in office.
A fourth direction for future study would be an effort to analyze the same data
from different methodological and theoretical vantage points. For instance, continuing
with a textual analytic methodology, Kenneth Burke’s Pentad, could be used to describe
the data from a different angle. For that matter, it would also be interesting to approach
the data from an entirely different methodological perspective. For instance, I
hypothesize, based upon the results of the present study, that “groupthink” occurred
(Irving Janis’s notion). It would be interesting to conduct a content analysis of the
decision making process through the lens of that theory to see if my hypothesis is
supported.
And, finally, a study designed to take up issues related to the process of the
debate and how a bill passes through congress could yield useful information. An
exploration of the ways the rules of debate were used during the Patriot Act
proceedings—a form of structural analysis—could be a useful contribution to the
literature. For example, as described in Chapter 13, when Sensenbrenner abruptly ended
the final debate for re-authorization, the effect on the process was substantial. Also, the
way in which the Democratic Party employed a rarely-used rule to initiate the extra
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